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# INDIA QUARTERLY

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

*XLV No. 1*

*January-March 1989*

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*By J.K. Baral*

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*By Chintamani Mahapatra*

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## STRATEGIES FOR WORLD PEACE: PEACE RESEARCH AND PEACE MOVEMENTS

By VEENA RAVI KUMAR\*

*Peace is not an esoteric word. It has philosophical underpinnings and real world connotations. In a nuclear era with the latest, and manifest, conflicts which may end in total war, peace becomes a deceptively complex word.*

*Peace Research and peace movements become dualities which are necessary strategies for world peace. As a scientific compilation of data and meaning methodology, they are a comparatively new phenomena but in terms of some kind of a movement have always been active. Even if only a protest by a minority it has been an ongoing phenomenon.*

*Peace Research and eventually peace movements become part of a social consciousness that is important to achieve a political end—world peace.*

*This paper spells out the meaning of Peace Research, its development and links with peace movements. Some peace movements in different parts of the world have been brought out merely to substantiate the peace research and its concepts. It is by no means exhaustive. A lot needs to be researched and brought out. But one main idea seems amply clear that the world system needs restructuring to absorb Peace Research and peace movements if only to rationalise it, make it viable for both study and activism. So also a change is needed among the 'realist' thinking if only to achieve positive and developmental peace, i.e. peace combined with social justice.*

### WHAT IS PEACE RESEARCH ?

**W**HAT exactly is Peace Research and how does it work as a strategy to achieve world peace ?

Peace Research is neither a theory nor an approach, nor is its concern solely with international relations. Defining a field as a theory implies that there is a set of interdependent, testable, tested and verified hypotheses that are logically linked to one another. An approach implies that there is some degree of agreement in terms of definition, scope of the activity, methods and/or paradigms. Peace Research, however, is in a unique position. It is not based in, nor did it originate in, a particular academic discipline; there is no agreed methodology, no agreed strategy. These are the elements of what Peace Research is not. Then what is it ?

---

\*Ms. Ravi Kumar is Lecturer Political Science, Lady Sri Ram College, Delhi University, Delhi.



It is an intellectual enterprise devoted to the study of peace and the bringing about of a state of peace in human society.<sup>1</sup>

Even though the concept of peace is fairly simple and Peace Research a means to obtain it, nobody is clear about a universal definition of the term Peace Research short of 'utopia'. Cynics might opine that Peace Research seems to be yet another area for those people who support life's good, albeit lost causes.

Yet Peace Research is alive, vigorously growing, rapidly maturing and producing a good amount of work related to peace which confirms to the framework of political methodology and the larger social sciences. This is evident firstly from an increasing number of scholarly journals; secondly a growing number of university and college departments and research institutes have devoted in whole or in part to peace research; third, a fairly well-defined body of men and women known to each other, by reputation, whose ideas are identified with the ongoing assumptions of peace research; fourth, the institutionalization of the field in terms of a series of annual conferences where these people and ideas meet; and finally, there is evidence to suggest that Peace Research is increasingly identified, by people from outside its own field, as being useful and worthy of financial support; for example, the University of Bradford set up a Chair of Peace Studies with the aid of outside finance while in the 1960s the Stockholm Institute of Peace Research (SIPRI) was endowed by the Swedish Government.

These above points suggest Peace Research as an intellectual movement open to ideas and interpretations, and though it might be in a particularly unique position, it has a symbiotic relationship with International Relations. Developments in Peace Research are capable of enlightening discussions of theory, methodology, value free social science research and its relevance.

Wars have different hues. Perpetual peace has become a dream. The classical concepts of national defence and of a system in which, by increasing the resources devoted to the defence of a nation in the hope of increasing its security have collapsed. The concept of defence has passed into deterrence which is a totally different and less manageable system. In a 'real' sense peace has become the only national defence that makes any sense. One instrument or methodology that makes it possible is Peace Research. After all, the problem of stable peace belongs to the empirical world and therefore, it can be researched.

The first requirement of Peace Research is the identification of the system of which peace is a major proposition. Peace is a proposition of conflict systems and it is a homeostatic or cybernetic proposition which enables the system in the course of its dynamic path to remain in some stated boundary. In terms of a world social contract it is a minimum



bargain between the contending parties which will sufficiently effect a system change to relieve it from the intolerable burden it now bears and to break boundaries for actual systemic change.<sup>2</sup>

Peace Research in its search for facts and causalities and validity of its propositions should cover:

- 1 The stage of tacit contract. In systems which have an inherent instability such as duopoly in the relation of firms, or a bipolar system of mutual deterrence in the relation of states, it is often possible to maintain a quasi-stable position for a long time through tacit contract, i.e., through mutually consistent unilateral behaviour on the part of each party, e.g., mutual suspension of nuclear tests by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Mutuality of conduct might be classified as tacit agreement and form a part of Peace Research.
- 2 Threat system needs to be researched thoroughly as it forms an intrinsic part of conflict and therefore an intrinsic part of Peace research too, the kinds of threats offered and rebuffed by states verging on brinksmanship in world systems. The main idea to tackle this in peace research would be how to face it and then get rid of it.
- 3 Arms control is a vast and important field that needs to be ordered in the area of peace research. Arms control has become a more realistic goal than unilateral disarmament, for, if nation-states were to keep only a specified number of nuclear or conventional weapons devastation would not be so complete and presumably threats would then be able to put off an escalation conflict.
- 4 Universal disarmament may reduce conflict. It needs a more idealistic concept of what peace would mean in the world system but eventually it would mean a realistic assessment by individual nation-states to give up their armaments for world peace. This is an utopian ideal which needs to be studied in greater detail but can work out as a goal of Peace Research.
- 5 True world government is definitely an area for Peace Research. It is meant to give a global ideality to nation-states and different orientations of power. It is meant to transform the present system to achieve peace and order. It is a system of affirmation of these political goals. The World Order Model Project (WOMP) works towards the goal of world government setting its values and ideals in order. There are various other problems, ecological, geopolitical and political but it concentrates on peace to develop an image of an orderly world system.



## DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE RESEARCH

The current state of Peace Research can only be understood if one is aware of its origins. Peace Research implies an intellectual activity, the aim of which is to achieve 'peace', utilizing Social Science methods. The main goal is to achieve a just, fair and equitable peace. There is an assumption that peace is a natural condition and that inversely, war is not. Therefore, war is a necessary evil and it is actually rational for man to seek peace. This assumption is important for peace researchers because the premise is simple. If enough of the right sort of information can be generated and presented properly to suggest that war leads to undesirable outcomes, it seems only reasonable that a man or group of men, acting rationally will seek to avoid war and destructive conflicts. Second, there is a theistic view associated with *Quakerism*, that wars and conflicts are harmful to man and must be avoided. A third and related point is pacifism, i.e., peace should be a cardinal virtue, prime motive force in man's behaviour. These are the three underlying strata explaining the atmosphere, intellectual and philosophical, in which peace research might grow. Peace research in actuality has grown because of both the efforts of men and the impact of events. With World War I began the genesis of wanting peace because of the carnage that resulted from it. Two men active in the period between wars—Lewis Fry Richardson and Quincy Wright contributed in a large way to Peace Research. The former, a meteorologist by profession studied war as his part-time interest and sought to examine the dynamics of war, arms race in particular to find out the stages and patterns, but mainly to control it.

Quincy Wright in Chicago was working on a project to study war—*A Study of War*—published in 1942. Again Wright wanted to study war to control it. Therefore, he catalogued and classified it, counted deaths, identified issues and so on. Both these works inspired teachers and students to further their work. Which brings us to an important aspect of Peace Research and that is, a study of peace becomes synonymous with the study of war. So those of the latter school and also termed the 'realist' in world politics who are sceptical of the jargonistic 'soft' Peace Research are in themselves trying to study the very same issues. The important difference is the actual motivation and end that the two are being studied with,

By the time of the Second World War, some seeds had been sown and some fertilisation was taking place. In terms of what was to influence peace research, a major factor was the harnessing of atomic power as a weapon of war. There happened to be normal and political unprecedented tensions involved around the issue of the bomb, a weapon which scientifically was fantastic and yet could wreak frustration and death.



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## NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT DIPLOMACY

By J.K. BARAL\*

*One of the main goals of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) has, since long, been the democratisation of international order. It is highly critical of the undemocratic nature of important international organisations like the United Nations, the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund); and for the last several years has been fighting the inequality and oligarchism built into these vital organisations affecting, obviously, the life, development and security of many countries. But this campaign of the NAM would be lacking to a great extent in credibility and strength if the organization itself suffers from the same flaws and deficiencies. Unless the NAM is democratic in its structure and functioning, it has little moral right to point its finger at the absence of democracy in other international bodies. No member of the NAM has got "veto" power or "weightage voting", the characteristic features of Great Power dominance in the Security Council and the World Bank respectively. But this is not enough to conclusively suggest that the NAM is a democratic body. To have a better idea about this, one has to examine its decision-making processes: whether all members have an equal voice in the formulation of its policies and programmes. For this purpose we need to look into the dynamics of the diplomacy of non-aligned summits. What are the various inputs of the decisions taken by these summits? Do some countries wield more power than others?*

*Apart from the big-small differential, the examination of non-aligned summit diplomacy may reveal some other important variables like the Cold War/ideological cleavage, communalism, regionalism, etc. The more powerful these divisive forces are, the weaker is the NAM. One of the wellknown features of decision-making at non-aligned meetings is "consensus." Its members seem to be demanding a lot of credit for practising "consensus" which, they claim, is not only highly democratic but also unifying in nature. A critical look at this phenomenon would be in order. It would also be important to find out if external forces try to influence the non-aligned policies. What are the various strategies employed by the Great Powers of rival Cold War sides to influence the deliberation and decisions of non-aligned summits? These are some of the issues which have been dealt with here.*

---

\*Dr. Baral is Professor of Political Science, Berhampur University, Berhampur, Orissa,



**D**IPLMACY forms an important part of non-alignment which seeks to settle international disputes through negotiation. This, however, is not to suggest that the NAM wants or has the monopoly in these negotiations. On the other hand, NAM has been extending strong support to the United Nations as a mediator of international conflicts. Further, it favours regional organisations like the Organisation of African Unity and the Organisation of American States as agents for the resolution/management of concerned regional conflicts. Thus there is intimate relationship between non-alignment and diplomacy. To be more specific, the latter forms a core element of the former.

Non-alignment came into being through diplomacy. The idea of non-alignment took a definite shape at the Brioni Meeting of Nehru, Tito and Nasser, 'the Big Three' of the NAM in its initial phase. Their common concern over the dangers of the Cold War and their common desire to defend small nations from the aggression/intervention of great powers prompted them to sit together and formulate an effective device to halt these dangers. This finally led to the formal establishment of the NAM in 1961 *via* the Belgrade Summit.

The First Non-aligned Summit was held at Belgrade in September 1961 and the latest (8th) met at Islamabad in September 1989. Except the interval of six years (from 1964 to 1970), non-aligned countries have generally been meeting so far with an interval of three years. Another exception to this practice was the postponement of the summit scheduled to be held at Baghdad in 1982 because of the Iraq-Iran War; however, it was hosted by New Delhi the next year despite a short notice. In addition to the summits generally attended by Heads of States/Governments, two other forums for non-aligned meetings are the Foreign Ministers Conference and the Non-aligned Bureau. Apart from the UN headquarters in New York where the Bureau, attended by UN representatives of its members, meets once each month, the Bureau also meets in other member-countries. Further, non-aligned countries hold extraordinary meetings at the ministerial level if and when serious situations develop warranting such meetings. It is now a general practice that each summit is immediately preceded by a Foreign Ministers meeting which thrashes out many issues. The most ticklish ones which they fail to settle are left to the summit. In some respects the Foreign Ministers Conference is a mini-summit. Some diplomatic dynamics are common to both. However, in respect of the seriousness of functions performed and attention paid to, the non-aligned summits are much more complex, complete and important than the Foreign Ministers Conference and the Bureau Meetings. The present study is mostly confined to the examination and analysis of non-aligned summits with the hope that this would



enable us to unravel the diplomatic dynamics and under-currents of non-alignment.

#### DETERMINANTS OF SUMMIT DIPLOMACY

##### *Domestic Linkages*

Non-aligned summits, to some extent, reflect the domestic political dynamic of member-countries. The shifts and changes in the internal politics of a member-country generally influences its role and policy at a summit meeting of the non-aligned countries. If, for example, there is a change of government in a country resulting in a sharp drift in its policy either to the left or to the right, depending upon the ideological orientations of the new government, the drift accordingly would stimulate a tilt in its stance at the summit. Further, the factional conflict and power tussle within the ruling regime of a country would have significant bearing on its role-performance in a non-aligned conference. At the time of the Havana Summit of 1979 there was a Caretaker Government in New Delhi headed by Charan Singh who chose not to attend the Summit and sent his Foreign Minister S.N. Mishra as the head of the Indian delegation. Mishra, an unknown name to most of the delegates present at Havana, proved, not surprisingly, to be a failure there. The discomfiture and difficulties of Mishra were aggravated by the known insecurity and weakness of Charan Singh's lame-duck government. It is a different question that the Indian delegation could make some contribution at Havana inspite of Mishra. That could be possible due to the wellknown talent and capacity of Indian bureaucrats in the field of negotiation and compromise-making in conferences, and the status of India as a pre-eminent member of the non-aligned group irrespective of the party and men in power in New Delhi.<sup>1</sup> In this connection we may also mention the last minute change in the composition of the Pakistani Delegation to the Harare Summit. It had been first decided that Mohammed Khan Junejo, the Prime Minister, would represent Pakistan at Harare. However, at the eleventh hour, President Zia chose to go to Harare and leave Junejo back at home. It may be relevant to remember that a few months earlier Junejo had visited the United States and seemed to have very much impressed the American Government and people. Junejo tried to project himself as the one who was sincerely trying to establish democracy in Pakistan. This apparently offended Zia who might have thought that his legitimacy as the ruler of Pakistan, greatly derived from American approval and support, was under challenge, and that Junejo was trying to pull the carpet from under his feet. Through his last-minute decision to replace Junejo as the head of the Pakistani Delegation



tion to Harare, Zia seemingly hoped to give an impression to others that he was still the effective head of the state and in command of things. Both these examples suggest that the role of a member-state at a non-aligned summit is influenced by the political cross-currents on its domestic front.

### *Cold War Alignment*

One of the main aims of the NAM was to contain and isolate the Cold War and keep the Third World insulated against its contamination. But, to a significant extent, it has failed in this regard. Great Power politics has managed to sneak into it through one door or the other. Many members of the NAM are, with varying degrees of intensity, aligned with one bloc or the other. While discussing any problem either in a non-aligned meeting or in some other international forum, they tend to be partisans rather than detached and impartial observers of the scene. This has greatly impaired the quality of non-aligned diplomacy and, obviously, its result. As a consequence the credibility of the NAM as an agent of conflict resolution has suffered.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from the Cold War cleavage, other differences existing among member-states restrain smooth functioning of the non-aligned group. The contradictions between monarchies and republics, dictatorships and democracies, secularists and communalists, Shiites and Sunnis, and relatively developed and backward countries have proved to be explosive. Beliefs in different values, cultural diversities and the intra-group developmental gap motivate member-states to have different goals and strategies which many times collide with one another. These differential backgrounds and objectives make them perceive the same thing in more than one way, and move in several directions.<sup>3</sup> Added to these divisive factors, the ego-clash of important leaders of the organisation has often hindered the forging of unity of purpose and action in non-aligned meetings. President Sukarno of Indonesia maintained aggressive postures in the Non-aligned Summits of 1961 and 1964 with a view to boosting his image in the Third World and projecting himself as a world leader. At Belgrade he seemed bent upon eclipsing Nehru who was then generally acclaimed as the unchallenged leader of the Third World.<sup>4</sup> Another example of the ego-conflict of non-aligned leaders was the duel between Castro and Gaddafi at the Algiers Summit of 1973.<sup>5</sup> Nehru, Sukarno and Nasser had already left the scene, and Tito was too old to lead the movement. This was the right time for other leaders to try to emerge as the dominant figures of the movement. Against this background Gaddafi chose to cross swords with Castro who was already a senior leader of the group.



*Intrusion by Great Powers*

The US, Soviet Union and China resort to some direct and indirect, as well as open and secret means, for influencing the deliberation and decisions of non-aligned conferences in their favour. This is particularly true of the 'Big Two', engaged in a constant, intense struggle to win over uncommitted countries of the Third World. They normally establish contact with their client/'allied' nations belonging to the NAM on the eve of the meeting and develop some strategies to be followed by the latter in the meeting. Further, they also issue some statements a few days before the meeting welcoming it, praising some of the achievements of the NAM, and expressing the hope that the decisions taken at the meeting would reflect the points of view which each one of them favours in its own interest. For example, the Russian statement would contain the hope that the NAM would continue to fight the "forces of imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism" while the American statement would express the expectation that the NAM would fight "dictatorships" and "hegemonism." Similarly Beijing would urge the NAM to steer clear of both Super Powers and carry on the struggle against their "duopoly" or "condominium." There is no direct evidence to the effect that Russia had tutored Cuba and other "allies" before the 1979 Summit, or Singapore and other clients had been heavily coached and motivated by the United States before the 1983 Summit. But the way these two groups of members campaigned in favour of their respective patrons in a well-orchestrated and determined manner in these two summits respectively, strongly suggests that the hands of their patrons were very much there behind their moves.

On the eve of the New Delhi Summit, the western media started predicting that the new Chairperson of the Movement—Mrs Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India—would bring back the movement to its original path. By praising India's moderation, they sought to create a rift between India and Cuba, the outgoing Chairman. President Castro of Cuba was severely criticised for "having tried to radicalise the organisation and take it closer to the Socialist bloc." It is a different question that India did not fall a victim to the western ploy. On the contrary, Mrs Gandhi, the new Chairperson, showered a lot of praise on her predecessor for his brave and dynamic leadership.<sup>6</sup> But it needs to be emphasized that both before the New Delhi Summit started and during its meeting, the Western Powers tried to win over India by praising it and by denouncing Cuba.

Another tactic, usually employed by Western Powers, consists of spreading misinformation about the NAM before its summit. Western news agencies, probably inspired by their governments, publish stories



relating to "sharp divisions and conflicts" in the movement and predict that the concerned summit would face the danger of collapse on controversial issues (*i.e.*, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Indian Ocean and the Gulf War). From Harare itself *Reuters* kept despatching several reports of this nature, though hardly anything of the sort happened. By deliberately ballooning such misleading reports, these powers want to create mutual suspicion, bitterness and uncertainty among the delegates, direct summit deliberations on wrong tracks and thereby weaken the movement.

During the Harare Summit the US employed another tactic to influence the attitudes and actions of non-aligned countries who had gathered there. It announced that it had cut off aid to Zimbabwe for its "lack of diplomatic civility." Jimmy Carter, an ex-President of the US, left a meeting at Harare sometime back in protest when a Zimbabwean Minister strongly attacked the US for having failed to impose economic sanctions against South Africa although it had applied similar sanctions against a few other countries like Poland and Libya.<sup>7</sup> This announcement of aid-cut to Zimbabwe was intended by Washington to forewarn NAM members that they would face similar consequences should they dare go against American interests at the Harare Summit. The latter, in general, took strong exception to this coercive tactic employed by the US to bend them. The American threat does not seem to have had much effect upon NAM leaders who, as before, did not fear to criticise it on several counts. Four days from the closure of the summit, the *Wall Street Journal* reported from Harare that the Summit Meeting had already set the stage for "Yankee-bashing." It noted that the delegates had already made 54 attacks on the US at preparatory sessions in contrast to 30 during the New Delhi Summit.<sup>8</sup> By publicising these figures on "Yankee-bashing" when the summit was half through, this mouth-piece of the American business world perhaps wanted to warn the non-aligned countries against further indulging in "anti-America outbursts", while "closing their eyes to Russian misdeeds."

### *Lobbying by External Forces*

A look at the proceedings of non-aligned summits amply demonstrate the efforts of external powers to influence the decisions taken at these meets. It is evident that since long, especially since the Colombo Summit, each super power has been lobbying hard through its known supporters to make its points of view prevail in non-aligned gatherings. At the Colombo Summit the United States lobbied hard through its supporters at least to limit, if not totally stop, the damage done to it by the summiteers. The extent of American lobbying was evidenced by the



fact that as many as 22 and 24 reservations were entered by pro-US countries on the anti-US summit formulations on Puerto Rico and South Korea respectively.<sup>9</sup> There was little doubt left in anybody's mind that while the Soviet Union tried to hijack the NAM at Havana in 1979, the aggressiveness and stridency of American lobbying became very visible at the New Delhi Summit. But what was still more important is the fact that lobbying by some other external powers in such meets has been quite effective, if not equally visible and publicised. For example, at the Cairo Summit of 1964, some pro-China members led by Indonesia almost blindly supported China and vigorously worked to safeguard its interests. On each issue involving China's interest, eight to nine countries—most of them African—extended strong support to China while India, one of the most important members of the movement, was not assured of the automatic support of even a single member-country.<sup>10</sup> That was the time when China was trying to enter Africa in a big way, and some sort of an axis was being built among China, Indonesia and Pakistan. With the support of what he called "new emerging forces" of Asia and Africa, Sukarno, the Indonesian President, was able to push forth at the Cairo Summit the ideological position of China that peaceful coexistence was not possible as long as the forces of "imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism" were not completely eliminated from the world.<sup>11</sup> In a way, the Cairo Summit undid the Belgrade Summit. The question of colonialism which had been placed much lower down in the Belgrade Communiqué was accorded the first place in the Cairo Communiqué. At Cairo, the China lobby succeeded in reversing the equation between the two questions of peace and colonialism.

At the Lusaka Summit of 1970, France was able to save face to some extent by successful lobbying through its "clients" in Africa which were its colonies in the past, but which continue to maintain some special association with the mother country after their independence. The Lusaka Summit, in pursuance of its previous resolutions, sought to condemn those countries which helped the racist regime of Pretoria. One of the countries which invited the censure by the non-aligned group was Britain for its intention to sell arms to South Africa. But it was a surprise that France, which had been selling arms to South Africa for a number of years, was not criticised at all by the summit. This was due to the fact that a group of pro-France Africa countries strongly opposed the move of the summit to censure France. The *New York Times* remarked: "This represented successful lobbying by France's 'independent' African colonies."<sup>12</sup>



### *Regionalism*

Regionalism seems to affect non-aligned diplomacy in three ways. First, there have come into being informal regional groups inside the movement which are tending to view issues more from their regional point of view than from that of global peace and development which the movement seeks to promote. Irrespective of the merits of a case, the countries of some regions have developed the tendency to take united stands. In this regard we may mention the behaviour of Arab countries at the Harare Summit; they vehemently demanded the expulsion of Egypt from the Movement on the ground that the latter went against the established non-aligned position by signing the Camp David Agreement. At the other end, an equally determined group of African countries stoutly oppose this Arab move. For the last several years, the members of the ASEAN have, more or less, been taking an identical position on several questions dear to them, *i.e.*, Kampuchea and East Timor. Secondly, the NAM seems to have developed a convention, not healthy though, that on any regional issue the consensus of the members from that region is to be treated as the consensus of the summit. One of the limitations of this approach is that the members of the region concerned, being directly or indirectly involved in the issue, may not be free from biases. Thus their "consensus" on the issue is likely to be plagued by imbalance, as it is not enriched by the views of others who, being distant observers, are expected to look at it with some degree of detachment and impartiality. Thirdly, another tendency has developed in the NAM: there is trade-off between different regional groups during summit meetings. Theoretically speaking, the African members would support the Latin American members on the issue of El Salvador if the latter back the former on the issue of South Africa. This "give and take diplomacy" is likely to weaken the quality of decisions taken in non-aligned conferences. In referring to the diplomacy of "regionalisation" that was at work at the New Delhi Summit, one Indian scholar has pointed out:

... All that the Political and Economic Committees appear to have done was to put together those regional consensuses and make it appear as the consensus of the whole movement. In the process of formulating these regional consensuses, no doubt, each group sought to give-and-take with the other groups. In other words, problems and situations were viewed not from a universalistic point of view but from the perspective of group solidarity and acceptability of a regional consensus to other regional groups.<sup>13</sup>



*Bilateral Disputes*

Some countries are using non-aligned meetings as the forum for hitting at member-countries with whom they have strained relations and/or subjecting the latter to embarrassment and discomfiture. It is doubtful if they gain anything substantive by this. But it seems that this practice, seen in most non-aligned conferences, has done a great deal of damage to the common interests of the Non-aligned Movement. Hurling abuses at each other has made the group look ridiculous in the eyes of those who are out to criticise the NAM even on flimsy grounds. Further, mutual recrimination and throat-cutting has often threatened to paralyse the group and create big obstacles for its smooth functioning. Bilateral conflicts which should be better tackled at the bilateral level are repeatedly taken to non-aligned forums not with the intention of getting a solution there but to score a point over the adversary. Since its entry into the non-aligned club, Pakistan, almost as a habit, has been raising the Kashmir issue at summit meetings with a view to offending India, though it is clear to all, including Pakistan itself, that the latter cannot gain anything more by raising this issue in international forums like the United Nations and Non-aligned Conferences than it has already in 1948 by occupying a part of Kashmir by sudden military invasion. With a similar motive Pakistan is regularly floating for the last few years the proposal of declaring South Asia a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in international forums. On several occasions India has opposed this proposal and it is unlikely to change its stand in the future. Even though Pakistan knows that no non-aligned summit can adopt this proposal over India's head, it has raised this issue as a ritual in non-aligned conferences. But at the New Delhi and Havana Summits, Iran severely criticised Iraq, the "aggressor" who, it demands, should be condemned by the non-aligned group. At Harare, it did not hesitate to belittle the NAM for its failure to condemn Iraq's invasion of Iran in September 1980. But then, Iraq, Iran's adversary, though on the defensive on the question of the Gulf War, did not set a good example at Harare; supported by eight other friendly countries it vehemently opposed the candidature of North Korea as the host of the next Foreign Ministers' Meeting simply because it does not like North Korea. North Korea failed to be selected as the host even though its candidature was supported by a large group of 33 members. The group of 9 threatened to quit the Movement if their plea was not heeded. A big majority failed to carry the day. It is a different matter that besides the opposition of these nine countries, some other countries for different reasons (to be discussed later) also opposed the candidature of North Korea. But the point to note is that the member-states, in general, are inclined to sub-



ordinate the common interests of the movement to their narrow interests.

#### PATTERNS OF DECISION-MAKING

Member states seem to be anxious to reach compromise agreements in non-aligned summits. In their keen desire to show to the world that they are united and that there is no danger to the existence of the group, they try their best to hammer out a compromise at the last moment even on contentious issues. It is not unusual then, that these compromises turn into verbiages and platitudes with little hope of achieving anything concrete. May be, the architects of these compromises, skilled, shrewd and manipulative though, know the ultimate fate of these compromise resolutions. But they perhaps think that compromises are better than the alternative—the prospect of NAM members, ranged on rival sides, taking their diplomatic fight too far and dragging the organization towards peril and destruction.

On several occasions non-aligned countries have chosen to avoid taking decisions on highly contentious and inflammable issues in the fear that a decision favouring the point of view of one side would seriously antagonise the other and jeopardise other important objectives of the Movement. For example, at the Havana Summit of 1979 the Arab members wanted not only to condemn Egypt but also to expel it from the movement for its mistake of having signed the Camp David Agreement. They considered Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt, as the 'betrayers' who had 'betrayed' not only his 'Arab brothers' but also the NAM which had always supported the cause of Palestine. They charged him with having let down the people of Palestine. Insofar as the mistake of Cairo on this issue was concerned, there was little disagreement among the members of the NAM. But many of them, especially some senior and respected members who, along with Nasser's Egypt, had founded it in 1961, did not like the prospect of Egypt's expulsion from the NAM. They feared that it would create a bad precedent and bitterly split the Movement. They also seemingly apprehended that the Arab countries, by flexing their petro-dollar muscles, would be encouraged to threaten other members if the latter did not go with them on some issue dear to their hearts. These considerations prompted elderly members like Yugoslavia, India and Tanzania to strongly oppose the Arab move to expel Egypt. After much wrangling, a compromise was reached with the result that Egypt was condemned, but the question of its *suspension* (not expulsion) was postponed; it was left to be discussed by the Coordinating Bureau, acting as an *ad hoc* Committee which would report its decision to the Foreign Ministers' Meeting scheduled to be held at New



Delhi in 1981. In course of time, the attitudes of Arab countries towards Egypt changed leading to improvement of relations between them. No surprise, the issue of Egypt's suspension from the NAM was allowed to die silently as the Arab countries who had raised a storm at Havana over this chose not to press it at the New Delhi Foreign Ministers' Meeting of 1982.

### *Consensus*

Consensus has been a regular feature of decision-making in non-aligned conferences. Consensus, however, does not mean unanimity. It means "optimum general agreement" or the "predominant majority." As NAM is a voluntary association, whose birth was the result of a voluntary desire of some states to come together with broad common objectives, its policy is not to impose anything on any member. To facilitate consensus, a "multi-tier" system of decision-making has been provided.<sup>14</sup> Before the summit meets, issues are discussed in several forums at different levels by officials, ambassadors and ministers. These pre-summit discussions at several tiers help in examining issues from different angles and often lead to consensus. If consensus does not emerge from the pre-summit discussions, the summiteers try hard for it. In spite of their best efforts, consensus on a contentious issue may elude the summiteers. In such cases the dissenters are allowed to enter their "reservations", but not their "objections", because the second course would militate against consensus—the essence of non-aligned diplomacy.<sup>15</sup>

In the earlier days of the NAM it was not difficult to reach a consensus on different issues. But with the multiplied heterogeneity injected into it, due to the steady growth in its size over the years, it has become increasingly difficult to effect consensus among its members on important issues, especially on those prickly problems having direct or indirect links with the Cold War. Even some local issues with no strong links with the great power politics are generating a lot of heat, rancour and division in non-aligned meetings. The best example of such an issue is the Iraq-Iran War. In such cases it has been extremely difficult to marry the contending viewpoints and establish consensus. However, when unanimity is not possible (it is often possible), efforts are made to adjust different stands with due respect accorded to the sensitivity of the members. It is believed that consensus-making which makes for utmost flexibility is the best strategy for arriving at not only the best decision possible, but also for ensuring the unity and strength of the Movement in spite of its vast diversity. Further, by providing for consultation with all the interested members and not giving special weightage to the views



of any member it helps in maintaining a democratic atmosphere. This, in turn, seems to contribute to the nurturing of democratic culture in international politics—a goal for which the NAM has been striving since long. Consensus building which involves respecting the views of all but which fights shy of taking votes on any issue is a healthy marriage between its two ideals—democracy and voluntary functioning. According to a Yugoslavian scholar, at non-aligned meetings “consensus stands for optimum general agreement on a certain question in point, achieved by the adjustment of stands, but without recourse to formal voting otherwise used to determine the actual numerical ratio of majority and minority.”<sup>16</sup>

As said above, with the passage of time, consensus-making has been increasingly difficult in non-aligned meetings. It is creating problems for summits. At Harare, the closing ceremony was postponed by 14 hours because at the committee stage the participants could not reach a consensus regarding the venue of the next Foreign Ministers Meeting. 33 members could not prevail upon a small group of 9 members led by Iraq which opposed the candidature of North Korea which is allegedly selling arms to Iran. A few other countries opposed North Korea on the ground that they did not have diplomatic relations with it. Finally, the alternative proposal of Cyprus as the host for the Foreign Ministers Meeting was able to gain consensus. To give some consolation to North Korea and its friends, it was decided to hold a special meeting of non-aligned countries at Pyongyang to discuss the question of South-South cooperation.

If on a sensitive issue there are two groups of members—not necessarily consisting of an equal number of states—ranged on rival sides, and neither side is willing to yield any ground, it would not be easy to have consensus on that issue. The Chairman is, of course, authorised to try for a consensus and declare it or its absence at the end of his effort in cooperation with some other important members of the Movement. But in such a case of intense rivalry of two groups he would not declare the viewpoint of either side as consensus because the side at the receiving end, feeling terribly dissatisfied, might be provoked to indulge in acts threatening the occurrence of an open split in the Movement. The Chairman, while taking a decision on this, would be keeping in mind the overwhelming consideration of “the preservation of the unity and strength of the Non-aligned Movement.”<sup>17</sup>

The consensus mechanism, in spite of its claimed virtues, is not free of heart-burning and mutual tension. Not infrequently do the consensus decisions of non-aligned summits involve victory for one side and defeat for another. The Harare consensus in favour of Cyprus as the next Foreign Ministers Meeting seemed to have been bitterly disliked by the



Cuban group, but it was perhaps outplayed by the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Rajiv-Mugabe combine—described later. At the New Delhi Summit, the members of the ASEAN became very unhappy with the formula on Kampuchea which finally emerged as a product of consensus, and they seemed to have majority support behind their pro-Sihanouk stand. But they willynilly accepted the formula after having been “satisfied” that by waging a strong fight they had made their point. A veteran diplomat of India, M.K. Rasgotra, has rightly said, “In my reckoning, consensus is a view which either people accept or are willing to live with.”<sup>18</sup>

The fact that a small but determined group of member states can prevent the viewpoint of a big majority from prevailing at the summit suggests that the consensus mechanism tends, at times, to militate against the democratisation of the Movement. The feeling that the summit cannot take a decision, if that is strongly opposed by some members irrespective of their number and the rationality of their stand, would encourage the member states with destructive potential to behave in an irresponsible and intransigent manner. Most of the members of the non-aligned group feel that the United States, through its Diego Garcia strategy, has been largely responsible for the militarization of the Indian Ocean in recent years. But they failed to pin the blame on the US for this at the New Delhi Summit because of the strong opposition by Sri Lanka, the main US lobbyist at New Delhi. It may be relevant to point out that it is Sri Lanka again which has been playing the American game by vigorously working for the continued postponement of the proposed United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean.<sup>19</sup> It is thus clear that rigid adherence to the principle of consensus in non-aligned summits may have been stimulating intransigence and irrationality in the behaviour of its members.

### *Manipulation by the Host Country*

The position of Chairman for three years gives a lot of leverage to the host nation to manipulate summit proceedings in its favour. It can significantly influence the outcome of the conference in terms of decisions taken by resorting to several manipulative devices like fixing the time schedules of different meetings—both general and committee meetings—and by fixing and, if necessary, changing afterwards the order of speaking in the meetings of the whole group. When the host nation sees that its stand on a particular issue is facing stiff opposition, it would favour postponing a decision on it till the last moment. By that time the determination and patience of its opponents might thin down and the host nation may get a favourable decision by taking advantage



of the exhausted and disinterested mood of its opponents who may be in a hurry at that time to prepare for their return journey. Further, the host nation tends to manipulate the ordering of the speaker-list to suit its own convenience. This happened at the Havana Summit. After Fidel Castro's hard-hitting speech strongly denouncing US "imperialism and colonialism" and advocating that the Soviet bloc countries were the "natural allies" of the NAM, President Tito of Yugoslavia, then the most respected member of the group, stood up to deliver a very important speech in which he successfully countered the "pro-Russia" slant of Castro's speech. In order to minimise the impact of Tito's speech on the audience, Castro, the Chairman, invited his radical friends from Asia and Africa who one after another delivered their pro-Russia speeches, although some moderate states had already been listed in the roster of speakers to speak after Tito.<sup>20</sup> This reordering of the speakers' list by Castro was severely criticised by moderate states, but they could not prevent Castro from playing this trick on them.

#### POLITICS OF HOSTING SUMMITS

A tradition has developed that a decision regarding the venue of the next summit be taken by the current one. However, some pre-summit exercises take place by aspirant nations in this regard: they make some efforts—often in subtle ways—to woo bigwigs of the NAM as well as the host nation which, as the Chairman for the coming three years, irrespective of its status otherwise, would be wielding a lot of influence at that summit. On all important issues including the decision on the venue of the next summit, influential members like India, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Tanzania and Algeria exercise some influence. Their voices are heard with respect and seriousness, and if there is consensus among them on any question, others hardly differ from that. Therefore, the aspirant nations for holding the next summit try to win the support of these influentials so that they could have a decision in their favour without much opposition and difficulty. For example, the question of the venue for the next summit created a lot of infighting, not highly publicized though, both in New Delhi and Harare. At Harare, Nicaragua started from the very beginning a campaign offensive in favour of its candidature for hosting the Ninth Summit, and with the active support of some radical states led by Cuba, it emerged as the front-runner quite early in the race. But a group of conservative and pro-US countries, though a small minority, put up strong opposition to this move. Having sensed that this question would divert the attention of the summit from the main items of the agenda, some middle-course members, including India, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe collected sufficient support at the summit to



postpone a decision on this question. The Cuban group then made the next logical move to recommend having the coming Foreign Ministers' Conference at Pyongyang. This meeting, scheduled to be held 18 months after the Harare Summit, would select the venue of the next summit. Many pro-US countries which do not recognise North Korea would not attend the Foreign Ministers Conference if held at Pyongyang. This would make the task of Cuba and its "allies", much easier in selecting Nicaragua as the host of the next summit. But this move, too, was bitterly contested by the pro-US group which threatened to boycott the next Foreign Ministers Meeting if North Korea would host it. The middle-course members, also not in favour of North Korea's candidature as the host of the next Foreign Ministers' Conference, took advantage of the lack of consensus on this proposal to kill it and push a "neutral" venue instead. The result was the choice of Cyprus for the purpose.

But this "consensus" decision could be possible by a clever move made by Mugabe probably in consultation with Rajiv Gandhi. Mugabe, as the Chairman of the Summit, declared that the decision on the venue of the next Foreign Ministers' Meeting would be taken not by the Political Committee or the Plenary, but by the Bureau chaired by him. He was aware that the Bureau, consisting of one fourth of the members of the group, would be packed by many radicals, but they would be ranged against the Chairman and some respected middle-course members. He was seemingly confident that he would be able to tackle the radicals there and make the Bureau meeting his show. At this juncture, Rajiv Gandhi made his intentions and feelings clear by stating that he would stand solidly with the Chairman and oppose anything which would give an impression to the outside world that the NAM was sharply divided. S. Hasani, the President of Yugoslavia, and Yasser Arafat, a senior leader of the Movement, also lent support to Rajiv by throwing their weight behind Mugabe.<sup>21</sup> Hurried consultations followed and the decision went in favour of Cyprus at the expense of North Korea. These senior members of the Movement opposed the move of the pro-Russia members on the ground that the latter's victory would lend credence to Western propaganda that the NAM had been taken over by pro-Russian forces and naturally this impression would erode the credibility and vitality of the Movement.

Apart from the Cold War divisions which affect the attitudes of many member countries at the time of selecting a venue for the next summit, mutual rivalry and ego-clashes between important members seems to be at play on this question. An important member would not like to see another influential member to steal the limelight by hosting the summit or by enabling one of its "allies"/friends to stage it. In the past, India and Yugoslavia were good friends and shared identical views on many



international issues. But, of late, it seems that relations between them are not as warm as in the past; far from continuing to be close, on some sensitive issues like Afghanistan, Kampuchea and the Declaration of South Asia as a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, they have not stood on the same side. Time was when Tito and Nehru moved hand in hand over vital questions like war and peace and strongly stood the ground at the Belgrade Summit in the face of stiff challenges to their viewpoint from Sukarno of Indonesia and Nkrumah of Ghana. Yugoslavia was a strong contender for hosting the Eighth Non-aligned Summit in 1986. Having hosted the first summit in 1961, it might have thought to bring itself back to the centre-stage by holding the summit again in its capital in the silver jubilee year of the foundation of the NAM. Rajiv's India, which seems to be working with determination to regain its leading position in international diplomacy, could see through the game of Belgrade and fought hard—though intelligently and without much noise—to prevent Yugoslavia from cornering the expected glory. At the Non-aligned Foreign Ministers' Meeting held at Luanda in September 1985, which was to decide the question of the venue of the 1986 Summit, the Indian delegation sponsored the candidature of Zimbabwe on the plea that since the important question before the Movement was the ongoing struggle in South Africa it would only be in order that a frontline African state stage the next summit meeting.<sup>21</sup> India, the Chairman of the Movement, did not face much difficulty in winning consensus in favour of Harare as the huge African delegation extended overwhelming support to this proposal. The pro-Russia members, led by Cuba, also supported the candidature of Zimbabwe as they did not want Yugoslavia because of its known equations with Russia. Libya, another contender for this honour, was prevailed upon to withdraw its candidature as many African countries intensely opposed its leader, Colonel Gaddafi. It is not a secret that relations between Tripoli and New Delhi are far from being friendly. It is thus clear that while selecting the venue for the Silver Jubilee Summit, factors like Cold War linkage, local and regional conflicts and ego-clashes between influential members of the organization significantly influenced the attitudes of member states.

#### BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS OF MEMBER STATES

In some cases the behaviour of member states in non-aligned summits is characterised by consistency and predictability. On issues like Cold War conflicts one can predict how countries with open and strong links with one super power or the other would behave. But on regional and twilight issues—issues with no clear-cut Cold War links—the member states including the super power clients and friends behave differently.



On a regional issue like the Middle East conflict all the Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, a strong supporter of the US, does not have any hesitation to pass an anti-Israel resolution, much to the chagrin of Washington. But if the countries of the region are already divided over a regional dispute, they would take rival stands if that dispute were to be discussed in a non-aligned summit. India and Pakistan oppose each other in this forum on issues like proposals to declare South Asia a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and to have plebiscite in Kashmir. However, on issues which affect the vital interests of the developing world and which cross Cold War lines, member states tend to forget, at least for some time, their local animosities and Cold War connexions and take common positions and make concerted demands/appeals. The demands for the establishment of a new economic order and a new information and communication order find little opposition in non-aligned conferences. Countries like India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Vietnam, Ethiopia and Morocco, speak in the same voice and use the same language.

Sometimes the behaviour of some members appears strange, but to a watchful observer, that would not look illogical. Singapore has always been regarded as a pro-US country and in different international forums it has been playing an active role on the side of its patron in recent years. But on an issue like Laws of the Sea, it is highly critical of the US. Being a littoral state it believes that the American stand on this question is detrimental to its interests. On questions relating to the basic demands of the Third World, Yugoslavia, a European Communist and a relatively developed country, supports all those resolutions which are directly or indirectly critical of the Western Powers. But on the Cold War issues like those of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, it supports the pro-US group mainly due to its rift with Moscow.

The diplomatic behaviour of India, one of the founders of the NAM, is carefully watched by many countries including the two Super Powers. Its voting patterns in the United Nations and its postures in other diplomatic gatherings, including non-aligned conferences, have been interpreted by Western Powers, particularly the US, as pro-Russia and in recent years Washington has several times threatened, indirectly though, to punish New Delhi for its pro-Russia diplomatic behaviour. Against this background, the track-record of India in non-aligned summits deserves some scrutiny. In this connection one general comment may be made that India's behaviour pattern in non-aligned meetings is in conformity with the broad parameters of its foreign policy. The main features of India's foreign policy are a spontaneous urge to oppose the forces of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, to support the basic causes of the Third World, to campaign for peace threatened



periodically by the onslaught of the Cold War, and above all, to *vigorously pursue its own interests*. It is also characterised by its *visible soft corner for the Soviet Union*, generally perceived by Indians as "a friend in need." Besides strongly supporting Third World causes like the demands for a new international economic order and a new international information and communication order, it has not hesitated to condemn the Israeli occupation of Palestine, American intervention in Nicaragua and American bombing of Libya. But on issues like Kampuchea and Afghanistan, the stands taken by India in non-aligned summits, though not wrong or illogical, have appeared to many, both in India and abroad, to have a "pro-Russia bias." Independent of the rationality of India's position on these issues, the fact remains that India's approach and posture have contributed to minimising the damage to Russia's diplomatic interests. This has not only made India appear, in the eyes of the Western camp, as an "ally" of Russia; it also has accounted for some erosion of its credibility as a leading non-aligned country.

One of the few non-aligned countries whose behaviour in summits has been strange and, at times, shocking, is Libya. Colonel Gaddafi, its leader has been a much talked about and colourful personality who has seldom been content to be confined to the four walls of his country. His dreams and action-plans often cross its boundary and his enemy list includes, at the top, the United States and Egypt. Having escaped from the April 1986 American bombing on his house which killed some members of his family, he himself feels terrorized. His arrival at the Harare Summit was unscheduled and sudden. He was accompanied by some women security guards who raised anti-America and pro-Libya slogans at different points during the duration of Gaddafi's Address to the Summit. Gaddafi seldom spoke loudly. In a cool and measured voice, he launched an attack on his opponents; the substance and taste of which was biting in satire.

The general reaction to the Colonel's speech at Harare was negative. Hardly anybody liked the tone of his scathing attack on the NAM, which he dubbed as an impotent body. He said that a large body like this had "no right to exist" if it could not defend the integrity of one of its members. While describing the decisions of NAM Summits as "paper resolutions", usually thrown into the dustbin, he charged that it contained many "stooges and spies" of the US. He threatened that his country might quit the NAM unless it shaped itself into a bloc for collective defence, "aligned against imperialism."<sup>23</sup> It bears mentioning that Ali Khamenei, the Prime Minister of Iran, a close ally of Libya, hurled similar abuses at the NAM meeting at Harare. He asked, "Why has our Movement failed to exert some international pressure against the aggressor (meaning Iraq) in such cases? Why has the Movement not taken a clear



unreserved stand as is the least expected from it and why has it in fact behaved most conservatively and ineffectively?<sup>21</sup>

It is common knowledge now that both the United States and Russia have their strong supporters inside the Non-aligned Movement. It is also generally felt that in regard to war and peace questions, the non-aligned group is a weak body; it often fails to do anything concrete against acts of aggression. But the way the leaders of Libya and Iran, particularly the former, expressed these criticisms was not in the spirit of brotherhood and *camaraderie*, the binding ties of non-alignment. This was particularly not expected of the leader of Libya because the American bombing of Tripoli in April 1986 had been strongly criticised by the NAM.

A strange feature of Gaddafi's performance in non-aligned summits is his shifting friendships and alliances. In the last few years he has emerged as a strong supporter of the Soviet Union and a close ally of Cuba inside the Non-aligned Movement. Since the Havana Summit, he has been mounting a fierce attack upon American "imperialism" and America's "stooges and spies" continuing as members of the NAM. However, we may be reminded of the fact that in the past the Libyan maverick was equally hostile to the other Super Power. At the Algiers Summit of 1973, he crossed swords with Castro who claimed that Moscow was the non-aligned nations' "best friend and ally." While launching his attack on both "imperialism and communism", Gaddafi said: "The majority of third world countries have links of different kinds with blocs outside the Third World. The number of countries which can be considered genuinely neutral in the Third World does not exceed the number of fingers of one hand."<sup>25</sup> At Algiers he was indirectly critical of India's close relationship with Russia. We may remember that during those years the Libyan leader had intimate relations with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

### CONCLUSIONS


The approach and behaviour of member countries in the Non-aligned Movement Summits are primarily guided by their foreign policy goals and objectives. In other words, there is no significant difference between how an individual member behaves in non-aligned meetings and outside—in other international forums and situations. No doubt, the NAM has some declared policies and objectives. But hardly would a member country take a position in a non-aligned meeting which would harm any of its vital national interests. The Movement is yet to develop a completely new personality and identity demanding much greater allegiance from its members than they have so far been showing to it.



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## AMERICAN BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES: A JOURNEY TO THE PAST

By CHINTAMANI MAHAPATRA\*

*The American Administration is at present confronted with a set of apparently contradictory problems: how to close the unneeded military bases in its territory and how to retain its important military facilities and installations in the Republic of the Philippines, including the well-known Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base. Studies undertaken by various United States' Government agencies have estimated that the Defence Department could save from \$ 1 billion to \$ 5 billion annually by closing some of the unneeded bases out of a total of 3,800 located in various parts of the United States.<sup>1</sup> And thus important Pentagon officials and key members of the US Congress are reportedly moving to stamp "surplus" on some of these bases with a view to closing them down.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, policy-makers in Washington still consider the US bases in the Philippines as "the irreducible minimum of American security and interests in the Pacific and the Far East." And as part of the plan to retain the bases in the Philippines the United States Government recently approved a mini-Marshall Plan for the Philippine Republic. Negotiations to review the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947 began in April between the officials of the United States and the Philippines.*

*The MBA has undergone more than forty amendments in the past four decades. But the current negotiations are significant because it involves extension of the term of the agreement that expires in 1991. Presence of foreign military bases and troops in a sovereign country has always remained a sensitive issue in international relations. After more than three decades since the signing of the MBA the Filipinos got their sovereignty formally extended over the US military bases in the Islands and the Filipino flags began to fly in US base areas since 1979. Yet the nationalist Filipinos still continue to ask: Is national sovereignty compatible with American military presence on their soil? Are not these bases likely to invite attacks from America's adversaries? Is Philippines interest being served by US maintenance of bases on the Islands? Some Filipinos raised similar questions way back in the 1940s. But they did enter into a Military Bases Agreement with the Americans by virtue of which the US military presence is still continuing in the Philippine Islands. Why did they sign the agreement? What were the compulsions? How did it all happen? When similar sets of questions, among others of course, are being raised after four decades of changes in the national, regional as well as global power configuration, a*

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*journey to the past is perhaps called for, for clearer comprehension of the current situation.*

*The present paper is based on archival materials and other primary source materials available in the United States. Secondary source materials available in India and the United States have been used in appropriate places.*

## ORIGINS OF AMERICAN BASES

### *"Pickets of the Pacific"*

IT was the strategic location rather than economic prizes that attracted the American attention to the Philippines. After its victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898 the United States joined the so-called "imperial club." In the aftermath of the war, while talking to the General Missionary Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church on 21 November 1899, President William McKinley said:

...When the war broke out, Dewey was in Hong Kong and I ordered him to go to Manila and to capture and destroy the Spanish Fleet. . . .

When next I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps, I confess that I did not know what to do with them...I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight, and I am ashamed to tell you gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed to Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night it came to me this way that ... they (Filipinos) were unfit for self-government and would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos and uplift and Christianize them. . . .<sup>3</sup>

While it was not necessary to christianize a people who had been adherents of the faith for more than three centuries, the Americans who had stayed in the Philippines and had contacts with the Filipinos did not consider them misfit for self-rule or illiterates. General Charles King, who was a "volunteer" in the Philippines, wrote that the capability of the Filipinos for self-government was beyond doubt and he believed that the Filipinos "rank far higher than the Cubans or the uneducated negroes to whom we have given the right of suffrage."<sup>1</sup>



## AMERICAN BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Admiral George Dewey in a telegram to the Navy Department put forth similar views. He wrote:

In my opinion these people are superior in intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races.<sup>5</sup>

Why did the Americans go to the Philippines then? By the time the continental expansion came to an end in 1867, the United States had a population and an industrial potential that marked it as a coming major power. The concept of "manifest destiny" fervently held by many Americans began to acquire a new dimension. Some American ideologues began speaking and writing about the American role in the arena of world politics. They saw American commerce and industry eventually surpassing that of the European countries which were then Great Powers on the world stage. The great European Powers, even at that time, were engaged in the process of carving out Africa. As George F. Kennan put it: "... American people of that day, or at least many of their most influential spokesmen, simply liked the smell of empire" and longed to "range themselves among the colonial powers of that time."<sup>6</sup> ... The ideologues of expansionism and the men of influence who were impressed by the argument surveyed the global scene and were convinced that the weakest target they could pick on was Spain. Hence the Spanish-American War! But before the capture of the Philippine Islands and subsequent colonial rule over it, the United States constructed a naval base in the Midway Islands, procured rights to set up naval bases at Pago Pago in Samoa and at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii. In fact, it was the American Navy that "supplied much of the ideological impetus for imperialist policies."<sup>7</sup> The growth of American business connections with China and Japan and visions of greatly enhanced trade gave rise to a desire for a base in the Pacific to preserve, protect and promote American interests in the Asia-Pacific region. And the Philippines came to be regarded as the "pickets of the Pacific", strategically located to serve as a military outpost for the said purpose.

*Need for Access to Strategically Located Bases*

Throughout the colonial period occupants of the White House in Washington generally maintained that it was in the American national interest to hold the Philippine Islands. Public pronouncements and sympathy shown for the Filipino desire for freedom by some presidents were different from the private political understanding of the colonial issue. In America's Asian colony extremist and militant nationalist



movements did exist, but they were sporadic, disorganized, intermittent and thus were easily suppressed. The so-called democratic nationalist leaders, on the other hand, lacked sincerity and seriousness in their efforts to achieve independence for the Philippines. The constitutional struggle for greater Filipino control and ultimate independence began with the establishment of the *Nacionalista Party* in 1907. US officials pointed out the lack of seriousness for independence of the Philippines on the part of the *Nacionalista* leaders from the very first election to the National Assembly in 1907. What the leaders actually "wanted was office, not independence."<sup>8</sup> The leaders of the constitutional struggle for freedom came from the Filipino elite class. Throughout their struggle for independence they remained faithful to America. One of such leaders, Sergio Osmena, who later became the President of independent Philippines, once told Governor General Forbes that "the Filipinos wanted independence only while it seemed to be getting farther off and the minute it began to get very near they would begin to get very much frightened."<sup>9</sup>

Even as the rigours of the Great Depression led to increasing pressure of the agrarian and the labour interests on Congress, the White House was confronted with the problem of evolving a strategy which while setting a satisfactorily distant enough date for the Philippines independence would ensure adequate safeguards for the strategic as well as economic interests of the United States. The result was the Tydings-McDuffie Bill which was passed into law by Congress and received the signature of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1934. This law for the first time set a definite date for Filipino independence. That the legislation was enacted during the administration of FDR has led his numerous apologists among liberal American historians to describe it as a trail-blazer in the field of national liberation of peoples under colonial rules. An Indian specialist on Roosevelt, while giving Roosevelt due credit for many other accomplishments, has persistently challenged the mythology of characterizing FDR as a champion of national liberation of colonial peoples. According to the Indian specialist, Roosevelt was a man of humane instincts, was willing to speak in generalities of freedom for "all peoples" at some "undefined time in the future." But "in concrete terms he was ready to commit himself only for the unfettered freedom of European victims of the Axis—and to freedom for the Philippines under benevolent American guidance."<sup>10</sup> (Emphasis added)

Franklin Roosevelt was a student of Alfred T. Mahan and a staunch navalist. He was a strategist with insights in geo-politics. Once he told his son Elliot that the British "don't begin to understand our thinking in terms of the Philippines, as a future base for operations against Japan."<sup>11</sup> Just before the outbreak of the First World War when there



was a probability of a Japanese surprise attack on Hawaii and the Philippines, Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of Navy, fully agreed with General Leonard Wood to take necessary measures, stating it would be criminal folly to leave the Asiatic Squadron in so precarious a position at a time when hostilities could be started at any moment.<sup>12</sup> During the 1920s Roosevelt repudiated Imperialism in public, but strongly defended the use of marines in Haiti and Santo Domingo and General Wood's tough policies in the Philippines.<sup>13</sup> The attack on Pearl Harbour and the subsequent overrunning of the Philippines by the Japanese invaders were traumatic developments for the American people and their president. While Roosevelt was confident of ultimate victory over the Japanese, he became also interested in the geo-political security requirements of the United States in the post-war era when the nation would have achieved its "Manifest Destiny" to be a pre-eminent military power in the world. In that future, Roosevelt and his closest military and National Security Advisers saw a vital need for access to strategically located overseas bases in different parts of the world. In such a scenario the Philippines continued to figure in Roosevelt's thinking as a vitally important location for the projection of American power in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-war period. Thus when in the wake of the massive Japanese attack in December 1941, Manuel Quezon proposed the neutralization of the Philippines, Roosevelt's response was an absolute "no". "My reply must emphatically deny the possibility of the Government's agreement to the political aspects of President Quezon's proposal...American forces will continue to keep our flag flying in the Philippines so long as there remains any possibility of resistance..." Roosevelt wrote to General Douglas MacArthur.<sup>14</sup> The President had no hesitation in casting aside the neutralization clause of the Tydings-McDuffie Act that he himself signed in 1934. It was in the same spirit that General MacArthur had declared when he was evacuated from the Philippines: "I shall return."

#### AMERICANS RETURN TO PHILIPPINES

The American forces "returned" to the Philippines before long to "liberate" it from the Japanese occupying forces. Guns were still booming and bombs still exploding when George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army began thinking about ensuring the restoration and control in the post-war era of naval and air bases in the Philippine Islands. The imminent independence of the Asian colony induced a sense of urgency into Marshall's thinking. In a telephone conversation on 1 November 1943 with General Malin Craig, a former Chief of Staff



of the US Army who was called back to active service in 1941, General Marshall said:

*Here's what we want.* On account of the fact that Quezon ceases to be President on 15 November, *the Government has to take special measures in order to keep him in the position of power...* Specifically what they (Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of Navy, Frank Knox) want is to get certain commitments between now and the 15th on the Naval Bases and Air Fields in the Philippines. They feel that it would be much better to get a commission from whatever government Quezon represents at the present time than to take that up after action which gives them independence. So that we've to act pretty fast...<sup>15</sup> (Emphasis added)

That was what Marshall, who was to be acclaimed as the "Architect of Victory," wanted. For American purposes, a certain pliable Filipino was to be kept in power. Had he not shown himself to be adequately cooperative, the General would have wanted action to remove him from power. It was a pattern that was to be repeated in the years that followed. However, it was not only Marshall but also the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that perceived an imperative necessity to conclude agreements for future control of bases in the Philippines. A departmental Memorandum stated:

All factors regarding US post-war requirements in the Philippine Islands point towards the necessity for securing commitments from President Quezon under the broadest possible provisions. These should be so general and so sweeping in nature as to permit exact location to be determined by US military and naval authorities upon conclusion of the war. The rights obtained should be complete and absolute...<sup>16</sup>

#### *Agreement Permitting Bases Signed*

President Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth passed away in the United States on 1 August 1944. Sergio Osmena was proclaimed the new President of the Commonwealth in Washington. In Tokyo, the Japanese had found their own Filipino, Jose P. Laurel, to serve as "President" of the Philippines. However, Osmena's pro-American leanings, as stated earlier, were as strong as those of Quezon. American officials had nothing to worry about as the result of the death of Manuel Quezon. Osmena assured Secretary of State Edward Stettinius in April 1945, that whatever suggestions the United States would make relating



to its requirements of bases in his country "would be agreeable to him."<sup>17</sup>

The American side was soon ready with a document for his signature. By signing on the dotted line an agreement with President Harry S. Truman on 14 May 1945, Osmena fulfilled his promise. President Truman got what his Joint Chiefs of Staffs wanted—an agreement "so sweeping and so general as to permit exact location (of bases) to be determined by military and naval authorities upon conclusion of the war." The two parties agreed that "the fullest and closest military co-operation will be observed...and the military plans of the United States and the Philippine Government will be closely integrated in order to ensure the full and mutual protection of the United States and the Philippines."<sup>18</sup> Out of a total of ten provisions of this agreement nine enumerated the special rights and privileges to be given to the United States by the Philippines. The agreement also incorporated lists of areas in the Islands where the United States might desire the right to set up bases. A total of thirty-eight facilities and installations in thirteen different locations were included in the list.

### *Philippines "Primary Base Area"*

At about the same time, President Truman held a conference with President Osmena, Senator Millard Tydings and the Secretaries of State War and Navy on plans for future military base requirements in the Philippines.<sup>19</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff also made known their desire that nothing less than complete American sovereignty over the bases in the Philippines was desirable.<sup>20</sup> They designated the Philippines as a "Primary Base Area" by defining the term as a place "strategically located and adequately developed, comprising the foundation of a base system essential to the security of the United States, its possessions, the Western Hemisphere, the Philippines and for the projection of military operations."<sup>21</sup>

In pursuance of the objective of making the Philippines a "Primary Base Area", on-the-spot surveys were conducted by American strategists. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's instructions were set fourth in the following terms: (a) The military bases in the Philippines were to constitute an integrated system for all forces—air, ground and sea; (b) The bases should be so located as to provide maximum accessibility, with due consideration to the dangers of surprise attack; (c) The bases should be capable of expansion to meet probable trends in developments of future implements of war; (d) The bases should afford maximum advantage for health and sanitation, except where incompatible with strategic requirements.<sup>22</sup> The JCS took it for granted that the Philippine bases would be needed far into the future, serving as a vital part of the American security



system for East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Military Adviser to the President, put forth the point to the Secretaries of War and the Navy and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Navy: "The bases in the Philippines would be needed for 'one hundred years and beyond' to function as both 'outposts' and 'springboards' from which American military might might be projected in order to 'uphold American policies and interests' in the Far East, including the fulfilment of its international commitments."<sup>23</sup>

After on-the-spot studies and surveys were completed the Joint Staff Planners submitted the report on "United States' Requirements for Military Bases and Rights in the Philippine Islands" for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 28 March 1946, the JCS requested Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, after due consideration of the report, to begin negotiations with the Philippines on the concerned issues. Secret negotiations began in June 1946 between the United States and the Philippines even before the latter was granted independence by the former.

### *Yet Another Pliable President*

Osmena, who had promised full cooperation with the United States on the issue of granting base facilities, was defeated in the Presidential Elections held in 1946. Manuel Roxas was elected to the presidency to become the first president subsequent to the declaration of an independent republic in the Philippines. Roxas had served at Bataan, Corregidor and Mindanao during the first Philippine campaign. He was twice successful in befooling the Japanese; first, by leading guerrilla operations in Luzon while apparently collaborating with them and secondly, by escaping from the Presidential Party of Jose P. Laurel which the Japanese were transporting back to Japan. He went over to the American side soon after his escape and General MacArthur promoted him to the rank of a General. Roxas was described as a "withdrawn, serious man . . . who seldom smiled." He was "very Spanish in his habits; using English with an appearance of reluctance." But at the same time, he was a practical man and less impulsive or emotional.<sup>24</sup> He knew that no Filipino politician could win a presidential election by being anti-American or, for that matter, could continue long in office by adopting anti-American policies. The new President lost no time in announcing a pledge of allegiance to the United States. In a statement to the press on 27 April 1947, Roxas declared: "I am absolutely determined to do everything in my power to make America's Far East policy effective through whatever the United States needs. The sooner America's



needs of strategy are mapped out we can go work the better. I'll be pleased."<sup>5</sup>

The negotiations which were going on for months informally and for weeks formally in a top secret environment were for the first time leaked to the press in September 1946 creating a sensation in the country. The *Manila Times* on 3 September 1946 reported a "deadlock" in the negotiations and attributed the report to "reliable sources." The *Evening Times* wrote that US Ambassador McNutt "was understood to have stated, rehabilitation aid for the Philippines would be easier to get", if the military bases agreement was signed soon. The *Star Reporter* commented in its editorial:

If reports were accurate, the terms now proffered would virtually result in the establishment here of extra-territorial rights for army personnel. And judging from the number of bases contemplated, one gets the impression the whole archipelago would just about be converted into one vast military reservation . . . And if it were to become a military reservation, we might as well elect a Moncado Governor and enlist the country as a state of the Union.<sup>6</sup>

The paper then came out with fresh advice. "After all there is no conceivable threat of immediate invasion of the Philippines with the Japs out of the way. So, let's sleep over it. It would be to everybody's advantage if we did."<sup>7</sup> The leak shocked both the Malacanang Palace and the White House. President Roxas publicly denied that there was any deadlock. He appealed to the persons possessing information regarding the base negotiations to refrain from disclosing such information "to our national advantage and at the same time privately admonished the negotiators and thus helped bring about an abrupt end to the 'leaks'. "<sup>8</sup>

Only days after the 'leak' the Philippine Congress was to assemble for a special session. Indications were there that there might be a Congressional uproar on the issue of military bases and thus negotiations were suspended for the time being. President Roxas did not want to face a possible Congressional uproar against the base negotiations, coming soon after a sudden 'leak' to the press, and thus gave assurances to US Ambassador Paul McNutt that "he will resume discussions, personally participating during later part (of the) week beginning September 30."<sup>9</sup> The Filipino President, however, gave a different justification for the slow progress of the "conversations," as he called, them, on the bases agreement to his own people. A Malacanang Press Release on 6 October 1946 stated:

The 'conversations' have entered a technical phase involving the solicitation of opinions and data from surveyors, land experts, and



engineers . . . . As a result, formal meetings will be spasmodic and progress will probably be slow until all opinions and data are thoroughly canvassed and analyzed.<sup>30</sup>

During the course of the negotiations Filipinos raised similar questions, such as the issue of sovereignty, that they are raising today. But what delayed the conclusion of the agreement was the constant irritation arising from alleged misconduct of the American soliders, mostly raw recruits, who were stationed in the Philippines. The *New York Times*, reported that the deterioration of the morale of the American troops in the Philippines was not only damaging America's image but also was alienating the public there who had of late begun to ask that the GIs who had fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Filipinos during the war should be brought back to replace the "brash, ill-mannered, slovenly and contemptuous children you now call solders."<sup>31</sup> The newly independent people, who were obviously more excited and careful about safeguarding their sovereignty, were enraged by such events. At one time the Philippine Government insisted that all US Army forces be removed from the Manila area. Partly due to this development, the War Department in the United States reconsidered the strategic and political importance of the army bases in the Philippines and recommended that the US Army forces should be withdrawn from the Philippines on schedule so as to permit an orderly phasing out of the Army interests over there.<sup>32</sup> President Truman accepted the recommendation and authorized the withdrawal of all Army forces save one composite air group with a "very small" ground detachment, and accordingly the War Department suspended all permanent base constructions in the Islands.<sup>33</sup>

However, there was a possibility of misreading the American Army's withdrawal not only by the Philippines but also by other American allies in the region. In order to pre-empt an interpretation of the US Army withdrawal as "a sign that the US is losing interest in the defence of the Philippines and in Far Eastern matters," the Sub-Committee on Foreign Policy Information prescribed the following course of action, among other alternatives:

Unilateral statement by Roxas in which he expands further on Philippines' desire to retain US forces in Philippines and in which he may point out to the Filipino people the advantage of such retention. This statement should be discussed with Roxas by Ambassador McNutt.<sup>34</sup>

Ambassador McNutt held discussions with President Roxas. And Roxas obliged. McNutt sent a portion of the Filipino President's speech tele-



graphically to the Secretary of State before it was delivered. The speech was on the following lines:

We are as you know, in the midst of negotiations for an agreement for bases for the mutual protection of the Philippines and the United States . . . . I am able to report to you that the United States Government has shown every disposition to consider our wishes in the matter. It has in no instance been arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable in the location of the base sites.

Recently the American Government showed extreme anxiety regarding press reports that fundamental relations between the Philippines and the United States were being endangered by the presence of American troops here. It is my judgement that those press reports were largely inaccurate. Partly as a consequence of these reports the United States recently expressed herself as perfectly willing to withdraw all military forces from the Philippines, unless we desired otherwise...

Since the matters of the conduct of American troops here became of general concern, conditions have rapidly improved to a point where these troops and forces have again become welcome guests in our land. I expect that, that the base agreement will be signed within a short time...<sup>35</sup>

The United States was apprehensive that its decision to withdraw American troops from the Philippines could be interpreted as lessening of its interests in the Philippines. This fear was sought to be removed through a statement by the Philippine President himself. Such a statement would also remove the irritants and quicken the pace of the military bases negotiations, Washington rightly thought. The Military Bases Agreement was signed on 14 March 1947.

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

After about four decades of the conclusion of the Military Bases Agreement, a major review of the Agreement is being undertaken. It is significant because it is going to decide the future of American military presence in the archipelago. Other reviews of the Agreement and the current negotiations are beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless one finds certain striking similarities of situations and events. Roxas, for instance, was a pliable president. Yet he was practical. He knew his limitations. He was the new President of an infant republic that was in economic shambles as a result of the war. He had to start his administration with a budget of \$ 130 million with an expectable government



revenue of a mere \$ 25 million.<sup>36</sup> There was also a rising trend of Hukbalahap insurgency in the country. Like Roxas, Madam Aquino came to power with indirect American help.<sup>37</sup> The economy of the country at present is in a bad shape. Aquino is also facing ever increasing trends of communist insurgency.

Nonetheless, Aquino has to face the Philippines Congress, which Roxas tactfully avoided, because the present negotiation is going to be converted into a treaty unlike the MBA of 1947 that was an executive agreement. Another new dimension is demands in the Philippines to keep the country free of nuclear weapons. It is likely to create added problems. Washington, on its part, still considers bases in the Philippines as significant for the protection and promotion of American security and economic interests in the region. It had offered rehabilitation aid to the Philippines during the negotiations for bases in 1940s. Now it has come up with a mini-Marshall Plan for the economic development of the Philippines. Indications are there that the Military Bases Agreement will be extended, yet it seems that tough times are ahead.

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## PAKISTAN'S INDIA POLICY: SHIFT FROM ZIA TO BENAZIR

By PARMINDER S. BHOGAL\*

According to Sajjad Hyder, an ex-Ambassador of Pakistan in India, "The first determinant of our foreign policy is safeguarding Pakistan from India."<sup>1</sup> Pakistan's India policy occupies a very significant role in Pakistan's overall foreign policy. In other words, Pakistan's foreign policy mainly revolves around its India policy, or is Indocentric. The major reason behind such a trend is the historic background of Indo-Pak relations. It will be apt to say that, "In large measure, Pakistani feeling (and policy) towards India has been a continuation of the political struggle before partition."<sup>2</sup> Support to the idea of Pakistan among Indian Muslims arose basically from the feeling of fear and insecurity both real and propagandised. The feeling of insecurity was indeed vis-a-vis the majority Hindu community and their certain dominance over India once it became free. This feeling aroused mistrust and hence misunderstanding and this was strengthened by the psychological trauma "resulting from the way the sub-continent was divided between India and Pakistan. There was a complete emotional upset of all the people in India and Pakistan because of this."<sup>3</sup> Such a psychological condition has been a very strong factor behind Pakistan's India-centric foreign policy. As a result, "from the day Pakistan emerged on the world map as a sovereign independent country, the main plank of Pakistan's foreign policy has been to obtain a shield against a possible attack from India."<sup>4</sup> The calculations of Pakistan's foreign policy-makers, in fact, revolves around the India factor—Pakistan's overriding concern vis-a-vis India, fear of its sheer size and size of the army."<sup>5</sup>

There is a continuing feeling in Pakistan that India has not reconciled to the partition of 1947 and is bent upon destroying and dismembering it. Such a psyche is mainly the result of the deliberate propaganda which was sustained by the statements of some communal leaders in India, as well as by misinterpreting the broad statements on the part of secular Indian leadership like Jawaharlal Nehru. But such a feeling was aggravated after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Whatever may be the factors, people in Pakistan do widely believe in this. The leader of the Opposition in the Pakistan National Assembly, Mohammad Aslam Khattak remarked during a debate:

*It is a fact that India never reconciled herself to the partition of Pak-Indian sub-continent. They always cherish this secret desire and*

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*dream that partition may be undone one day. The hostility of India has been a nightmare for the foreign policy-makers of this country.<sup>6</sup> (Pakistan National Assembly Debates-1964).*

*Again, as Ambassador Sajjad Hyder puts the same fear in this way: "To us in Pakistan the reason for this malaise is our perception that beneath a thin veneer, the Indian leadership and a sizeable segment of its following continue to regard the formation of Pakistan as an historical error forced on India, that given the opportunity they would like in some way to redress the situation and that in their mind, the 1971 War supported this presumption."*

*Apart from the above aetiology there are a number of other factors also behind the evolution of Pakistan's foreign policy. These include, the psychological need for parity, interests of the ruling elites, the fear of being reduced to a satellite state of India and above all using the existing hostility of bilateral relations to justify and rationalise all kinds of foreign aid from all sources as also to legitimise the creation and existence of Pakistan in the eyes of its own public and the world at large.*

FORTY years have passed since then and several developments have taken place during these years affecting Indo-Pak relations. Year 1971 was the watershed year in Pakistani history. Its East wing seceded to become an independent country. This tremendously affected the power balance in the region and as a result several new developments took place in Indo-Pak relations. Pakistan's foreign policy and India policy in particular experienced some changes. Eighteen years have passed since then. Though we cannot say that the traditional hostility between the two "unfortunate brother nations"<sup>8</sup> has ended, yet it will have to be conceded that now for the past few years there is greater understanding between them. Some of the mistrust and confusion has been allayed and there have been signs of cooperation here and there. Though it is always impossible to guess or to have premonitions about the future, nor is it advisable in the study of international relations, yet certain developments and events show positive trends now and even encourage us to think cautiously that we may be looking towards an era of cooperation, overlooking, if not forgetting the erstwhile conflict and hostility.

#### A GENERAL FRAME-WORK

Soon after the sub-continent was divided, a fairly far-fetched opinion was expressed by the first Governor General of Pakistan regarding future relationships between the two states. He said, "I think that these two states of Pakistan and Hindustan, by virtue of contiguity and mutual



interests, will be friends in the sub-continent. They will go to each other's rescue in case of danger and will say 'hands off' to other nations. We shall have a 'Monroe Doctrine' more solid than America's."<sup>9</sup>

But this *bonhomie* and goodwill was not to be the basis or the guiding principle of the mutual policies of India and Pakistan towards each other. On the contrary, historical factors, the nature of partition, the internal weaknesses of Pakistan and the great power pulls in the region began to guide the destinies of the two states. Therefore, the Pakistani elites soon began to be swayed by such factors. As Mushtaq Ahmed remarked, "*He (Liaquat Ali Khan) was deeply aware of the desirability of concord with India and also equally conscious of the impossibility of attaining it.*"<sup>10</sup> As a result Pakistan began to follow an India policy based upon conflict and countering, a policy of congenital opposition towards India, so to say. And as the years passed by, it became a marked point on the part of the Pakistani elite to do and behave always in opposition to whatever India wanted, proposed or did. *It became their permanent motive to maintain conflict between the two nations. It became a policy of total alienation and estrangement from India in all respects including economic, social and cultural. A policy of conflict on the part of Pakistan can be ascertained from the following statement: "The roots of confrontation between India and Pakistan go deep down into our history and will have to continue until the cause of justice triumphs, no matter how heavy the odds."*<sup>11</sup>

Ambassador Sajjad Hyder very rightly observed when he wrote, "*Pakistan's policy towards India is mainly reactive.*"<sup>12</sup> This conflictual intention is again visible in a very pertinent observation made by the late Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan. He remarked: "*What should be the foreign policy of Pakistan towards India? I maintain, while wanting to live in peace with India, we shall continue to lean against India till such time that resolution of these problems has been found.*"<sup>13</sup>

Such a confrontational India policy was sought to be justified on the basis of the outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan. As Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said: "*Pakistan maintains the confrontation only to resolve the outstanding disputes . . .*"<sup>14</sup> But what is the dispute and conflict? Does it end with the solution to the Kashmir and other boundary problems? To quote Zulfikar Ali Bhutto again: "*Our countries must ultimately live in peace, but only when conflict has been resolved. Such peaceful coexistence, however, remains out of question so long as India strives to impose a cultural, religious and linguistic uniformity upon all its minorities.*"<sup>15</sup> This clearly shows that the Indo-Pak conflict does not end with a solution to Kashmir and other boundary issues.

Most observers attribute Pakistan's India policy to its domestic compulsions and its desperate search for identity and legitimacy—both



internal and external—for its coming into existence. According to Selig H. Harrison: *"In Pakistan, the need for an external diversionary symbol to hold together a spiritless body politic, is if anything more conspicuous than India."*<sup>16</sup> And this "external diversionary symbol" could be best provided by none other than the perceived and propagandised Indian threat both real and imaginary. Bhutto amply justified this factor when he said in 1967: *"It has taken twenty years and two wars (with India) to establish the separate identity of our state with its population of over a hundred and twenty million."*<sup>17</sup> This is the *raison d'être* of Pakistan's India policy. And therefore, "India though a legitimate concern of Pakistan, in view of the long common border between the two countries, acquired an exaggerated, almost obsessive importance in determining the components and orientations of the newly emerged state (Pakistan)."<sup>18</sup>

*This general frame-work of Pakistan's India policy that I have attempted to establish, is more relevant to the 1947-71 phase. After this the foreign policy of Pakistan experienced some changes. Consequently the India policy was also re-oriented. There were reasons behind this and for the first time we find a faint sentiment of normalisation in Pakistan's India policy. But the general content of this policy is equally relevant today as will be seen in the succeeding arguments.* It is in the light of this frame-work that I shall be trying to analyse this policy during the period of Gen. Zia and the shift in it, if any, in the succeeding period, i.e., Benazir's ongoing rule.

#### ZIA'S INDIA POLICY

Zulifqar Ali Bhutto had realised and initiated the process of environment building, necessary for normalisation between India and Pakistan. Several steps had been taken in this direction during his days; after the historic Simla Pact, a number of other agreements regarding trade, shipping, cultural exchange and travel had been reached. And, a people to people level interaction begun. *Though he kept up a strong anti-India propaganda, mainly because of his domestic compulsions, he successfully made efforts for normalisation.*

*With the advent of Gen. Zia, this process came to an abrupt halt. When in 1978 a trade delegation from India arrived in Islamabad to review the Trade Agreement signed in 1975, the Government of Pakistan declined to renew this treaty. And the Pakistan Government by an order restricted all trade with India only at the government levels.*<sup>19</sup> Similarly, the Pakistan Government declined to open land routes (other than Wagah) as stipulated in the Visa and Travel Agreement of 1974.

Anti-India propaganda was whipped up, especially on the so-called wrongful stand of India on Afghanistan.



## PAKISTAN'S INDIA POLICY

The much famous "peace offensive" on India also needs to be discussed here. Gen. Zia adopted the policy of covert war with India. It meant a war on all fronts, barring the actual battlefield. The "peace offensive" was another strategic move in this regard. Pakistan offered India a No War Pact; India instead of accepting it, offered a broader peace treaty which unfortunately impinged upon the sovereignty of Pakistan directly. Pakistani objections were mainly to India's insistence that Pakistan should make a unilateral declaration not to concede any base to any foreign power on its territory. This gave Pakistan a clear cut leverage over India and a propaganda tirade followed. This was indeed a diplomatic success to be rejoiced at by Pakistan. No doubt, the Pakistan Ambassador in India was right when he said: "*For the first time in our history of relations with India, we have been able to force India to take a defensive posture in diplomacy.*"<sup>20</sup>

Pakistan also meddled in India's internal ethnic problems. The Government of India has been accusing Pakistan of aiding and abetting terrorism in Punjab.

At the newly formed forum of SAARC also, Zia maintained hostile postures and was successful in lobbying against India on several issues including the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka after the July 1987 Accord.

*The hall-mark of Zia's India policy was a perpetually hostile confrontation but always short of an open war. But the December 1987 adventure was too close and the two countries almost came to the brink of an actual war.*

The Zia era in Pakistan saw the emergence of another new issue between the two countries. This was the Siachin Glacier issue. A limited war has been going on between the two countries on this issue, with considerable losses to both sides. This has further complicated the relations between the two countries.

Thus looking at the whole eleven years' span of the Zia era in Pakistan we can safely infer that *Pakistan's India policy during this period was a bundle of contradictions; contradictions in proclamations and practices. It was rather a hawkish policy phrased in some of the most deceptive words and presented in an enchanting manner. As a result "it is often claimed that the military government in Pakistan after taking power in that country has made a special new demarche in extending a hand of friendship to India and has endeavoured to accelerate the process of normalisation of relations with us. The fact however speak otherwise."*<sup>21</sup> According to one observer he "produced an absolutely brilliant India policy. Seek peace on the battlefield. Step up the ideological war. Whip up a climate in which the sun of friendship was kept blazing by sweet rhetoric. And in the shadow of that sun arm and give sanctuary to those



forces within India which could fight for theocracy. *Do not use the Pakistani Army to try and break up India for three very good reasons. First, because it could not, even if it wanted to. Second it was needed to run things at home. Third, there was a far cheaper way of achieving the same aim—make Indians fight themselves.*"<sup>22</sup> His personal brilliance and finesse apart, such an India policy was highly detrimental for the betterment of Indo-Pak ties as also for the maintainence of peace in the region. It was rightly observed by the Indian Press after his tragic end in the air crash on 17 August 1988. *"Indo-Pak relations reached their nadir during his rule."*<sup>23</sup>

*"An ultra-rightist dominance in Pakistan has always thrived upon its hostility towards India. Because of the lack of popular legitimacy, the legitimacy of a 'hostile India' does help along with other similarly presumed' induced and propagandised threats."*<sup>24</sup> Apart from the domestic reasons, Zia used the pretext of a hostile India to make the maximum out of the existing international situation in this part of the world. *This also helped him in successfully countering the growing Indian influence in West Asia as also in proving his Islamic credentials both at home and abroad.*

#### BENAZIR'S INDIA POLICY

*"The finest investment in improving Indo-Pak relations has been made by the people of Pakistan through the process of 16 November."*<sup>25</sup> Benazir has been in power now for five months. And her coming to power was hailed not only in Pakistan but also equally warmly in India. Since it was expected, on the basis of her earlier statements from time to time, that her arrival on the Pak scene would help improve bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, *speculations have been ripe since that day as to what would be her India policy. Will there be a shift from Gen. Zia's beaten track, or the sub-continent will continue to be the "Continent of Circe?"* The shift was expected because Premier Benazir has always stressed not only the improvement of ties but also of adding the dimension of friendship to these relations. This she has cherished with a degree of sentiment, common and natural among the people of the two nations. She wrote: *"I symbolise a new generation, I had never been an Indian. I had been born in independent Pakistan. I was free of the complexes and prejudices which had torn Indians and Pakistanis apart in the bloody trauma of partition. Perhaps the people were hoping that a new generation could avoid the hostility that had now led to three wars, burying the bitter past of our parents and grand parents, to live together as friends. And I certainly felt it possible as I walked the warm and welcoming streets of Shimla. Did we have to be divided by walls of*



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*hatred or could we, like the once warring countries of Europe come to terms with each other."*<sup>26</sup>

In India both views exist regarding the shift in Pakistan's India policy. There are people who don't see much scope for a change. They argue so on the basis of the traditional nature of Indo-Pak relations and Benazir's compulsions at home owing to her precarious condition *vis a vis* her opposition and armed forces combine. *On the contrary, there are also people in all walks of life who are optimistic. Their optimism is based upon the following facts:*

- 1 That there is a democratic government in Pakistan.
- 2 That there has now been over a number of years an increasing feeling in the minds of both people that relations be improved.
- 3 That the change in the overall international environment would be conducive to improvement in relations.
- 4 That the Indian response towards Pakistan will now be more balanced and accommodative.

What can be the degree of shift, if at all there is going to be one? Though to exaggerate expectations may prove to be an illusion, to deny happy prospects is to be depressive. *"At best some change can be expected in the general environment in which the two countries interact, in the immediate future."*<sup>27</sup>

Benazir Bhutto it seems is picking up the threads, from where her late father, Premier Z.A. Bhutto was made to leave. She has already stated that she wants the historic Shimla Pact to be the basis of relationship with India. She has dismissed the "No-War Pact" authored by the late Gen. Zia, saying, *"We could not really understand its logic—How a simple No-War Pact could resolve the different issues between the two countries? We felt that the Shimla Agreement had a legitimacy, and we must approach step by step the problem of resolving the issue to help build the confidence as we emerge from one day to another."*<sup>28</sup> She has already emphasized upon the need to improve the people to people relations. As a result of such an approach, visa and travel facilities have been made easier. And according to press reports, bilateral trade between the two countries has doubled in the first three months of the democratic government.

SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) has added a new dimension to improving the Indo-Pak ties. Several programmes to be undertaken under the aegis of SAARC, would positively improve Indo-Pak relations. These include the SAARC passport scheme, the holding of South Asian Cultural Festivals and the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange Programme. (SAVE).<sup>29</sup> Thus India and Pakistan could now, under the



auspices of SAARC, have the option of taking all those steps which they otherwise could not because of their domestic political compulsions.

*Of late, two issues have been greatly impinging upon Indo-Pak relations; the first being Indian accusations regarding Pak aid and sympathy to the terrorists operating in Punjab, and the second, the Siachin Glacier issue. Of course both are Zia legacies. Regarding the first, Prime Minister Ms. Bhutto has assured the Indian Government that she would make maximum effort to stop help to the terrorists. Though she has not been much successful in it, yet, for this Ms Bhutto need not be blamed. She is sincere when she says that playing the Sikh card would be disastrous for Pakistan. Her problem is that the mischief in Punjab remains the exclusive preserve of the ISI. Here the Indian Government will have to exhibit patience and show restraint considering her precarious condition vis-a-vis the Army and opposition-ruled Punjab.*

*The other issue is the Siachin Glacier. She has avoided any scathing attack on India regarding this and has expressed a keen desire to resolve this issue through peaceful negotiations under the Shimla Agreement. She notes with regret that this is the first ever violation of the Shimlu Pact by India. Here also a cooperative and compromising Indian stand would be helpful in resolving this complicated issue. Talks regarding this are expected to be held in Islamabad some time this year.*

Thus, from all accounts the first months of Benazir Bhutto's rule are indeed encouraging, There is indeed a noticeable shift in Pakistan's India policy. The shift is manifested clearly in two aspects; first, the overall improvement of the environment in which the two countries interact. Severity of propaganda has gone down and measures for the restoration of confidence and goodwill have been taken. Second, the importance of people to people relationship has been recognised and preliminary steps have been taken in this regard, in the form of relaxed visa and travel facilities. The exchange of information material both through bilateral and SAARC channels has been agreed to. And it has been decided to do more in this regard. However, much will depend upon the stability of the democratic government. Any internal crisis, leading to the destabilisation of the government can obstruct this process of normalisation. But given the state of affairs now, we can look towards the scheduled meeting of the Joint Indo-Pak Commission in July 1989, with a degree of optimism, An expected visit by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto some time this year will also be a positive development in this regard.

#### APPRAISAL

The most significant development in Pakistan's India policy, during Benazir's first five months in office, has been to return to the path from



where it was deflected to a different course. *The very fact that Pakistan now has a democratic government has resulted in a relaxation of the environment governing mutual ties of the two countries. A lot has been achieved in a comparatively short time. Trade has been fully restored and unnecessary embargoes put by the Zia regime, as mentioned earlier, have been withdrawn.*

Visa and travel facilities have been made more liberal with a promise to very soon do more in this regard. A return to the Shimla Pact has been declared. The significance of this lies in the fact that the Shimla Pact was the result of mutual direct negotiations whereby it was agreed to solve all pending issues on a bilateral level through mutual negotiations step by step. The Shimla Pact also opened the way for taking confidence-building measures, including the steady initiation of people to people relationship by various means. *In a nutshell, the Shimla Agreement has an ideal mechanism to resolve even a case of a chronic conflict.*

Another good development arising out of the enhanced confidence and goodwill between the two countries is its impact on SAARC. We can now expect greater development and consensus within it. *Pakistan it seems, has decided to refrain from making the SAARC forum into another platform for its unjustified anti-Indian propaganda. The last meeting of SAARC in Islamabad was held in an extremely cordial environment and there was a degree of consensus; as a result, several new measures to strengthen the South Asian fraternity were approved.*

*Another positive signal recently came when Pakistan made a very balanced and restrained observation over the Indian intervention (on the request of President Gayoom) in the Maldivian peril at the hands of the mercenaries.*

The new regime in Pakistan, keeping its constraints in mind, seems to have decided, alongwith India, to use the forum of SAARC to undertake those measures which it otherwise would be unable to take owing to political compulsions at home. The SAARC passport scheme, the SAARC cultural festival and cultural and information schemes, augur well in this regard.

And a few days ago, Prime Minister Benazir expressed her hope that India and Nepal would peacefully sort out their present crisis. *It is a great encouragement that unlike in the past, Pakistan this time has refrained from taking undue advantage of this adverse situation between India and Nepal.*

There is thus goodwill; but this is not the end. Indeed, a lot is yet to be achieved before the shift in Pakistan's India policy is clearly manifested. It will depend upon a number of factors apart from those directly concerned with India and Pakistan. But the trend so far has been encouraging and whatever we have achieved in the form of mutual under-



standing to shun confrontation and return to normalcy is very very significant. To quote Winston Churchill, "This is not the end, it is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."

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came to power, a change in the environment in which the two *countries* interacted could be expected. It would however depend much upon the Indian response to the new government in Pakistan, as well as the regional developments around it.

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## THE GORBACHEVIAN POLICY OF OPENNESS

By A.G. MODAK\*

*Even a cursory glance at the speeches of Mikhail Gorbachev leads one to remark that the present captain of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is excessively restless over the stagnation of the Soviet economy. It also informs us that for Gorbachev, a complete transformation of USSR is the panacea for ending stagnation. The process of total transformation is, of course quite wide and deep; it comprises in fact three sub-processes known as restructuring, acceleration and openness. If restructuring hints at the purpose of transformation, acceleration refers to the urgency of implementing this act, and openness underscores the necessity to shape a public relations policy appropriate to the transformation of USSR. The policy of openness is thus essentially a supportive framework for implementing thorough changes in the Soviet Union.*

*In this paper we first intend to explain why the present Soviet leadership is bent upon resorting to the policy of openness. Next section of the paper will devote itself to the elaboration of this policy. We will discuss later various reactions to the Soviet pursuit of openness, as the knowledge of such reactions will convey to us how people expect Gorbachev and his colleagues to reach new heights in the field of openness. Finally we will refer to certain limitations of the Gorbachevian policy of openness.*

### WHY GLASNOST?

**M**IKHAIL Gorbachev explained rather implicitly the concept of reorganisation in his speech delivered at the 27th CPSU Congress. There he emphasised that the USSR must pursue the path of truth<sup>1</sup>, as, according to him, the pursuit of this path would make it possible for the Soviet people to engage themselves wholeheartedly in the task of reconstruction. Later days witnessed an explicit unfoldment of the idea of reorganisation at the hands of Gorbachev. Thus Gorbachev made the following comment in his speech at the All-Union Conference of Heads of Social Sciences Departments held at Moscow in September 1986:

The truth must be sought through a comparison of various view-

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points through discussions and debates, with destruction of the old stereotypes.<sup>2</sup>

And it is the way of discussions and debates which reflect the policy of openness, a part of reorganisation. The Party Chief found it essential in January 1987 to devote a whole speech for explaining in detail the different aspects of reorganisation. The extract given below from this speech underscores the significance of openness in the field of reorganisation.

Openness, criticism and self-criticism are vital for us. These are major requisites of the socialist way of life. If someone believes that we need these only for criticizing past drawbacks he is making a big mistake. The main point is that openness, criticism and self criticism, democracy are necessary for our advance, for accomplishing immense tasks. We shall not be able to accomplish these tasks without the people's active involvement. This is why we need all this.<sup>3</sup>

Mikhail Gorbachev made plain in the same speech that without developing democracy, without the broad involvement of the working people "we will not be able to cope with the tasks of reorganisation."<sup>4</sup> The 18th Trade Union Congress was also given the same message from the CPSU General Secretary. It was conveyed that every transaction in a socialist state is the concern of the people. And later in the same vein, Gorbachev declared: "that is why we stand for openness. . . . We stand for criticism and self-criticism, which should also be a normal practice in our life. We need such powerful forms of democracy as openness, criticism and self-criticism in order radically to change every sphere of our social life."<sup>5</sup>

The Report submitted by Gorbachev at the Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on 25 June 1987, surveyed the policies and practices undertaken for implementing the tasks of "radical restructuring" in the period of the two years of Gorbachevian leadership. The proud announcement made there is noteworthy in the present context:

The first conclusion that arises from the experiences of the past two years is that the atmosphere of openness which has been created in the country and which enables every person to display his civic stance, take an active part in discussing and resolving the vitally important problems of our society, and accelerate processes leading in the direction should not only be preserved and maintained but also deepened and developed.<sup>6</sup>



*Links between a truthful system and a dynamic economy*

The Soviet leader has thus conveyed through various speeches that there is a very close link between a truthful system and an efficient and dynamic economy. If, for instance, the system is truthful, its description and its practical outcomes do not conflict with each other. Moreover, neither the system functions in such a manner that participants are compelled to be at odds with laws, nor does it force them into routine violations of generally accepted moral standards. Leaders of such a system follow certain norms while dealing with people. They arrive at decisions through democratic methods. They do not utilise their positions for selfish purposes. They are honest not only in the reporting of past activities, but also in assuring future days. Such a system is open and there develops a *rapprochement* between leaders and participants. Common masses then willingly follow rules and regulations. They do not find it expedient to resort to illegal means for raising their living standards. The open system thus facilitates smooth and efficient transactions. There thus comes into existence a dynamic economy. Mikhail Gorbachev, of course, knows it well that unfortunately, the past experience of Soviet Union is not very satisfactory on the criterion of truthful or open system. He has, for example, mentioned in his speeches that Soviet authorities of previous times relied on report paddings and showy communications. Gorbachev has complained that Soviet leaders glossed over obvious shortcomings and resorted to offering false promises of a beautiful future.<sup>7</sup> He has categorically blamed leading bodies of the Party and the State for "a conservative outlook, inertia, a tendency to brush aside all that did not fit into conventional patterns and unwillingness to come to grips with outstanding socio-economic problems."<sup>8</sup>

All the admissions of the present Soviet leader remind us of an interesting commentary made on the economic crisis of State Socialism by Jan S. Prybyla:

The suppression of reality, the hiding of real phenomena, the burying of unpleasant truths are not, of course, limited to the State Socialist System. *However, in the State Socialist System they are the officially sanctioned and propagated rules.*<sup>9</sup> (Emphasis added)

Till the mid-1950s, Soviet leaders could afford to ignore the requirements of a truthful and open society; the resources were abundant, the masses were docile and happy with moderate living standards. Visible external dangers to the security of USSR moreover inculcated the spirit of devotion in people. Later days witnessed a scarcity of resources. In



the very period, however, aspirations of the masses also reached new heights. Memories of the past events moreover no longer inspired new generations. While the industrial and scientific progress required enthusiastic public participation in the development process, the people at large developed lethargic and passive attitudes towards macro-level issues. Thus Soviet Union began to experience that while growing mechanization required a very careful maintenance and utilisation of resources, the workers and managers concerned with production processes exhibited reckless behavioural patterns. This was indeed a natural culmination of the negligence of the human factor in the long span of the Stalinist period.

Wellknown Soviet thinkers like Richard Kasalapov and Tatyana Zaslavskaya have plainly admitted that for seven decades or so, the USSR has undergone severe strains and tensions due to the lag between a remarkable growth of productive forces and the almost stagnant productive relations.<sup>10</sup> Gorbachev lent official authenticity to this view, when he made the following remark in his exposition of reorganisation in January 1987: "An ossified concept of socialist relations of production appeared, and their dialectical interaction with the productive forces was underestimated" in the period since 1930s-1940s.<sup>11</sup> It is true that the present Soviet thinking is expressing what has already been pointed out by non-Soviet thinkers. Thus in the 1950s Oscar Lange noted the intellectual ossification of socialist thought, and in the same decade D.P. Mukherji, one of the founder members of the Lucknow School of Economics, referred to anti-intellectualism in the socialist movement.<sup>12</sup> The present official airing of such views is indeed a notable aspect of the policy of openness expounded by Gorbachev. This is undoubtedly remarkable against the background of a long span which observed the spread of simplistic notions of productive relations in the USSR. Thus the ending of the problem of unemployment was considered as equivalent to the ending of all problems pertaining to employment. Egalitarianism was given the status of Socialism. The price structure that was adopted in the Soviet economy actually reflected a "money illusion", in view of the fact that it underestimated the true prices of commodities and overestimated the true cash balances in the hands of consumers. Primacy of the production of the means of production over the production of the means of consumption became the prime indicator of progress. Dogmatic assertion of this view actually resulted in the practice of ignoring and neglecting the needs of the social sphere of the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup> No wonder therefore that the development of the social sphere of the national economy received a residual allocation of resources. Gorbachevian policy of openness is definitely a glaring contrast to the Soviet history of seventy years. The paragraph given



below from an article published in one of the recent issues of the *News and Views From the Soviet Union* mirrors this contrast only:

Several generations of Soviet people lived in accordance with the principle 'all for socialism. . . .' Now the Soviet people are trying to establish the principle 'socialism for the people.' The main aim of economic development now is social development. For the first time in the history of this country, the development of the social sphere is accorded as much importance as the development of production.<sup>14</sup>

### *Socialism For the People*

Negligence of the social sphere in the Soviet Union has produced certain problems like alienation on the part of workers, lack of a sense of mission in the youth and a number of widespread corrupt practices. The first two problems are very serious, as they challenge the legitimacy of the Soviet system and also throw light on the roots of the third problem. Credit again goes to the General Secretary for pointing out openly that solution of these problems must receive first priority in the USSR. He, for example, stated in his elaboration of the policy of reorganization in January 1987 that in the Soviet Union, conditions must be created and the suitable forms of production organisation must be evolved for making workers feel that they are the real masters of their enterprises.<sup>15</sup> He stated in the speech that "a house can be put in order only by a person who feels that he owns the house."<sup>16</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev continues to emphasise this principle. He has indeed confirmed that a mere juridical or constitutional change in the ownership of the means of production does not imbibe the required social consciousness in workers. The 27th CPSU Congress pointed out that "it would be naive to imagine that the feeling of ownership can be inculcated by words." Tatyana Zaslavskaya has also repeated the same theme in an article in one of the recent issues of the well-known journal "Communist." The editor of this journal invited readers to express their views on this theme and one V. Lipitsky came out with the following response:

Today much is said and written about the insufficiently solicitous attitude towards work at all levels—of production and management. This phenomenon is rooted in the unexpectedly tenacious consequences of the *old alienation of labour*—at least socially and psychologically. Quite a lot of people still do not feel themselves co-owners of public property.<sup>17</sup> (Emphasis added)



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This paragraph exposes the tenacious continuation of the old alienation of labour in the contemporary Soviet society. A flash-back analysis of the October Revolution attempted by Anatoly Butenko takes us to the root cause of the present anomaly. According to this analysis, the October Revolution facilitated the juridical public ownership of means of production; "it did not however reflect the factual ownership of the working people over the means of production. There merely appeared the possibility for moulding new—*not capitalist, yet not completely socialist*—relations that could eventually lead to a socialist system of relations of production."<sup>18</sup> (Emphasis added)

According to Paresh Chattopadhyaya even this type of analysis falls short of the actual assessment of today's Soviet Union. He has thus argued that what has in fact happened in the USSR is the real private (collective) appropriation of the means of production by a small minority, "who through the party-state apparatus, continues to dominate the conditions of production and the immediate producers, by definition, continue to be wage labourers."<sup>19</sup> Paresh Chattopadhyaya has further mentioned that the oligarchic domination over the means of production has resulted in tragic labour participation which is "forcible, alien and imposed from the exterior."<sup>20</sup>

This viewpoint is, of course, quite extreme; even the present Soviet thinking which mirrors the policy of openness does not go to the extent of accepting it. Butenko and others, for example, do not share the opinion that means of production in the USSR are practically owned by the minority. That, however they admit of alienation of the Soviet labourer is itself thrilling. And the policy of openness deserves to be appreciated at least on that ground.

Gorbachev indeed feels that the neglected, alienated and unenthusiastic masses can be energised through the pursuit of openness, as, in his opinion, ultimately it is the open and truthful society which can inculcate in its members the sense of belonging. His policy of openness has accordingly blessed an open discussion of troublesome subjects in the USSR. It has facilitated an open criticism of the shortcomings of the Soviet Union. It has also invited people to re-examine the history of the USSR. It has moreover encouraged citizens to engage in a political debate over the future of the Soviet system.

## SHORTCOMINGS OF BREZHNEVIAN SYSTEM

*Attacks on Brezhnevism*

The shortcomings of the Soviet Union, exposed so far in pursuance of the campaign for openness, are quite revealing. These can be listed



broadly under three headings such as Brezhnevism, bureaucratism and parasitism. Brezhnevism appears to be important as it was Brezhnev whose rule for around two decades perpetuated failures like bureaucratism, parasitism, etc. The Gorbachevian attack on Brezhnev is, moreover quite consistent with the wellknown Soviet pattern, where "the new man has to blame somebody in the past for the way everything is going wrong now."<sup>21</sup> "A new broom sweeps in a new way"—thus reads the Russian proverb. Gorbachev is indeed following the Soviet pattern. He has plainly stated that for the piling up of unresolved problems since the beginning of the 1970s, the CPSU Central Committee and the leadership of the country deserve to be criticised.<sup>22</sup> Once the new General Secretary sets the tone, others go on repeating expected refrains in the USSR. Thus participants at the international conference "Socialism at the Threshold of the 21st Century," held in Moscow on 11-12 May 1987, described the political decisions of the 1970s as "subjective, voluntaristic and time-serving."<sup>23</sup> They pointed out in other words that the leadership of those years "contradicted the objective needs of the development of a socialist society." If another APN News Bulletin remarked that the Soviet leaders of the 1970s resorted to old, obsolete methods for solving new problems,<sup>24</sup> A. Yakovlev, a member of the Politbureau and Secretary Central Committee, bluntly observed that the Brezhnevian concept of developed socialism became an obstruction to a realisation of the need for cardinal change.<sup>25</sup> Alexander Bovin, a reputed Soviet water on international affairs held Brezhnev responsible for the spread of silent obedience and slavish kowtowing to the bosses, as the previous leader "allowed himself to be turned into a monument to himself."<sup>26</sup> The resultant speedy decline of democratism affected Party meetings. Boris Yeltsin, one of the most outspoken colleagues of Gorbachev gave voice to this feeling when he stated that, "Party officials lack the courage to promptly and objectively assess the situation and their personal role, to tell the truth, if it is bitter."<sup>27</sup> The Brezhnev-phenomenon moreover gave a boost to the system where personal connections counted for a great deal. Thus under the shadows of Brezhnev, Sympathizers close to the captain, climbed the ladder quickly. Gorbachev perhaps had this phenomenon in mind when he warned Party officials in Moscow in September 1986 that there was no specific rule for them and another for the people.<sup>28</sup> Gorbachev has criticised Brezhnev also for the violation of the implementation of the principle of distribution. His comment is worth quoting here:

...One should add that although the assignments of the past three Five Year Plans for the growth of production and its efficiency were not



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fulfilled, spending on wages systematically exceeded the figures set by the plans.<sup>29</sup>

According to Gorbachev, "a certain part of the money was paid out without any connection with the end results of work." That the present Soviet leader is annoyed over the sustained negligence of basic popular requirements by previous captains is more than obvious. That he wants to provide essential goods and services to masses is equally obvious. He however knows that the needed resources for this purpose can be made available if a stop is put to the relentless militarisation pursued by Brezhnev for around two decades. This aspect of the present anti-Brezhnev campaign is interesting indeed. As evidence, one can refer to the dismissal of the Defence Minister, Sergei Sokolov and of the Head of Air-Defences, Chief Marshal Alexander Koldunov in reaction to the incursion into Soviet air space by a West German youth, Mathias Rust. The Gorbachevian peace offensive and a weakening of the influence of the military are indeed two sides of the same coin. To that extent, an attack on Brezhnevism is in line with the policies of Gorbachev.

*Anti-Bureaucratism Natural Outcome of Anti-Brezhnevism*

An attack on bureaucratism is also a follow-up of the policy of openness. Actually it was Brezhnev who offered undue security to bureaucrats and therefore anti-Brezhnevism results in anti-bureaucratism as well. The exposure of bureaucratic shortfalls seems to be a multi-dimensional phenomenon. As for the first dimension or aspect, the present leadership wants to break the Brezhnevian policy of carrying personnel stability to the point of absurdity. According to Gorbachev, "the artificial stability has essentially turned into personnel stagnation."<sup>30</sup> Secondly, technocratic, "administrative pressure" style of work must also be discontinued, as it has caused great damage to the public relations policy. According to Gorbachev, such a style has led "Party workers to ignore socially significant phenomena in the economy, and in social and cultural life."<sup>31</sup> Thirdly, anti-bureaucratism means condemning such party committees and secretaries who try to cover up their own blunders and failures with ostentatious exactingness towards personnel.<sup>32</sup> Fourthly, it implies an attack on those executives who are intolerant of independent actions and thoughts of subordinates.<sup>33</sup> Lastly, it signifies "discharging careerists and time-servers, all who sully the title of Party-members, of the Soviet Executive by money-grabbing, drunkenness and immorality."<sup>34</sup> As Fred Halliday has pointed out, Gorbachev has so far dismissed 200,000 or more party and state officials.<sup>35</sup> That the number of dismissed officers includes many renowned stalwarts is a well known fact. The



standards by which Gorbachev brought about changes in the Party and the Government within a year after assuming the headship of CPSU were quite staggering if compared to the changes in the previous regime. Thus sixteen of the Soviet Union's 64 ministers were removed and replaced by younger men. If for example, Nikolai Baibakov, the Chief of the GOSPLAN was replaced by Talyzin, Tikhonov, the octogenarian Prime Minister was replaced by Mr. Nikolai Ryzhkhov and Boris Yeltsin was appointed to the post of Moscow's Party boss as a substitute for the dismissed Victor Grishin. Recently of course, Yeltsin has also been dismissed. Dinmuhammed Kunayev of Kazakhstan and Dzhusupbek Akmatov of Soviet Kirgizia were sacked on the ground of serious shortcomings pertaining to the issue of nationality. Leonid Khitrin, Minister of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Fodder Production and Sergei Afanassiev, Minister for Heavy and Transport Machine Building were dismissed for the failures in their performances.<sup>36</sup> While several corrupt administrators in the Rostov region were sent to forced labour camps, V. Usmanov, one of the former ministers of Uzbekistan was awarded death sentence for embezzlement and other crimes.<sup>37</sup> According to Achin Vanaik, Gorbachev took stern disciplinary measures against intermediate layers of bureaucracy, as the squeezing of such layers was considered as an effective antidote to the so called "moonlighting" (black market) activities on a large scale.<sup>38</sup> Thus twenty-two out of 121 regional First Secretaries of Rostov were ousted by Gorbachev in the first eight months after assuming the highest Party post. Gorbachev found it necessary almost in the same period to wind up the seven ministries in charge of agriculture, thus "putting thousands of bureaucrats out of work and replacing them with a single committee and single chairperson."<sup>39</sup> Such type of harshness on the part of new leadership against parochial, corrupt and redundant elements in Soviet bureaucracy is surely an expression of the course of openness. It was through the following wording that Gorbachev gave voice to this harshness:

We have transferred to new methods of administration; we need to cut down the apparatus. I do not want to say by how much we should cut it, but I think it should be resolute.<sup>40</sup>

Such a harshness is justified in view of the damages caused by the bureaucracy to the Soviet economy. We can allude to certain damages like heavy paper work, negligence of final ends of any process, ministerial distortions of reform principles, carelessness towards quality considerations, and so on. The leadership knows that the Soviet people, who no longer happen to be lumpen masses, suffer a lot because of such damages. Deliberate paper business, which is a reflection of over-



organised thinking makes all decision, coordinating efforts trying and exhausting. Evgenii Chazov, the Nobel Peace laureate and the Soviet Health Minister has given sanction to this observation at least with respect to life sciences. In his opinion, it is the bureaucratic stranglehold which comes in the way of meaningful research activities in frontier areas like immunology, genetics or molecular and cellular biology. He has thus stated that there are as many as 72 scientific councils and 509 ad-hoc committees overseeing medical research activities.<sup>41</sup>

Excessive insistence on paper and procedures has resulted in much bureaucratic fuss. It has in fact led administrators to pay priority attention to the inflated reports and communications. Final results are therefore frustrating. If one manager of an enterprise indulges in "storming activities", another goes on utilising redundant inputs, thus facilitating "gold plating." Somebody else tries to impress his superiors by showing results in terms of gross output and ignoring the quality of products.

It is again the bureaucratic fuss which leads ministers and other superiors to distort reforms. Gorbachev has thus complained that "certain officials keep shifting the burden on to the central authorities, and wait for assistance from those higher up."<sup>42</sup> He has also stated that "leaders of many regions take a light attitude to the cause. If there is a shortage of feed, they send telegrams to the Central Committee and the Government."<sup>43</sup> That certain officials do not bother to utilize local resources and count only on those coming from elsewhere, has also been pointed out by Gorbachev."<sup>44</sup> An alliance between bureaucrats and ministers actually gives a boost to the command methods in economic management. No wonder, quality is the number one casualty, Gorbachev is highly disturbed over several negative phenomena like permissiveness, mutual cover-up, slackening discipline, and so on. In his opinion, one should blame in this context serious discrepancies such as subversion of the authority of plan by subjective approaches, imbalance, instability, the striving to embrace everything down to trifles, etc.<sup>45</sup>

It is interesting here to refer to the measures undertaken for overcoming bureaucratic shortfalls. Thus the dominance of paper business will be demolished by fewer instructions, directives, conferences, meetings and commissions. "Checkups and inspections will be rendered orderly. The structure and functions of ministries and departments are being specified. Petty tutelage of enterprises will be removed, and so will be infringements of their rights on the part of higher bodies."<sup>46</sup> Then there is a drawback of the negligence of final results. Here Gorbachev has asked authorities concerned to implement substantive measures in the place of window-dressing and palliatives. His attack on the bureaucratic habit of sending showy, inflated reports to higher



authorities is also quite appropriate in this regard. As for the removal of ministerial distortion of reforms, the new leadership decided to define and legally formalise the rights and duties both of enterprises and the top echelons of the economic management structure—Ministries, Departments, etc.<sup>47</sup> The new law accordingly adopted by the Soviet Parliament on 30 June 1987 has offered greater autonomy and made enterprises self-financing and financially self-supporting. Thus “there will be no state subsidies, except investments in major new projects.”<sup>48</sup> Moreover, enterprises have been allowed to engage in any economic activities which are not specifically banned by the new law.<sup>49</sup> The new policy which entrusts only strategic decisions to the Centre and tactics to enterprises is also a remedial measure for narrowing the arena of ministerial interference in the management of enterprises. Such a transition of enterprises to self-financing and full cost-accounting is expected to goad factory managers to produce only quality products. Proposed replacement of the system of centralised distribution of production means with their wholesale trade and direct links among enterprises is also supposed to make managers conscious of the quality of their output.

#### *Anti-Parasitism Significant Aspect of 'Glasnost'*

Anti-parasitism is also an equally significant aspect of the campaign for openness. Gorbachev has criticised parasitism on the part of leaders as well as that of common citizens. It appears that the former type of parasitism is at the root of the latter. It was mainly an inertia and formalism on the part of the predecessors of Gorbachev which facilitated the spread of egalitarianism, philistinism, alcoholism and consumerism in the Soviet masses. Gorbachev has provided quite some evidence of the inertia of previous leaders. He has, for example, stated that “the theoretical concepts of Socialism had remained largely unchanged since the 1930s-1940s, when the tasks being tackled by society were entirely different.”<sup>50</sup> This type of inertia gave birth to dogmas that left no room for analysis. Secondly, very simplistic solutions were offered to such key problems as public ownership, relations between classes and nationalities, the measure of work and the measure of consumption, cooperation, methods of economic management, people's rule and self-government, struggle against bureaucratic abuses and so on.<sup>51</sup> Thirdly, there were violations of the most important principle of Socialism—distribution according to work. “Struggle against unearned income was not determined enough. The policy of providing material and moral incentives for efficient work was inconsistent.”<sup>52</sup> When inertia was supplemented by formalism there came into existence a sort of stagnation or immobilism, of course, under the camouflage of “developed socialism,”



A reference has already been made to the habit of "report padding." Gorbachev referred to the formalism in socialist emulation in his address at the 18th Trade Union Congress held at Moscow in February 1987. His figurative reference is quotable:

At times one even begins to think that the trade unions have helped to instal into the sphere of emulation some kind of 'paper motor' which, as paper keeps moving in, revolves regardless of whether there is any competition or not.<sup>53</sup>

Parasitism at the top is bound to come down to the level of the masses; and it has come down accordingly. Thus the simplistic equation between Socialism and Egalitarianism resulted in the policy of wage levelling, which kept the careless worker and his efficient counterpart on the same level. From the view point of Gorbachev, such a simplistic notion led authorities to ask "customers to pay the same price to the *Omsk Amalgamation* for its tyres, whose quality is the best in the country, as to other factories."<sup>54</sup> The resultant ironic situation made Gorbachev put the following rhetoric: "How can an economy make progress if it offers hot-house conditions for laggards, while hitting front-runners?"<sup>55</sup> The same type of situation in Soviet agriculture in pursuance of the previous application of the principle of egalitarianism there elicited the following remark from Gorbachev: "The old practice (of egalitarianism), when the negligent worker was paid from the budget, corrupted the farmer."<sup>56</sup>

Gorbachev feels sorry to point out that parasitism at top levels "hit those workers who could and wanted to work better, while making life easier for the lazy ones."<sup>57</sup> There inevitably grew in this atmosphere drawbacks like philistinism and consumerism. "Interest in the affairs of society slackened, signs of amorality and scepticism appeared and the role of moral incentives in work declined."<sup>58</sup>

Gorbachev further mentioned:

The section of people, including youth, whose ultimate goal in life was material being and gain by any means, grew wider. Their cynical stand acquired more and more aggressive forms, poisoned the mentality of those around them and triggered a wave of consumerism. The spread of alcohol and drug abuse and a rise in crime witnessed the decline of social mores.<sup>59</sup>

A discussion of remedial steps for overcoming parasitism must begin with a review of measures proposed for doing away with the top level inertia. Gorbachev has thus suggested that Soviet people urgently need



a real breakthrough on the theoretical front based on a strict analysis of the entire sum total of the aspects of Society's life, a scientific substantiation of the aims and prospects of "our" movement.<sup>60</sup> He expects that "the leadership must make a profound analysis of the wealth of experience accumulated not only by the USSR, but also by other fraternal countries."<sup>61</sup> He believes that multi-dimensional restructuring based on such type of analysis is the effective answer to the problem of inertia. The Plenary Meeting held in January 1987 formulated the theory and policy of restructuring. The main principles of restructuring can accordingly be listed as follows:—more reliance on the masses, more effective wielding of democratic centralism, a resolute switch to science; priority development of the social sphere, a determined struggle against negative phenomena in the moral sphere, a struggle for a healthy moral atmosphere and social justice.<sup>62</sup> It was in June 1987 that Gorbachev reviewed the process of restructuring implemented till then in the USSR. He felt that the process of restructuring had awakened activity among the masses. He therefore warned his colleagues that restructuring in the Party must not lag behind the economic, social and spiritual processes which were taking place in the Soviet Union "We cannot allow a situation where changes in life and the moods of people would outpace the understanding of these processes in the Party, particularly its guiding bodies."<sup>63</sup> The new Party-Captain is indeed impatient to demolish top-level inertia and parasitism. His Report to the Plenary Meeting of June 1987, launched very explicit attacks on leading personalities like Talyzin, Voronin, Khitrin, Afanassiev, etc. The same Report also made different references to certain republics and regions as they failed in their missions. The worthy leaders and regions have, of course, been openly honoured by the same document. The Gorbachevian policy of openness perhaps believes that the simultaneous exposure of faulty elements and the felicitation of worthy counterparts would assist the remedying of parasitism at the top. As for overcoming parasitism at the power levels, the campaign for openness relies on such features as "encouragement to local initiative and departure from over-organisation and from excessive reliance on centralized management. . . ."<sup>64</sup> Gorbachev is confident that if the collectives and individual workers are made accountable for the use of public property; if, in other words, the broad masses of the working people are involved in economic management at every level from work unit to the entire national economy, a worker may become a real and active co-proprietor in the true sense.<sup>65</sup> We have already noted that the feeling of alienation has made a Soviet worker negligent to his social obligations, selfish, philistine and consumerist in his individual pursuits. If therefore, conscious efforts are put in by the leadership to involve the worker in management and administration, the just mentioned drawbacks would be remedied. The



present leadership has thus decided to replace administrative methods of management by economic ones. The economic methods rely on five commandments; (a) Extend drastically the margins of independence for amalgamations and factories; (b) Entrust only strategic decisions to centralized economic management. This would relieve the Centre of interference in the day-to-day activities of subordinate economic bodies; (c) Evolve a well-ordered price and finance-and-credit system whereby the market would be controlled in accordance with its laws; (d) Create new organizational structures to ensure deeper specialization and more reliable co-production schemes; and (e) Go over from an excessively centralized, command system of management to a democratic one promoting self-administration and a mechanism for activating the individual's potential.<sup>66</sup> Only time will prove how far such measures would help remedy parasitism at various levels of the Soviet society.

In pursuance of the campaign for openness Mikhail Gorbachev has exposed various shortcomings of Soviet life. Such an exposure is bound to result in the critical assessment of the past as well as in open debate of the future. The present is indeed linked with the past as well as with the future, as it offers on the one hand, relics of previous years and, on the other, hints of future times. Certain factors have further strengthened the Gorbachevian urge to re-examine history and to encourage a free and frank debate of future policies. First, the formative years of the present Party-Chief have played their role in influencing Gorbachev to opt for a re-assessment of Soviet history. Secondly, the policy of deBrezhnevization cannot isolate the Brezhnevian era from the whole course of Soviet history as, like any other leader, Brezhnev also inherited the past in some respects at least; and to that extent an attack on Brezhnev is bound to culminate in a critical examination of previous years. Thirdly, the policy of openness has sanctioned the freeing of media and the rehabilitation of writers and poets victimised in the past. As a logical follow up of these processes, Gorbachev gave his consent to re-examine Soviet history.

Mikhail Gorbachev, born in 1931, began to work for the Party in the 1950s; the decade had witnessed the launching of the deStalinisation-campaign at the hands of Khrushchev. The post-Stalin leadership created a historical sensation by bringing to light a number of crimes committed by Stalin. Gorbachev must have thus observed the futility of terroristic practices. He did not, of course, fully share the Khrushchevian views. We can here rely on the commentary of one Zdenek Mlynar, a former leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who had studied as a colleague of Gorbachev at the Moscow State University in the 1950s. He stated in his article in April 1985, that Gorbachev did not like the Khrushchevian interventions in



the field of economic management. According to Gorbachev, "Khrushchev had put in motion in a unilateral manner a campaign directed from the Centre and supported by his own subjective solutions, which were handed over as a panacea." It was indeed the free atmosphere of the 1950s which shaped the formative years of Gorbachev. As a result, the present Soviet leader is least dogmatic in his approach. According to Gromyko, "He refuses to be guided by the law of black and white; he is in other words, for intermediate colours, intermediate links and intermediate decision."<sup>68</sup> Such a person, no doubt, finds it indispensable to discontinue a large number of past policies. Re-examination of history is thus very natural to Gorbachev; it is obviously a conviction on the part of the new Party Chief that social and cultural reforms must precede economic progress. It is moreover certain that Gorbachev treats Stalin's legacy as an obstacle in the path of reorganisation. This feeling must have led him to bless the policy to re-examine Soviet history.

#### REASSESSMENT FOR THE FUTURE

Attacks on Brezhnevian policies also led the present authorities to undertake a re-assessment of the entire past, as criticism of this type cannot confine itself only to the immediate past. Mikhail Gorbachev stated in his Report to the 27th CPSU Congress that the targets set by the previous Congress for the 11th Five Year Plan period had remained unfulfilled. He drew then three important lessons from the review of this period. The first one was, of course, a very important lesson. He called it the lesson of truth. He conveyed the following message in this regard:

A responsible analysis of the past clears the way to the future, whereas a half-truth which shamefully evades the sharp corners holds down the elaboration of realistic policy and impedes our advance.<sup>69</sup>

Later Gorbachev literally shocked the conservatives in his Party by erasing one after another quite a few Brezhnevian policies. During that course it became evident that by the pursuit of truth Gorbachev actually meant a rewriting of Soviet History. Thus in February 1987, a record number of 140 dissidents were released by Gorbachev. That time a meeting of senior media officials heard from the Party Chief that "there should be no forgotten names or blanks either in history or in literature. . . . History must be seen for what it is and that there should be no attempt to cover up mistakes, miscalculations...decisions."<sup>70</sup> Gorbachev gradually undermined the whole Brezhnevite hold of the



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party. He also decided to free managers of enterprises from the suffocating central dominance. On these occasions he reminded audiences that in the immediate post-Revolution years and in the years of NEP there prevailed real democracy inside as well as outside the party. He thus conveyed to citizens that any portion of Soviet History can become a topic for debate. If the present experiments in Soviet agriculture make citizens doubt about the validity of collectivisation of agriculture; the frank admission that socio-cultural needs of Soviet masses have been neglected urges upon historians to reassess the whole spectrum of Soviet policies.

The decision of removing restrictions on the Soviet media and that of showering posthumous honours on certain writers have also brought the entire Soviet History in the arena for a fresh debate. It was in March 1986 that Mikhail Nenashev, Chief of the Soviet publishing industry, called upon journalists to be more open and critical. He described the news and features in the Soviet press as an "over simplified picture of the reality, which was far from the real." He also urged journalists to become professionally bold: "Let us call successes, successes, shortcomings, shortcomings and mistakes, mistakes."<sup>71</sup> It seems that the Soviet news media decided to implement this message with great enthusiasm. At present in the USSR we come across media criticism of such features and institutions which were once regarded as sacred. Even the Party journal—*Kommunist*—is launching attacks on matters such as large and wasteful subsidies, inflationary trends, misutilisation of resources and so on. Accidents and disasters also receive extraordinary coverage in newspapers. Then there are events like riots in Kazakhstan, the Red Square picketing by Crimean Tatars, the release of Sakharov from internal exile, etc., which also get impressive publicity at present. As a result of an open media, dogmas crumble and prejudices collapse. Such an atmosphere makes people ask crucial questions about relevant portions of the course followed by the Soviet Union. The partial lifting of censorship of books announced in July 1986 and the reforms in the cultural sphere, endorsed by the Plenary Meeting in January 1987, put an end to the incompetent interference in the creative processes. They also informed citizens that the replacement of methods of ideological influence with high-handed decisions was inadmissible in the guidance of creative activity. Gorbachev feels sure that poets freed from all shackles would render their whole-hearted support to the proposed reforms in Soviet life. Thus Yevgeny Yevtushenko has definitely come ahead to propagate the Gorbachevian fight against a sluggish bureaucracy. The permission granted recently to the staging of a historical play by Mikhail Shatrov also mirrored the Gorbachevian attacks on excessive militarism



expounded by the previous regime. The play informs people of the Leninist insistence on signing a peace treaty with Germany in 1917-18. But the openness of this type of theatre blessed by Gorbachev has got a direct bearing on the re-examination of Soviet History. Also, the permission granted for the publication of *Dr. Zhivago* of Boris Pasternak has invited people to re-assess the entire Russian revolutionary period. The sanction given to the printing of the novel *Children of the Arbat* by Andrei Rybakov has in fact asked the people to note the cruelty of Stalinist purges. And the posthumous recognition granted to the novel *Life and Fate* of Vasily Grossman has actually meant that the Soviet Government expects people to remember certain war period misfortunes like tortures in prisons, anti-Jewish campaigns and curbs on personal freedoms. The openness or *glasnost* in Soviet media has already encouraged some publishing houses and literary journals to print such works which were banned in previous times. As a result, poems of Gumilev, Nabokov, Khodasevich and Voloshin have reached readers. Anna Akhmatova's poem *Requiem*, and Yuri Stefanovich's short story *Snows* have also seen the light of day. Events buried in the past are thus revisiting the Soviet masses. Gorbachev and his colleagues indeed feel that history needs to be re-examined.

The policy to re-examine Soviet History in fact reflects three types of considerations on the part of Gorbachev. First, it reflects that Gorbachev is merely succumbing to the situation. A widespread circulation of underground journals and a sort of information explosion due to the increasing contacts with capitalist countries have seriously affected Soviet life. The new rulers have therefore decided to take initiative and welcome historians to undertake the task of re-assessing the past. Zhores Medvedev has rightly stated that presently a society has arisen "which is ideologically and politically heterogeneous and makes the governments of countries tolerant of different points of view in the population."<sup>72</sup> Secondly, Gorbachev wants to inform citizens that he is genuinely interested in the Soviet march towards pluralism, of course within certain limits. He must therefore discard Stalinist ways of dealing with dissidents. Permission to re-examine historical events has thus persuaded Gherman Trukan, the Deputy Director of the Soviet Institute of History to observe that a fresh scientific analysis and indepth study must be undertaken for probing the controversy between left wing and right wing concepts of social development witnessed by the Soviet people for fifteen years after the death of Lenin.<sup>73</sup> Gorbachev wants to show his faith in the rectification of historical distortions undertaken by Stalin, because he knows that the latter aimed at legitimising his tyrannical rule; and therefore every attempt was made to eliminate altogether the names of opponents like Trotsky, Bukharin and Zinoviev. Thirdly, the decision to reopen



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historical questions is relevant for solving current problems as well. Thus a leading Soviet scholar, academician Isaak Mints has stated in his article published in the journal *Voprosy Istorii*, that a new interpretation must be made of the first "crusade" organised by the seven capitalist countries for overthrowing the young Soviet Government in the immediate post-Revolution times; as according to him, the same seven countries are presently busy in conducting an anti-Soviet campaign. If the government gives sanction to an overall re-examination of the collectivisation of agriculture launched by Stalin in the late 1920s it will merely underscore the governmental determination to encourage private production in farming.

We have stated above that a post-mortem of the present shortcomings inevitably results not only in a re-examination of past events, but also in a debate over future policies. It seems that the openness in Soviet Union has accordingly moved from a criticism of society's drawbacks to the beginning of a debate over the future course of USSR. Gorbachev has welcomed such debates and expressed faith in them: "Truth is acquired not by declarations and instructions; it is born in scientific discussion and debate and is verified in action...."<sup>74</sup> A *Pravda* editorial has also endorsed the pursuit of truth through debate: "It must be realised that no one has a monopoly on truth, either in posing new questions or in answering them."<sup>75</sup>

The debate thus, which unfolded itself in the recent past has accordingly given birth to quite a large number of ideas pertaining to the economy and policy of USSR. The list of ideas runs as follows: weakening of central control over enterprises, evolution of a socialist market, emergence of credit institutions, privatisation of the service sector; and so on. Ideas in the field of polity are equally impressive. They can be listed as follows: multi-candidate constituencies in elections, open court enquiries of bureaucrats, dilution of censorship over publications, etc. The proposed economic and political reforms are of course closely interlinked in the state-run Soviet system. Thus proposals like reduction of central planning and increase in the autonomy of enterprise managers and also an enhancement of the role of family farms, etc., are bound to have serious political consequences as they will ultimately free millions of citizens from the domination of bureaucrats. Wellknown Soviet scholar Abel Aganbegian has forcefully advocated the case of self-supporting and self-financing enterprises. According to him, what is needed at present in the Soviet economy is a synthesis between methods of planned economic management and the use of commodity-money relations or market instruments. He has, of course, taken care to point out the distinct marks of a socialist market. Thus he asserts that in the Soviet economy there is no market of capital, of natural resources, or



manpower. "Nevertheless, the use of market instruments is certainly not a monopoly of any social system." Soviet economists are recommending that enterprises must rely on profits and investible surpluses. They are, as if, asking firms either to profit or perish. Economists have also advocated the privatisation of services like repairing of household utilities, running of eating houses, processing of secondary raw materials and wastes into wood and leather products, etc. Such an advocacy believes that a measure of this sort will do away with illegal grey markets and will also offer the required relief to Soviet masses. The idea of multi-candidate constituencies has already been implemented in elections to the local *Soviets* of people's deputies held on 21 June 1987. Another novel idea of permitting citizens to appeal against unlawful actions by officials has also been implemented in the recent past. *Glasnost* or openness has undoubtedly prompted a large number of people to expound various ideas regarding reforms.

#### APPRAISAL

We have in the above lines made a full length review of various aspects of Gorbachevian "openness." Now in the final sections we propose to undertake not only a survey of reactions over the present Soviet policy but also a study of the limitations in this regard. As for reactions, we can begin with the assessments attempted by leaders and experts of capitalist countries. Ultimately, it is the group of rich capitalist countries in general, and the United States in particular, which receive utmost attention in Moscow; and the events in the Soviet Union also get reciprocal cognizance in Washington and London. It seems that the policy of openness has generally been welcomed by capitalist countries, probably because a Soviet Union which resolves its domestic problems democratically appears to be less frightening than a Soviet Union which fails in this arena and therefore presents a frustrated face to the outside world.

It is interesting to note President Reagan's hearty welcome of Gorbachevian *glasnost*:

We hear much about changes in the Soviet Union. We are intensely interested in these changes. We hear the word, '*glasnost*', which is translated as 'openness'. In English 'openness' is a broad term. It means the free, unfettered flow of information, ideas and people. It means political and intellectual liberty in all its dimensions. We hope, for the sake of the peoples of the USSR that such changes will come. And we hope, for the sake of peace, that it will include a foreign policy that respects the freedom and independence of other peoples.<sup>76</sup>



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The reactions of Henry Kissinger are amusing. He does not doubt the sincerity of Gorbachev regarding reforms, though he feels that, "the purpose of reforms is not to spur democracy or freedom, but to encourage efficiency and industrial progress."<sup>77</sup> Abraham Brumberg, a former Editor of the journal *Problems of Communism*, is highly optimistic of the positive accomplishments of *glasnost*. He has in fact called Western analysts to "discard conventional assumptions that could distort their views of the Soviet Union."<sup>78</sup> Fred Halliday has reminded us of similar reforms attempted by Khrushchev in the past. He has however remarked in the same vein that, "matters have already gone further than in the Khrushchev period and it would be difficult, though not impossible, to turn the clock back."<sup>79</sup> Max Jakobson thinks that, "the Gorbachev revolution is irreversible, because of the generational change effected by the present leader."<sup>80</sup> We can legitimately state that there is world-wide consensus that Mikhail Gorbachev is quite earnest in his campaign to free Soviet people from the bondage of prohibitive features and that under his leadership there is taking place a revolution in a revolution. Last two years have literally witnessed a piling up of evidences of *glasnost* and that is why we feel that the Soviet Union is opening itself to the world.

There are, of course, certain limitations to the Gorbachevian policy of openness. (1) First, the legitimacy of Soviet rules heavily depends on the success they achieve in presenting to the masses that their actions and views are defensible on the ground of interpretations of the relevant position of Marxian thoughts. Soviet rules accordingly present Marx as the defender of their policies. As a result, poor Marx is asked to support concentration camps in one period and to favour the dismantling of such camps in another. Cornelius Castoriadis, a one time radical Greek thinker, has actually stated that there are certain ambiguities in Marxism which make it possible for rulers and others to stretch it in different directions by reinterpreting the texts and putting a new gloss or emphasis on one or more of them.<sup>81</sup> The pertinent question that arises in the present context is whether the Gorbachevian policy of openness will allow a Soviet citizen to follow the reasoning of Castoriadis. Will this policy moreover show a green signal to the frank debate over the contemporary validity to Marxism? Sham Lal, a former Editor of the *Times of India*, in fact feels that in the new situation created by the immense increase in productivity, the more active intervention by the State in the economy, the taming of the working class by the steady rise in living standards and the disappearance of the spectre of revolution, one should admit that the Marxian prognosis has become out of date at least in the highly industrialised societies.<sup>82</sup> The fact that such statements are likely to be described as heretical in official circles in Moscow



informs us of the limitations of *glasnost*

(2) Secondly, the Gorbachevian policy of openness has undoubtedly criticised Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. It has, however, restrained itself while dealing with Lenin. Gorbachev actually refers to the policies adopted by Lenin for conveying to the masses that he is carrying forward the legacy of Lenin. Thus the policy of giving more and more freedom to people is defended on the ground that Lenin also believed in the same policy. The decision to expose the shortcomings of the Soviet society is presented as an incarnation of the Leninist faith in self-criticism. Encouragement for the privatisation of services is shown as a pursuit of Leninism; a fight against bureaucratism is also described as an effort to bring into practice the principles of Leninism. In such circumstances, when Leninism has acquired the status of an article of faith, it is highly unlikely that there would take place a free debate on the role of Lenin in heralding Stalinist practices

(3) Thirdly, collectivisation of agriculture has almost become an inseparable feature of the Soviet economy. We therefore feel that even though amendments and modifications in the collectivist structure of agriculture are welcome in the present set-up, the proposal for totally abandoning this structure would not be appreciated by Soviet leaders.

(4) Fourthly, it seems that advocacy of complete marketization will also be discouraged. We have already referred to the remarks made by Aganbegian in this context; he has time and again stressed that the proposed market in the Soviet Union possesses distinct characteristics. He has thus drawn boundaries of the Soviet market. The resultant limitations will affect the whole debate as well.

(5) Fifthly, the policy of openness has sanctioned multi-candidate constituencies in elections for local *Soviets*. It is, however, certain that the CPSU will not allow rival parties to emerge in the Soviet Union. To that extent, there will be restrictions on the debate regarding pluralism in Soviet Union.

(6) Sixthly, recent months have witnessed rehabilitation of writers, release of prisoners and lifting of bans over dissidents like Yevtushenko and Sakharov. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether dissidents like Andrei Tarkovsky, Joseph Brodsky and Alexandar Solzhenytsin will be felicitated at the hands of the present leadership. If Tarkovsky was a self-exiled Soviet film director, always at odds with his country's authorities, Brodsky underscored metaphysical dimensions of life and language; and Solzhenytsin continues to proclaim that "Russia is to the Soviet Union as a man is to the disease afflicting him."<sup>83</sup> Vladimir Bukovsky, a Soviet dissident, who spent many years in jails and labour camps till his release in 1976, seems to be highly sceptical about *glasnost*. He believes that the idea of *glasnost* has been borrowed by Gorbachev



from the Soviet human rights movement. His comment indeed deserves to be quoted here:

So far, Gorbachev has not shown much gratitude to those of our colleagues still imprisoned for offering *glasnost* about Russian society. Perhaps, he is right in one sense, our *glasnost* had very little in common with his. *For us it was a way to expose lies; for him it is a method of concealing them.*<sup>84</sup>

Vladimir Bukovsky has further stated that Gorbachev wants to overcome the backwardness of the Soviet economy through reforms. Thus "it was not a concern for people's well-being that made 'radical changes' in the Soviet economy absolutely necessary...."<sup>84</sup> It is obvious that the policy of openness will neither allow Bukovsky to come back to the USSR nor will sanction anybody to question the motives of Gorbachev.

(7) Reactions in certain East European countries to the Gorbachevian policy of openness also point out another limitation of this policy. Thus Romania is reported to have flatly rejected the notions of democratisation, self-criticism and other elements of *glasnost*. Leaders of the German Democratic Republic also seem to be lukewarm to the Gorbachevian proposals. So long such leaders continue to rule respective countries in East Europe, a Soviet leader is bound to have some bearing on his mind while conducting the campaign for openness.

(8) Finally, there are certain sections in the USSR itself who have strong reservations regarding the policy of *glasnost*. Gorbachev himself stated in a speech at the Plenary Meeting in June 1987, that demands for renewal, creativity and constructive initiative are facing opposition from conservatism, inertia and selfish interests. He also mentioned then, that narrow and egoistic interests of separate individuals and groups as well as the bureaucratic style of work in diverse fields has tended to freeze the renewal drive in Soviet society. The recently held confrontation between Yeltsin and Ligachev is also an evidence of difficulties on the path of openness.

The campaign of openness is nevertheless a welcome measure in the USSR. It has strengthened the Soviet march from Power to Authority and from State to Society. That it is facing certain obstacles need not deter us from appreciating the steps taken by the Soviet leadership for making society open and truthful.

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## NOTES AND VIEWS

### NOTE ON THE COMMISSION ON CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS' REPORT

THE Commission on Centre-State Relations submitted its Report to the Prime Minister in October 1987.

2 The Report is detailed and voluminous. The press reports published so far about its Conclusions and Recommendations are incomplete and somewhat misleading. All the recommendations of the Report as well as its conclusions (especially in first and last chapters) need to be read and considered together to get a comprehensive and balanced view.

3 One of the main conclusions of the Report is that over the years there has been undue concentration of powers in the Union Government. There is urgent need for greater decentralisation, both formally and informally. Undue centralisation leads to blood pressure at the Centre and anaemia at the periphery. The inevitable result is morbidity and inefficiency. Unwise exercise of majority power in the legislature and minority defiance outside it can be quite counter-productive, especially in the long run. The "politics of confrontation" has a regrettable tendency of going beyond reasonable limits and needs to be carefully watched and curbed imaginatively in a heterogeneous country like India, where majorities and minorities have different features and are less interchangeable than in a homogeneous country like Britain.

4 Constitutional amendments having a bearing on Union-State relations suggested by the Commission, though significant, are not many. As noted in the last Chapter, these pertain to Article 155 (appointment of Governor); Article 217 (empowering the President to frame rules); Article 248 read with Entry 97, List I (residuary powers regarding non-tax matters); Article 252(2) (regarding amendment of an Act passed under Clause (1)); Article 269(1)(f) and Entry 92, List I (enlargement of their scope); insertion of a provision regarding sharing of Corporation tax, analogous to Article 272; Article 276(2) (for raising the tax-ceiling on professions, trades, etc); Article 356 (to ensure its proper and efficacious use) and shifting a part of Entry 5 of List II and List III (for ensuring regular elections to and working of local bodies by an all-India statute).

5 But the changes proposed in the functional aspects of Union-State arrangements, are far more substantial. The more important of these relate to the role of Governor; reservation of State Bills for considera-



tion of the President; use of the extraordinary powers under Articles 256, 257 and 356; establishment of a standing Inter-Governmental Council with a comprehensive charter and assisted by an Advisory Committee of experts, National Economic and Development Council having a nexus with the Planning Commission, all formalised under Article 263; limitation of Centrally Sponsored Schemes regarding subjects in the exclusive State field; State Finance and Planning Boards; role of Zilla Parishads and Municipal Corporations regarding socio-economic planning and development; restraint on excessive occupation by the Union of the Concurrent field; periodic review of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951; decentralisation of powers assumed by law under Entry 52, List I; Loans of States and Municipalities; Language policy, etc.

6 The conclusions and recommendations of the Report, if carefully listed, considered and accepted by our legislatures and implemented by the executive, are likely to bring about significant improvement in Union-State relations in our country. I hope this will be done because the alternative will be growing conflict. It may be noted that the Commission sought to adhere strictly to its terms of reference and to avoid making any suggestion which is likely to be unacceptable to a large proportion of our legislators. The Commission has, therefore, taken care not to make any recommendation, which might be theoretically appealing but unlikely to secure the needed amount of support from our legislators. The Report is, therefore, essentially pragmatic, with all the strength and weakness that go with pragmatism.

7 Although on the very first page (Introduction) the Report has noted that "consensus and cooperation which is a prerequisite for smooth functioning of Union-State relations is threatened by politics of confrontation" and in Chapter I (Perspective) it has pointed out serious deficiencies in the actual functioning of our system of government, political parties and electoral process, it has avoided going into them for the above mentioned considerations. I personally feel that these are also very important determinants of Union-State relations, especially in a country like ours. Unless our people and our legislatures are persuaded to correct these deficiencies, the recommendations of the Commission, even if fully implemented, will leave some of the basic problems largely unresolved. I venture, therefore, to highlight through this paper some of the crucial issues which were raised before the Commission but were ultimately left out of the Report because of the considerations mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

8 In the interest of brevity, I refrain from dilating on all the possible alternatives and their pros and cons. I limit myself to expressing my personal preferences on these issues, less as conclusions but more as



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relevant points in the great debate that will obviously be necessary before final decisions are taken.

## SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

9 The system of government obtaining at different levels is a very important factor in influencing Union-State relations that needs reconsideration. If the governments at both the Union and State levels have "fixed tenure" by law or by established convention, there is usually less strain between the two. On the other hand, if the governments at the two levels have "non-fixed tenure" and can be toppled at any time, relations between the two tends to be more difficult, especially when a healthy two-party system and stable governments have not developed as a result of heterogeneity or other peculiar features of society. In a two-tier system with "non-fixed tenure" governments, different political parties ruling at different levels face the temptation and even political compulsion of indulging in the adversary game of undermining the position of one another, especially when party loyalty is weak and discipline lax. The result is that governments are so busy keeping themselves in power that they do not have time to pay due attention to governance. No sooner than a government comes to power after a general election, costing a very large amount of money and effort, frequent attempts are made, either by opposition parties or by factions within the ruling party, to topple the elected government by fair means or foul like defection of individuals, party splits, break up of coalitions, etc. The ruling group tries to retaliate in the same way and unduly multiplies the number of ministers, weakening the effectiveness of the Cabinet. In the end, the country as a whole pays a very heavy price in terms of administrative and economic inefficiency, and what is even more serious, loss of faith of large sections of the people in democracy itself. Before the supposed corrective factor of reaction of the votes in the next general election can become effective, very serious damage may already be done.

10 There is in fact a view that with splits of national parties and emergence of regional parties, Union-State relations in India are likely to suffer increasingly from serious tensions and strains if the British type of "non-fixed tenure" Cabinet system continues in future at both the Union and State levels as at present. The reforms suggested in the Report of the Commission may help reduce them only to a limited extent but will not eliminate them or even reduce them to the extent necessary.

11 In this context, I may note that K.M. Munshi, who was an eminent jurist, a leading member of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent



Assembly, a member of the Union Cabinet and Governor of a state, observed after the first 17 years of working of our Constitution:

Those of us who supported the British Cabinet system, to which we were accustomed, thought that it would work effectively in India; but I must confess that we have failed to evolve the two-party democratic tradition necessary to support the Cabinet system. Our democratic instincts have proved immature. The Congress is falling to pieces; many Opposition parties have no constitutional outlook. The Cabinet system of government has not been a success. The Central Executive has been wobbly. We are heading towards a situation in which either the Presidential system or military rule would become inevitable.

12 He noted that the Constitution has provided some safeguards against possible Presidential dictatorship, e.g.:

- (i) the Council of Ministers presenting a united front,
- (ii) the difficulty of finding an alternative Prime Minister who could form a stable ministry,
- (iii) the danger of possible adverse vote of Parliament.

13 The 42nd Amendment of the Constitution which amended *inter alia* Article 74(1) to add to the original words "there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President", the new words "who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice" provided a further check against possible Presidential dictatorship.

14 But Munshi also noted:

The danger of Cabinet dictatorship—which is all the greater because of its being supported by a regimented political party in Parliament all too willing to retain and enlarge its power—threatened the quasi-federal structure of the Union as well as the democratic processes and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.<sup>1</sup>

15 When as a result of the "first past the post" and "winner gets all" system and multiplicity of parties, the ruling party, while commanding majority of seats in the legislature, does not command majority of the votes polled in the general election (as has been quite common in India as a result of our failure to evolve the two-party system), the Opposition parties are tempted, in a "non-fixed tenure" system, to create situations which may hasten another contest in the polls and the party in power



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is tempted, in its turn, to resort to undemocratic methods to continue in power.

16 While the basic feature of our Constitution must continue to be democracy, it is a moot point whether it must necessarily be the British form of democracy.

17 The "competitive system of politics" which was evolved as a counterpart of the "competitive system of economics", at a special stage of historical development of Britain, which had a unitary system of polity, a relatively homogeneous population and security provided by the seas, was modified or given up in other countries which changed over from a "competitive" to a "socialist" or "cooperative" system of economy or had a two-tier form of government or a heterogeneous population or powerful enemies across the border.

18 USSR and some other East European countries which gave up the competitive system of economy also gave up the competitive system of polity, and adopted the one-party system.

19 United States of America which had the security of oceans, opted for the "fixed tenure" Presidential form of government with **checks and balances** provided by a "separation of powers" thus putting some check on competitive politics while maintaining competitive economics.

20 But several countries, especially those feeling less secure, which adopted the Presidential form later found it politically difficult to provide the same checks and balances with attendant delays in decision-making. The result was that replacement of democracy by dictatorship, implicit if not explicit, became relatively easy. A short cut to the Presidential system by amending Articles 54 (by introducing direct election) and 74 (by reverting to pre-42nd Amendment wording) of our Constitution, that has recently been suggested by some of our politicians, will introduce the Presidential system in India without adequate "checks and balances" and give the President undue power and may *inter alia* adversely affect Union-State relations.

21 Inability to follow the codes of conduct evolved in Britain and develop the requisite spirit of compromise led to the failure of the British system in a number of other countries which tried it.

22 But one country, Switzerland, which is surrounded by aggressive big powers and has a multi-religious, multilingual population with different communities dominating different regions (somewhat like ours), has had the unique distinction of maintaining for over 100 years the competitive system of economics as well as a competitive and confrontational system of politics in the legislature but a 'cooperative' system in the executive. It could not have the luxury of 'separation of powers' which USA could afford because of its security and could not trust a President elected from one region or community with too much power,



It could also not afford to have the politics of confrontation which a homogeneous and relatively secure country like UK was successfully practising. Switzerland has, therefore, evolved an interesting via media, which has served well. Some of its essential features are:

- (i) Supreme power is exercised not by a single person (a President or a Prime Minister) but by a Council of Seven Ministers elected for a fixed tenure through the single transferable vote system by the legislature with the limitation of not more than one minister from one commune.
- (ii) The legislature is elected by a system of proportional representation.
- (iii) The head of this Council is appointed for one year only.
- (iv) Each minister has his work supervised by a small committee of the Legislature elected again by the single transferable vote system.

23 This system, which may not have the exciting confrontations and debates of the British system, succeeded nevertheless in providing Switzerland, which has a heterogeneous population and a two-tier system of government, a remarkably stable and efficient cooperative system of government.

24 When such a system was suggested in our Constituent Assembly, it was summarily rejected, along with the US system, *inter alia* on grounds of unfamiliarity. But as one eminent member of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly deposed before the Commission, this decision was taken without adequate examination and was, in his hindsight, a mistake. The Swiss system cannot obviously be adopted in its entirety in India because of some basic differences. But there are some elements of it which with suitable modification could serve us better than the British system.

25 Since, even after 37 years of trial, we have not been able to evolve a healthy two-party system and operate our system in a moderate and constructive way that the British do, on account no doubt of certain important differences in the situation, a time has come when we should give serious thought to modifying the position of the Council of Ministers that we have borrowed from Britain to the type that obtains in Switzerland, even though in a limited way.

26 This modification, in my view, would relate to only three Articles of our Constitution and should not be difficult to make under powers given by Article 368(2). The suggestion is that Articles 74, 75 and 164 should be amended as under;

"Article 74," COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO AID AND ADVISE



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**PRESIDENT**—(1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his executive functions, act in accordance with such advice, except where he is specifically required by another Article of the Constitution to act with the advice of another authority or in his discretion. (e.g. Articles 60, 75, 78, 103, 118, 143, 274, 317, 341 and 342).

Provided that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, after obtaining the opinion of the Vice President of India (assisted by two experts of his choice), and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration.

Provided further that the President need not act in accordance with such advice regarding Articles 352, 356 and 360, if he is not satisfied in his individual judgment about its need.

(2) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by ministers to the President shall not be inquired into in any court.

**"Article 75," OTHER PROVISIONS AS TO MINISTERS**—(1) The Council of Ministers shall have a fixed number of members, not exceeding three per cent of the members of the House of the People, who will be elected by a joint session of both houses of Parliament through the system of single transferable vote and appointed by the President. There shall also be an equal number of Ministers of State eligible to participate but not to vote in the Council.

(2) The Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.

(3) The President shall appoint the Prime Minister from among the members of the Council of Ministers on the basis of majority support in the Council and when there is no such support, on a principle of rotation every two and half years (or at mid-term) between the largest elected party and other parties.

(4) The Prime Minister shall distribute or redistribute portfolios among the ministers in his discretion and shall preside over meetings of the Council of Ministers.

(5) Before a minister enters upon his office, the President shall administer to him the oaths of office and of secrecy according to the forms set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule.

(6) The salaries and allowances of ministers shall be such as Parliament may from time to time by law determine.

(7) The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People, and carry out the decisions of the Parliament,



(8) Decisions in the Council of Ministers shall be taken by simple majority vote.

"Article 164," OTHER PROVISIONS AS TO MINISTERS—(1) The Council of Ministers shall comprise seven members, or three per cent of the members of the Legislative Assembly, whichever is larger, who will be elected by the Legislative Assembly or by a joint session of two houses of the legislature where there are two houses through the system of single transferable vote and shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor. There shall also be an equal number of Ministers of State eligible to participate but not to vote in the Council.

(2) The Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor from among the members of the Council of Ministers on the basis of majority support in the Council and when there is no such support, following a principle of rotation every two and half years (or at mid-term) between the largest elected party and other parties.

(3) The Chief Minister shall distribute or redistribute portfolios among the ministers in his discretion and shall preside over meetings of the Council of Ministers.

(4) Before a Minister enters upon his office, the Governor shall administer to him the oaths of office and of secrecy according to the forms set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule.

(5) The salaries and allowances of Ministers shall be such as the Legislature of the State may from time to time by law determine.

(6) The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State and carry out the decisions of the legislature.

(7) Decisions in the Council of Ministers shall be taken by simple majority vote.

27 This will mean that while the political parties will be competing in elections and also confronting each other in the Legislature, thus preserving some of the advantages of the competitive system of politics, when it comes to administration, they will be participating as it were in a "National Coalition" government like one that may emerge even in our present system under certain circumstances. Since the growing regionalisation or split of political parties makes the latter a distinct possibility, such an alternative system deserves earnest consideration.

28 It is possible no doubt to imagine a number of difficulties for the system of government, which will include members of different political persuasion, but if Switzerland has not found them to be serious for a



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period of over 100 years, there is no reason why we should not be able to deal with them, if they arise.

29 The provisions that the Prime Minister (or Chief Minister) will have the power to distribute or redistribute the portfolios among the ministers, the Office of Prime Minister (or Chief Minister) will rotate every two and half years (or at mid-term) between the biggest and other parties in the Council of Ministers *in the absence of absolute majority for a single party* and decisions in the Council of Ministers will be taken by simple majority vote when necessary, will be three very useful safeguards against such difficulties and promote a spirit of constructive and cooperative behaviour. The system of mid-term rotation will help make leaders of the biggest and other parties more cooperative and the presence in the Council of Ministers of members from different parties will ensure a more frank and thorough discussion of issues than at present although ultimately it is the majority which will continue to take the decision. Such a system would also help curb irresponsible actions like defections and toppling of governments, which have been the curse for some of our State Governments and one Union Government in recent decades and make possible healthy Union-State relations in our heterogeneous society.

30 There need not be a fear that the unhappy experience of the Interim Government of 1947 may be repeated. The three special provisions mentioned in the above para (which were not there in 1947) will help prevent this. Any member of the Council of Ministers who has very serious reservations about accepting and implementing a decision of the majority in the Council will be free to resign and get replaced by the next person in the elected panel, if feasible, otherwise through a fresh election. Articles 78 (c) and 167 (c) will ensure that an individual minister will be obliged to follow the decision of the majority members of the Council. There will thus be no basic difference from what obtains in a conventional coalition government at present.

31 The suggested proviso that the Council of Ministers shall consult the Vice President of India (assisted by two experts of his choice) while reconsidering its advice to the President on a reference back from him under Article 74 will be an useful check against inadequately considered or biased action in a dispute, especially between the Union itself and a State and yet will not detract from the ultimate authority of the Union Council of Ministers. It will promote healthy Union-State relations in as much as the Union Council of Ministers will not be seen as an arbitrary judge in a dispute, especially between itself and a State in which reference to the Supreme Court under Article 143 is not feasible.

32 The other suggested proviso that the President has to be satisfied in his individual judgment in regard to an advice for emergency action



under Articles 352, 356 and 360 will also be another useful check against invoking these last resort powers before exhausting other powers.

33 The possibility that voters other than elected members of legislatures may become ministers has been found to be wholesome in many modern democracies by facilitation of induction in the government of some eminent and competent persons who are unwilling or unable to contest elections to legislatures for some reason or other. Articles 88 and 177 permit such ministers to attend, without the right to vote, a House of Parliament or state legislature of which he may not be a member.

34 Unlike the Swiss system, our constitutional provision that Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the President (or Governor) may be retained because in our special situation it provides some useful flexibility.

35 While the President (or the Governor) must withdraw his "pleasure" from a minister on conviction by a court on a criminal charge or breach of oath of office or evidence of subversion of the Constitution or action against the integrity and independence of the country or defiance of the directive of the legislature, he may not do so if only a motion amending a proposal by even a censure motion against an individual Minister or the Council of Ministers as a whole is passed. He may ordinarily be content with asking the minister or the Council to take appropriate follow up action. Only if there is failure of the constitutional machinery he may order a new election of the Council of Ministers. The essence of the principle of collective responsibility will thus still continue. But the chance of a new election of the Council of Ministers as a whole is likely to be small in the system proposed.

36 The amendments to Articles 74, 75 and 164 suggested above follow only the spirit and not the letter of the Swiss Constitution and that only in a limited way. They do not, in fact, represent a modification in our Constitution which is more serious than, say, the 42nd Amendment. They do not even enjoin "fixed tenure" for the Council of Ministers, they only aim at a more stable tenure than at present. They do not prevent the majority from having the ultimate say, they only ensure that the minority view has also to be duly heard and considered within the Council of Ministers. They do not take away the supremacy of the Council of Ministers, they only put some check against the dangers apprehended by Munshi as noted at para 14 above.

37 If the amendments proposed above are considered unacceptable and the present system of confrontational politics is to be retained not only upto the legislature but also in the executive, the desired improvement of Union-State relations calls for a somewhat different role of the President than what has been assigned to him by the 42nd and the 44th Amendments. It is important that the State Councils of Ministers



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should not see the President merely as a "rubber stamp" of the Union Council of Ministers. As Munshi has so convincingly argued the constitution of a two tier polity like India is *sui generis* and conventions of a unitary polity like UK do not necessarily apply in this country. Our Constitution-makers had given quite a different role to the President of India who is elected by members of both Union and State Legislatures and who is required by Article 60 to defend the Constitution, compared to the role played by the monarch in UK. Against the views of jurists like M.C. Setalvad and Alladi Krishnaswami Iyer one can pit the views of jurists like B. N. Rau, K. M. Munshi, P. B. Mukherji and M. M. Ismail. Against the Supreme Court judges in the Samsher Singh case one can cite the views of the judges of the same court in the Sardari Lal case. In any case, there is no basic unalterable constitutional provision in this particular matter. What has been done by the 42nd Amendment can be undone by another amendment by the requisite majority in Parliament alone under Article 368 (2) of the Constitution.

38 I feel, therefore, that the minimum that should be done to prevent the danger noted above, as apprehended by Munshi, is to amend Article 74 as under:

"Article 74". COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO AID AND ADVISE PRESIDENT (1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall in the exercise of his executive functions, act in accordance with such advice; except where he is specifically required by another article of the Constitution to act with the advice of another authority or in his discretion [e.g. Articles 60, 75, 76, 78, 103, 118, 143, 274, 317, 341 and 342].

Provided that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, after obtaining the opinion of the Vice President of India (assisted by two experts of his choice), the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such consideration.

Provided further that the President need not act in accordance with such advice regarding Articles 352, 356 and 360, if he is not satisfied in his individual judgment about its need.

39 Since democracy requires that no individual, however important, should exercise all by himself "absolute power", it is also desirable that the provisions of Article 78 are followed both in letter and spirit, *inter alia* about Union-State relations. The Head of State and Head of Government should meet regularly and frequently for frank exchange of information and views, which is the practice in Britain and has promoted the spirit of moderation there. Unless this is done, requisite *rapprochement*



cannot develop between the President and the Prime Minister and the President cannot exercise effectively his basic "right to be consulted, the right to warn and the right to encourage."

### POLITICAL PARTIES

40 In a two-tier system which is democratic, the relationship between the Union and the States are determined to a large extent by the political parties which are controlling the government at the two levels. The constitution and functioning of political parties deserve much greater attention than has been the case so far. In line with the Constitutions of countries like USA, our Constitution did not originally make any specific mention of political parties. Certain favourable conditions obtaining in those countries led to the evolution of a healthy two-party system and no constitutional provision for political parties was considered necessary. But in countries where similar conditions did not obtain e.g., West Germany, special constitutional provision for political parties was found to be necessary. Experience of the last 37 years shows that conditions in India resemble more those in West Germany than the United States.

41 Recently however, political parties have been specially included in our Constitution through the 52nd Amendment. This is somewhat of a move in the West German direction. But the legislative action taken under it so far is inadequate. It does not prevent splitting of parties or emergence of a multiplicity of parties or breaking up and reconstitution of coalition of parties. These latter possibilities can create considerable trouble in future as present portents tend to indicate.

42 One undesirable result of the present Anti-Defection Act may be undue control of a political party by a caucus and demise of intra-party democracy, leading eventually to mass defection by disgruntled elements of that party, especially on the eve of a general election, to form rival parties. This may eventually add to the multiplicity of parties and instability of governments.

43 Now that the 52nd Amendment has given constitutional status to political parties, it is necessary to give careful thought to their constitution, duties and privileges. The minimum that needs to be done is to legislate that no political party will be given official "recognition" and a specific election "symbol" by the Election Commission unless it signs a pledge that it—

- (a) accepts unreservedly the unity and integrity of India and sovereign democratic and secular character of our Republic,
- (b) abjures propaganda against any religion or race or caste or lang-



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uage and other fissiparous or chauvinistic action that can adversely affect national unity and integrity,

- (c) would hold free election of office bearers at least once in two years under the supervision of the Election Commission, and
- (d) would get its accounts audited by an auditor from a panel recommended by the Election Commission.

44 There is even a case for banning by law political parties (and candidates), who do not sign and fulfil pledges (a) and (b).

45 A political party will be recognised as a "national party" by the Election Commission only if it gets elected at least one member of the Lok Sabha each from 3 different "zones" and secures a prescribed minimum percentage of votes (say 15 per cent) polled. This will help moderate "regionalism".

46 A party so recognised as a "national party" should be entitled to receive a financial grant per vote polled by its candidates, from the Union Exchequer through the Election Commission.

47 In addition, candidates of all "recognised" political parties fulfilling conditions at para 43 and each securing over 20 per cent of votes polled may be given reasonable grants by the Election Commission to help finance the election out of funds placed at its disposal by the Union Government.

48 Such a set of measures should have a long-term beneficial effect in as much as it will help promote secularism, discourage regional chauvinism and reduce the dependence of the "national political parties" on financial contributions from moneyed interests. Financial assistance from the State cannot be extended to others because it will be very burdensome and lead to undue multiplication of candidates. There should also be strict limits to donations by individuals or companies to meet election expenses of candidates or for political parties.

49 In the interest of democracy, candidates not belonging to any "recognised" political party should also be permitted to contest election but only with individual election "symbols". In order to keep their number within a reasonable limit, conditions regarding "deposit money" and number of sponsors may be suitably enhanced. With a view to discouraging irresponsible candidates, it may be useful to prescribe that each nomination paper (of at least candidates not nominated by a "recognised" political party) should be signed by 8 voters, of whom at least 3 should be members of a religious or ethnic or linguistic community different from that of the candidate and 1 former or present member of Union or State Legislatures. This will also help keep down the number of independent candidates, which is creating serious problems now.

50 In order to keep down the money and muscle power used in elec-



tions (which have led to many undesirable consequences), it will be useful to supplement the financial limits for election-related expenses by physical limits also, e.g., low cost specifications regarding number, size, material and colour of hand bills, posters and hoardings, newspaper radio and TV advertisements, number of vehicles, loud speakers and election campaigners used (to keep down money power) and also ban large electioneering meetings needing use of more than one loud speaker, all election related processions and use of unapproved and unregistered campaigners (to keep down muscle power). All registered campaigners should be checked by an agent of the Election Commission for their suitability and issued identity badges. The penalty for infringement of any of these limits should be disqualification of the concerned candidate. These measures are in the spirit of the "codes of conduct" prescribed at present by the Election Commission but are more specific and provide more teeth.

51 Analogous procedures may be also prescribed for "state political party" and non-party candidates at the State level elections after appropriate modifications. A political party may be given comparable recognition by the Election Commission as a "state party" with corresponding obligations and privileges, including financial assistance from the State Exchequer through the Election Commission. For such recognition, the party must get elected at least one member to the Vidhan Sabha each from 3 different religious, ethnic or linguistic communities and secure a prescribed minimum percentage (say 15 per cent) of total votes polled. This, together with the proposals at para 48 will help moderate the ominous electoral trends noted in Chapter I of the Report.

#### ELECTORAL SYSTEM

52 One important feature of the Swiss system, namely, proportional election for all seats in the Federal Legislature, is not suggested because it may be difficult to implement in a country like India. Its main advantage is a close correspondence between the number of votes polled in an election and number of seats won by different parties in contrast with the Indian system where a party securing about 40 per cent of votes has sometimes been able to secure even 60 per cent of seats. On the other hand the Indian system of election based on territorial constituencies has certain operational advantages. However a closer correspondence than at present between votes polled and seats won by a party may be secured if steps are taken on the lines suggested in paras 45 to 51, which will, *inter alia*, help discourage multiplicity of parties. Election of



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Ministers by the single transferable vote system by the legislature will also help introduce in government some of the expected benefits of the proportional representation system.

53 A former Chief Election Commissioner and a former Union Home Secretary and Governor have, however, suggested that "proportional election based on party lists" should be provided for half the seats in our Lok Sabha, while the present system of territorial constituency may continue for the other half of the seats. This is analogous to the West German system, which is somewhat of a *via media* between the British and the Swiss systems. Since such eminent experts consider it feasible, it deserves consideration. Three benefits may follow if such a reform is found practicable. It will help balance local issues by national issues in the election process. It will provide better opportunity than at present to professionals, experts and intellectuals, who are obliged to live and work away from their home villages or towns, to get elected and thus help improve the quality of deliberations in the legislature. It will help produce a better balance than now (although less than in the Swiss system) between votes polled and seats won by the contesting parties. But it can be tried without adverse effects **only** if the "tenure" of government is such that it has a built in *de facto* (if not *de jure*) stability either of the system suggested at para 26 above or at least of the system of "constructive no-confidence" motion that obtains in West Germany. It is likely to add to instability in a "non-fixed tenure" system like the British or our present one. A former governor has suggested indirect election. But that will be susceptible to undue manipulation, corruption, and strengthening of oligarchical forces, and not much improvement in our special situation except some reduction of muscle power.

54 In Chapter I of the Report, especially at paragraphs 1.4.18 to 1.4.21, reference has been made to a strengthening of undesirable regional and communal chauvinism and forces of corruption, inimical to national integrity, resulting from our present electoral system. Para 1.4.19 says, "The Indian Constitution contemplates election of representatives both to Parliament and to the State Legislature on the basis of territorial constituencies. This led to replacement over the years of ideology-oriented intellectuals by vote-bank-based political leaders in the power structure . . . . Populism became a much more important factor for them and the new generation of politicians found it essential to combine money and manpower with populist slogans, to capture and stay in power." Para 1.4.20 says, "Wherever the majority in a territorial constituency, although with general electorate, could be swayed by communal (or linguistic) slogans, the behaviour pattern tended to be nearly the same as in a territorial constituency, with separate electorate, which had led



to the creation of Pakistan and had been firmly discarded by the Constituent Assembly." Para 1.4.21 says: "Elections have become today very costly with all round allegations of corrupt practices. Control or influence over the State machinery secured at large expense has to be increasingly used by politicians to give as *quid pro quo* special advantage to those moneyed interests who help to meet this expense . . . . It was not uncommon for the national level leaders to lay down high principles for selection of candidates; but the political machinery was in the hands of local bosses whose only concern was winning the election. This led to selection of candidates based on communal and caste grounds."

55 Mere exhortation will not curb these growing evils. Some legal and institutional safeguards will be needed. For curbing local chauvinism, it may be helpful if in each general election at least a third (if not half) of the constituencies, through a system of rotation, have their choice limited only to candidates who are not resident in the same district. For curbing communal chauvinism, it may similarly help if in each district votes of one designated "dominant" community (e.g. denomination or caste or linguistic group as per available Census data) and all "others" together are given ballot papers of different colours and say, 7 per cent of votes polled in each colour is made the minimum requirement for successful election. For curbing corrupt practices, it will be essential to implement effectively the suggestions made at paras 45 to 51 above.

56 A time has come when these suggestions, along with those made by others, for electoral reform need to be examined by a Parliamentary Committee set up specifically for this purpose. It is not necessary that the Union, States and local governments should have the same system. There is a view that differences in conditions and compulsions may justify different system at the Union, State and local government levels, as this may help promote complementarity rather than competition and also provide a useful check on undue pressure by the political compulsions of one level on the others. This point may also be considered by this Committee.

#### OTHER RESTRAINTS ON "POLITICS OF CONFRONTATION" NEEDED IN A HETEROGENEOUS POLITY

57 The main issue before the country is how to maintain its unity and integrity and at the same time create conditions for optimum decentralisation and/or devolution, of administrative and economic functions and powers. Responsible political parties have undoubtedly to play a key role in it, as an essential part of the democratic process, but care has also to be taken that the compulsions of a competitive system do not



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make them transgress the limits set by our Constitution and needs of social welfare.

58 While the ultimate decision at each level of government has necessarily to be taken in our system by the political party or coalition of parties commanding majority support at that level, democracy cannot work and even last if the majority parties do not make genuine efforts to accommodate the viewpoints of the key minority parties and these latter in their turn do not abjure unconstitutional and illegal actions.

59 A more purposive use of the committees of the legislature to this end needs to be made than has been the case so far. In this context the very constructive inputs from all parties that the Swiss have succeeded in securing through small but effective committees of the legislature attached to each Ministry deserves the consideration of our authorities.

60 The objective of reaching compromise solutions for divisive problems will also be helped if greater use is made of Commissions and Tribunals comprising eminent and respected persons, who do not have political axes to grind, in sorting out various controversial issues, before such matters come to the Inter-Governmental Council, Cabinets and legislatures. Such Commissions and Tribunals should have at least three members so as to ensure greater public confidence.

61 In the ultimate analysis, Union-State relations depend only partly on legal, administrative and financial arrangements. They depend very largely on human behaviour at different levels of government.

62 Moderation in approach and conduct is the key to healthy Union-State relations. Extremism on the part of any of the parties involved is bound to trigger off opposite extremism in some other party, adversely affecting their relations. It is largely through timely mediation by *other* parties who have a more objective view and are non-partisan in regard to the issue in contest that such extremism can be curbed. Since the position will differ from issue to issue, it should be the duty of all concerned to make concerted effort all the time to promote mutual understanding and accommodation if Union-State relations are to be put on a sound and constructive basis.

63 As in some other countries, there are in this country also a few small but strident extremist groups, which deliberately take violent actions with the ulterior motive of provoking violent reactions and deepening communal (religious, caste, linguistic or ethnic) differences that exist in a plural society. These often create serious problems affecting Union-State and Inter-State relations. It is the primary responsibility of the State government to keep careful watch and take timely and firm police (and other) action against such violence, especially communal riots. But the Union is also concerned because often the "provocateurs" come



from outside the State and contagion spreads to other States.

64 It may be sometimes helpful if the needed police action is taken, especially at the field level, by police personnel who do not belong to either of the feuding local communal groups. If the State Governments do not have adequate number of such personnel they would be well advised, as suggested in Chapter VII of the Report, to have standing arrangements to secure the services of such personnel at short notice from other States or the Union Government. Effective action by police personnel who are seen by feuding parties as impartial, is an essential measure for checking private vendetta and counter-vendetta.

65 But police action by itself would not be enough in many cases. Public opinion would need to be mobilised against such violent action and reaction. As many members as possible of the extremist groups would need to be personally approached to change their ways by respected non-officials, preferably those who belong to none of the feuding groups. Such non-officials, who are seen as non-partisan, can play a very important peace-making role.

66 If the National Integration Council and allied agencies promote and provide the needed support to such non-official "peace corps", as it were, it will help strengthen significantly the forces of unity in our diverse society. Peace keeping should not be seen as the function of government alone. There is need for the National Integration Council to meet more frequently and have adequate staff support.

67 In dealing with extremism, which often creates problems for both Union and States, a policy of diffusion as well as defusion of tension will be a very useful complement of any policy of deterrence by police or armed forces that may be deemed unavoidable. Some of the institutional reforms suggested in the Report and this paper are designed, *inter alia*, to facilitate such diffusion and defusion.

68 It is, however, important to ensure that these reforms are effectively implemented and do not remain mere symbols, as some of our recent reforms, e.g., introduction of *Lok Ayuktas*, have unfortunately turned out to be. The difference between our *Lok Ayuktas* and the *Ombudsmen* in Scandinavian countries is striking. If the recommendations recently made by the Central Vigilance Commissioner, after a careful study of the experience in a number of countries, to strengthen our *Ombudsman* system are implemented, there should be considerable reduction of the discontent and extremist reaction in the country.<sup>2</sup> It is important that a Committee of the concerned legislature is appointed to ensure that all the *Ombudsmen* are provided with adequate resources to be able to function effectively. It is only when disadvantaged groups feel that there is no non-partisan authority within easy reach to attend to their genuine



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grievances and there is a welling up of emotions that they usually turn to disruptive action. The recently established Department of Public Grievances in the Union Government can only supplement but cannot substitute the system of *Ombudsmen* proposed by the Central Vigilance Commissioner because it is not autonomous and sufficiently decentralised.

69 If, as a consequence of undue centralisation, the Union Government alone is seen to be responsible for dealing with all public grievances, not only at the Union but also at State or local government levels, its task will become unmanageable, its relations with State and local governments will deteriorate and its public image will be adversely affected.

70 Devolution and decentralisation, as proposed in the Report and this paper, will help strengthen, rather than weaken, the position of the Union as well as State Governments. From this standpoint, the recommendations in the last Chapter of the Commission's Report, which regrettably have not been listed as such and risk getting neglected, namely:

- (i) strengthening of the local governments (para 21.2.01, 21.2.07 and 21.2.09).
- (ii) setting up of a Standing Advisory Committee of experts on Inter-governmental Relations, with public hearings, to look into relations of not only Union and State governments but also local governments (para 21.3.02, 21.3.03, and 21.3.04) and
- (iii) right codes of conduct and conventions and right "sentinels of the polity" (para 21.4.06 to 21.4.08)

deserve special attention. If effectively implemented, their beneficial influence should progressively gather strength and be very substantial within a few years.

71 Now that as many as six principalities with less than 1 million population each have been converted into full fledged States by using the powers given by Article 3 of the Constitution, there is no longer any justification for not delegating to the districts, which have larger population and higher level of development, the powers suggested in the Report as a minimum to start with and some more later in the light of experience. The rationale given by the States themselves for delegation of more powers, especially in normal times, from the Union to the States applies with equal force for delegation of more powers from the States to the districts. To ensure sound governance of a country of the size and diversity of India, relations between Union, State and local govern-



ments all need to be kept under careful review and an effective machinery for the purpose is indispensable.

S.R. SEN\*

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- 1 K.M. Munshi, *Pilgrimage of Freedom*, p. 274.
- 2 Vide U.C. Agarwal, "Case for a National Level *Ombudsman*."

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\*Dr. Sen was Member of the Commission on Centre-State Relations,



## BOOK REVIEWS

### SOUTH ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

#### A Review Article

THE kind of book under review\* keeps one tied to a brief time frame. It is a collection of reports originally written for the media columns and primarily intended to reflect the author's spot impressions about the evolving situation in South Asia. The events and personalities dealt with by the author are, technically speaking, relevant to the period between 1986 and 1987. By the time the reports reappeared as a volume many significant changes had taken place that confirm as well as refute many of the basic assumptions of the author. What seemed to be revealing, if not flashy, when the reports were first published have lost much of their edge in the reprinting. Of course, this cannot be blamed on the author for most writings on contemporary affairs are musings in a conditional mood and must necessarily make allowance for contingent elements.

Even though the ingredients of the reports sound a bit dated, they make fascinating reading partly because they come from the pen of one of the ranking academic journalists of our country and mainly because they are intended to provide a basic perspective or rather a conceptual frame for analysing the myriad changes occurring in South Asia today. Empirically the reports are rich in information to which the ordinary reader may not have an easy access. The author with his left intellectual background and personal *report* with many a diplomatic magnate brings the reader a bonanza by way of inside information.

The "Seven Nations" referred to in the subtitle comprise all the nations which recently formed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), plus Afghanistan but minus the Maldives. The inclusion of Afghanistan is significant not only because of the far-reaching effects of Soviet military intervention and subsequent disengagement but also because it cannot be left out of account in a study which is thematically focused on inter-state ethno-political problems which, in the opinion of the author, are the principal sources of inter-state tensions and conflicts in the region. In fact, one cannot fully comprehend the

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\*Bhabani Sen Gupta: *South Asian Perspectives—Seven Nations in Conflict and Cooperation*. D.K. Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1988, ix, 286 pp., Rs. 160.



dynamics of bilateral and multilateral politics of the region unless one fully grasps the implications of the ethnic factor responsible for much of the unrest and instability in this region. Although the author takes a sub-systemic view of the interaction between politics and ethnic complications, he has duly accommodated the extra regional element of great power involvement in the affairs of different South Asian nations.

Before going into the details of the presentation it is perhaps necessary to point out that the author does not start from any given definition of ethno-politics. On the contrary he identifies four different types of political use of the ethnic factors. These are: (a) the diversionary tactic of blaming a neighbouring state for complicating one's own internal ethnic situation; (b) working on the political-cultural passions of some disgruntled elements in a neighbouring state; (c) achieving attrition on an adversary by extending moral and/or material support to separatists in a neighbouring state; and (d) making capital of the supposed inclinations of cross-national groups to combine and form a different political entity. These ethnic strains are converted into political conflicts by way of the threat perceptions of the ruling group in each country. The interesting fact about almost all ruling elites in South Asia without exception is that they constantly face challenges from disaffected sub-nationalities—such as the Sindhis, the Pushtus and the Baluchs in Pakistan or the Chakmas in Bangladesh or the militant Tamils in Sri Lanka. The ruling groups everywhere feel threatened by the menacing size of these groups whose loyalty to the state is increasingly suspect. The author rightly observes that India with her 21(25?) linguistic states and several more cultural, religious, caste and linguistic groups constitutes a special case where state power is imperfectly shared between the Centre and the States and very little has been done so far to meaningfully associate the local elements with the processes and products of nation building. The national elite itself is a divided house, with fewer, and fewer members able to rise above regional, racial or caste loyalties. Confronted with the challenges of ethnic unrest the ruling elite of the South Asian nations have evinced a mixed response. If the Indian leaders have alternately followed the policy of rejection and accommodation, those in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan have mostly relied on intimidation and coercion. By contrast, the Himalayan states of Nepal and Bhutan, with their authoritarian political structures, have reflected a kind of seize mentality. The crux of the matter arises when minorities, out of a sense of insecurity, cross the borders or when they develop clandestine connections with their kith and kin in a neighbouring state. The problem of legitimate settlers and immigrants can also take serious proportions as is evident in the case of Indians in Nepal. The issue that arises therefore is one of evolving a rational elite response to the ethnic



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question, to disentangle it from the existing strategic and commercial disputes and to limit as far as practicable the undesirable effects of big power interference from outside. Such a response cannot take shape as long as the statesmen of the region fail to address themselves to confidence-building measures and eventually move towards a collective arrangement for the solution of such problems at the regional level.

This naturally prompts the author to take a close look at the proposed SAARC. The chapter on SAARC interestingly opens with a pleasant recollection of a dinner table discussion between the author and some top officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Little wonder that the industrial giant of Asia will keep its diplomats "watching SAARC with sustained interest." But the author does not report why his hosts could not be a little more explicit on what they had to offer and the terms on which the offer would come for strengthening the SAARC objectives. Turning his attention to the Soviet Union, the author, in a rather sketchy section, informs the readers how the Soviet leadership welcomes the SAARC as a positive development, though due to alleged inadvertance of speech writers, Gorbachev's 28 July speech at Vladivostok omitted Bangladesh and Pakistan from the future of Soviet cooperation. The comparison he makes between the SAARC and ASEAN is, of course, quite illuminating. He has rightly pointed out that other than the factor of geographical contiguity the SAARC does not share the political and strategic compulsions which keep the ASEAN in its place. It is also significant to note that the South Asian economies, with precious little regional transaction, are basically more complementary than the economies of Southeast Asia, which are all export-oriented and mostly compete for the same market. The largest single obstacle for SAARC, however, lies in the hegemonistic role in which India, unwittingly though, is being pictured by the other members of the SAARC. The real agenda for SAARC, if it is to survive, will be not so much to call a spade a spade as to cure the smaller partners of their exaggerated sense of insecurity, and the Indian statesmen of their obsessions with bilateralism.

One need not blow out of proportion the spectre of 'ganging up' by some minor Asian powers who might use the SAARC as a possible united front against India. Objectively speaking, India does not owe its prominence as a nation to any regional consensus. As such what the smaller nations can possibly challenge is its intentions, and not its natural position of advantage—geographical, political, economic and otherwise. Since action is the best mirror of intention, the Indian decision-makers need not feel disturbed by undue insinuations nor become irate every time a neighbouring nation chooses to take some manifestly bilateral contentious issue to any international forum. The author



correctly maintains that mere mentioning does not internationalise an issue. Even if an international forum is activated India certainly has the necessary diplomatic and legal means at its disposal to turn the table. Such irritants only serve to indicate the direction in which the winds of bilateral relations are likely to blow and India can chart its course accordingly. It is possible, on the other hand, to look upon the SAARC as giving India a new opportunity to induce regional collaboration in some economic as well as environmental matters of vital concern. The development of aqua power, exchange of technology and aggregation of economic diplomacy *vis-a-vis* the developed countries are some of the items that ought to come up high on the agenda.

There is perhaps a point in viewing South Asia as a sub-system that is neither hierarchical nor hegemonic but bipolar specially because of the Pakistan-India divide. The smaller partners of the SAARC can and do sometimes exploit this standing constraint on India's regional initiatives. Nonetheless, barring Bangladesh (a recent captive of Islamic fundamentalism) and Sri Lanka (a dubious buyer of India's mediation on the Tamil issue), most of these smaller Asian nations are likely to take a neutral posture in any dispute between India and Pakistan. Besides, there is no reason why India and Pakistan should permanently remain at loggerheads. This calls one's attention to the recent changes that have been taking place within Pakistan heralding the return of a relatively responsible government and with that also the onset of a more healthy interaction between the two countries.

The author, however, apprehends: "As Pakistan returns to political life the anger, frustration and bitterness that have been deposited in the minds of the Pakistanis will come out in the open", and among possible targets, India is mentioned first. But has not this India-baiting worn thin after so many years of use? Are not the citizens of Pakistan today, at least the more enlightened section, aware by now that the real roots of their political and economic tragedy lay with the irresponsible leadership at home. Forty years of deceptive democracy and unabashed military dictatorship must have made them mature enough not to be misguided any more by official propaganda on Kashmir or Siachen. The mood of the Pakistani intellectuals, the thrust of the media and above all pent-up public demand for restoration of human rights, all point to the fact that Pakistan not only needs a responsible government at home but also a responsible foreign policy. Hopefully the new leadership that has been installed in power after the last elections seems to believe in restrained behaviour despite anti-India sentiments spread by a few interested quarters. One cannot miss the current inclination to restore the old climate of confidence once generated by the Simla Agreement, a remarkable product of practical diplomacy between two statesmen of



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India and Pakistan who are no more. Besides, due regard should be paid to the fact that those who now preside over the destiny of the two countries, represent a new generation of politicians who take a somewhat demystified approach to international relations, which warrants projecting a positive trend in Indo-Pak relations.

On the whole, therefore, the treatment of South Asian politics by Prof. Sengupta may be regarded as inspiring a forward looking view of the whole situation. While the present reviewer would go a long way with him, he would still have some reservations about one or two hasty generalisations, e.g., it is perhaps premature to think that the SAARC would be kept at its existing "modest shape, embellished with a Secretariat and a Secretary General;" again one wonders if it was really in Junejo's style "to come to India to win minds and hearts," or can one compliment Ershad for devising "a much representative government than Zia's", and yet find it comparable with President Suharto's model of military-bureaucracy combine. One unwholesome remark that cannot be helped in closing this review is that it is a sad specimen of extremely careless printing that makes the reader stumble on atleast three to four glaring mistakes in every other page. The photo off-set device and the rainbow jacket hardly help that impression!

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## FOREIGN POLICY

C.P. BHAMBHRI : The Foreign Policy of India. Sterling Publishers Private Ltd., New Delhi, 1987, vi, 165 p., Rs. 100/-

SERIOUS Indian writings on foreign policy can be divided into three categories: (i) Theoretical modelling; (ii) normative and prescriptive and (iii) descriptive. The present work falls into the second category. The author adopts analytical tools and concepts of Marxist economic theories. The policies pursued by the Government of India in the realm of foreign affairs, in the author's view, reflect the interests of the dominant class namely the Indian capitalist and *bourgeoisie*. The roots of foreign policy are traced to traditions, class structure of freedom movement and the strong nationalist bias displayed by indigenous capitalism.

The United States, USSR, Western Europe and China are the principal countries with which Indian foreign policy has to interact. Economic relations and economic aid channeled through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and their impact on foreign policy and strengthening of economic self-reliance have been rightly given the importance they deserve. There is a chapter on the influence of the Foreign Service consisting of officers drawn from socially dominant classes on the foreign policy formulations and more importantly its implementation. There is also an interesting chapter analysing the references to foreign policy in the Election Manifestos of different political parties in the 1980 General Elections.

Although the author's ideological convictions are unequivocal and undisguised, the approach is not doctrinaire. The intellectual vigour is tempered by recognition of *realpolitik* in foreign policy formulation and the author accepts the exigencies of a highly complex and dynamic international environment which deflect the course of Indian foreign policy and distorts the unfolding of Marxist dialectics.

Non-alignment is the natural basis of Indian foreign policy. Jawaharlal Nehru was its author; but non-alignment is the natural reaction to the anti-colonial struggle of Indian people, representing national interests and is the instrument for achieving a self-reliant economy. The Indian capitalist and *bourgeoisie* are compelled to make compromises with international capitalism and the ex-colonial powers to perpetuate its own domination of the internal economy, hence the full potential of non-alignment has failed to be realised. This has led to the emergence of contradictions in pursuit of foreign policy goals. Trade and economic relations with USA have grown while on the political front India and the United States have adopted stridently divergent and often conflicting



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policies. Foreign economic assistance both official and private has been eagerly sought while at the same time there is growing resistance to pressures from donors to influence and "condition" India's internal economic developmental policies. Political and economic relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have been expanded and deepened but their full impact on economic self-reliance has been thwarted as the internal economic structures have remained largely traditional and its operations profit-oriented. These contradictions can only be resolved, argues the author, when the dominant role of the Indian capitalist class is ended. The parliamentary form of government has released and strengthened to a substantial extent the democratic and mass movements necessary to overthrow the capitalist class domination but deeply entrenched traditions, caste and sectional forces and linguistic, religious and regional pulls have slowed the pace of resistance to the dominance of the capitalist class. The goals of non-alignment namely combating aggressively anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic forces remain unrealised and the conduct of foreign policy limps along.

The dissection of Indian foreign policy issues from the Marxist dialectic angle has been presented with robust realism, intellectual integrity and a canny eye for details. There is a refreshing absence of rhetoric and crusading spirit. The chapters were all originally written and published as separate articles (it would have been useful if the dates of their original publication had been indicated), but they have been weaved together to present an integrated approach to the understanding of the basic factors moulding India's foreign policy.

Issues of India-China border conflict and the challenges to the Indian policy of non-alignment have been analysed with clarity and in all its different facets. Maturity and courage of conviction in adhering to the policy of non-alignment against pressures both internal and external and exigencies of the moment were in our national interest. That for the policy of non-alignment to succeed self-reliance in defence industries is vital has been a lesson well learnt from the India-China border conflict. Differences between India and China are on a different footing from those between India and USA. India and China are two of the most populous countries, large in size, neighbours and developing. Their political systems being vastly different notwithstanding, they have a common outlook on issues relating to the New International Economic Order. The statesmanship displayed at the time of the India-China border conflict—looking at the issue in a world perspective—continues to have validity also a quarter of a century later.

There is a separate chapter on India's relations with the West European countries; West Europe is the home of classical colonialism. Economic and political relations with West European countries are marked by a



growing sense of equality and commonality of interests. Old colonial attitudes seem to have withered away and are replaced by mutual respect and understanding. Classical colonialism is no more threatening India's vital foreign policy objectives. It is the global interests of USA—which has a tradition of anti-colonialism—a Superpower, champion of capitalism world-wide which exhibit a feature of neo-colonialism and pose a serious challenge to India's legitimate interests in international affairs. West European capitalism does not necessarily work hand and glove with the United States, and shorn off its colonialist attributes offers a number of opportunities which should be availed of to accelerate the march towards-economic self-reliance.

Development of relations with the erstwhile colonial powers and India on the basis of equality and mutual benefit does not fit in with the generally propounded theory of neo-colonialism. Although India has one of the lowest per capita income levels in the world, in aggregate terms India's economic weight in dealing with West European colonial powers, individually if not collectively, is considerable and rapidly growing.

The author acknowledges that India is no doubt one of the leading non-aligned and developing countries, but its size, resources, population and planned economic development resulting in the creation of an advanced industrial and technological base impose on India wider responsibilities in international affairs. India's relations with its neighbours in South Asia have only a marginal coverage in the book. Suspicions and fears born from great differences in the size and resources continue to hinder growth of regional cooperation in South Asia. Search for more than good neighbourly relations among SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) countries needs to be investigated from the conceptual, historical and normative points of view. Prospects for increased South-South cooperation will be materially affected by the state of our relations with our immediate neighbours.

The central issue in Indian foreign policy is how a country like India, with all its known limitations and yet strongly motivated by traditions and leadership towards international cooperation, can play an effective role in promoting a healthier and more peaceful international climate. It will be a long time before our economic strength matches our efforts and aspirations in realising a new international economic order, restricting and eliminating armaments especially nuclear arms and strengthening democratic processes in decision-making in international relations. We should not overplay our cards but should not lose heart either if our efforts do not produce immediate results. The path to better international cooperation is tortuous and agonisingly topsy turvy. There is a strong streak of idealism in the foreign policy goals we have



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fixed for ourselves. But in international relations there are no recognisable rules of the game to go by. This idealism of ours is a precious and rare asset which must be preserved. 150 odd nation states are the principal actors on the international stage. They are all equal before the law and zealous of their sovereignty. In practise, divergencies in strength among nation states are as wide as between an elephant and a bee. India on an overall grading is one of the ten principal actors. No viable alternative to nation-states as principal subjects conducting international relations has been found or likely to be found in the foreseeable future. It is in India's enlightened self-interest that the large family of nation states does not fall apart and take recourse to arms to solve their differences.

Prof. C.P. Bhambri's book has kept this larger vision of India's role in international affairs as the centre piece. Though written in a somewhat combative and partisan style it is not propagandist or populist. It lays bare through rigorous intellectual analysis some if not all the currents and cross currents both internally and internationally which go to mould India's foreign policy.

New Delhi

K.L. DALAL

V.I. LONGER: *The Defence and Foreign Policies of India*. Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1988, xii, 357 p., Rs. 200/-.

SCHOLARS interested in the study of foreign policy, may be of different types. There are those who are concerned with the process of making policy; others take an interest in the actual behaviour of states. V.I. Longer, whose book is under review, belongs to the second type. The book is divided into seven chapters and is concluded with "A Note to Update Events."

Chapter I discusses the foundations of India's defence and foreign policies. Until 1921 Indian leaders took little interest in the Indian Army or defence, primarily because, "the British had kept the Army away from the people and pursued a deliberate policy of building up a privileged class which would serve the imperial purpose and widen the gulf between the Indian soldiers and the common man". (p.5) The author tells us that the foundations of India's foreign and defence policies were laid in the 1920s. He refers to the Sapru Committee's Report of March 1921 as well as to the 15 resolutions moved by Sivaswamy Aiyer which set "the parameters of all future thinking on defence". (p. 6) Next he



points out the differences of thought between Gandhi and Nehru on the Army and defence. Although Gandhi wanted India to practise non-violence, yet he recognised the need "to resort to arms in order to defend her (India) honour." Nehru was in favour of strengthening and improving the Army of free India and felt that "though the position of free India would be favourable in the international world and the chances of external attack on her would be remote, the country had still to prepare for all contingencies and reconstruct her defence forces." (p. 15)

As regards its foreign policy, India wanted to be friendly with all nations and peoples and was willing to cooperate with all nations "in the furtherance of world peace and freedom." India also resolved to "keep away from the power politics of groups."

The structure of India's defence and foreign policies was as under: "Though defence was not to be ignored and the use of force and military power in the defence of the nation had been accepted, diplomacy and foreign policy were to manoeuvre a position where India would stay out of all power politics, military alliances, wars and conflicts. The balancing of forces as also the non-involvement in pressure politics would ensure the security of the country." (p. 25) Such type of thinking, the author believes, "lulled the leaders and the people into complacency." He also contends that, "there was a general euphoria which was difficult to beat down and Nehru's visionary outlook and poetic approach to men and matters added to the ethereal atmosphere." (p. 26)

Chapter II deals with, among other things, how Nehru's policy of non-alignment affected India's defence planning and military preparedness. The author argues, that the way Nehru defended his policy of non-alignment served to create "an euphoria and also a good deal of complacency in the nation." (p. 38) As military threat was perceived only from Pakistan and not from any other quarter, "the operational role of the Army was restricted to the defence of the border with Pakistan." As a result, "a relaxed atmosphere enveloped the armed forces." Next the author draws attention to a sterile debate on defence vs development in the country. He admits that money was required for the economic advancement of the country and that economic development was essential for the strength of the nation. However, his complaint is that "heavy emphasis was placed on development, planning and economic progress," and "defence, though not ignored completely, was accorded a step-motherly treatment." (p. 39) Confusion is invited when he also admits that, "within the limitations of international politics and the limited financial resources of the country. the best that could have been achieved was done." (p. 41) Again, we are told that *Sharman*, *Centurion* and *AMX-13* tanks were obtained for the Army; the *Mysteres*, the *Hunters* and the *Canberras* were acquired for the Air Force; the Navy got its



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second cruiser, *INS Mysore*, three escort Destroyers, five anti-submarine Frigates and three anti-aircraft Frigates; defence production picked up pace and 16 ordnance and clothing factories started expanding. (p. 41) But we are also told that "...unfortunately, with the emphasis on economic progress and development, the growth and advancement of defence was forgotten. (p. 42)

For India's security, friendship with China was essential. Thus the author welcomes the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet in April 1954, but his feeling is that a "hysterical atmosphere" of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai was created in the country following the signing of the Agreement, with the result that "the possibility that a threat may develop from China was completely forgotten and India lived in a dream world divorced from the realities of power politics." (p. 58) Equally essential were India's relations with the Soviet Union which "improved considerably," became "a great security gain for India and fitted into Nehru's scheme of things." (p. 62) The author has no quarrel with Nehru's policy of non-alignment, but he feels unhappy because "in an euphoria of idealism the hard realities of international politics and the limitations of diplomacy were forgotten." His contention is that "the rock-bottom of politics is power and there is no substitute for armed strength..." (69)

In Chapter III the author discusses China's "aggressive designs," and Nehru's inadequate appreciation of it. He draws attention to Chou En lai's letter of January 1959, which indirectly called into question "the entire India-China boundary of 2,400 miles or so extending from the tri-junction of Burma-China-India in the north-east to the tri-junction of Afghanistan-China-India in the north-west." (p. 84) The Khampa revolt in Tibet in March 1959 served to intensify China's hostile attitude towards India as the latter accorded asylum to the Dalai Lama. In explaining Nehru's attitude to China, the author says that "Nehru was obsessed with history. The past was pressing on him but he was refusing to see the present or he was confident that he could effectively handle the future." (p. 88)

Pakistan getting closer to China was ominous for India. And, "it was under the shadow of the combined threat from China and Pakistan that the defence and foreign policies of India were discussed in the Lok Sabha in 1960." (p. 96) A new defence policy, known as 'Forward Policy', was initiated and put into operation on the India-China border in NEFA (North Eastern Frontier Agency) and Ladakh. It "intended to checkmate the Chinese, prevent their advances on the border and establish the Indian presence right upto the McMahon Line in NEFA was also in Ladakh upto the Indo-China border." (p. 99) The author feels that the 'Forward Policy' "was militarily stupid for it only meant patrolling the forward areas as close as possible to the border and rais-



ing posts in the border areas to observe and check infiltrations." Besides, "These posts, thinly guarded by sections and platoons with no defence in depth and inadequately supplied through air droppings or long marching porters, who took days to get to various posts, served little purpose except showing the Indian flag and asserting Indian possession of the border territories." (p. 100) The policy instructed "the Indian troops not to open fire on the Chinese unless it was to do so in self-defence."

Although the Nehru Government managed to obtain military aid from several countries, including the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, yet India could not successfully resist the "aggression" by China in 1962. Before explaining India's 1962 military reverses the author examines China's motivations behind aggressing India thus: "... there were two dominant motives for the Chinese attack. Assertion and establishment of China's supremacy in Asia through humiliation of the largest nation in Asia and secondly, to attack India as a proxy for Russia. In its challenge to Russia and Khrushchev's theories of peaceful coexistence, China had weighed the factors well. India did not have the armed strength or preparation to meet the Chinese onslaught; Russia would not intervene militarily. India would not want to pull the United States in unless it was compelled to do so and China would ensure that a point of no return was reached. The rest of the world did not matter. China could commit aggression with impunity." (p. 120)

In explaining the failure of Nehru's China policy, the author argues that, "Nehru had kept his China card so close to his heart and his blind spot for China was so entirely personal that not many others could share the blame or relieve him of his burden..." (p.121) He has no quarrel with Nehru's policy of non-alignment; his lamentation/accusation is that India had refused to learn the lesson that, "A nation must build up its own strength. In this cruel world of *realpolitik* there is no substitute for armed strength." (pp. 121-122) The error, which the author finds in India's defence policy, consisted in looking on Pakistan and not on China as India's enemy; as a result, the Indian Army stood unprepared on the border. "And this unpreparedness grew directly out of the political understanding that China would not attack India—the most that could be expected was some border skirmishes and minor frontline engagements." (p. 122)

Chapter IV begins with a description of the collusion between Pakistan and China; this, the author argues, "produced fears of a war on India's two fronts." He notes, perhaps with delight, that "To meet these contingencies missions were rushed to various countries in the West as also to the Soviet Union to obtain arms and equipment required essentially for the defence and security of India." (p. 138) Besides, "The reorganization of the Army was carried out and intensive individ-



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ual and collective battle-training with battle inoculations were conducted. The quality of equipment was constantly improved and the arms and equipment which were received from the Soviet Union, UK, Canada, France, Italy and Yugoslavia were utilized to the maximum. The transport fleet of the Indian Air Force was augmented with the help of the United States, the Soviet Union and Canada." (p. 140) On Sheikh Abdullah's initiative. Nehru and Ayub agreed to meet together to resolve the Kashmir issue. The meet could not take place as Nehru suddenly died in 1964. When Shastri took over as Prime Minister, the policy of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence continued but "foreign policy was no longer important" and "the internal problems of India took precedence." India's military debacle of 1962 had already blighted India's image in the world. The author feels that "Shastri who did not have the stature of Nehru, could not refurbish this image and he made no efforts to do so." (p. 144)

Having written a few words about the "Chinese nuclear threat" in 1964, the author discusses the Indo-Pak War of 1965. For Ayub, the year 1965 was the most "propitious year for an action against India," particularly because "the people of Pakistan and nuclear China were with Ayub while the United States had guaranteed the security of Pakistani the USSR wanted to remain neutral in the disputes between India and Pakistan; most of the Muslim world was with Pakistan...Nehru was dead and Shastri was a mild and meek leader (and) India was facing a number of internal problems." (150) The author describes in some unnecessary detail how the Pakistani forces attacked India and how "a Chinese-style guerilla infiltration and warfare was planned" in Kashmir. Similarly he describes India's military response to Pakistani attacks on different sectors.

A resolution on cease-fire between India and Pakistan was adopted by the Security Council in September 1965, followed by the withdrawal of the armed forces personnel to positions held by them before 5 August 1965. India accepted the proposal, but Pakistan agreed to it with bad grace and said that the proposal was being accepted "in the interests of international peace and in order to enable the Security Council to evolve a self-executing procedure which will lead to an honourable settlement of the roots of the present conflict." (pp. 158-159) The author argues that Pakistan accepted the ceasefire resolution "because it had been let-down by China," though he makes no attempt to explain China's behaviour. He only says, "Ayub and Bhutto had hoped that China would attack India. But China did no more than make some threatening sounds, some minor movements on the Sikkim-China border and long statements of sympathy and support. Pakistan received no aid from China. (p. 159) He concludes the chapter by writing a few pages about



the Tashkent Declaration and its reactions in India and Pakistan.

The author records in Chapter V India's willingness to improve its relations with Pakistan, China and a number of countries including the aligned nations like Japan, Thailand, Iran, Turkey, Australia and New Zealand. Improvement in relations between India and other countries was necessary not only because "India continued to face a threat from Pakistan and China," but also because "India had the potential of becoming a great power." (pp. 176, 179) Meanwhile, not only did Pakistan's relations with the United States improve. "The Pakistan-Soviet negotiations resulted in the Russian-Pakistan arms deal which became known in July 1968." Besides, Pakistan reached an agreement with China in October 1967 on the reopening of border trade. The author also points to Nepal's "flirtations" with China and Pakistan and maintains that Nepal could provide a base for hostile activities against India though it could offer no "direct threat" to India because of its lack of strength.

In the rest of the Chapter the author discusses, by reference to interesting information, the revolt by East Pakistan against the Yahya regime, the dismemberment of Pakistan, how India was dragged into a war with Pakistan as well as the signing of a treaty of friendship between India and the Soviet Union. He also interprets how India managed to win the war. In explaining Pakistan's military reverses the author says that the Pakistani forces "lacked leadership, discipline and morale," (p. 214) and that "China had let down Pakistan." (p. 219) Again it is not clear why China chose to disappoint Pakistan "for the second time."

The 1971 decisive victory of the Indian Armed Forces notwithstanding, the author argues in Chapter VI that though "the armed strength of India was greater than before, it was certainly not adequate to meet the combined threat from China and Pakistan." He tells us that India's willingness and readiness to hold bilateral discussions with China on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence evoked no positive response from the latter. Although India's relations with Pakistan were far from happy, yet the author is optimistic about it for no apparent reason. His only hope is that "time alone would solve the tangle." (p. 236)

Chapter VI also records India's success in winning over Iran "which had been lending support to Pakistan." India's security has been considered in the light of the Super Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. The author's assumption is that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union "would use their warships or their bases in the Indian Ocean to attack India." (p. 241) The remainder of the Chapter is addressed to three things in particular: India's nuclear policy, the violent transfer of power in Bangla Desh which posed a threat to India's security and the exit of Mrs. Gandhi. Although the Government of India pledged that it would not go in for nuclear weapons but would use nuclear energy



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only for peaceful purposes, yet the author feels that "the future may force India to change this pledge," and that "national security must take precedence over morality." (p. 252) Although Chapter VI has appeared by the title of "The Exit of Mrs. Gandhi" only six sentences have been written about it. Either the author has done injustice to the title of the chapter, or the title should have been different.

Unlike the other chapters of the book, Chapter VII is divided into three sections beginning with the Janata regime which advocated "genuine non-alignment" in place of the non-alignment of Nehru and the Congress which "was biased in favour of the Russians." About the foreign policy of the Janata Government, the author writes: "The Janata Government wanted to hold the balance evenly between the Super Powers. It wanted to get closer to the United States to restore the balance." He also points out that the Janata regime differed from the previous Congress regime as regards India's nuclear policy. The author's opinion on the Janata Government's views on security is unclear. He tells us that "the Janata Government was not faced with serious security problems." (p. 274) He also says that "the overall security environment was the same as before and was...highly sensitive. China, Pakistan, Bangla Desh and the Indian Ocean were the main areas of anxiety." (p. 274) The author argues that the policy of "genuine non-alignment" earned the Janata Government "no advantage," but he has recorded its various significant achievements on the international front. (pp. 268, 273) Section II deals with Mrs. Gandhi's regime (1980); describes India's efforts to normalize its relations with Pakistan and China and records India's anxiety about the shifting of the "game of conflict and cooperation" from Europe to the developing world. Attention is drawn to India's active participation in the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference in 1981 and in the meeting of the Heads of State of the Non-Aligned Nations in 1983. At the close of Section II, the author discusses how political instability and uncertainty in Bangla Desh and ethnic violence in Sri Lanka had served to cause India's anxiety. In Section III, the author argues that India's friendship with the Soviet Union should be sustained primarily because, "the biggest security bugbear of India was a combined Pakistan-China attack on India." (p. 303) Soon the author changes his mind and warns that, "the Soviet Union could also mould its relations afresh with Pakistan," and therefore, "India must build its own armed strength...." (p. 304) As regards India's defence and nuclear policy, the author's suggestion is that "India's defence planning must take the Pakistani military potential and its anticipated augmentation into account. The nuclear resources of Pakistan must also be weighed carefully. The reality must be accepted since moral pleadings and international pressures may not yield the de-



sired results. If India is to change and modify its nuclear policies, it should do so without blushing." (p. 305) Chapter VIII is concluded with a brief description of several national and international events.

On reading the book one gets the impression that the author has laboured long over it and has collected considerable interesting information. Unhesitatingly, credit can be given to him for that. But his interest in analyzing the information is not always apparent. Easily he could have written a relatively smaller volume by choosing and utilizing only that information which would be essential to his work. He has left the chapters of the book, excepting Chapter VIII, undivided into sub-sections causing inconvenience to the readers. The style of writing is ordinary.

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PRASANTA SEN GUPTA

S.P. SINGH: *Political Dimensions of India-USSR Relations*. Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1987, 302 pp., Rs. 60/-.

THE book under review is an outgrowth of the author's post-doctoral research. It measures the dimensional depth of political relations between India and the Soviet Union since Jawaharlal Nehru to the present. The book is divided into four parts. Each part deals separately with the different phases of the varied relationship between India and USSR.

Indo-Soviet relations have political and economic dimensions. Since the days of Nehru, i.e., soon after India's independence the political relationship between the two countries assumed importance. When Prime Minister Nehru first visited the Soviet Union in 1955, he received an unprecedented welcome. This visit was later reciprocated when the Soviet Prime Minister Bulgamin and First Secretary of the Central Committee of CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev, paid a return visit to India the same year. Both the Soviet leaders expressed their unequivocal support for India's right over Kashmir. Since then Soviet leaders never looked back on Kashmir. Relations between the two countries were further consolidated during Indira Gandhi's term of office. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed by the two countries in 1971, is a living example of mutual cooperation and friendship. After Mrs. Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachov, "have laid the basis for a dynamic and innovative approach to the bilateral relations between the two countries," as rightly observed by the author. We may very safely say that Soviet



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Union and India are tested friends of each other irrespective of change of leadership in both the countries.

Indo-Soviet relations had a mild set-back soon after the Tashkent Declaration which of course was short-lived. Singh has rightly commented that "the anti-Tashkent campaign of Bhutto, which of course had the clear-cut backing of the official circles in Pakistan, almost coincided with the first visit of the Chinese President, Liu Shao-Chi to Pakistan...." Leaders of China were really responsible for it. They even supplied arms and economic assistance to Pakistan in order to compensate their losses of the 1965 war with India. Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi was not perturbed by Pakistan's hostile attitude and she declared that "India would implement the Tashkent Agreement in spite of Pakistan's provocation...." At some stage the proximity in Soviet-Pak relations became noticeable during Ayub's first visit to Moscow in 1965 and subsequent visit in 1967. At that time the Soviet Union desired to improve relations with Pakistan. It was also reflected in a Soviet credit offer of Rs. 600 million. Later on, Soviet arms aid to Pakistan were being viewed in India with some anxiety. However, Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi assured her Party Members of Parliament that Soviet leaders had assured India that their relationship with Pakistan would not in the least affect their ties with India. Again, India's favourable reactions to the developments in Czechoslovakia, Sino-Soviet border clashes and Brezhnev's proposal of collective security in Asia prove that Indo-Soviet relations "had successfully overcome much of the stresses and strains put on their mutual relations by various hostile forces."

This book contains useful references from various sources available for the study of Indo-Soviet relations. Press and political parties' reactions in and outside Parliament on various issues involving India and Soviet Union is also a welcome feature of the book. An exhaustive use of documents is made by the author to present an objective and a comprehensive treatment of the subject. This will prove to be a useful study in understanding political dimensions of Indo-Soviet relations and the author is right when he observes "India and the Soviet Union have not allowed anything to sour their relations..." To add this relationship has passed through many trials and tribulations.

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V.K. ARORA



P.K.S. NAMBOODRI, J.P. ANAND and SHREEDHAR: Intervention in the Indian Ocean. ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, vi, 362 pp., Rs. 96.

IN the book under review, the authors have attempted to demonstrate the relationship between the politics of the Indian Ocean area and Super Power rivalry. According to the authors, the interventionary tactic of the Super Powers are greatly responsible for the political and socio-economic instabilities in this region. As a consequence of this concern of the authors, the study focuses on this aspect of intervention in Indian Ocean politics. They believe that the involvement of external actors in the region has generated immense pressures on the domestic and foreign policies of the littoral and hinterland states and as a result contributed to instability and uncertainty. These instabilities and uncertainties have in turn perpetuated further external involvement.

According to the three authors, the lack of capability of the strategically significant islands in the Indian Ocean have made them extremely vulnerable to external pressures and their political development is subjected to destabilisation, often at the instance of outside powers, as borne out by the plot by overthrow the Government of the Maldives, in April 1980, by certain opposition politicians in collaboration with a group of European mercenaries led by a British national. Similar attempts have also been made in the Seychelles and the Comoros group of islands, *coups* being a regular feature in the unstable politics of the latter. President Abdullah of the Comoros accused France of engineering the breakaway move of the Island of Mayotte in order to transform it into "a fall-back base" so as to maintain French presence in the Indian Ocean.

Diego Garcia situated in the centre of the Indian Ocean has, according to the authors, proved to be "the *casus belli* for an unrestrained arms race in the Indian Ocean." It has been converted into a "launching pad" for interventionary activities in the area. These islands in the Indian Ocean have an "escalatory potential." Moreover, the establishment of bases on some of these islands accorded the Super Powers greater control over the strategic waterways such as the Straits of Malacca, Cape of Good Hope route, Suez Canal and Hormuz Straits. These are of immense significance to the Soviet Union in as much as they provide the closest link between the European and Eastern parts of the country. They are also important for the Western Powers and Japan since they are necessary for the transportation of raw materials to the industrialised countries from the Third World.

Further, the study points out that a major tool of intervention in the Indian Ocean has been the practice of transferring arms to the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean. The 1970s witnessed the



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beginnings of an unprecedented arms race in the area, particularly in the Persian Gulf region. With the sharp increase in the prices of oil in 1973, there was the emergence of the concept of "regional influentials." In West Asia these "regional influentials" were Iran and Saudi Arabia, chosen by the West to protect their interests in the region. With the increasing flow of petrodollars, the Gulf countries embarked on an armsbuying spree. From 1973 onwards the Gulf constituted an important arms market for the United States and West Europe; during 1973-1977, 24 per cent of the United States' arms exports, 30 per cent of British and 17 per cent of French exports went to the Gulf region. Soviet Union's share of arms transfer to the region was 25 per cent. The major recipients of Soviet arms have been Iraq, Egypt, Ethiopia and India. Arms induction has served to bring about an alignment between the security perceptions of the West and those of the ruling elite in the Gulf countries; the latter's perceptions being an extension of those of the former. Moreover, the rapidly changing weapons technology has placed the buyers in a position of continued dependence on the suppliers, particularly in view of their own low technology base.

Besides increased arms purchases, the Gulf states also initiated a process of development and modernisation. The aim was to build such an industrial infrastructure as would serve to sustain the prevailing tempo of development even after the exhaustion of the country's oil reserves. This was immensely advantageous to the West since development of an infrastructure necessitated the import of managerial and technological manpower from the developed countries.

Though formal political domination came to an end with de-colonisation, imperialism in its economic and cultural dimensions has continued to persist.

According to the authors, Super Power intervention can be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase began with the British decision to withdraw its forces from the Indian Ocean in the late 1960s and the United States decision to instal its presence on grounds of the "vacuum" theory. The Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal were considered suitable areas for deployment of US *Polaris* A-3 Submarine Launched Missiles against the Soviet Union and China. This possible deployment in an area so close to the Soviet underbelly evoked Soviet response in the form of increased patrolling of the area.

The 1973 West Asian War and the oil embargo led to a shift in US strategy. Attempts were made to project US power in a more pronounced manner. Periodic naval task forces were sent to the Gulf region and a decision was taken to upgrade the facilities at Diego Garcia. As a response to US moves the Soviet Union also enhanced its naval presence



in the Indian Ocean. It sought to develop more support facilities and bases in this area.

The Iranian Revolution signalled the end of the Nixon doctrine whereby US interests were protected by "regional influentials". Now the American aim seems to be the capability to intervene in areas of importance to itself. Its military objectives in the Gulf are primarily aimed at not merely securing unhampered flow of oil but gaining it on American terms.

Besides oil, the Western Powers are also dependent on the Indian Ocean region for several other raw materials. The authors point out the American dependence on external sources for as many as eighteen critical resources, many of which come from the Indian Ocean region.

Having discussed the Western interests, the authors examine the Soviet objectives in the Indian Ocean which, according to them, are primarily four. These are—

- (a) avoidance of strategic nuclear threat from the Indian Ocean front;
- (b) uninterrupted maritime communications;
- (c) conduct of activities in support of space exploration;
- (d) sustaining political relations and trade with littoral states.

Thus, it appears that the Super Powers are promoting their interests by dint of force unmindful, of course, of the erosion being caused by their intervention to the legitimacy of the present world order based on sovereignty and independence of states. It may also be true to say that they are involved in thwarting the emergence of a new world order which is being advocated by the leading non-aligned nations in the region.

In the last chapter, the authors outline India's response to the escalating interventionary tactics in the Indian Ocean. India through its efforts focused on the concept of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. India's advocacy of the concept it is argued is a continuation of its earlier efforts to promote the concept of non-alignment in order to keep the newly independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America away from Super Power rivalry.

The authors state the Indian apprehensions that the instalment of nuclear facilities in the Indian Ocean region pose a nuclear threat to India and other littoral states. These apprehensions are confined not only to security concerns but to fears that the outside powers may also seek to influence the path of development in the Indian Ocean region to nurse their economic interests at the cost of the people of the region. This probably is the most serious concern of this country, because of the challenge it poses to the ethnics and politics of non-alignment,



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The book, though published in 1982, continues to be relevant to those who feel concerned about the interests of post-colonial states in this region and are involved in the consolidation of their territorial integrity and independence. It is a useful addition to the growing literature on the politics of Indian Ocean from a third world perspective and provides insights to policy-makers.

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K.K. PATHAK

SREEDHAR, JOHN KANIYALIL and SAVITA PANDE: *Pakistan After Zia*. Associate Book Co., New Delhi, 1989, 173 p., Rs. 96.

THOUGH the book under review purports to deal with Pakistan After Zia there is little material in it to warrant such a title. In a book consisting of 173 pages barely a 100 odd pages consist of commentary and that too largely about the last years of General Zia. The remaining 70 pages are taken up by reproduced material.

There is little that is novel or original by way of either substance or analysis in this work. The authors essentially summarize what is known about the machinations of Pakistani domestic politics particularly the long-standing question of Islamicization. They also devote a rather cursory chapter to the Pakistani nuclear programme. Once again they re-hash the all-too-well-known efforts of the Zia regime to clandestinely obtain nuclear technology and material.

The lack of any original analysis or content is further compromised by the near-complete absence of footnotes. The few textual footnotes that do exist are incomplete by any standard. This book is little more than an extended polemical essay masquerading as a work of scholarship.

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SUMIT GANGULY



## REGIONAL COOPERATION

K.P. SAXENA : *Cooperation in Development—Problems and Prospects for India and ASEAN*. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1986, 220 pp., Rs. 150.

THE book under review is an excellent contribution to the growing literature on international relations of South and Southeast Asia by Indian scholars during recent years. In the context of increasing vocal support to the concept of South-South cooperation as a viable alternative available for third world countries to stem the tide of deterioration in their standing in the international economic scene, this book which deals with the problems and prospects for India-ASEAN relations will be of great interest to all students of India's foreign policy and Southeast Asian affairs. The main objective of the book is to identify the problems which prevented cooperation in the past and underline those areas where cooperative links could be forged.

Despite the positive advantages that India has in Southeast Asia—the benign interaction between India and Southeast Asian countries led to cultural efflorescence in the region, the presence of large number of people of Indian origin has helped in making yeoman contribution to the development of these countries and India's consistent and continuous support to the struggle against colonial domination—the unfortunate fact still remains that India and ASEAN have been drifting apart during recent years. On crucial international issues—Afghanistan and Kampuchea for example—ASEAN as a regional organisation has taken positions which are very different from that of India. New Delhi, during recent years, had been quite shy of projecting the rationale of its foreign policy and this fact, in some cases, had led to further widening of the chasm. It is worth mentioning that the attempt to have a dialogue between India and ASEAN in 1980 failed because of New Delhi's mishandling of the situation.

As the author points out, there is some degree of convergence of interests between India on the one hand and Indonesia and Malaysia on the other, with regard to their understanding of Beijing's long term foreign policy goals in Southeast Asia. (p. 31) Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur share New Delhi's misgivings that it is in China's interests to bleed Vietnam white and such a possibility would have dangerous consequences both for Vietnam and Southeast Asia. China's ambivalent stance on government-to-government and party-to-party relations is also a matter of great concern for Southeast Asian governments faced with communist insurgencies backed by ethnic Chinese communities. Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, therefore, are very keen to find an immediate solution to the Kampuchean problem. They share India's perceptions



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that in the long run a strong Vietnam, independent of the Soviet Union and China, will be a bulwark against Chinese expansionism and a guarantee for the peace and security of Southeast Asia.

In the context of the Super Power rivalry in Southeast Asia, ASEAN propounded in November 1971 the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPHAN). (p. 37) The idea of ZOPHAN was very similar to the concept of "Area of Peace" which Jawaharlal Nehru propounded on the eve of the Geneva Conference in 1954. Its objective was to keep out Super Power rivalry from Indo-China so that the newly independent countries of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia could attain political and economic progress rapidly. The concept of the "Area of Peace" failed because of US policy of containments of communism and promoting security alliances, opposition to non-alignment and military support to its client states in Southeast Asia. Today unfortunately even the member states of ASEAN are lukewarm in their support to ZOPHAN though it continues to remain as a viable solution to Super Power rivalry which had been the complicating constant factor in Southeast Asian politics since the end of the Second World War.

The author argues that one prospective area of cooperation between India and ASEAN lies in the promotion of Indian joint ventures in these countries. While it is a good theoretical proposition the fact remains that many Indian joint ventures, started with much fanfare in the 1970's, have either failed or are yet to take off adversely affecting New Delhi's image in the region. New Delhi should immediately undertake a study of these joint ventures, adopt corrective measures and spell out new guidelines as to how joint ventures could become a meaningful component in India's economic diplomacy in the region.

The book, undoubtedly a good academic exercise, suffers from some factual errors. Dealing with communist insurrection in Malaya, the author mentions (p. 23) that the Communists were aided by the Malay peasantry. On the contrary, one of the reasons for the failure of the Malayan Communist Party was its failure to enlist Malay support. Similarly, the author writes that the state of emergency in Malaya continued till July 1963; (p. 56) in fact, the emergency ended three years earlier in 1960. On page 57, it is mentioned that Indonesia laid claim to North Borneo; Jakarta made no such claims, it was the Philippines which laid claim to North Borneo. Singapore is referred to as the smallest nation in ASEAN (p. 78); with Brunei becoming a member of ASEAN it is this miniscule state which is the smallest member.

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V. SURYANARAYAN



## DISARMAMENT

M.K. BHARGAVA : Disarmament : From Versailles to Test Ban Treaty. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1979, x, 221 pp., Rs. 60/-.

AN adaptation of the author's Ph. D work (1966) in Political Science at the University of Saugar, Sagar, this study of the issues of disarmament is a challenging venture, not only because of the complexities of the problems and the technical intricacies it inevitably brings out but also because of the protracted period of time for which the question of disarmament has been engaging the attention of a majority of decision-makers, strategists and negotiators and the *corpus* of literature which has now become available on these issues over the last many years. Dr. Bhargava's book is another addition to the ever growing literature on the problems of disarmament. In this context he sets forth his thesis and particular limitations in the Preface. According to him, "... the chief concern is not merely to trace the historical development of the major powers' disarmament policies though that is implied, but also to bring to the forefront the currents and cross-currents of disarmament policies both in the period between the wars and the post-World War II period. . . . I confined myself all along to the attitudes of the great powers, dealing with the small powers only when their policies involved them in the negotiations of great powers."

The book has been divided into nine chapters. The introductory part is a prelude to the historical background of the problems of disarmament. A cursory treatment has been added of the various dated concepts, *modus operandi* and strategies of disarmament and arms control. The author has rightly pointed out that the World is confronted today by the dread of nuclear war, and public opinion demands that for the survival of the human race instruments of war must be controlled if not prohibited altogether. As a result, the problem of disarmament has assumed great proportions in this century.

In Chapter 2, the author deals with the initial ten years of the endeavours of disarmament under the League of Nations and explores that the League machinery was an advance over the concept of the balance of power and the Concert of Europe. It appeared as the first international endeavour to generate public opinion in favour of disarmament under its auspices.

Chapter 3 deals with the central idea and projections of the World Disarmament Conference and its aftermath ending with the indices which precipitated the failure of the disarmament efforts and return to clash and conflict.

The approaches and plans of the then Major Powers for the post-



World War II negotiations form the subject matter of Chapter 4. The author has terminated his discussions in this chapter with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of Moscow 1963, and maintains that the Treaty stands as a landmark in the realm of disarmament negotiations. Particular emphasis is laid on the Soviet-Western processes of negotiations and reasons for the minor success achieved during the years.

Chapter 5 discusses disarmament within a framework of four independent but inter-related categories—conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological. Apart from these specialised fields, the author maintains, the doctrine of general and comprehensive disarmament be envisaged involving all powers and all categories of weapons.

Chapter 6 takes up the critical issues of inspection and control mechanisms which are indispensable for the enforcement of any disarmament and arms control agreement. The author stresses that “in the absence of East-West agreed inspection the human family will continue groping in the darkness, constantly living in fear and suspicion, and even if peace prevails, it will be rendered most precarious by the inevitable fear of a nuclear holocaust.” (p. 142)

Chapter 7 studies the economic and social aspects of disarmament. The author has rightly pointed out that the arms competition consumes enormous material, financial and manpower resources; creates a direct menace to the life of people and sharply retards the process of peaceful developments in the World. He pleads that “disarmament could usher in an era of great prosperity, security and economic well-being to mankind. It could well lead to peace on earth and goodwill amongst men.” (p. 164)

Chapter 8 covers the special problems of disarmament which pose themselves for the coming future. These encompass the proliferation of nuclear weapons by other countries, the question of nuclear test ban, militarisation of space and disarmament, arms control issues and the impact of continuous technological innovations.

Chapter 9 sums up the findings and also presents broad generalizations. The author's analysis of the various issues is mainly a political one although some of the military and technological aspects have been slightly referred to for a cursory treatment of the subject. In fact, he only scratches the surface in dealing with such important issues as the expansion of the nuclear club, the question of disarmament and arms control in a military and technological milieu, etc. Not that his comments are not appropriate but they lack deep analysis and interpretation. He has failed to bring out how the nuclear doctrines have given way to the various problems of disarmament and arms control and to



newer theories influenced by the various changes in technological sophistication in electronics and satellite systems.

The author's style of presenting his views is impressive. Nevertheless, most of his findings are interestingly nothing but commonplace information for the scholars and strategists of disarmament and arms control studies and some of his observations even lack convincing clarity. This, however, does not detract us from the book which comes a vast wealth of information for researchers and general readers inclined to know more and more about the problems and prospects of disarmament and arms control. All in all the book deserves praise.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

## INDIA

C.P. BHAMBHRI : *Politics in India : 1947-1987*. Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1988, viii, 239 pp., Rs. 125.

THE great political ferment and revolutionary movements which originated in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries swept across the entire world including India, notwithstanding the fact that India was a colony of the British. M.N. Roy, Tilak, Gandhi, Nehru, Subhash Chandra Bose and Rajagopalachari were the representatives of the different political ideologies. It was only after 1947 when India became independent of the British that these different ideas and systems could influence evolution of Indian polity on the ground. According to the author, the political system which has evolved in India is "an open democratic political system based on universal adult franchise." The key word "open" means that political parties of all hues and colours compete for political power through fair and free elections, organised independently of the executive authority of the government in power. The author propounds the thesis that this open democratic political system has not been allowed to operate in the spirit in which it was designed by the framers of the Indian Constitution by the dominant class in the Indian polity namely the Indian capitalist class. In collusion with the bureaucracy, para-military and police forces and their counterparts in erstwhile imperial countries, Indian capitalism has strengthened itself by legitimising its control over the governmental apparatus and the resources it commands by victories in elections.

The Indian capitalist class has been the principal actor and beneficiary of the political system operating in India. In the late sixties and seventies it began to face serious challenge from the rich peasantry and landed gentry with which it had joined hands during the anti-colonial struggle. Not satisfied with the sharing of the "spoils" the rich peasantry, which represented a larger voting bank than the capitalist class tried to split the Indian National Congress Party with a view to capture political power on its own strength. The mainstream of democratic forces, e.g., the industrial workers, rural and urban poor, have had so far no political power. This is in spite of the existence of Socialist and Communist parties working with the objective of organising the proletariat for winning political power through competitive, open and participatory political systems based on universal suffrage. The "structural weakness" of the Indian Society, mainly inherited from the pre-colonial times, such as caste system, differences based on religious, regional, linguistic and cultural diversities and different stages of the economic development of aboriginals, tribes and populations living in



the island off the mainland and mountaneous regions have been serious obstacles to forging unity among the democratic forces.

Bhambhri's analysis of the evolution of Indian polity since independence, using the tools of Marxist dialectics and based on class conflicts, has its value. It is lucid, well documented and has intellectual rigour. It is not rhetoric or doctrinaire and conclusions are not pre-conceived. In fact there is a certain grimness and cry of despair in the concluding chapter when the author states that the "challenge from the exploited classes is not a serious threat to the ruling coalitions."

The description of politics in India as struggle for power by class interests does not raise basic issues, let alone answer them. What is the strength of nationalism in moulding political evolution in India? Indian capitalist class was "nationalist" in the context of capturing the Indian market and economy from the colonial capitalist, but was "anti nationalist" when it came to exploiting the masses. What role nationalism plays in forging unity of democratic forces or are these efforts of leftist political parties only aimed at getting the levers of government under their control? Have the unity and national identity of India strengthened by the formation of linguistic states?

The Central or the Union Government has since independence concentrated in itself vast and awesome powers. In spite of these powers the Centre has been less and less effective in imposing its will on recalcitrant state governments with well entrenched leadership, whether it belongs to the same party in power at the centre or not. The growth of regional parties runs parallel with the decline of national parties. What will be the shape of the Indian political system if and when the regional political parties eclipse the national one? Centre-state relations are assuming forms which the founding fathers did not clearly anticipate.

Currently there is a growing disenchantment with the functioning of the parliamentary form of democracy, especially the election of the Prime Minister, who is the Head of Government indirectly by the political party caucus which captures the majority of seats in the Parliament and stakes its claim to form the government. The growing dependence of the Prime Minister on shifting loyalties in the party leads to erosion of his authority and circumscribes his capacity for taking new initiatives. Parliamentary democracy has led to a staggering increase in expenditure incurred at elections, both to central and states legislative bodies. High cost of fighting elections has been considered one of the root causes of the spread of the virus of corruption far and wide in the body-politic and economy of the country. What are the prospects and possibilities of curing the existing electoral system of the malise of corrupt practices and making the Head of Government more directly accountable to the nation as a whole?



India like China, Iran, Greece and Egypt has been a seat of an original civilisation and political thought and system. It has not easily and kindly accepted grafts of political systems which did not originate from within. There can be no transfer of political technology. It must evolve from within. Gandhi's concepts of trusteeship, decentralised economic power, self-reliant if not self sufficient village units, were indigenous to the soil but have withered away in the hostile and incompatible environment of conflicts with well armed neighbours and technological compulsions of a modern military-industrial state.

Bhambhri's book should be read with his companion volume *Foreign Policy of India*. Together they provide an overview of India's domestic political scene as well as international relations and emphasises their close interconnections. Methodology and concepts followed are Marxist but many of the conclusions are not. The book takes account of hard realities of this ancient, and at the same time young nation, in the first four decades of its new existence.

New Delhi

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KALIPADA DEB: *Foreign Resources and Development in India*. Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1982, xii, 276p., Rs. 90/-.

THE book under review consists of eleven chapters. In Chapter I, the author has historically examined the performance of economic development for leading industrialised countries like the United Kingdom, France, Germany, United States of America, USSR and Japan. Considering the different span of time, factors such as evaluation of transportation, communication, inflow of foreign resources and the role played by State governments are held responsible for the economic development of different countries. The general findings tend to suggest the exploitative role of foreign resources and the ruthless exploitation of the labour class of society.

Chapter II deals with the influence of foreign resources of various types on the economic development of developing countries. It is dissatisfying to note that foreign resources from the developed world did very little for the economic development of these countries. In fact, the objective of the developed world in disguise was to intensify the political and economic dependence of the developing world. Thus, the pattern of industrialisation guided by Western culture in developing the economy was primarily to transfer the gains into the developed world,



It is stressed by the author that the developing countries could have done better in achieving their economic development objectives without much intercourse with the developed world.

Chapter III discusses the rationale of India's planning objectives, resource allocation policy and undue privileges received by bureaucrats and administrators. India accounts for one-sixth of the world population, while in terms of area, it is the seventh largest country in the world. India is fairly rich in terms of mineral and water resources. Despite all this, India has been characterised as having higher illiteracy rate, "social and cultural institutions of oppression by landlords, foreign domination, etc." The planning objectives of the country are not compatible with the prevailing internal conditions; more resources were allocated to the industrial sector, whereas less resources were given to agriculture, family planning, education and other essential sectors. Officials of the government were given undue facilities in all respects including decent housing, handsome remuneration, etc. Moreover, indirect taxes that directly affected the common masses increased, but direct taxes which only covered a "handful" of the population have decreased over time.

In Chapter IV the author has described the performance of India's import and export policies. It is pointed out that India's export of non-traditional capital-intensive goods has increased over time, whereas, the export of traditional goods witnessed a remarkable downward trend. However, India's exports as a percentage of world exports has declined over the years. India's export policy, having a clear objective of foreign exchange earnings, involved a higher cost of the country's economic growth.

Chapter V examines the repercussions on economic growth owing to the inflow of foreign assistance. The World Bank and USA constituted the lion's share. In terms of grants, four countries Canada, USA, UK and Germany—accounted for about 71 per cent of the total. The share of USA and Canada declined, whereas that of UK increased over time. Of the total commodity assistance, the United States constituted a significant proportion. Foreign aid has, however, distorted the growth of the Indian economy by pushing up the prices of goods and services. Also, "delayed utilisation of aid, distortion of priorities, increased cost of operation, uncertainties of investment, cost of administering aid, cost associated with political strings" were, according to the author, the principal repercussions on the growth of the Indian economy.

Chapter VI broadly discusses the nature and magnitude of foreign business investment and its supplying sources, the growth performance of foreign companies *vis-a-vis* the Indian-controlled firms and existing pattern of technical collaborations and their payment structures. Over the years, the outstanding foreign business investment and its constitu-



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ents fluctuated. It is pointed out, however, that the value of net flow was much less than what was indicated by the statistical magnitude. The relative share of UK in the total foreign business investment in India declined sharply, whereas, the share of USA, Germany and the international institutions increased considerably. Performance of companies controlled by the foreign firms was much better than the Indian firms. The sale, capital employed and gross profits were higher in the case of the former. It appears that the investments deployed by foreign firms were primarily meant to earn dividends and to exercise control over India's management policies. Besides, foreign companies have also exploited the Indian markets and led to the capital intensive nature of production in a labour surplus economy. "This high profitability of foreign controlled companies, has not only meant current exploitation of Indian consumers but a mounting stronghold on the Indian economy, through ploughing back of profits, for increased future exploitation. Their capital base and lines of operation go on expanding without bringing anything worth the name for their parent organizations." (p. 127) The technical collaborations in India increased considerably, but not without cost to India's economic development. This led to an increase in net imports of about 90 per cent in the early sixties. Royalty remittances increased about five-fold primarily on account of lack of definite rules and regulations of the Indian Government with regard to foreign agreements. This has led to the maximization of benefits by foreign countries and discouraged the adoption of indigenous R & D which would be more compatible for local Indian entrepreneurs.

Chapter VII was designed to represent the import structure and its payment system, nature of import policy and resource allocation and procedures adopted in the Indian economy. Import of merchandise goods while constituting a significant proportion, showed a downward trend. The share of service payments, however, registered an upward movement over time. As compared to the private sector, the public sector accounted for the bulk of payment. This shows that the borrowing pattern of industrialization disregarded the needs and resources of the country while benefiting the rich classes of Indian society. The increase of imports was mainly the outcome of the country's import liberalization policy from time to time, conservation of foreign exchange, promotion of import substitution and export promotion. The licences for imports were given on the basis of "indigenous non-availability" and "essentiality" certificates. Many times, import licences were misused by way of "under invoicing" which was primarily because of corruption and inefficiency of the government machinery. Besides, the overvalued Indian rupee not only created a foreign exchange crisis through discouraging exports but also widened the gap between the official



and black market exchange rates. These, associated with many other factors, resulted in smuggled goods trade due to its high profitability. The quantitative restrictions, including devaluation, were not sufficient to control and regulate the "low price elasticity of most of the import goods."

Chapter VIII shows the significance of agriculture and the rationale behind the resource allocation policies. It was found by the author, that planning resources from the agricultural sector declined over time. The performance of non-foodgrains was better than foodgrains resulting in heavy imports of the latter. Despite this, the availability of foodgrains per capita per day declined over time from 457.8 grammes in 1960-63 to 431.4 grammes in 1974-77. The poverty in the rural areas of the country increased over the years. To improve the conditions of the agricultural sector of the country, various experts were sent to foreign countries to receive better training and knowledge. This again has made India's agricultural sector more dependent on Western systems leading to the import of machinery and technology.

Chapter IX contributes to the knowledge of India's industrialisation fostered by the growth of the capital goods sector. Plan outlays on the industrial sector increased over time to maximize the saving rate. However, khadi and village industries, which cater to the demands of the masses in the country and absorb the workers significantly has, to a very great extent, been neglected. This was primarily due to the administrative inefficiencies and bureaucratic set-up of the country. The author discusses as to how India's industrialization strategy was determined by the vested interests of the developed countries which led to the capital intensive nature of production incompatible for the Indian resources endowment structure.

Chapter X examines comprehensively the importance of India's infrastructure sector like power, transport and human development and rationale behind the allocation outlays in these sectors. It is pointed out that resources in the power sector increased over time but the gap between the installed and utilization capacity widened. Achievements in terms of village electrification were far from satisfactory. The industrial sector also suffered due to power shortages which generally resulted in loss of production. The reasons for this are both external as well as internal. Under the transport sector, railways and civil aviation occupied a preferred position in terms of plan outlays and foreign aid, whereas road transport received secondary treatment. The share of Plan outlay on the education sector declined particularly after the Third Five Year Plan, but in terms of values it showed an upward movement. Across the different categories of education, University education which was beyond the reach of the common masses, was given primary impor-



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tance, whereas secondary and adult education were ignored considerably. This type of educational development was influenced by the foreign powers on one hand and the Indian bureaucrats and administrators on the other. The family planning programme was also neglected in the country pushing up the growth of population by inducing fertility rate in the country. This was mainly because of the lack of any comprehensive population policy in the country. These policies were also influenced by the Western Powers who were more concerned about imposing their own policies and programmes which were not suitable to the existing Indian overall situation.

Given the framework of the book, it appears that the author has critically examined the important aspects of foreign resources under Indian circumstances and the rationale behind India's planning policies and objectives. However, there may be certain specific questions to be posed for readers and plan-makers in general and researchers in particular. First, the author, through the entire book, has questioned seriously the involvement of foreign powers for the country's economic development. It appears that the author tends to believe that without foreign countries' and international institutions' involvement, India's economic growth would have been more if India's industrialisation process could have been based upon its own indigeneous resources and technology. This seems to be true and one notes that foreign resources and technology on account of India's existing resources endowment structure, is incompatible, but the fact remains that India so as to speed up its industrialization process had needed foreign resources most critically. This was mainly due to the fact that India's indigenous technology was so obsolete and outdated that the products manufactured would have been too uncompetitive qualitatively to even survive in the international market. Apart from the export constraints, even home demand of the products would have been quite limited. This aspect of the import of capital and technology has however not been given due consideration that it deserves in the entire analysis of the book. Second, to prove one observation, various reasons have been put forward in the many chapters of the book. From that, it is very difficult to infer as to what factors are more significant than the others. It would have been more rewarding and useful if the author could have applied certain known statistical techniques to prove or disprove the facts or observations not to mention about the hypotheses. Third, many times repeatedly the author has blamed the administrators, bureaucrats and policies of the developed countries in unsuccessfully framing and implementing India's planned objectives and programmes. This seems to be partly true but the lack of awareness and unwillingness on the part of beneficiaries are also important constraints that deserved due attention by the author,



Nevertheless, the present book is a modest attempt in revealing the facts currently under way in the country. It is superbly written disregarding a few printing errors. It justifies its printing costs and would be a new addition in the field of international economics and could be used extensively by those interested in understanding the problems and policies of India's planning process.

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NIRANJAN PANT and R.K. VERMA : Farmers' Organization and Irrigation Management. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi 1983, x, iii p., Rs. 65/-

THE rationale, objectives and priorities of irrigation, especially of major irrigation projects, need a fresh look. This has become necessary because of the fact that returns from huge investments in irrigation are not encouraging enough. With a view to tackle the issues inhibiting irrigation efficiency and realise the stated objectives of irrigation, the agency (government) ought to formulate a realistic need-based programme of action. In the forefront of this move to make irrigation more efficient and purposeful, stands a massive task of ensuring farmers' participation in irrigation systems' construction, operation and maintenance. In several countries attempts have been made to ensure farmers' participation in irrigation management through appropriate organisational strategies. But the success rate has been minimal and tardy because of a variety of socio-economic constraints. Even so, these experiments or experiences may help identify the gaps and tactical errors, if any, that would help to incorporate corrective measures while formulating strategies for farmers' organisations in canal command areas. It is in this sense that the results of empirical studies as presented in the book, under review, would be useful for formulating policy perspectives.

The book is an outcome of a field study conducted in 1981-82, in Sone Command area of the Bihar state, India. It is divided into five chapters. A brief account of irrigation development in terms of potential created and utilised, research objectives, data collection methods and salient features of the study area (Sone Command) are presented in Chapter One. Chapter Two gives a review of research works on farmers' organisation followed by a detailed description of farmers' organisation



in the Sone Command area in the Third Chapter. Data analyses are presented in the Fourth Chapter and the results are summarised in Chapter Five.

The book, though loosely structured, has tried to focus on some of the practical limitations of farmers' organisations in a given socio-economic framework. It is an unsuccessful attempt by the authors to link the title of the book with its contents. However, passing references given to some problems of irrigation management, while describing organisational aspects of Chak societies, will give clues to understand their nature and magnitude. This is possible for those readers who have a fairly good knowledge and experience in irrigation water management problems.

While the emphasis on farmers' participation, especially in major irrigation projects, is on the increase, there is not much evidence to show that problem-specific comprehensive operational plans have emerged to accomplish the task. Many a times the target group (beneficiary farmers) are not properly motivated to organise themselves to overcome the constraints coming in the way of ensuring equitable distribution of irrigation water. With the result adhoc and ill-conceived plans emerge and remain as paper plans rather than field plans. Sometimes the bureaucracy is guided by certain statutory obligations to fulfil target-oriented developmental programmes, with little thought for their sustainability. It is evident from the authors' observations in the Third Chapter of the book: "Hard-Pressed by the Union Government, the CADAs in Bihar have been trying to set up the formation of the water users organisations which may be of help in the maximum utilisation of irrigation potential in their respective commands. . . . While most of these societies are on paper, three societies. . . show any promise." (pp. 39 and 57).

The Third Chapter makes incoherent and disjointed reading, which the authors could have avoided with little more attention to systematic treatment of the problems and issues. The issues raised are not pointed and not analysed in proper perspective. However, they help one to understand as to how the theoretically visualised functions of farmers' organisations take twists and turns under the realistic local dynamics. The big and influential farmers guided by their self interest play a dominant role in the formation and successful functioning of farmers' organisations. A high proportion of dominant caste farmers in the Chak samitis under reference might have helped the formation of samitis with comparative ease. The motivation, as stated in the book, for farmers to get organised is the subsidy offered by the CADA for on-farm development. In order to fulfil the paper formalities to obtain the subsidy, the scheduled castes and other weaker sections were given proper representa-



tion in the committees. But in reality they were never a party to decision-making as they were not invited for meetings. (p. 44) Even some of the measures taken to prove social justice orientation of the organisations were short-lived. (pp. 54-55)

Reference to some of the community responsibilities in maintaining water distribution systems, like the cleaning and up-keep of the field irrigation channels by the farmers in their respective farms, protection of irrigation structures by the farmers whose lands were located adjacent to them, tend to serve as guidelines for evolving suitable managerial strategies in command areas elsewhere in the country.

In the Fourth Chapter, the results of the study are presented. The authors have failed to prove what aspects of farmers' organisation in the selected samitis have contributed for their success/failure in improving irrigation efficiency. The so-called efficiency in the form of higher productivity per hectare in Chak areas when compared to non-Chak areas, is essentially due to variations in input levels and the adoption of hybrid varieties of seeds. What was the incentive for more input use in Chak areas and less input use in non-Chak area is not clear. The reasons are left to the imagination of the reader. The summing up in the last chapter is relatively better presented when compared to other chapters.

Printer's devils in some pages of the book adds to the confusion of the reader who has to often refer back to get logical sequence of events. The book, however, is a good addition to the literature on irrigation management, which is limited.

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## INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By V. Machwe

*The object of this feature is to offer every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of Social Sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the Review Section of this journal, does list publications of importance useful for libraries and research workers in the Social Sciences.*

BHATTACHARJEE, S.R. (Sambhuti Ranjan) *Tribal Insurgency in Tripura: A Study in Exploration of Causes* (Tribal Studies of India Series, T. 136). Inter-India Publications, New Delhi, 1989, 211p., plates. Rs. 150.

This research study, based on field work, analyses the factors and forces which contributed to the problem of insurgency in the small hilly state of North-East India. Divided into six chapters the author describes the land and people, discusses the social, cultural and economic life of the people and gives a sketch of political-administrative organisation of the state. The final chapter studies the factors responsible for the insurgency and tribal peoples attitudes towards these factors; it also suggests some remedial measures. The author, who has been closely associated with the tribal life of Tripura, gives a good insight into the socio-psychological factors and their politicisation which caused unrest in the state.

CHANDRAHAS SINGH, *The Civil Service in India (1858-1947)—A Historical Study*. Atma Ram, Delhi, 1989, vi, 144p., Rs. 85.

The book gives an historical account of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) which occupied a unique position amongst the civil services all over the world. With the help of many quotations and three appendices, the author, an Indian Administrative Service Officer, deals with the question of Indianisation of the service and with the issues of recruitment and training giving details about the subjects required to be taken for the examination. Other topics discussed by the author are administration of justice and revenue departments, the role of District Officer and the organisation of the Secretariat. He also deals with the behaviour patterns of ICS Officers and with the contributions made by these officers in the field of literature, history, linguistics and social work.

CHOPRA, J.K. *Politics of Election Reforms in India*. Mittal Publications, Delhi, 1989, viii, 313p., Rs. 200.

The book, which is mainly factual should be useful in an election year. The first three chapters deal with organisation and functions of the Election Commission and give a survey and brief political outcome of the General and indirect elections (Presidential, Vice Presidential and Legislative Council's elections) held since the first General Elections of 1951-52. The next two chapters deal with the question of electoral reforms and consider the views of the Election Commission,



of the various committees and commissions on the subject, and the views of political parties. The chapter "Recent Developments" and the post-script deal with various elections held in the period between 1982-1988, elections to the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council and the January 1989 Legislative Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu, Nagaland and Mizoram.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA, *War and National Liberation: CPI Documents 1939-1945*, Edited and introduced by P. Bandhu and T.G. Jacob. Odyssey Press, New Delhi, 1988, xxxiii, 382p., Rs. 65.

This volume is a sequel to the earlier volume *National Question In India: CPI Documents 1942-1947*. These two volumes cover an important period of the history of the Communist Party of India. The Second World War period saw some major political developments in the history of India's freedom struggle. Demand for Pakistan was articulated in a forceful manner, Quit India Movement was launched and Netaji Bose organised the Indian National Army. Since its shift in attitude towards the war, the Communists faced accusations from the Indian National Congress. The present volume contains articles and documents of these political developments and the famine conditions prevailing in India at that time.

DANG, Satyapal *Genesis of Terrorism: An Analytical Study of Punjab Terrorists*. Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, 148p, Rs. 100.

The veteran Communist leader in this timely publication analyses the factors responsible for the rise of terrorism in the Punjab and gives his views on the crisis. The study is based on life sketches of terrorists, which have been prepared after thorough investigation and are based on reliable information. These sketches have appeared previously in various magazines.

DAYANANDA, Swami *Introduction to Vedanta: Understanding the Fundamental Problem*. (Edited by Barbara Thornton). Vision Books, New Delhi, 1989, viii, 112p., paper, Rs. 35.

The book is based on the opening talks given by the author in November 1979 at Piercy, California. Swami Dayananda has conducted several teacher-training courses in the methodology of Vedanta in India and in the USA. His lectures have been popular due to simple and lucid nature of the language of his talks.

DAYANANDA, Swami *The Teaching of the Bhagavad Gita*. Vision Books, 1989, 168p., paper, Rs. 45.

The teachings of Gita have greatly influenced Indian thought and life. Swami Dayananda comments on selected and important verses from the eighteen chapters of the *Gita* and succinctly conveys the message of the *Gita* to the common man. The book is a condensed transcription of Swamiji's talks.

DEORA, Man Singh *Guru Gobind Singh: A Survey—literary Survey*. Anmol Publications, New Delhi, 1989, ix, 158p., Rs. 160.

This bibliography of articles from periodicals and newspapers and of chapters from the books covers the various aspects of the life of the tenth Guru of the Sikhs and deals with his teachings and his literary and philosophical contributions. The entries are arranged alphabetically under various headings which are given in the



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subject schedule. The book also contains an introduction describing the life of the Guru and dealing with his literary works and teachings. A select list of Punjabi literature, author index and a list of periodicals and newspapers which have been indexed are also included in the book. The bibliography supplements the earlier bibliographies published on Guru Gobind Singh.

DHARAM VIR *Political Efficacy in Urban India: A Sociological Exploration*. Classical Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1989, xvii, 182p., Rs. 100.

Based on a sample survey (for Meerut City), this study aims to identify the extent of political efficacy among the lower sections of society *vis-a-vis* the other sections. It also aims at identifying the determinants of sense of political efficacy like age, sex, level of education, family background, ethnicity, religion, organisational affiliations, exposure to mass media, etc. It assesses the consequences of sense of political efficacy and draws conclusions from the inquiry conducted by the author, who has been a recipient of Young Social Scientist Fellowship of the Indian Council of Social Science Research. The author has given systematically, while dealing with the subject overview of the literature, definition of the concept of "political efficacy," an extensive bibliography and the schedule (in Hindi) used for doing the survey work.

DIETRICH, Gabriele *Women's Movements in India: Conceptual and Religious Reflections*. Breakthrough Publications, Bangalore, 1988, ix, 201p.

The author, born in West Berlin and a student activist, has been working on women's movement in India since 1972. The present collection of her selected essays, some of which have been published in various magazines on issues with which women have to struggle in their daily life, has a combined Marxist feminist approach and the essays analyse and reinterpret the role of religion and culture.

FARIDOON, Mahmood *Murder of Bhutto: A Political Play*. Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, 188p., Rs. 30.

The author dramatically exposes the "Conspiracy" against the regime of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970's and captures the mood of the nation and of the different sections of people connected with the death of the deposed Prime Minister. The author, who left Pakistan in 1984, has edited a number of English and Urdu periodicals. He was a student activist.

GHOSH, Partha S. *Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia* (South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University, New Delhi Branch, South Asian Studies No. 21), Manohar, New Delhi, 1989, viii, 265p., Rs. 230.

The author analyses the domestic political problems of the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) region where forces of cooperation are over-shadowed by those of conflict. The exploitation of the region's religious, ethnic, linguistic and other problems for short-term interest is not conducive to regional cooperation. From the foreign policy perspective the author explains the regional conflicts by relating them to domestic issues rather than to external factors and finds that foreign interference is as much a result of domestic conflict as it is a cause for domestic conflict. Six chapters of the book, which contains eight, are devoted to the study of India's relations with other countries of the



region and with the region as a whole. The first and last chapter contain the basic analytical framework of the study and the conclusion respectively. It also contains a useful bibliography.

GUPTA, Rakesh (Ed.) *India's Security Problems in the Nineties*. Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, 124p., Rs. 100.

The volume contains papers presented at a seminar in New Delhi in 1987, concerning interstate conflict and their bearing on India's external and internal security problems. The papers by eminent scholars, are divided into two sections, viz., military and non-military factors. The first section covers topics like dangers of nuclear fallout, problems of littoral states, Gorbachev Peace Plan, Soviet view of peace and development and US policy in the Asia-Pacific region. The section dealing with non-military aspects includes articles on three topics, viz., role of economic factors, political economy and destabilization and the contradictions in United States' view of the Indian security environment.

GUPTA, Uma *Supreme Court and Civil Liberties*. Mittal Publications, Delhi, 1988, 279p., Rs. 130.

The book examines the role of the Indian Supreme Court in the protection of civil liberties and promotion of justice to the common man. Divided into six chapters, the first chapter defines the concept of civil liberties and discusses its various aspects. The next three chapters deal with the Supreme Court, its powers and jurisdiction, its role since 1950 *vis-a-vis* personal liberty and with its widening role since the internal emergency period of 1975-1977 in the sphere of protection of civil liberties. The debate between judicial restraint and the need for progressive judicial activism is highlighted and the issues of civil liberties of prisoners and prison reforms are discussed. Chapter Five is devoted to the role of Supreme Court in public interest litigation and discusses some cases relating to bonded labour, environmental protection and other issues. It also refers to the role of *locus standi*. Chapter Six brings out the defects in the present judicial system and stresses the need for judicial reform. The book is based on author's Ph.D. thesis.

JITINDER KAUR *Punjab Crisis: The Political Perception of Rural Voters*. Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1989, 104p., Rs. 125.

The book studies the Punjab Assembly elections of September 1985. Based on data collected through a sample survey of voters of village Ghanour (District Patiala), the author analyses the levels of political awareness and the participation of villagers in the electoral process. The author's analysis of the electoral process is supported by numerous tables. Her findings about the people's attitude towards the prevailing Punjab situation, should be helpful in understanding the various aspects of the Punjab problem.

McMULLEN, Clarence Osmond *Religious Beliefs and Practices of the Sikhs in Rural Punjab*. Manohar, New Delhi, 1989, vi, 142p., Rs. 150.

This is an empirical study of Sikh religious beliefs and practices and of Sikh views regarding their history, caste and community and their world outlook. Data for the study, which investigates relationships between variables like sex, age, caste and education and the Sikh beliefs and practices, have been collected by in-



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terviewing 500 persons from six villages of Gurdaspur district of Punjab. The survey work was carried out before 1984. The book contains as background to the data, analysis of the process of institutionalisation of Sikh religion and an extensive bibliography. The author is the Director of the Christian Institute of Sikh Studies, Batala, Punjab.

MISHRA, P.K. (Ed.) *Culture, Tribal History and Freedom Movement* (Dr. N.R. Sahu Commemoration Volume). Agam Kala Prakashan, Delhi, 1989, xvi, 230p. plates, Rs. 500.

The volume consists of seventeen research articles, mostly by academics, on three aspects of Orissa's history. Section one contains articles on early history of Kosala, on social organisation and feudal relations in early medieval Orissa, besides articles on Vikramkhola inscriptions, on images of Chamunda Devi, on temples and on icons of Vishnu and Saraswati and on protest and non-conformist traditions in Orissa. Section two, dealing with tribal life, contains two articles on Khond life under the British Administration and on the Ganjam Agency (1839-1900). Section three consists of four articles devoted to role of Surendra Sai in the Sambalpur rebellion of 1830-1864 and to nationalist politics and non-cooperative movement in Orissa.

MUKHERJEE, Neela and Amitabha MUKHERJEE *India's Foreign Trade by Regions 1950-1986*. Indus Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1988, x, 176p., Rs. 150.

The book presents an overall picture of the dynamics of India's foreign trade which has undergone structural change in terms of direction of trade during the last four decades. It consists of nine chapters. The first chapter deals with the concept, the determinants and the background of direction of India's trade. The last chapter gives a comparative picture of the changes which have taken place with respect to: (i) share of different trade partners, (ii) growth of nominal vs real trade and (iii) prices of goods paid and received through trade. It also contains the main conclusions and some policy suggestions. The other seven chapters analyse India's trade performance with following seven currency areas, trading blocs and regions: sterling and dollar areas, European Economic Community, Eastern Bloc, countries covered by United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries and African Countries.

NIKOLSKY, Nikolai *The Philosophy of New Thinking and the Soviet Initiatives* (The World in Focus). Allied, New Delhi, 1988, vii, 157p., Rs. 75.

Present-day world conditions which are linked with the on-going scientific and technological revolution have necessitated a concept of new political thinking, described by Gorbachev in his Political Report to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February-March 1986. This book provides a lucid exposition of the new thinking as a comprehensive philosophy and as a programme of action with reference to its implementation in the sphere of Soviet Union's foreign policy initiatives and international relations. It discusses the Soviet concept of a comprehensive system of international security and its main aspects like nuclear free world, regional security and economic and ecological security.



PANDIT, H.N. *Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose: From Kabul to Battle of Imphal*. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, xii, 342p., Rs. 175.

Part one of the story of the last five years of the life of the legendary figure, Subhash Chandra Bose and of the Indian National Army (INA). This historical account of a chapter in India's freedom movement brings out the role played by the leader and by the prominent men of the armed movement. The author is critical of the role of the insincere foreign allies of the movement which was organised in East and South-East Asian countries.

PRASAD, Rajendra *India's Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age*. Prakash Book Depot, Bareilly, 1988, 226p., ii, p. Rs. 120.

The book which deals with various aspects of civil defence is based on the author's doctoral work. The author explains the importance of civil defence in the national security system and writes about the objectives of civil defence. He lists and describes various kinds of threats like different kinds of bombs, nuclear biological and chemical warfare agents and gives detailed suggestions concerning civil defence organisation and its functions. A chapter deals with civil defence and the protection against chemical, biological and nuclear challenges.

PUCHKOV, V.P. *Political Development of Bangladesh 1971-1985* (USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies), Translated from the Russian by Ravi M. Bakaya. Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, viii, 115p., Rs. 180.

The author traces the history of Bangladesh from its emergence as a Republic. Divided into two parts, part one covers the years 1971-1975, and deals with the birth of Bangladesh and with the positive and negative aspects of the government of Prime Minister Mujibur Rehman. In the second part, the author writes about the period of instability and tensions, about the advent of Ziaur Rehman and his assassination and deals with the military administration of the country led General Ershad. The author also deals with the many acute socio-economic problems faced by the new Republic, with the political and economic tensions and with the conduct of foreign policy. He discusses the role of religion and describes the activities of the political parties and factions.

RAJASEKHRIAH, A.M. B.R. *Ambedkar: The Quest for Social Justice*. Uppal Publishing House, New Delhi, 1989, xiii, 290p., Rs. 250.

Dr. Ambedkar who was Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly of India and subsequently a Minister in the Government, was a great thinker, writer, a constitutionalist of eminence and stout defender of the rights and privileges of the minorities. This study after briefly giving an account of his early life and later, of his emergence as a leader, presents his basic political philosophy and evaluates his contribution in the sphere of political and constitutional reform during the period 1919 to 1947 and later with special reference to the question of political participation by the minorities, especially the untouchables. The study, which is a revised version of the doctoral thesis of the author, who is Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Professor of Political Science, Karnatak University, also contains a bibliography of Dr. Ambedkar's writings and lists books, periodicals, newspapers, yearbooks, Government Reports and legislative proceed-



ings. The book would be read with great interest both by scholars and the general reader.

REKHI, Upjit Singh *Jharkhand Movement in Bihar*. Nunes Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, 248p., index, etc., Rs. 150.

The first two chapters of this dissertation deal with the concept of social movement and the theory of tribal politics. Problems of tribals, their development and tribal politics in 'Jharkhand' region of Bihar are discussed in the next two chapters. In conclusion, the author analyses the causes of the 'failure' of the movement.

SARASWATHI, T.S. and Ranjana DUTTA *Invisible Boundaries: Grooming for Adult Roll: A Descriptive Study of Socialization in a Poor Rural and Urban Slum Setting in Gujarat*. Northern Book Centre, New Delhi, 1986, xviii, 246p., Rs. 150.

Study of child behaviour and development in terms of the social, economic and physical environment in which children grow is important for educators, social workers and others. This research study investigates the process of socialization of children and interprets the data from ecological perspectives. The book contains chapters on: Review of literature and on methods and plan of analyses and on description of the two communities in terms of their history and demographic and economic profile. The chapters also describe the physical layout and environmental conditions, basic facilities available, the socio-cultural and family set-up and the daily life-schedule of children. Supplementary material like a bibliography and appendices complete the book.

SINGER, Hans, *et al* (Eds.) *Technology Transfer by Multinationals*. 2 Pts (New World Order Series, 3). Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1988, Pt. 1, xxviii, 519p., Pt. 2, vi, 524-925p., Rs. 600 for the two parts.

These two parts bring together recent research studies by wellknown scholars from different countries on issues relating to transfer of technology by multinationals. The topics discussed are: issues of conflict and control, global efforts for technology transfer and diffusion, technological development in the host countries (this section includes four articles relating to India), technological change in the North and options for the South, international patents system, code of conduct for multinationals and technological change and economic development.

TRIPATHY, Ram Nirajan *Economic Development in India: A Critical Assessment*. Indus Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1989, 198p., Rs. 180.

The author, a former professor of economics, studies some of the important problems of India's economic development. Quoting official and non-official statistics and other writers' viewpoints he analyses the problems and offers some suggestions regarding the corrective measures needed to tackle these problems. The book, divided into eight chapters, discusses the following topics: structural changes in the economy, income distribution, capital output ratio and Indian Planning, employment implications of industrialisation and of new farming technologies, regional differences, role of agriculture and the public sector in the economy.



VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (Ed.) *Human Rights in the Changing World*. International Law Association (Regional Branch, India), New Delhi, 1988, xxiv, 476p., Rs. 150.

Commemorative volume on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly. Articles contributed, mostly by eminent persons from the legal profession in India and some from abroad, demonstrate the influence exercised by expanding human rights movement in various spheres of human society and show how changing human development perspective necessitates a fresh approach to human rights movement. All together the articles deal with many aspects of human rights like role of non-governmental organizations, legal responsibilities, protection of human rights in emergencies and other aspects. The Appendices contain the basic documents on human rights.

VENKATESWARAN, R.J, and D.M. Mithani *Rajiv Gandhi: Economic Perspective Towards 21st Century*. Himalaya Publishing House, Bombay, 1989, xiv, 239p., Rs. 150.

After noting the economic policies pursued since Independence, the authors examine the different aspects of new economic policies initiated by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, assess the Government's performance and offer some suggestions. The topics discussed are: role of the public sector, promotion of exports, non-resident Indian investment, fiscal policies, development of rural and small industries, role of science and technology, reform of the bureaucracy, Prime Minister's style of administration and the role of economic advisers.



## STRATEGIES FOR WORLD PEACE

This view was put forth by no less a person than Einstein. Robert Oppenheimer himself expressed grave doubts about the prospects of a nuclear world and views of the scientists put forth in their journal, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, in which a debate took place.

A second spur to the mobilization of the science community came at the initiative of Bertrand Russell in 1955. He drew up a resolution calling for states to use peaceful means of conflict resolution and asked eminent jurists to join him in asking governments to heed the warning. Many did.

From the Russell Resolution there developed the Pugwash Movement, to explore further the major issues focusing on world peace. This afforded crucial information to the policy process and to the discussion of nuclear war. It also demonstrated that the Peace Research phenomenon did not restrict itself to a minority but formed a part of a large issue for eminent, sensible, and far thinking people.

Alongside, a behavioural approach critical to the prevalent Social Science methodology emerged. It was avowedly interdisciplinary; suffice it to say that it along with the other approaches gave rise to a mood of satisfaction and innovation creative to peace research. Boulding, Rapoport, Lasswell, Kelman, Kluckhohn and Richardson Jr. were the people who came forward to do seminal research in peace. As a consequence of their efforts, a *Bulletin: Research Exchange of Prevention of War* and the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* came to be published. Theodore Lenz's individual effort was not lacking. His monograph, *Towards a Science of Peace*, need not be underestimated. It was based on a relatively simple premise—bring together science and democracy to produce a harmonious ordering of human affairs. According to him, there were five features that could achieve peace. First, the goal is faith in human harmony; second, the means is provided by the faith in facts, the tool being the faith in human intelligence; fourth, the method is faith in science, with faith in democratic or human motivation. His belief that a basic harmony is possible when faith in the goal of peace, supplemented by scientific data, can change structures of given society, is feasible. In the meanwhile, the Michigan Group was developing its stance and in England the campaign for nuclear disarmament began.

The sort of work peace researchers addressed themselves to was the nuclear environment and connected issues such as defining deterrence and its parameters. How do Soviet and American decision-makers perceive each other? How important is public opinion in the making of foreign policy? How might disarmament be achieved? Or arms control?

The function of Peace Research was to stimulate and communicate systematic research and thinking on international processes, including the total international system, the interactions among governments and



among nationals of different states, and the processes by which nations make and execute foreign policy. By these theoretical and empirical efforts, it was hoped that Peace Research would help minimize the use of violence in resolving international conflicts.

Over a period of time, two signs of change appeared *vis-a-vis* Peace Research. One was the radical critique of Peace Research which pointed to Peace Research as fulfilling establishment ideas. Another change appeared when Johann Galtung discussed the notion of peace and distinguished two kinds of peace: negative peace—the absence of violence and war; and positive peace—the integration of human society. Being a sociologist, Galtung recognised Peace Research to have a deeper socio-economic context than was evident. He used a structural analysis to deal with the problem of Peace Research. He felt that decolonization had much to do with this. The marxist analysis of economic and political relations in terms of neo-colonialism served to effect a change in Peace Research.

Herman Schmid took it further and said that Peace Research should not merely confine itself to international and supranational institutions but also to suppressed and exploited groups and nations. It should explain not how manifest conflicts are brought under control but how latent conflicts are manifested. It should explain not only how integration is brought about, but how conflicts are polarised to a degree where the present international system is seriously challenged or broken down. This approach by Schmid marked a change in the concern of peace researchers. A lot of these new concerns were taken up and assimilated in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), established in 1966 funded by the Swedish Parliament, producing work of relevance and high quality which brought it closer to university students and college research agendas.

As changes in thinking in Peace Research have taken place, there is the concept of linking peace with social justice and *ipso facto* economic development and restructuring of national economies. Yet the first priority ordering is that elimination of war precedes peace. Yet peace equated with social justice expresses the idea that violence does not mean just killing in war but in 'peace' there is deprivation, starvation, repression and hunger where structural violence is endemic in socio-economic structures. This is where the maximalists and minimalists have to unite changing perceptions and changing structures. For the most part, the maximalists have tried to come to terms not with how best to achieve revolutionary change, but how to affect long-term changes in social structures and processes that might effect peace. In this area, the idea of a 'technology of peace' has become established, especially among European peace researchers. This is by no means an exhaustive classification of the theory,



its advance or its critique, but an overview as to what Peace Research actually is, its methodology, tools and its advance as a discipline.

If Peace Research was to be taken as an applied science, even its clientele for information would be diverse. Further, a government would not fund an agency to subvert its own values. Apart from the government, its clientele would be students, professionals, even the world's humanity.

One clear avenue of advance has been in the field of peace education. Peace education has been an intrinsic part of Peace Research. In Canada Sweden, Norway and Finland it has its curriculum structured even at the school level, while of course at the college and university levels, departments of research abound which give evidence of both the methodology and science of Peace Research. Experimental data from different levels of analysis and setting up of abstract models are also employed reflecting the increasing interdependence of socio-political issues. Finally, the findings of Peace Research depend in part on the relationship between two variables : Personal commitment and the requirements of methodological rigour (vigour-rigour issue), i.e., validating the argument with personal commitment and ardour.

Thus Peace Research contains (a) the *substantive* issues of peace; (b) the *methodological* issues involved in amassing good data about a complex social phenomenon; and (c) basic concern for a value *commitment* in the study of peace.

Yet Peace Research does not differ from any other research on international relations or political behaviour in terms of the criteria for scientific objectivity and validity. The selection of problems to which the peace researcher addresses himself is based on a desire to contribute to a peaceful world order.

#### PEACE MOVEMENTS

A smooth transition from theoretical constructs of Peace Research to practical activist peace movements seems inevitable.

The uncertainty of the international *detente* policy, the aggravation of political confrontations and the acceleration dynamics of the armaments race have mobilized millions of people in industrial and non-industrial states against the arms race and the dangers of war.

Preservation of peace seems to involve both big and small states, peace movements cut across national boundaries and political parties. It has been able to inspire people from all states in society and also those of particular religious denominations—Churches in Peru, Spain, Venezuela have played an important role.

It was probably around 1899 at the First Hague Conference that the first peace movement was thought of. The next realisation came after



viewing the destructions of World War I at the Potsdam Conference. After World War II came another major realisation and a spurt to peace movements. It is safe to assume that major shocks or changes in the international system gave added fillip to the peace movements.

In spite of the weakness of the new peace movements in the face of the dominant political and military forces in the West as well as in the East, and in spite of the complicated relationship with the national and social emancipation, and at the same time, militarization processes in the Third World, the peace movement is probably the most encouraging political phenomenon in international relations in recent years.<sup>3</sup>

Peace movements fortunately, do not cherish the 'just war' concept to achieve peace. They are most international, lay a claim to global politics, oppose arms policy in all states but realistically study them in order to oppose them.

Further, economic and social tensions tend to be acerbated because of the fear of war and insecurity created by this fear. Already nations have incompatible problems, impersonal and sometimes poor political leadership. Besides, there is an increasing arms build up and inversely diminishing social spending. All this creates devastating effects on industry and environment weakening efficiency of bourgeois parliamentary consensual democracies and even other political systems. New political forces have to be released to give an alternative way of living, take on issues of social, communal and political policies. Representatives of this wish not to be mere objects of official or allied security policy but want to have a voice in determining their policy.

These new political/economic social crises pose challenging global problems which require peace researchers to act quickly, which in turn has translated a sudden revival of simultaneous wide-ranging peace movements. Peace movements in themselves are sociologically and politically manifold and complex and include members of a whole social spectrum.

Theoretical Peace Research becomes ineffective without a peace movement. The corpus of Peace Research has contributed to theoretical intellectual level of peace movements, to a critical approach of official policy, to development of counterpublicity, to the creation of the need for information and problem of consciousness related to armaments and war, to democratization of security policy.

Peace Research has made it clear how controversial the Western conception of deterrence is; the West wants to prevent nuclear war by developing the most perfect possible means for fighting it which means further technical development of military technology (with accuracy, speed, and explosive force) leading to a decreased nuclear threshold to a more concrete and likely possibility of fighting a nuclear war.



Regarding the composition of peace researchers, according to Egbert Jahn, there exists the first group with peace oriented traditions, a second group comprised of participants of peace movements and the third group of students of the first two groups who started to actively take part in Peace Research.<sup>4</sup>

Critical Peace Research has been a reaction to the 'realist' school of international relations, i.e., to the spread of the science of international relations as an affirmative American world view. The Peace Research of the cold war period studied the possibilities of avoiding conflicts and the methods of peaceful conflict management in the interest of stabilizing the American *status quo* of "no war."

Contrary to this critical Peace Research, the real Peace Research has rejected conflict management based on the management of the maintenance of American power *status quo* and has emphasised that apart from the study of inter-state and systems relations, Peace Research has to be engaged in concrete criticism of internal social processes in the analysis and change in the social, political, economic structural power relations that are at the base of individual and communal aggression. Critical Peace Research has also regarded forms of conflict activation as means and techniques of conflict solution and put forward the concept of "positive" peace based on ending structural power relations—repressive political distribution and production relations—with the 'negative' peace theory based on the absence of accidental or organised use of force. It is for these very reasons that Americans have not been able to evolve a full-fledged peace movement except as a reaction to a broadly anti-war sentiment and narrowly, as an anti-nuclear movement.

Peace Research cannot give up influencing official policies directly or indirectly. It has a good chance of this if political culture develops to such an extent that the scientific discussion on fundamental political questions becomes a necessary condition of enlightened public opinion. It is peace movements which perform this function and channel public opinion to study domestic social, political, economic processes which may rouse international conflicts.

The West German Peace Movement has been one of the biggest. It was partly caused by the translation of Peace Research into practice. Since Peace Research was and is at one with the positivistic hopes of much of the Social Sciences, it created the West German Peace Movement which reflected the same. In 1979 the Green Party emerged mainly as a response to NATO's two-track decision of deploying *Cruiser* and *Pershing II* missiles in Western Europe. The movement attracted professionals and diplomats as well as the young, intellectual university educated and left-leaning who had passed through West German universities in the 1960s and after.<sup>5</sup> So the West German Left made an impact



on the peace movement. The leftist ideas created by the 'long march through the institutions' as well as the political climate favoured by the Brandt wing of the Social Political Democrats are the background of the peace movements of the early 1980s. A survey reveals that the anti-missile peace movement 1980-84 was led by university-educated people between 18-34 years whose leftist views were formed in the radical 60s.

The expanded concept of violence leads to an expanded concept of peace entailing absence of structural and personal violence. Galtung's view on structural violence and negative peace articulated the new Left's 'third Worldism,' what Pierre Hasner acerbically called the 'Scandinavian Theory of Peace.' Galtung took up these arguments which reflect the discussion within the peace movement at the beginning of the 80s.

- 1 *Cruise* missiles and *Pershing II* missiles are qualitative new types of weapons. Therefore, their production and deployment cannot be considered as "supplementary" but as "anticipated armament."
- 2 Experience has taught that every Western qualitative "anticipated armament" was followed by a Soviet supplementary armament of the same kind within two to five years (arms chase).
- 3 An arms race can logically lead to one of the following possibilities : to a negative arms race (disarmament) or a contained arms race or war.
- 4 The deployment of *Cruise* and *Pershing II* missiles is not only fatal, but also absolutely unnecessary because there are alternatives which are not only acceptable, but which should rather be taken into consideration.<sup>6</sup>

Peace movements in Germany addressed themselves to various inter-related subjects, i.e., the increase of arms exports; the growing concentration of military and armaments in Central Europe; the increase in number of nuclear states (horizontal proliferation), the increase of nuclear means of mass destruction (vertical proliferation); the increased capacity of destruction of nuclear weapons and finally the minimal impact of negotiations on arms control so far.

These items show a deadlock in dialogue between the East and West in the late 70s. There was renewed discrepancy between the growing self destructiveness and the decreasing overall efficiency and competence of the political parties and elites to find solutions. Again, the responsible representatives were blamed for their immobility, due to structural and internal limitations which made them respectively incapable of reaching and ruling.

Contrary to the 1950s and 1960s it was not the government party but



the socio-liberal coalition which had to face the criticism of the population. And therefore parties and movements emerged outside parliament. A new party, the Greens, was formed and the movement turned into one of manifest protest which had to be taken seriously. During the 1970s, the resources of an anti-defense intelligentsia were institutionalised further, emerging even more strongly and resulting in real political power which has returned in the 1980s.

The West German Peace Movement made the transition from utopian to scientifically grounded pacifism as well as an extra parliamentary expansion of power. The movement seemed to have an added advantage of the SPD under Willy Brandt.

Earlier signature campaigns contributed to Peace Research movements and others, who brought a different insight into the movement, were ten different groups: women, youth, Greens, and at the local level, trade unions, social democrats, the churches, professionals, generals for peace and peace researchers.

Two factors which may account for the changing relationship between research and the peace movement were :

- 1 the social background and,
- 2 the level of international tension.

Mostly research and peace movements have common areas and are supportive of each other, yet, there will be some kind of a division of labour between the researchers and the activists.

According to Galtung, peace movements provide an alternative source of information and insight breaking the monopoly that security research or military science in its more militaristic vein had until recently.

Peace movements in the Nordic countries have had an amazing and unprecedented growth. There has been an institutional innovation and political revitalisation; a new consciousness has been created. They have made disarmament a priority objective. Both Denmark and Norway have had a vision of a nuclear-weapons-free Europe as a fundamental idea and therefore, have been against the deployment of new intermediate range missiles in Europe. Iceland wanted a demilitarized zone and therefore had a referendum to close US military bases and also withdrew from NATO. The peace movements in Nordic countries are also concerned with a number of non-nuclear issues like alternative concepts of defense and security policy, spending on conventional armaments, alternate conceptions of conscription and national service, peace and disarmament education.

One of the major goals is the nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ). A rally with one of the largest participations, 130,000 people in the post-



World War II era was for NWFZ. This is primarily seen as a Nordic contribution to detente.

As in Germany, in Nordic countries too, the NATO plan for deployment of new INF missiles in Europe was the immediate cause of spurt in the peace movement. The Danish Peace Movement, January 1980, denounced traditional arms control negotiations. Earlier in 1979, there was a powerful campaign attacking NATO and its plans for *Cruise* and *Pershing II Soviet SS-20s*. Their slogan was 'No to Nuclear Weapons'.

Women played an important role. Women for peace took part in peace marches and collected half a million signatures. This movement spread to the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and The Netherlands. The Peace March 1981, from Copenhagen to Paris, was to a great extent initiated by women for peace. So also the Peace March 1982, from Stockholm to Minsk, with slogans like 'No to Nuclear Weapons in Europe—East and West;' 'No to Nuclear Weapons in the World;' 'For Disarmament and Peace.' Both events were covered extensively by the media.

In Norway, Finland, Iceland, Denmark and Sweden the peace movement is becoming a powerful political function. The professional groups have launched their own programmes, most of them focusing on nuclear disarmament. In Denmark however, peace movements play a reticent role.

Church groups are also involved in the peace movement. I have already and would presently lay out more of its contribution, but for now suffice to say that the 1982 Bishops Conference in Norway and Finland, as well as in Iceland, issued statements on peace and disarmament. The Danish Ecumenical Joint Council published a pamphlet *Peace on Earth* in 1981. In summer 1983, the Danish Church focused on peace work. There are various peace services and study groups in church organisations.

In Norway, 11 out of 18 Country Councils and 50 municipalities so far have passed resolutions on banning nuclear weapons in Norwegian territory in times of both peace and war.

Finally, in the Nordic countries a powerful political movement is emerging signifying new political and ethical awareness, determination and creativity.

In Austria there was growing scepticism about the fact that the policy of *detente* of the 70s did not halt the arms race, the warlike conflict and the violation of human rights; b) the insight that in spite of official disarmament negotiations there was a worldwide rearmament; c) the realisation that the technological development of nuclear weapons of the two Super Powers creates the temptation for a first strike and/or limited nuclear conflict to achieve military superiority.



These are the very same causes that have inspired the West European peace movement in general. In fact, there is an emphasis on negotiations and on mobilisation of people from different sectors and institutions of society. Non-violent resistance is taken as method of resistance to ensure moral victory. Independence of the peace movement is important as also the cooperation with other peace movements. A long-term objective and unity of the peace movement is equally important. These have also typified the Austrian peace movement.

Yet, Austria has its own problems and peculiarities as part of the peace movement since it is a neutral, non-aligned, small state in Central Europe. Balance of reason and/or "balanced disarmament" is on the possible lowest level. It is precisely for this reason that Austria did not put forward demands for mobilizing the masses. This has also resulted in a certain "non commitment" of the Austrian Peace Movement. It is against the rearmament of military likes *per se*. This non-commitment of demands gave the peace movement a very broad political spectrum. For a long time the Austrian Peace Movement followed the German Peace Movement and did not really come into its own. There were however aspects necessary to change it: to 'Austrofy' it, globalize it and broaden its orientation. It is the Austrian 'syndrome of thrust and insecurity' which is symptomatic; for the main dilemma of the peace movement, i.e., the peace movement must make the danger of a nuclear war credible. But at the same time it must undertake to prove that its analysis was correct to prevent and do everything against the realisation of its predictions.<sup>7</sup> In spite of its microcosmic function as regards West European peace movements, Austria should work towards a new peace order based on independence and identity.

In general, the anti-nuclear demonstrations in Europe in October 1983 brought out one fact that peace movements were largely thought to be 'Eurocentric' and that it would cease to be active in the event of a compromise resolution of the missile issue.

But this is not really true. Eastern Europe, Soviet Union and much of the Third World boasts of an awareness in peace movements and their goals, a spectre is definitely haunting Europe, the spectre of pacifism. Even now the Soviets are facing the dilemma of reconciling military goals with political limitations in Eastern Europe. If current trends continue, a regional peace movement could one day challenge Soviet control even more broadly than did Poland's now banned independent trade union *Solidarity*.<sup>8</sup>

Eastern Europe is overtaken by the same fears as those of Western Europe, i.e., the NATO's two track decision. In 1981-82 the Soviet stepped up their peace offensive in an attempt to turn West Europe against the NATO decision, so much so that anti-war movements arose



throughout East Germany. These stirrings surprisingly first manifested in Church circles with resolutions and proclamations on questions of war and peace in November 1981. The Synod of Protestant Churches in Saxony called for unilateral steps towards disarmament by the Warsaw Pact countries, specifically a reduction in the number of Soviet missiles and tanks. In 1982, East Berlin pastor Ranier Eppelman circulated an anti-war petition called the Berlin Appeal, which thousands signed. In February 1982, in Dresden, 6,000 anti-war marchers upstaged the government-sponsored commemoration of the Allies' 1945 bombing of the city. Soviet propaganda scared both the East and West Germans.

A very different sort of anti-war movement emerged in Romania between 1981-83. Although as rigidly orchestrated as any other state-sponsored Soviet bloc organisation, the Romanian Peace Movement stands alone as a party controlled movement opposing the Soviets. As the INF crisis worsened, the Romanian position grew more strident and party leader Nicolae Ceausescu grew more outspoken. Thousand marched in staged rallies in which both Super Powers were criticized for their military build-up endorsing the zero-zero option.

In 1983, about the only other East European anti-war activity was in Czechoslovakia. A tiny group of human rights activists known as Charter 77 issued a number of resolutions on questions of war, peace and liberty. Obliquely critical of the Soviet position of INF, it issued a proclamation jointly with Western representatives at the Communist Party-sponsored World Assembly for Peace and Life Against Nuclear War in Prague, June 1983.

The collapse of the INF negotiations created a great deal of uneasiness across Eastern Europe. This fear was not due only to the confrontation with the West but also in response to a particular Soviet initiative, that of counter-development of nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe.

In Hungary, the Peace Group for Dialogue announced a proposal for a European Nuclear Free Zone, which includes the withdrawal of all foreign troops. The Hungarian anti-nuclear campaign slogan was 'Let's Melt the Weapons'.

Both Roman Catholic and Protestant clergy contributed to peace movements in Bulgaria and Poland.

The West wants to create a common platform on this issue. But nowhere is the dilemma more complex than in East Germany. Honecker of East Germany appears to exploit the *Deutschland politik* of inter-German relationship within the US-Soviet crisis to gain some degree of national independence. Paradoxically, the anti-nuclear activists in East Germany are in some ways a by-product of this policy. There is duality in that they are German patriots as well as peace activists and hence the Galtung thesis works out wherein structures need to be changed. Nation-



alism gets linked to peace movements. East Germans have resisted Soviet installation of nuclear missiles causing interbloc dissension and advocating a strong peace movement.

Moscow's options for control of these movements are severely limited because pacifism cannot be isolated and eliminated; also because of Moscow's own efforts to put down NATO deployment of missiles and because of dissension within the bloc itself. Hence the Soviet response has been tentative.

Generational change is another important facet of the East European Peace Movements. It is the young who are spearheading the movements. Because of the diversities and different national interests there is no major commonality and broadening of the movement.

Peace movements in Eastern Europe will be successful only if linked to wider issues. They cannot afford to form too great an alliance with peace movements of the West because that would create fear and tension amongst the Soviets and spur repression as a reaction leading to complete withdrawal. It is up to the East Europeans to make sure that their movements are taken seriously by the West.

While the Western Peace Movement, in Moscow's larger view, are made out to be a manifestation of the accelerated 'social struggle' within Western societies and this struggle is a direct reflection of growing Soviet military power, Soviets also want to use the anti-war movements in the West advancing their common sociological—ideological platform making the West even more suspicious of Soviet intentions.

This is probably the major reason why peace movements in the United States have been sporadic, emerging and reacting to major issues and then fading away. One major issue was the Vietnam War and other has emerged in anti-nuclear demonstrations. The ideology that US policy-makers infer in peace movement is wrongly 'Marxist' or 'leftist'. The United States strategists have always been wary of West European opinions and therefore there is the same suspiciousness towards the West European peace movements. Yet as far back as 1817-19 the Massachusetts Peace Society was studying the losses of human life during wars, estimating public expenditures and considering alternate uses of the resources invested in warfare.

Among the initiatives of Peace Research and the movements were Quakers. Scientists who joined later were already well established. Other areas which need to be added to increase important impetus of peace movements is the role of Churches and the influence of Gandhi's thinking.

Churches in the peace movement took into account a great similarity



of political demand among various societal groups and institutions. New, more organised coalitions, transcending national borders, emerged. They adopted new, progressive positions implying a departure from official governmental policies. The role of Churches has already been detailed in some of the peace movements.

There were three factors influencing Churches in the United State's defense policy—(i) huge arms build-up along with drastic reduction in the social sector; (ii) initial and resolute unwillingness to begin arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and conduct them in a serious way; and (iii) amartial nuclear rhetoric towards the Soviet Union. These are, of course, conventional arms responses.

Churches became a relevant factor moreso because of the political setting of the Reagan Administration which made a number of latent, deeply-rooted processes manifest. They concerned the structure and self image of the Churches as well as a change in the priorities. This is less true for traditional Churches—*Quakers*, *Brethrens* and *Menmonites*. For the Catholic Church it meant Americanization of the Catholic Church.

A new definition of political area between the Church and the state took place. The second Vatican Council provided the theological rationale and incentive for a stronger political and social commitment. With younger ecclesiastics the difference was from a command to a communication structure and change in interests—Vietnam, abortion, ecology and the Third World. Numerous activities involved in the 'freeze' agenda initiated a 'Peace with Justice War' in 1983 focusing on the negative social implications of the Reagan Administration's armaments policy. Among the sponsors were the Riverside Church Disarmament Program, the Sojourners, and the Clergy and Laity concerned. The United Church of Christ and the United Methodist Church were active and well organised. A number of demonstrations have initiated a network called IMPACT as a congressional lobby. The Churches have been successfully able to link the peace issue with social justice as in the Galtungian analysis. The Pastoral Letter underlined the policy clearly—no to MX missiles and bilateral and verifiable freeze of the arms race. The dynamics of the Pastoral Letter is the linkage between a strong critique of the system of deterrence with a clearly detailed critique of the Reagan Government's nuclear policy. This spearheaded the United States' Peace Movement.

The churches' role in other peace movements has also been touched upon. Churches have assumed a function as a forum for social debates on security policy and more importantly, as a pace setter and introduc-



ing an ethical dimension. What they will be further able to do with it is far more important.

In terms of Gandhi's contribution to peace movements, it is too much to go into in this paper except to touch on its method and relevance. Gandhi believed in the ethical content of Socialism, its respect for human labour and its accent on human brotherhood. It is on this plane that religion can assist in the process of resolution of ideological conflict and it is this religious 'instinct' that is called to the aid of conflict resolution. Gandhi's ideal of conflict, going beyond narrow ideology, is obvious when he says, "only universal cooperation under conditions of intellectual freedom and the lofty moral ideals of Socialism and labour accompanied by the elimination of dogmatism and concealed unit interests will preserve civilization."<sup>9</sup>

Alienation due to the conflict between the universal had the particular is implicit in the ideal of humanism. Gandhi was a notable inheritor of this spiritual legacy. But he saw the stark contradiction in the sordid degradation and meanness of man's social and economic existence and his utter alienation. He favoured a communitarian democracy and socialism ensuring participatory democracy, a collectivity in which the individual would not be alienated. This is not inconsistent with Marxism. Gandhi believed in a 'clean' means-ends theory. His ethics of non-violence bridged the gulf between means and ends. Non-violence as a means prepares the way for the realisation of non-violence as a comprehensive end that ends all conflicts.

The technique and strategy of non-violent action is used to change a political or social system, to resolve basic conflict or contradiction in the socio-political situation that has assumed a widespread spirit of resistance (refer: Galtung). According to him, there is a unity in the diversity of racial forces and a man lives in his endless search for truth. This unity is conceived in terms of a socio-economic order which minimises social conflict, even when it cannot eliminate it. It provides non-violent ways of solving conflicts and contributing to peace movements. His "parallelogram of forces", through a mechanistic analogy conjured a simple imagery that conflicting socio-economic forces in the sense of opposites need not act in such a way that truth might merge in a unity to move on to a non faith traced by the resultant of both the forces.

Gandhi thought social progress as well as conflict resolution depends on the re-education of man. According to him, conflicts and their resolution constituted the dynamics of physical life. The technique of Gandhi was *Satyagraha*; *Ahimsa* or non-violence really was a contribution to both democracy and pacifism.



## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Peace Research and peace movements are realistic aims of peace. Avoiding annihilation of mankind depends on its study and even more so in its application.

This is by no means an exhaustive paper on this subject. Very little work has been done in this field and what I have tended to do is use Peace Research and peace movements as two main themes to achieve world peace. In order to do this, it was important to lay down its theory and linkage. It depends largely on a restructuring of the international system in order to have a peace with economic-social justice approach. It further means making radical changes in national policies.

'Peace' is a misused term. It is labelled with connotations that do not exist. United States should be less defensive of this word, and to achieve successful policies should actively work for it both in terms of theory and practice. Soviet Union, too, would be wiser in not twisting the meaning of the term peace but cognitively redefine it and use it to achieve world peace. The smaller 'actors' in the world system in terms of their survival should be working in the field of 'peace'.

Finally 'peace' and its connective aspects—Peace Research and peace movements—are the language of '*real politik*' as much as power is. Power will have infinitely more dimensions to it with world peace as its goal. Peace Research gives a background to security policy and can be used in the same vein to achieve peace. Peace Research needs to have a common set of definitions and a basic common ideology. It also needs a methodology to firstly restructure national policies and secondly form a part of the peace movement. Finally, Peace Research has a chance if both national and global political culture and social consciousness develop to such an extent that the scientific discussions on fundamental political questions becomes a necessary condition of enlightened public opinion.

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## CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

By VEENA KUKREJA\*

*Students of civil-military relations, particularly those in the developing countries, admit having to work on myopic assumptions, meagre data, sloppy conceptualization and inelegant explanations. The relative newness of this area of studies could be one reason for this. The study of civil-military relations in the narrow sense referring mainly to military coups and interventions, has attained importance after World War II. But the study of civil-military relations in the broader perspective of multiplicity of relationships between military men, institutions and interests, on the one hand, and diverse and often conflicting non-military organizations and political personages and interests on the other, has begun to draw academic interest only in the last two decades or so.<sup>1</sup>*

*In the twentieth century, the armed forces, being an universal and integral part of a nation's political system, no longer remain completely aloof from politics in any nation. If politics is concerned, in David Easton's celebrated words, with the authoritative allocation of values and power within a society, the military as a vital institution in the polity can hardly be wished out of participatory bounds, at least for legitimate influence as an institutional interest group with a stake in the political decision-making. The varying roles the military may play in politics range from minimal legitimate influence by means of recognized channels inherent in their position and responsibilities within the political system to the other extreme of total displacement of the civilian government in the forms of illegitimate overt military intervention in politics.*

*This paper seeks to attempt an overview of the existing scholarship on civil-military relations; second, it examines civil-military relations in the world with special reference to major political systems of the world; third, it surveys the literature on civil-military relations in general, and finally, it attempts to develop a general, complex, and hopefully fruitful causal model for analyzing the dynamics of civil-military relations; exploring implications for future research on civil-military relations.*

### SCHOLARSHIP ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

**N**ORMATIVE philosophical and constitutional-legal approaches were so prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth-century Europe and America that they failed to identify the behavioural and dynamic

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aspects of politics, including civil-military relations. Earlier writings tended to reflect the traditional assumption of the military being something of an alien and demoniac force that did not interact with other social groups but simply acted against them.<sup>2</sup> In the European and North American experience, by both objective and subjective devices, the military were subject to civil control and were politically neutral, and anti-militarism appeared as a norm of democratic civilian control of civil-military relations.<sup>3</sup>

Traditional thinking in the general literature on civil-military relations, being deeply rooted in the western intellectual heritage as in many other areas of study, reflects the ethno-centric bias of Western liberal political theory.<sup>4</sup>

But the traditional, essentially teleological, view that the military's participation in politics is necessarily perverse<sup>5</sup> has had to change under pressure of reality. It is now increasingly recognized that the armed forces and civilian politics are often closely intertwined, that armies are only partly encapsulated institutions set apart from politics even when not directly intervening.<sup>6</sup> The following factors would appear to have contributed to this change.

First, the classical theory of democracy has undergone a general reformulation and democratic consent is also seen as including that of the institution of the military. Secondly, with the crisis of democracy in Western Europe, the emergence of Italian and German totalitarianism and the brutalisation of Soviet Communism under Stalin, political scientists were forced to change the focus of their study away from the constitutional legal rules governing politics to the more immediate aspect of the processes of social and political change. The third factor that led to this change in focus was the glaring reality of the outbursts of military revolts and *coups* in the newly emerged countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, following the era of decolonization. The final factor would be that the study of political theory itself has become more sophisticated.

Scholarly work in this field has essentially been of two types analytical and empirical. Analytical work dominated the initial period immediately following World War II. Generalised and often divergent *ad hoc* hypotheses proliferated in this period, seeking to explain and predict fundamental trends and patterns of military intervention and *coups* and their impact on the process of modernization. Many of these writings contradicted each other.<sup>7</sup>

Another weakness of these writings is that they either concentrate on the characteristics of civilian politics and their influence on the civil-military relations to the exclusion of the organizational and professional



qualities of the military itself, or emphasize the latter, to the exclusion of the social and political environment.<sup>8</sup>

With the passage of time, the initial period of deductive and speculative formulations made way for vigorous efforts at empirical research. The accumulation of case studies and quantitative analyses also made systematic comparative analysis possible. Research in this phase focused on country studies and case studies of institutions and agencies directly involved in the management of civil-military relations. The earlier hypotheses and formulations were subjected to the rigours of statistical analysis of social, political and economic indicators designed to explain uniformities and variations in civil-military relations. The empirical analysis took note of the military's growing role and direct involvement in domestic politics to account for the patterns of military *coups*.

The empirically-oriented research however, has been criticized for not making any serious attempt to suggest broader generalizations and more analytical conclusions. It also manifests inconsistency between the individual country study and institutional analysis, and the statistical studies. Very few scholars have sought to weld these alternative strategies. In the case of statistical analyses, the time periods covered were short and the available quantitative data limited, as a result, time series analyses developed slowly. In addition, the statistical studies have paid "insufficient attention to the quality of data and to the theoretical basis for imputing causality and interpreting the result."<sup>9</sup> These studies "are replete with empirical details but frequently limited in discernment of patterns and relationships."<sup>10</sup> It must however be noted that in many cases the unavoidable gap between the empirical evidence and the theoretical framework exposed the scholars to unfair criticism.<sup>11</sup>

Empirically-oriented research in the latter phase however has been both challenging and productive. A growing sense of self-criticism and the realization of the complexities involved in civil-military relations were to be seen in a world perspective has marked this phase. Also, the emphasis broadened from the new nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America to a more extensive analysis and study of the industrialized nations both in the liberal democratic and communist nations.

Contemporary research on civil-military relations could be divided into three major areas of concentration—Western liberal, Communist, and developing countries. Research in each area differs significantly in terms of typical focuses, conceptual approaches, analytical methods and normative prescriptions. These differences are further heightened on another account, that is the difference of outlook of the major exponents of each area and the attitudinal preferences, cognitive biases, assump-



tions and dominant orientation that they influenced in the later researchers.<sup>12</sup>

Sociologists dominated the study of civil-military relations in the Western liberal developed countries initially with inputs from history and political science.<sup>13</sup> Their tendency was to emphasize the importance of internal structures, social origins and composition of the officer corps, and the value systems prevalent in the military in developed countries. The historians and political scientists, on the other hand, inquired into the degree of military professionalization and its congruity with democratic or anti-democratic traditions and forms of government; the military's role as an interest group and its influence on political circumstances and social priorities within the country; the impact of modern technology on the military ethos and on managerial functions within a bureaucratized military establishment and so on.

The study of civil-military relations in the developing countries was taken up by experts from the fields of comparative politics and sociology.<sup>14</sup> The comparativists tended towards paradigmatic approaches to military organizations and their role in the developing countries, emphasizing such analytical criteria as development, intervention, maintenance, integration and performance. They also addressed themselves to the following questions: Is the military a modernizing force, an accelerator of economic and political development in developing societies, or is it retrogressive? Is the military more interested in its own power rather than in national development and modernization? Under what circumstances does the military intervene in politics? What are the means and consequences of military *coups* and interventions?

The writings on the military in the communist nations have stemmed largely from such channels as research institutes, governmental agencies, and from Sovietologists and Sinologists,<sup>15</sup> the focus of Western scholars being premised to a considerable extent in certain cognitive and political distortions. The tendency has been to impose Western strategic deterrence paradigms upon communist countries premised on threat perception and potential capability studies, strategic doctrines, weapon technologies, elite tensions, etc., rather than to study the civil-military relations in terms of the military's social composition, social role, institutional values and interests, or its larger role in society. As Kolkowicz suggests, these "studies are characterized by a certain unevenness, by a set of historically idiosyncratic circumstances and by a certain parochialism."<sup>16</sup> Research in civil-military relations in the other two categories of countries is also marked by isolation of the respective parts of the field, derived from disciplinary ethnocentricities and cultural parochialism. This has "made it difficult, if not impossible, to transfer



certain insights from a more 'developed' research area to one that is still rather 'underdeveloped'." <sup>17</sup>

## MAJOR MODELS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

### *The Western Model*

The Western liberal or classical model pertains to the highly industrialized nations of Western Europe. This region constitutes a distinct entity with a strikingly common pattern of civil-military relations. The military is neither expected nor is it oriented to intervene in electoral, representative politics—Greece, Spain and Portugal being the rare exceptions. The system is dominated by politicians who attain to power after an exhaustive and elaborate party competitive struggle in an open electorate and policy is implemented by bureaucratic and military elites who are subordinate to the elected politicians. National defense policy rests, by and large, firmly in the hands of the elected political leaders, while the military operates analogously to civil servants. The military nevertheless operates as a persistent pressure group pursuing its own organizational and material well-being.<sup>18</sup> The political roles of armed forces in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States are contained within a relatively strong central government or a stable party system.

Three features common to the Western European nations, despite the linguistic, religious and ethnic differences, have contributed to such regulation of civil-military balance. The most important is the institutionalization of competitive elections as the basis of political power. A powerful common culture has taken root in these countries to support the political institutions which regulate civil-military relations. The second relevant factor is the emergence, over the last half century, of a welfare state ideology and the associated operating agencies of the welfare state.<sup>19</sup> The third factor that constrains overt participation by the military in the partisan struggle for power is the firm establishment of the legitimacy of the civilian political order along with the professionalization of the military.

Among the most industrialized countries such as the United States, Japan and Sweden, the political institutions have demonstrated their effectiveness and legitimacy under conditions of mass participation, and the extent of popular support for complex and adaptable civilian organizations and procedures imposes severe limitations on the political efficacy of coercion. By contrast, at low and medium levels of political participation (for example, in Zambia or Chile) the institutionalization of civilian control is much less secure.



The type of civil-military relations that prevailed in the nineteenth-century Europe and America and which have been identified by Huntington as the professional objective type of civil-military relations, were characterized by the distinctions made between the state, the military, and the bureaucracy in terms of a sense of mission and responsibility to clients. Huntington's model of objective civilian control is thus the product of a stable political regime whose fundamental political asset is legitimacy and stable political structures.<sup>20</sup>

Any conflict between the civil and military authorities was one over policy and not power. The political supremacy of the civilians was unquestioned. The primary function of the military was to defend authority, not society, and it almost always came to the support of the state in suppressing political dissidents. The military's function to defend stability at home was consistent with the defence of the state from external enemies. The military's position in civilian decision-making however has been strengthened in the post-war Western world, because of several qualitative changes that occurred in the international environment such as the cold war and development of nuclear weapons.

In the United States especially, the fantastically complex technological requirements of defence and warfare in the nuclear age, global security considerations and their implications for coercion have vastly and sharply increased the bargaining power of the military elites against other interest groups within the society.<sup>21</sup> The military's participation in the civil decision-making and implementation of national security policy and foreign policy has grown significantly in the Western world, with even veto power. Yet the role of the military remains within the bounds of civilian supremacy. This may be attributed to civilian control founded in the strength of countervailing civilian institutions; in the value structures of liberalism, the dominant national ideology, the democratic tradition against militarism and internationalization within the officer corps, through the society's values, education structure, etc., of the principle of civilian supremacy.

A somewhat different form of objective civilian control has been institutionalized in the civic polities of Sweden and Japan, where the armed forces are highly professionalized, yet have no clearly defined external competitive focus for their activity. The coercive resources they manage are more moderate in size, both in absolute terms and relative to their respective populations. Of the two, the Swedish Armed Forces constitute the more significant bureaucratic pressure group, given Sweden's long tradition of armed neutrality. Japan's defence imperatives have been moderated by the United States' security guarantees, and its small but highly professional armed forces are further restrained by the deep anti-militaristic feeling in the Japanese society since 1945.<sup>22</sup>



### *Communist Model*

The Communist political systems have generally been quite successful in establishing the supremacy of the civilian party over the military.<sup>23</sup> The Communist Party-State system, according to Parlmutter "represents a network of complex organizations whose relationships to one another are not neutral and isolated, but integrated and, in some cases, are symbiotic."<sup>24</sup> In other words, political-military relationships in Communist party-states are a microcosm of the entire social macrocosm.

The military in communist systems may be considered as a coequal partner, an ally or guarantor of the party civilian regime, and protector of party hegemony which also implies intervention into party affairs during hegemonial crises within the party.

The military's special relationship with the party could be analysed in terms of symbiotic and conflictual relationships.<sup>25</sup> The function of the military in the party state is to protect the party's hegemony, supremacy and heroics even when that conflicts with its self-image and institutional autonomy. In fact, without the military, the reign of the party-state might come to an end. The military is thus an administrative arm of the party or a mechanism that buckles the party to the state without which single-party authoritarianism could not be sustained. This kind of military participation in communist polities says Parlmutter, "is the normal and natural state of affairs in the party-state system. As a guardian of the heroic party and the ruling, political ideology, and as a potential coercive instrument, the army in the party-state is *ipso facto* politically oriented."<sup>26</sup> The degree of tolerance of military participation in Soviet, Chinese, Cuban and Yugoslavian politics is high by virtue of its own definition as the guardian of the communist constitution.

Colton believes that "Party-Army relations have been remarkably free of direct conflict, and the safest prediction is that such confrontation will be avoided in the future."<sup>27</sup> William E. Odom identifies, in contradiction to Kolkowicz and Colton, the consensual aspects of party-army relationships.<sup>28</sup> According to Odom their alignments are horizontal. Divisions over military policy are not civil-military but intra-party factional divisions. The extent of interlocking between the Party and Army, Odom maintains, is underestimated by Kolkowicz and Colton. The military-party relationship is symbiotic. They share to a considerable extent the same values, even if their roles are clearly differentiated. Political values are not necessarily identical with political roles.<sup>29</sup>

The crux of the Party-Army interdependence has been rightly expressed by Parlmutter: "The Army in the party-state identifies its values with that of the party. The military in the authoritarian state is dependent on the central system—the party. The party exclusivity and hegemonial



aspirations depend on the military in legitimising the party-state, but leaves the military a considerable role and input into stabilizing and maintaining modern authoritarianism."<sup>30</sup> Further shedding light on the prospects of party-army relations and interdependence, he maintains, "Some could also argue that the tight relationships between the two could also disintegrate and fragment. Certainly it could, but it is not a very likely prospect in an institutionalized authoritarian political system. The military in modern authoritarian states is a central political and bureaucratic structure endowed with political and sometimes considerable executive power. The most interesting political development of party-state systems is that the linkage between two authoritarian and competing structures enhances political stability, modifying each other's excessive behaviour and routinizing the dependency on one another."<sup>31</sup>

The military in Soviet Russia is first and foremost a political institution which happens to be a key supportive actor in the present array of Soviet domestic and foreign policies. The Army, whose institutional autonomy has been increasing, assumes the role ascribed by Kolkowicz as follows: "The protector of the waning legitimacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the guardian of ideological revolutionary heritage of the party; quasi-revolutionary agent of Soviet interests in the Third World and traditional defender of the homeland."<sup>32</sup>

The relations between the party and the military in the Soviet political system are dynamic, changing, and not rigidly frozen in a static, 'totalitarian' paradigm. The military is not, as certain Western analysts insist, an undifferentiated, amorphous, 'fully integrated' 'executant' of party. It does have its own distinct institutional and professional values, interests and objectives which it seeks to advance within the given rules and constraints of the system.

In the past seven decades, civil-military interactions in Soviet Russia have ranged from subordination to accommodation, with dependency (during the Stalin period), institutional interdependence (during the Khrushchev era), and political and institutional interdependence (under Brezhnev's leadership)<sup>33</sup>.

The military provides the party with many of the desirable values, styles, rituals and methods for the management of the quasi-military and militant hegemonic systems. The military tends to be a loyal, dependable and supportive institution of the party, though the latter tends to suppress its independence and to dominate it by various means.<sup>34</sup> The party finds itself becoming more dependent on the military as the demands and expectations from the domestic populace and institutions increase, as the party's control of alliance systems declines, and as the very inner dynamism and revolutionary vitality of the party itself erodes,



However, the dynamics of the civil-military relations in Soviet Russia are shaped by systemic, structural and ideological parameters of interaction; these factors include the hegemonial power of the single party, the absence of constitutional means of transfer of power; the presence of security and para-military organizations within and around the military establishment; the anti-militaristic traditions of Marxism-Leninism which consider standing professional armies as anti-revolutionary forces and a threat to the revolutionary goals of party hegemony in communist societies and the scope of the party's leadership and so on.<sup>35</sup>

In sum, the military, more than other institutional structures in Soviet Russia, developed special institutional loyalties and relationships to the party and state. The professional concept of responsibility and mission and its associative corporate value guarantees the political quiescence of the military, but also its partnership with the party which enhances the military's political role, influence, and privileged position.

This pattern in which the party has maintained continuous and basic control, only partially applies to the Chinese military. It is important to note the special case of three communist regimes—China, Cuba, and Yugoslavia—in which the army has been used at points as an instrument against the political power of the party cadres and for institutionalizing the party.<sup>36</sup>

The party-army symbiosis and dependency in China are even greater, as in Cuba.<sup>37</sup> The symbiosis is developed to such an extent in China that, despite its professionalization<sup>38</sup> since the 1950s, the military is still a major political force in Chinese politics in the 1980s. There have been periods of dependency and autonomy (times when there were practically no distinctions between party and army), of involvement and non-involvement in party affairs. During the Great People's Cultural Revolution, the Army exemplified the political importance of the interlinked relationship between the most powerful structures of Chinese Communism. The military became Mao's mailed fist or the instrument of purification against the party.<sup>39</sup>

### *The Praetorian Model*

The most conspicuous model of civil-military relations in weak regimes or unstable states is the praetorian model. In the post-World War II era, developing countries experienced varying levels of military intervention and erosion of democracy, and the *coup* zone has largely been confined to African, Asian and Latin American states. In these countries, in comparison to the developed countries, the armed forces are more likely than not to be among the most potential contenders for political



power. Military intervention is characteristically associated with the less developed countries which are sometimes referred to as "praetorian societies" or praetorian civil-military type, characterized by ineffective political leadership and lack of instrument and structures to channel political support.

Huntington argues: "In a praetorian system there is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining and moderating group political actions. Social forces confront each other nakedly: no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized and accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. . . . Each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities to decide upon office and policy. . . . The techniques of military intervention are simple more dramatic and effective than the others . . ." <sup>40</sup>

A praetorian regime is dominated on the whole by the military, or by a coalition of the military and bureaucracy, or a coalition of military, civilian politicians and technocratic groups. The military elites uniformed or non-uniformed in a praetorian regime innovate political structures and implement policies aiming to dominate the regime.

In contrast to developed and stable countries, in praetorian polities, the key civilian institutions are very few and narrowly based and they are not strong enough to assert control over the armed forces. As a result, the political role of the armed forces may more readily expand beyond the bounds of participation acceptable in an institutionalized interest group.

This general decay in political institutionalization is basically a crisis of legitimacy. Political power and resources are dispersed among numerous groups in praetorian polities and political parties are usually identified with particular social forces rather than as aggregating the interests of a broad range of groups; governments tend to be formed by a coalition of various interests. Every interest group must be given its due, including what the military sees as due to itself. At any time the military perceives the regime as inconvenient to itself, it can intervene to bring in a regime that is more amenable.

Weak polities of modern times have a disproportionate growth of the historical instruments of the classical nation-states, the bureaucracy and the military over political structures, institutions and parties. The most powerful instruments of praetorian state models are precisely those structures which, traditionally and constitutionally, in the classical model are subservient and instrumental, that is, the military and the bureaucracy.<sup>41</sup> These two modern and relatively more efficient and institutionalized elite structures, the military and the bureaucracy, carry on a continuous and naked struggle for power over the weak state. The weak



governments, aware of their popular institutional impotence, employ non-political and extra-political structures to maintain legitimacy. In the modern state legitimacy cannot be secured through the barrel of a gun or from the administrative apparatus. It can only be derived through a popularly organized party system, the interest group network, the organized articulation system, the media, and, of course group and collective support.<sup>42</sup> Praetorianism begets praetorianism. As Perlmutter argues, "In the weak state and non-legitimate regime the chances are that civil-military relations are skewed in the direction of military domination, if not supremacy. Military corporatism then supersedes professionalism. The only instrument that possesses the instrument of force—the military—has the opportunity, which it often uses, to seize power and turn the classical civil-military arrangement upside down."<sup>43</sup>

Further, observing the clientelistic nature of praetorian civil-military relations, Perlmutter contends that, "What produces the different types of praetorianism are the kinds of coalitions they create to sustain themselves in power. The coalitions could be with one another, or between the bureaucracy and the military and another political group. Praetorian civil-military relations are clientelistic not regime-oriented. On the whole, the militaries of praetorian states become rather rigid, coporate, non-cohesive alliances of ambitious and interventionist officers, bureaucrats, and opportunistic politicians."<sup>44</sup>

Comparing the three models of civil-military relations, it emerges that what is fundamental to the first two civic models is the manifestation of civil-military balanced pattern. Civilian control of the military is cardinal to them. Military intervention is either unthinkable, or intolerable, and at best rare and temporary. In sharp contrast in the praetorian type, the boundaries between politics and policy are clearly fragmented and the nature of the political domination is unstable. The military instead of being balanced with, predominates over the civil. Civilian control is likely to be highly tenuous or non-existent. While the first two models are on the whole legitimate, stable, and sustaining political orders, the praetorian regime is either illegitimate or unstable.

#### REVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

In studying existing theories and hypotheses on civil-military relations in developing societies, two facts emerge: the various authors thought they were improving on the existing body of literature; and there was a strong correlation between the designed conceptual and analytical models and the political ideological climate of the time.

Harold Lasswell was the first to attempt a civil-military taxonomy. Lasswell put forward a development construct of 'garrison state' as a



reaction against the rise of three totalitarian systems in Europe, reflecting the ethnocentric bias of Western-liberal tradition of political theory. The simplest version of the garrison-state hypothesis is that the arena of world politics is moving towards the domination of specialists on violence. The garrison-state construct proposes a model in which the sequence marches from the relatively mixed-elite pattern of the nineteenth century to military police dominance.<sup>45</sup>

Since the garrison construct is an aggregate hypothesis, it refers to the dominant characteristics of the entire arena of world politics, thereby going beyond the circumstances of a particular body politic. A garrisoned world is a military arena, not a civic arena, in which resort to extreme measures of coercion are regarded as a persisting state of affairs, or as a chronic danger.

The course of events, however, seems to have refuted Lasswell's celebrated construct. To quote Raymond Aron, "The industrialized world is more removed than even before from garrison state. . . The Soviet world possesses certain traits of it, because totalitarian regimes, even when governed by an ideological party, still approximate the model constructed by Lasswell."<sup>46</sup> The conduct of military operations by military leaders was never before so subordinated to political considerations as, say, in the war of Korea and Vietnam. Third World military regimes, too, do not show a historical movement in the direction that Lasswell predicted. The power of the military in these countries fills a vacuum left by the collapse of the colonial power or by the devaluation of the traditional authority.<sup>47</sup>

Moreover, Lasswell mistakenly identified the military as the high priest of totalitarianism. Later events showed that the 'Grand Inquisitors' and 'villains' of the garrison state were actually the civilian ideologues and demagogues, the romantic primitivists of Japan and Germany.

The totalitarian-oriented garrison soldier model has been followed by the liberal and civil-oriented professional soldier model advanced by Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz respectively. These two scholars have removed the problem of civil-military relations from the ideological orientation of anti-totalitarianism and paved the way for an open analysis of the modern civil-military relations. While Lasswell's garrison soldier—the technician of violence and an independent variable—served to depict the totalitarian state, Huntington concentrated on the professional soldier as a dependent variable. He attempted to explain the nature of the modern military professional in terms of its loyalty to his master, the civilian-dominated democratic state.

According to Huntington, military professionalization involves a balance among 'expertise', 'responsibility' and 'corporateness.' He argues that the rise of military professionalism is inversely related to military



intervention, that is, the modern professional sense of mission, military mind, and corporate autonomy induce the military against political intervention.<sup>48</sup>

With the development of a professional ethic the military sees its own task as ensuring national security. Both the organizational and the attitudinal derives of professionalism lead the military to develop its own internalised loyalty and subservience to civilian authority.<sup>49</sup>

Civilian control, according to Huntington, can be subjective or objective. Subjective civilian control is by far the more common; no clear line exists between military and civilian groups, or between military and civilian values. Subjective civilian control has been "identified with the maximization of power of particular governmental institutions, particular social classes, and particular constitutional forms."<sup>50</sup> "Objective" civilian control depends on clear-cut boundaries between civilian and military authority. More important, it requires the "recognition of autonomous military professionalism."<sup>51</sup>

Huntington's theory that professionalism induces the military towards a low political posture, has been challenged by several scholars. Finer, for example, maintains that the very nature of professionalism often leads to the military's collision with civil authority. Therefore the truly effective check on the military is the firm acceptance of civilian supremacy and not just professionalism.<sup>52</sup>

Bengt Abrahamsson rejects Huntington's argument both logically and empirically. He argues that Huntington is empirically incorrect, because the impact of professionalism is left unchecked.<sup>53</sup> Huntington also defines the essential problem out of existence; if the military break, thwart or prevent civilian control, they are defined as being unprofessional.

Another objection of Abrahamsson's refers to the lack of correspondence between Huntington's emphasis on the military's professional nationalism, alarmism and conservatism, and, on the other hand, his contention that professionalism involves political sterility. Abrahamsson believes that military obedience cannot be made totally independent of the society's political system; it is always tied to some group and some political ideology. It seems to him that Huntington wishes the army to be an animated machine, an instrument in the hands of the executive for enforcing the law and maintaining the honour and dignity of the nation. But politics and military issues are often difficult, if not impossible, to separate, and if the military is a machine, it possesses a definite capability of influencing its programmes.<sup>54</sup>

Moreover, Huntington uses professionalism and objective civilian control as inseparable theoretical concepts, and rules out the empirical possibility of establishing the relationship between the degree of profe-



ssionalism and the degree of political neutrality. Thus Huntington's thesis becomes, what Carl Hempel calls, "a covert definitional truth."<sup>55</sup>

All the same, even those general theorists who have regarded Huntington's theory as abstract, ideal-typical, inadequate, and oversimplified<sup>56</sup> and subsequently found fault with elements of his analysis have not challenged the fundamental notions. As David E. Albright rightly comments, "Morris Janowitz (1960), for example, has taken issue with Huntington's stress on 'objective' institutional constraints as a determinant of civilian control, and Bengt Abrahamsson has questioned Huntington's linkage of military professionalism add political neutrality, but both have accepted the general conceptual framework that Huntington advanced without contesting other features of his theoretical outlook."<sup>57</sup>

Janowit views the military from a different direction—from the direction of the sociology of organizations. He writes that "the future of the military profession rests on a balance between organizational stability and adaptation to rapid technological and political change."<sup>58</sup> Janowitz suggests a new framework for the operation of the military in modern times—the military as a constabulary force.

While Janowitz specifies the characteristics which make officership a professional expertise—lengthy education, group ethics, standards of performance—he does not employ a static ideal-typical analysis on which Huntington bases his analysis. Rather he proposes a politically sensitive profession integrated with the society. He treats the military as a social system in which the professional characteristics are variables which interact with each other and with external conditions so that the system adapts internally and externally. Finally, he does not propose by definitional fiat that the military have professional autonomy, instead he maintains that the civilians, with participation of the military, establish standards and evaluate the performance of the profession. Janowitz's "constabulary force" proposal maintains that the officer would be responsible to civil control because of law, tradition, professionalism, and his integration with civil values and institutions.<sup>59</sup>

While Janowitz avoids some pitfalls of Huntington, his model too has some limitations. As Arthur D. Larson points out, "Janowitz fails to clearly delineate the boundaries of military professionalism; he does not also discuss how that profession is to retain its uniqueness under the pressure towards civilization, or its members their expertise and detachment, with the heavy emphasis on political sensitivity and indoctrination which he proposes."<sup>60</sup>

The spurt of research on civil-military relations in the late 1960s witnessed the development of a new theme centred primarily on the contrast between the potential and organizational strengths of the



military and the very real weaknesses of the governments which they served. In the early 1960s in the wake of the rise of modern comparative politics and new ideological stances a host of apologists rushed forward to describe the armed forces in new states as modernizers and nation-builders both in the general literature on new states and in writings on the military as a political institution. The exponents of this viewpoint were Guy Pauker, Lucian W. Pye, Edward Shils, Manfred Halpern, Morris Janowitz, and Marion J. Levy. This school of the "Modernizing Soldier", emphasized the sensitivity of the military elite to the overriding goals of social and political change in their societies as well as the modernizing skills and capabilities of the military as an agent of modernization, order, efficiency, and social change.<sup>61</sup> The exponents of this point of view, primarily Americans, sought in the institution and leadership of the armed forces qualities for facilitating modernization and development in view of the military's positive qualities such as structure, prestige, solidarity, foreign connections, etc.

Pye described the leadership of the new militaries of the fifties as "dynamic and self-sacrificing military leadership committed to progress and the task of modernizing transitional societies that have been subverted by the 'corrupt practices' of politicians."<sup>62</sup> Levy went further and argued that the armies were the "most efficient type of organization for combining maximum rates of modernization with maximum level of stability and control."<sup>63</sup> On the other hand Guy Pauker argued that in Southeast Asia, armies were the only group with the organizational strength, leadership and discipline capable of competing with communists for "control of vacuum."<sup>64</sup>

The evidence adduced for this assertion was limited to a few case studies. The presumed modernizing character of the armed forces became more an object of assertion than a subject of investigation, the assumptions quickly becoming conclusions.

The second or revisionist view, generally accepted from the mid-1960s onward, sees the military as antithetical to development.<sup>65</sup> In several cases, the dramatic failure of many military regimes actually forced the students of military politics to re-examine the data and admit that some of the myths associated with the military were products of empty deductions that must be discarded. In 1970 Eric Nordlinger published the most categorical rebuttal of the Pye-Halpern position.<sup>66</sup> McKinlay and Cohan suggest that military regimes hardly differ from non-military regimes from the perspective of "economic performance."<sup>67</sup> Another study, comparing data on 77 Third World countries during 1960-70, concluded that the military was not necessarily an agent of social change, and that its performance in the field of modernization and change was not very different from that of civilian regimes.<sup>68</sup>



## CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Apart from this, several empirical studies, mainly by sociologists such as Hopkins and Nelkin highlighted the potential deficiencies of military rulers in the technological-managerial sphere and, particularly in political communication.<sup>69</sup>

Several statistical cross-national aggregate studies such as Nordlinger's also show the military's commitment to fundamental reform as being of minor consequence compared to their preoccupation with political stability and with the advancement of their own corporate interests.<sup>70</sup> Nordlinger contends that the performance of military regimes "... is significantly and almost consistently poorer than that of civilian government."<sup>71</sup> He also maintains that military regimes have not succeeded in achieving any economic progress, neither on traditional lines in terms of Gross National Product (GNP) growth, industrialization and agricultural output, nor in terms of the redistribution of industrial and landed wealth and the expansion of social services and welfare programmes.<sup>72</sup>

The third view, generally accepted from the mid-sixties onward suggests a reversible model, including the possibility of economic development and retardation or retrogression of political development under conditions where modernization proceeds at a very rapid pace. Here the military is seen as an impediment to political development.<sup>73</sup>

A more recent approach to modernization strongly emphasizes the diversity of military regimes demonstrated in the works of Robert Pinkney, R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Cohan.<sup>74</sup>

A.R. Willner also argues against the optimistic view that considers the military as one of the most promising champions of change and development. According to her, first, this view has projected upon the military organization in one setting attributes they have been observed to possess in others. Second, there is no basis for assuming that the military is capable of preserving the positive qualities attributed to it in a non-military context. Third, there is no assurance that the alleged positive qualities are indeed efficient and functional in the civilian sector.<sup>75</sup> In other words, one should expect that the army often will fulfil the role of pseudo modernizer. In some extreme cases, the army must be defined as a deceptive agent of modernization.

A number of scholars at the same time began to focus on the military establishment itself in order to explain the phenomenon of military intervention. Debate of the sociology of the military has focused upon a variety of explanatory propositions, variables or characteristics of the military organization to explain both its capacity to intervene in politics and its ability (or lack of it) to govern after such interventions.

In this context, Janowitz, for example, has emphasized the organizational format of the military, its skill structure, social origin, profe-



ssional ideology and cohesion to an understanding of the political behaviour of any military organization.<sup>76</sup>

According to Finer: "The armed forces enjoy three massive political advantages over civilian organizations: a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms."<sup>77</sup> Prestigious and highly organized corporation than any civilian body because of its highly peculiar structural features. These are: central command, hierarchy, discipline, inter-communication, *esprit de corps* and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency.<sup>78</sup>

Others have focused upon the size and firepowers of armies, degree of professionalism, their class origins, socialization, training, bases of recruitment, corporate interest and perceived interests of the officer corps.

Not only have many variables been cited, but there has been little consensus on the bearings of any of them. It has been argued that some empirical evidence supports these connections, but some other does not. For example, some highly cohesive armies have never intervened; others with low cohesion have done so repeatedly (the 1947 *coup* in Thailand and that of 1966 in Nigeria). Similarly, officers with a variety of skills—managerial, charismatic, technical, and political—have all intervened in politics or refrained from such interventions. Neat causal connections are blurred by contradictory evidence.<sup>79</sup>

Apart from the lack of consensus and contradictory hypotheses, a fundamental problem with most studies of this nature may be attributed, as Dowse maintains to "this very widely held belief that the military is an ideal-typical Weberian bureaucratic organization within which rationality is almost everything."<sup>80</sup>

In sum the military establishment theory and modernizing soldier model failed to formulate the general theory of civil-military relations. As a result these pioneering efforts were soon superseded by more penetrating and pressing explorations and efforts which focused on the larger societal factors as a determinant of whether and in what form military intervention occurs. Challenging Janowitz's approach as "misdirected", on the ground that "military explanations do not explain military intervention", Huntington saw "the most important causes of military intervention in politics" rather in the "political and institutional structure of the society."<sup>81</sup>

In the mid-1960s various theorists—who have often been critical of the theme of the military's role as a vehicle or accelerator of economic and political development—focused on society at large and centred on the question of "regime vulnerability."<sup>82</sup> There is a set of variables relating the susceptibility of the political system to military intervention or attributing it to regime vulnerability. Examined are the levels of



political culture, degree of institutionalization, socio-economic development and domestic social tension of *coup*-prone states.

An early expression of the theme of political or institutional vulnerability is found in Finer's work which, despite several drawbacks, remains one of the best and comprehensive treatments on regime vulnerability. Finer postulates that the various degrees and forms of military intervention are directly or negatively related to the nature of the society's political formulae current therein and their compatibility with such military intervention.

Finer's four-fold division of countries according to the maturity of their political culture<sup>83</sup> leads to the hypothesis that only countries with "mature" political culture—those in which both consensus and mobilization are very high—are actually immune from military takeovers. All other types of countries where there is some unevenness between mobilization and consensus are vulnerable. However, Finer concludes that the legitimation of military rule would be unobtainable in the group, resisted in the second, and fluid in the third, unimportant in the fourth.<sup>84</sup>

Despite the excellent generalization offered by Finer one can suggest several qualifications in it in view of its theoretical vagueness. For example, Finer maintains that the military's intervention in politics is rather a function of the "opportunity and disposition" of the army to intervene, which themselves are related to the level of political culture of the particular community which he defines as the strength or weakness of the attachment to civilian institutions. But this leaves unexplained that which it seeks to explain. As Dudley observes "it is like saying 'X cries because X is disposed to cry' which is to explain nothing about why X is crying." In other words, it is tautological.<sup>85</sup>

However, Finer's classic work remains an organic part of a general theory of civil-military relations. Dowse is fair to Finer when he maintains, "... the attempt to spell out a relatively unambiguous set of criteria for political culture, to derive or infer a four-point typology from this set and to relate levels of intervention to this typology, is clear and effective."<sup>86</sup>

An alternative—more refined and persuasive—analysis of the same basic theme (i.e., the level of political development as a determinant of military intervention) is made by Samuel Huntington with a different kind of formulation and terminology, which also causally links military intervention with the general level of political institutionalization in society.

According to Huntington, the causes which produce military intervention in politics basically lie not in the nature of the military organization itself; rather it is a specific manifestation of a broader



phenomenon in underdeveloped politics, i.e., "praetorianism."<sup>87</sup> Praetorianism refers to the general politicization of social forces in the absence of "autonomy", "complexity", "coherence", and "adaptability" of political structures—in one word "political institutionalization."<sup>88</sup>

In short, a prevalent theme in Huntington's observation about the praetorian society is that its civilian political institutions are always weak. A vacuum in institutions and leadership impels groups to arrogate control for their own ends, and the armed forces count among many potential contenders for power.

Though Huntington provides a reasonably valid generalization, to some extent it is still plagued by theoretical vagueness and problems.<sup>89</sup> For example, his analysis reflects a belief in continuity of development, an approach borrowed from the Western concept of a developmental sequence. Such a view is untenable in the light of the historical perspective and the experience of developing societies themselves.

Moreover, Huntington de-emphasizes the importance of military establishment variables. As the military does not and cannot work in an environmental vacuum, it appears more fruitful to explain civil-military relations functionally rather than strictly genetically, and in terms of factors external to the military in conjunction with the internal characteristics of the military establishment.<sup>90</sup>

Despite these criticisms, nonetheless, Huntington's contribution to the theory of civil-military relations—in terms of an attempt to construct an index of political institutionalization—remains highly valuable.

While *Finer* and Huntington, writing in the 1960s, sought to relate military intervention in politics to a society's level of political development, a number of scholars about the same time (especially in Latin America) dissatisfied with this line of thinking, were trying to link the phenomenon of military intervention or *coups* to the level of social and economic development of a society respectively.

The exponents of the theme of social vulnerability such as Karl Deutsch, Robert Putnam, and Samuel *Finer* postulated that the propensity for military intervention is likely to decrease with increased social mobilization. Here the concept of social mobilization can be defined with Karl W. Deutsch, "as the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour."<sup>91</sup>

Robert D. Putnam has supported this hypothesis in his correlational analysis of Latin America during 1956-65. He has linked the extent of military influence in politics with five indicators of social mobilization—urbanization, literacy, newspaper circulation, higher education, and the



distribution of radios—and found a fairly strong negative correlation ( $r^2 = 0.53$ ) between the two.<sup>92</sup>

In sum, it is argued that social mobilization increases the number of potential political actors and diffuses increased political resources to these actors. The assumption underlying this hypothesis is that these actors will be willing and able to sustain civilian political activities and institutions.

However, the counter viewpoint is represented by Huntington and A.S. Passos respectively, who consider it possible that both social mobilization and likelihood of military intervention could be high simultaneously.<sup>93</sup> According to Huntington, military rule is one aspect of disorder that results from an imbalance between the degree of social mobilization and the degree of political institutionalization. He believes that the political institutions' competence in meeting the expectations engendered by rapid social mobilization is the key factor influencing the possibility of intervention.

While in general agreement with Huntington's emphasis on the need for political institutionalization, some authors such as Wayman have attacked his entire treatment of the concept of social mobilization utilizing supportive data. Alternatively Wayman suggests that a high rate of social mobilization increases military rule only in societies divided by underlying social cleavages,<sup>94</sup> which he interprets as being in line with the theorizing of Deutsch. However, historical as well as contemporary evidence indicates that this hypothesis may hold only in certain circumstance.<sup>95</sup>

On the other hand, the exponents of the theme of economic vulnerability relate the level of economic development with the levels of military involvement in politics. For example, Lipset (1959), Janowitz (1964), Johnson (1962), Shils (1962), Putnam (1967), Fossum (1967), Needler (1966), Horowitz (1966), Kennedy (1974), and Hopkins (1966) hypothesize that systems with lower levels of economic development tend to be more prone to military intervention. Similarly, industrialization and economic development are frequently associated with the degree of political competition and, indirectly, the military's "political abstention." The more advanced the economy, the greater is the probability that more people will have access to resources with which to compete in politics.<sup>96</sup>

The impact of economic stagnation, deterioration or decline in the frequency of military intervention has been demonstrated by various scholars such as Johnson, Fossum,<sup>97</sup> Needler,<sup>98</sup> and Hoadley,<sup>99</sup> who suggest that the likelihood of military intervention rises with a perceived deterioration of economic conditions, especially marked by a belief that the government cannot resolve this deterioration. In sum, more



dynamically, these studies maintain that economic deterioration invites military intervention or conversely, that military *coups* are less likely when economic conditions are improving.

Systematic cross-national data, however, do not permit firm conclusions. One must point to the ambiguous status of the economic factors revealed by deviant cases. For example, Argentina and Brazil are notorious for conflicts between civilian and military elites despite their relatively high economic and technical development. Indeed, for the great majority of contemporary states, the clarity of the causal link between economic development and a specific political role for the armed forces does not exist. In this context we may consider Putnam's viewpoint, which suggests that before we can definitely interpret the relationship between economic development and military intervention, we must take into account their joint correlations with social mobilization. This procedure, in fact, produces a most remarkable result; if we remove the effect of social mobilization, economic development itself turns out to be positively, not negatively, correlated with military intervention.<sup>100</sup>

Thus, though economic adversity vis-a-vis *coups* need not be overstressed, deterioration may well be a highly facilitative factor in *coup* success in some cases.<sup>101</sup>

The broad sweep of "regime vulnerability" literature induces the suspicion that the thematic theorists have put forward broad statements about the nature of politics in developing areas within close analysis of actual military *coup* situations. As Thompson observes: "As a consequence of prematurely closed frameworks or broader goals, analytical expectations, and dataless inquiries, the military *coup* has become an analytical casualty."<sup>102</sup>

It could therefore be argued that the "regime vulnerability" perspective is only a partial approach to explaining the dynamics of civil-military relations. As Thompson believes, the other *foci* include the study of *coup-makers'* grievances,<sup>103</sup> the internal dynamics and structure of the military organization, and such external factors as foreign aid,<sup>104</sup> "*coup* contagion", subversion, and "global structural inequalities."

The factor of foreign influence is also supposed to affect the dynamics of civil-military relations to some extent. It is often said that military training missions from foreign nations inculcate attitudes favourable or unfavourable to military intervention in politics. It is also often argued by opponents of foreign military aid that it tends to increase the likelihood of military intervention in recipient countries. Such assistance, Alexander T. Edelman believes, encourages the political independence of the military and gives it leverage against civilian leaders.<sup>105</sup> While certainly a contributory factor, the foreign influence



cannot, however, fully explain military intervention.<sup>105</sup> Similarly, the hopes of many people, including Johnson, that the effects of foreign military aid on military intervention in politics would be reduced by courses at Leavenworth, indoctrination in Anglo-American doctrine of civil supremacy, and association with professionalized American military officers, have also turned to nought. Huntington's well considered view on this issue is that: "Military aid and training are by themselves politically sterile; they neither encourage nor reduce the tendencies of military officers to play a political role."<sup>107</sup>

In this context, the possibility that military cliques in neighbouring states may emulate *coups* occurring in another country, thereby creating a chain reaction, should also be investigated. Richard P.Y. Li and William R. Thompson have put forward the speculative interpretation which emphasized the possibility of a behavioural reinforcement process operating within global regional communication networks.<sup>108</sup>

Contemporary research in the nature of case studies does provide empirical detail absent from earlier writings. However, even in this category most studies seem to be concerned not so much with broader socio-economic and political issues as with the military itself. These studies also suffer from statistical reliability and methodological standardization problems.

The inadequacies in the research on civil-military relations may be attributed to a variety of reasons. Firstly, they are related to the academic preferences and bias of the scholars themselves. "Most of the looseness in the formulations," writes Dowse, "stems not from intellectual shortcomings of the exponents, but rather from the totally overwhelming variety of events that the theorists attempt to embrace."<sup>109</sup> For example, the Marxist and neo-Marxist approach has not been used widely enough. The Western academic institutions, after all, do not encourage scholars to study the processes of political change using an approach other than the Western liberal one.

Secondly, the available literature also suffers from the dynamic but asymmetrical state of the contemporary social Sciences, that of general acceptance of value orientations and research procedures, and the absence of governing standards and procedures concerning definition, conceptualizations, frames of reference, theories, and taxonomies.<sup>110</sup> An additional factor is the political sensitivity surrounding the military establishment which complicates the collection of data.

#### DYNAMICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A COMPOSITE MODEL

Much of the contemporary theorizing about civil-military relations in the Third World is therefore inadequate and partial. One does find a



few multivariate analyses which attempt to combine military organization variables with larger societal factors,<sup>111</sup> but such research at present being in a heuristic stage, the scope exists to develop a comprehensively multi-factoral theoretical model by synthesizing different variables.

### *Basis of the Model*

In connection with the proposed model, the following comments seem warranted. Civil-military relations are viewed as ranging from total conflict to complete cooperation. At any given juncture, a particular state can be located at a point between these two poles; that point can shift overtime in accordance with changes in the conditions relevant to the state.

Having stipulated that we should be sensitive to the fluid nature of civil-military relations—which means seeing the roles of civilians under military regimes as well as seeing the influence of military personnel in civilian regimes—the next necessary step needs more in-depth case studies on individual armies and much finer grained description of civil-military interactions. Most scholarly works on the armed forces and society in developing countries first focused on military intervention and next on the consequences of military rule, but rarely did scholars explore the dynamic interaction between them. Frequently, the studies infer civil-military relationships from a historical record without directly or informally investigating civilian and military networks, values, and patterns of interaction between the civil and military institutions.<sup>112</sup> This is true of studies of military-politics in communist systems as well as in Western European democracies.

Civilian-military relations can best be understood as a process in which there is frequently a great deal of fluidity and even informality. The relationships between civil and military personnel cannot be completely captured by using interest group models alone or by setting large institutional networks contending or cooperating with each other. Leave aside the developing countries where the political and social environment is relatively uninstitutionalised, this also appears to be the case in political systems which have been understood to have relatively strong institutions and have defined boundaries. Alliances are made across organizations, and personal, ideological, and policy networks may exist across the formal organizational boundaries.

One must also distinguish carefully what is meant theoretically and operationally by variables like social mobilization, political legitimacy, and political participation. The existing scholarly literature brings forward a multitude of hypotheses suggesting reciprocal and often contradictory relationship. The causal relationship between two variables



is often ambiguous. "Many analysts," contends Bienen, "have not been looking at the 'dependent variable' which will provide a deep insight into these relations. The ties between the institutional characteristics of military organizations and political processes may be closer than the ties between organizational characteristics and social change as a whole or specific economic policy outcome."<sup>113</sup> The investigation of this hypothesis, he further writes, "will be difficult for obvious reasons, but the research problems will be more practical than theoretical once we focus on political processes."<sup>114</sup>

Civil-military relations can range across a broad spectrum and where precisely they fall on that spectrum at any given point of time depends on a multiplicity of variables. Focusing on merely a couple of these variables can produce a seriously distorted picture. The dynamics of a country's civil-military relations over time can moreover be highly complex, for many factors can spark changes in these relations.<sup>115</sup>

In the light of the above stated comments the following proposed conceptual analytical framework seeks to illustrate the various roles the armed forces can play in politics in different political systems—developed, communist and developing—ranging from legitimate institutional interest group role to illegitimate overt military intervention, with the help of four independent summary variables,<sup>116</sup> namely:

- 1 The level of the institutionalization of civilian political procedures;
- 2 The level of military institutionalization;
- 3 The domestic socio-economic and international environments; and
- 4 The nature of boundaries between the military establishment and its socio-political environment.<sup>117</sup>

#### *The Level of Institutionalization of Civilian Political Procedures*

This summary variable encompasses all factors pertaining to civilian political institutions such as level of political institutionalization, legitimacy, level of mass political mobilization and participation, roles of political leadership and political parties, and functioning of democratic institutions.

Political systems with high ratios of institutionalization-to-participation and high degrees of legitimacy have strong civil institutions. Irrespective of variations in governmental forms—monarchy or republic, democracy or dictatorship—these systems have the power to innovate and implement policy decisions for their societies. Such systems may be called civil polities. Conversely, praetorianism exists in a state in which institutions are weak and the basis for legitimizing political



authority is uncertain given the low ratios of institutionalization and low legitimacy have relatively weak civil institutions. Praetorian polities are characterized by varying degrees of overt class and ethnic conflicts, student rioting and mob violence, unstable and erratic political leadership, bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, government infringement of civil liberties, individual and group alienations, and military *coups*.

The strength or weakness of civilian political institutions can be measured by two key elements. First, the public support which political structures can aggregate. This, in turn, depends, writes Luckham, "on the amount and scope of allocative authority they are able to control, which in most new nations is relatively small because so many of the allocations are undertaken by other structures like urban associations, lineage and kinship groups, traditional authority structures, and the like."<sup>118</sup> The degree of political mobilization, the extent of political communications and public awareness of the government and the political issues surrounding it are other determinants.

There is another important referent of the strength of political institutions, i.e., the effectiveness of political structures. Political structures are more effective if they are legitimate,<sup>119</sup> if they can command widespread and stable allegiance to their symbols and procedures. "But strong and stable structures," contends Luckham, "are required to institutionalize that legitimacy, to maintain channels of political participation, to regulate and specify demands and to apply effective and limited coercion where need be. The institutions and organizations of the centre must be capable of legitimating their own internal patterns of action, of regulating their own internal conflicts and problems of succession, as well authoritatively adjusting conflicts of social interest external to them."<sup>120</sup>

In the chain of the following argument, the assumption is that deficiencies in either or both of the above respects facilitate military intervention in politics. The circumstances of the intervention will differ, according to the main sources of weakness of the civilian institutions. Uncontrolled mobilization or violence, for example, are likely to pull the military more actively into the conflict in order to cope with riots, mass movements, or internal warfare, compared to palace revolutions that may prevail under other circumstances.

### *The Level of Military Institutionalization*

This summary variable includes a cluster of factors all related to the military establishment such as its size, defence expenditure, recruitment and representativeness, cohesiveness, autonomy, socialization, professionalism, resources, etc., which affect the relative strength or weakness



of the military institutions *vis-a-vis* the civilian institutions. Broadly speaking, an army's institutional strength may be measured, at least roughly, with reference to its resources, and its professional level.

The resources from which the military may draw its power are of three kinds: coercive and strategic, organizational and political.<sup>121</sup> The size or coercive capacity need not be emphasized.<sup>122</sup> Two things make a difference in the political resources of the military (i) the degree of its integration with civilian power structures—the extent to which soldiers participate in civilian decision-making bodies such as cabinets, cabals and committees, the extent to which it has socio-metric links of friendship, kinship, etc., with political power groups; (ii) the amount of diffuse political support it can generate for its social legitimacy.

As to the military's level of professionalism, this aspect should not be associated with its propensity or reluctance to intervene. Bienen argues that, "the criteria for professionalism should be independent from intervention if we are going to measure discrete phenomenon and examine their interrelationships."<sup>123</sup> He further writes: "We should be interested in professionalism and corporate identity in armed forces in developing countries in part because we want to know how they relate to military intervention. However, it is not just accommodation and control in civil-military relations that concerns us. We need to explore the impact of civil-military relations on the widest set of political processes and outcomes."<sup>124</sup> A military's own understanding of its corporate interests is critical to its very definition in society and its relationship to the state. Self-definition is important for the ways that corporate interests get structured. The levels of professionalism affect the missions of the military, both internal and external.

Exploring corporatism and professionalism and personal and idiosyncratic factors will be useful, then, not only for analyzing power relationships between civilian and military but also for examining the range of civil and military interactions.<sup>125</sup>

It cannot be presumed that military organizations are oriented towards modernity or are determined to preserve their own integrity and autonomy and to preserve the state. A faction within the military may be willing to destroy the state apparatus and even destroy the military as a functioning organization in order to preserve its own power in the short run.<sup>126</sup>

### *The Domestic Socio-Economic and International Environments*

The third summary variable stands for the domestic socio-economic environment within which the military and civil institutions interact with each other as illegitimate or legitimate holders of political power. The



assumption is that the military establishment and the civilian political institutions cannot exist in an environmental vacuum. They are influenced by the domestic socio-economic environment whose important dimensions are the level of social mobilization, the level of economic development and the social structure.

Here one must distinguish between the level of social mobilization from the rate of social mobilization.<sup>127</sup> Zimmermann maintains that though Huntington is not explicit about making this distinction, in several instances he seems to be aware of it.<sup>128</sup>

Huntington's conceptualization of political instability or political decay which builds on several structural imbalances meant close attention. Syng Nam Yough and Lee Sigelman suggest that "rapid social mobilization itself is far less politically destabilizing than had previously been supposed. Indeed, we would argue that Huntington and others have focused so single-mindedly on the dysfunctional aspects of rapid social change that they have overlooked the potential of such change for creating higher levels of political support."<sup>129</sup>

Bienen suggests another distinction by pointing out that demands and participation must be kept analytically separate (and also measured separately). Increased participation need not lead to increased effective demands. There may be trade-offs between participation and the satisfaction of social and economic demands.<sup>130</sup>

Economic decline also has to be considered. Though it does not automatically lead to military intervention, in vulnerable regimes, economic deterioration is likely to increase military grievances.

Other numerous variables worthy of inclusion under this summary variable include internal disruption, ethnic or cultural pluralism, social cleavages and class structure, religion, colonial legacy, dimension of independence, people's attitudes, history, etc.

In the context of the international environment the factors such as foreign veto power (which rests with the United States and Soviet Russia with respect to their own blocs and spheres of influence), external war, external economic dependencies, and, *coup* contagion have to be considered. However, the interaction between the international environment and the military and civil institutions is not as direct and vital as that between domestic socio-economic environment and the military-civil institutions.

#### *The Nature of Boundaries Between the Military Establishment and its Socio-Political Environment*

Finally, I would consider the conceptualization of the nature of boundaries separating the structures of one organization as from the



structure of others within a particular system as a major determinant of civil-military relations.<sup>131</sup> The concept of boundary takes into account how strictly the roles are defined, how permeable these roles are and how easily interaction between the two roles or structures takes place. 'Balance of power' between the civil authority and the military in the LDCs (Less, Developed Countries), is one of mutual weakness whereas in more developed countries it is of mutual strength both enjoying greater institutional autonomy from each other. Praetorian states have fragmented boundaries. There are splits and factions in the armed forces and civil-military coalitions abound.

In sum, it could be said that the dynamics of civil-military relations depend on the interplay between the regime elites and military; the processes of institutionalization of each; and relative stability and cohesiveness of each, in a particular context of domestic socio-economic and international environment at a given point of time.

The tabular version of this four summary variable scheme displaying the dynamics of civil-military relations in different types of political systems is presented in Table 1.



TABLE—I  
DYNAMICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

<i>Types of Systems</i>	<i>Level of Institutionalizations of Civilian political Procedures</i>			<i>Level of Military Institutionalization</i>	<i>Democratic Socio-economic and International Environments showing level of</i>		<i>Nature of Boundaries</i>
	<i>Legitimacy</i>	<i>Party cohesion</i>	<i>Stability</i>		<i>Social Mob.</i>	<i>Eco. Dev.</i>	
Western Classical Liberal/ Developed	+ High	+ High	+ High	+ High	+ High	+ High	Integrated boundaries displaying objective civilian control
Communist Authoritarian/ Developed	+ High	+ High	+ High	+ High	+ High	+ High	Permeated boundaries displaying subjective civilian control
Praetorian/ Developing	— Low	— Low	— Low	— Low	— Low	— Low	Fragmented boundaries displaying tenuous civilian control



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- 95 Another school of theorists represented by Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, and Stanislaw Andreski, consider cultural cleavages conducive to regime vulnerability. Germani and Silvert suggest that military intervention is inhibited by the rise of middle strata in the social structure, since these middle strata have both the motivation and ability to create and sustain stable civilian political institutions. See Germani and Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America," *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, 1961, pp.62-81; Stanislaw Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (Berkeley, 1968), pp. 125-26. However, Jose Nun has noted that the armed forces serve in effect as gatekeepers for the middle class. See Jose Nun, n. 70, pp. 55-99,
- 96 Finer, *Man on the . . . .*, n. 14, pp. 113-15.
- 97 According to Egil Fossum, the frequency of coups in Latin America in economic deterioration years on the average was twice the frequency for the years of improvement. See Egil Fossum, "Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups in Latin America," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1967, p. 237.
- 98 Needler noted that between 1938-1942, a time of increased prosperity in Latin America, only one successful military seizure of power was carried out, contrasted with six triumphant coups in 1944. See Needler, n. 90, pp. 617-18.
- 99 Hoadley also suggests that military coups in Asia occurred about twice as frequently in the year following a drop in the total value of exports. Also consult Hoadley, *Soldiers and Politics . . . .*, n. 14, pp. 194-95. For a converse hypothesis showing economic growth as a destabilising factor refer, Mancur Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilising Force," *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. XXIII, December 1963, pp. 529-52, and J. Bayo Adekson, "On the Theory of . . .", n. 69, p. 31.
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- 101 Thompson, "Systemic Change and the Latin American Military Coup," *Comparative Political Studies* (Beverly Hills), Vol. VII, No. 4, January 1975, p. 476.
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- 105 Alexander T. Edelman, *Latin American Government and Politics* (Homewood, 1965), p. 189.
- 106 Some countries—for example, Peru and Thailand—which experienced military coups after receiving American assistance experienced them equally often before they became the beneficiaries of Pentagon's largesse. For detailed case studies,



- see Welch and Smith, *Military Role and Rule . . .*, n. 14, also see Putnam, n. 92, p. 102.
- 107 Huntington, *Political Order in . . .*, n. 14, p. 193.
- 108 Richard P.Y. Li and W.R. Thompson, "The 'Coup-Contagion' Hypothesis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Ann Arbor), Vol. XIX, No. 1, March 1975, pp. 63-88.
- 109 Dowse, n. 4, p. 217.
- 110 Raymond Duvall and Marry Welfling, "Social Mobilization, Political Institutionalization and Conflict in Black Africa: A Simple Dynamic Model," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Ann Arbor), Vol. XVII, No. 4, December 1973, pp. 673-702.
- 111 The most persuasive writers who stress the influence and interaction of macro-social factors with those internal to the military institutions are Luckham, n. 8, pp. 5-35; Welch *Soldier and State . . .*, n. 14; Bienen, "Military and Society . . .," n. 68, and "Civil-Military Relations . . .," n. 112.
- 112 Ekkart Zimmermann, "Towards a Causal Model of Military Coup d'etat," *Armed Forces and Society* (Beverly Hills), Vol. V, No. 3, Spring 1979, and Bienen, "Civil-Military Relations in the Third World," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. II, No. 3, February 1981, pp. 364-65.
- 113 Bienen, "Civil Military Relations . . .," n. 112, pp. 366-67.
- 114 n. 112, In this context, weak, low or zero-order connections should not be taken as ruling out causal influences of the specific variables under study or as corroborating such influences; consult Zimmermann, n. 112, p. 394.
- 115 Consult Albright, "Comparative Conceptualization . . .," n. 36, pp. 575-76.
- 116 For a discussion of 'Summary Variables' and their uses, see Easton, *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York, 1965), pp. 25-26 and 154-56.
- 117 Luckham, n. 8, pp. 17-20.
- 118 n. 8, p. 11.
- 119 For the detailed analysis of the relationship between the legitimacy and military intervention see Gavin Kennedy. He has provided statistical evidence about 200 coups that took place in the Third World between 1960-72 that supported his legitimacy thesis that the more fragile the political legitimacy, the greater the likelihood of coups and attempted coups. See Gavin Kennedy, *The Military in the Third World* (London, 1974), p. 12.
- 120 Luckham, n. 8, p. 12.
- 121 n. 8, p. 13.
- 122 Thompson, "Another Look at the Feit-Sigelman Dispute Over the Relative Military Size—Coup Propensity Hypothesis," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (Moreland), Vol. VI, No. 1, Spring 1978, p. 98 and his "A Reply of Professor Sigelman's Comment," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, (Moreland), Vol. VI, No. 1, Spring 1978, pp. 103-04; and Lee Sigelman, "A Comment on William Thompson's 'Another Look at the Feit-Sigelman Dispute Over the Relative Military Size-Coup Propensity Hypothesis,'" *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. VI, No. 1, Spring 1978, pp. 101-02.
- 123 Bienen, "Civil-Military Relations . . .," n. 112, pp. 367-68.
- 124 n. 112.
- 125 Bienen, "Armed Forces . . .," n. 68, pp. 1-16.
- 126 This happened in Idi Amin's Uganda and in Macia's Equatorial Guinea. They do this in the name of revolutionary goals as in Pol Pot's Cambodia, or they may do it or risk doing it in the name of stability and order, e.g., in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua,



- 127 Wayman, "Military Involvement . . .," n. 94, p. 15 and his "Coups or Military Rule? Some Comments on Zimmermann's Article," *Armed Forces and Society* (Beverly Hills), Vol. VII, No. 3, Spring 1981, pp. 487-89.
- 128 Zimmerman, n. 112, pp. 397-99.
- 129 Syng Nam Yough and Lee Sigelman, "Mobilization, Institutionalization, Development and Instability: A note of Reappraisal," *Comparative Political Studies* (Beverly Hills), Vol. IX, No. 2, July 1976, p. 229.
- 130 Bienen, *Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control* (Princeton, 1974), p. 194.
- 131 For a detailed discussion on integral permeable or fragmented military boundaries, see Luckham, n. 8, pp. 17-20.



## THE SIGNIFICANCE AND PROSPECTS OF STABLE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

By I.O. ONI\*

*The paper examines the significance and need for a stable civil-military system in Nigeria as a Third World state, which would draw closest to the ideal objective control model of civil-military relations. An appraisal of trends which promise a bright prospect for such a system, as well as anti-thetical forces which appear to make such prospects gloomy, is undertaken. We conclude that a stable and workable civil-military system in Nigeria as an underdeveloped state cannot be examined in isolation from the prevailing political economy and material relations in society. The termination of political instability and of the vicious cycle of civil-military alternation will be attainable in Nigeria only when autochthonous economic development, technological revolution and egalitarian and socialised material relations are forged and sustained.*

### I

#### INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

ONE of the attempts in defining the concept of civil-military relations is that posited by Adekson (1981). According to him:

Civil-military thought, whether explicitly formulated or largely implicit, may be defined as a set of dominantly held ideas about the structure and role of the military at any given time within a particular society, interpreting that society's history and providing a basis for the evaluation of a new experience. (p. 1)

Studies in civil-military relations attempt to capture the nature, processes and outcomes of the interaction between the military on the one hand and the civil/political milieu on the other. The political is often greatly emphasized in that relationship because the nature of the military professional role brings it face-to-face with the state apparatuses much more glaringly than with other societal institutions and sub-systems. We consider such relationship as being stable when the existing relational

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arrangement between the military and the civil/political structures is accepted as being proper and legitimate by both the military and members of the civil society, and is therefore not subject to kaleidoscopic alteration.

The concept of civil-military relations presupposes a demarcation between the military on the one hand and the civil/political on the other. Such a demarcation had not always been possible until the second half of the 19th Century when the vocation of officership became a profession *sui generis*. The 18th Century officer *corps* was designed for the needs of the aristocracy rather than for efficient performance of the military function. Wealth, birth, personal and political influence dictated the appointment and advancement of officers. Needless to say that the pre-19th Century officer *corps* in Europe fell short of the present ideal of military professionalism virtually by any standards, be they those of expertise, cohesiveness, discipline or institutional autonomy.

Huntington (1957) posits that despite the lingering tenacity of the aristocratic elements, by 1875 the basic institutions of professionalism had become securely established in the armed services of the major European Powers. A rounded and complete military system had been developed in these armed services, the characteristics of which included, *inter alia*: requirements of general and special education for entry into the officer *corps*; graduated examinations in institutions for higher military education; advancement by merit and achievement alone; a sense of corporate unity and responsibility and a definition of the professional competence. The factors that did facilitate the emergence of the military vocation as an autonomous profession included, among others, the growth of nation-states; the victory of democracy over aristocracy and of meritocracy over particularism; and the industrial revolution with the attendant technological specialisation which led to radical transformation of military science.

The emergence of a professional military *corps* has created the modern problem of civil-military relations. For it is only possible to discuss civil-military relations after professionalism has ensured the demarcation of the civil/political realm from that of the military. Professionalisation itself may be located within the evolutionary process of structural differentiation and specialisation, in which the military sphere services the political, but is yet differentiated from it. Given that differentiation, the relation of the military to the state is supposed to be that of subordination and submission. Huntington submits that the relation of the military profession to the state is based upon a natural division of labour; the essence of this relationship concerns the relative scope of competence of the military officer and political expert or statesman. Before the professionalisation of military science in 19th Century Europe, the same person



could be simultaneously qualified in both fields; now this is difficult if not impossible to achieve. The area of military science is subordinate to, and yet independent of, the area of politics. Just as war serves the ends of politics, the military profession serves the ends of state. The ideal pattern of civil-military relations is said to exist when the military stays strictly within the traditional professional calling of national defence, the civil politicians control the state machinery, including the military, and with the condition that the prevailing arrangement gains the legitimacy of various sections of the society.

Within that ideal arrangement, the responsibilities of the military officer to the state are threefold. He has first, a representative function, to represent the claims of military security within the state machinery. He must keep the authorities of the state informed as to what he considers necessary for the minimum military security of the state in the light of the capacities of other powers. Secondly, the military officer has an advisory function to analyse and to report on the implications of alternative courses of state action from the military point of view, though it is beyond his function to state which is the most desirable. Thirdly, the military officer has an executive function, to implement state decisions with respect to military security even if it is a decision which runs vehemently counter to his military judgment. Within this ideal outlook, politics and state management are considered as lying beyond the scope of military competence.

## II

### HISTORICAL MODELS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

We submit that the ideal arrangement of civil-military relations introduced above is hardly ever achieved in reality. It is an ideal type from which each nation-state deviates in varying magnitude. In reality, at least three historical types of civil-military relations have emerged, each nation conforming more or less to the characteristic features of any one of these models. These are: the objective control model, the subjective control model and the praetorian model.

#### *The Objective Control Model*

Both Huntington (1957) and Perlmutter (1977) view objective civilian control as characterising the pattern of civil-military relations of Western European and North American nation-states. The military establishments of these states are said to steer clear of overt political rule and are not involved in the pressures and counter-pressures that arise from the struggle between civilian political groups. This is achieved,



according to Huntington, because military officers have internalised the norms of civilian supremacy and because professionalism makes the military uninterested in matters other than those that are strictly within the spheres of professional calling—the defence of the state. Thus, Huntington (1957) submits that:

Civilian control in the objective sense is the maximising of military professionalism. More precisely, it is that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behaviour among the members of officer *corps* . . . . The essence of objective control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism. (p. 83)

In the same vein, Mckinlay (1971) asserts that the development of internalised professionalism by the military is the most effective way of minimising civil-military conflict. It is most effective in that a clear division of labour between the military and the polity emerges, and that the polity does not have to employ elaborate or expensive means to ensure the loyalty and submission of the military.

Critics have however picked on Huntington and Perlmutter for their exaggeration of the submissiveness and political neutrality of the military establishments of Perlmutter's 'classical nation-states'. In this respect, Mckinlay has argued that the assumption that the spontaneous development of military controls means that the military completely withdraws from politics is fallacious. For not only does professionalisation not exclude a significant political role for the military, it may in fact precipitate such a role. The first level at which the military officer *corps* are politically active in western nations is a pressure group capacity. Mckinlay avers that all professions are composed of individuals and that all professions have a particular location in society and should thus be expected to hold and express political views concerning their interest and location in such society. The major areas of military pressure group activity concern the size of the armed forces, the size of the budgetary allocation and the nature of the defence system. Both Mckinlay and Abrahamson (1972) are of the opinion that not only is it perfectly legitimate for the military to play a pressure group role in a democratic country, it is also in a position to do so by reason of the access of military elites to their civilian counterparts. However, any conflict and potential strife at this level is likely to be limited and contained, and is likely to be concealed for security reasons. Thus the vital aspects of military professionalism are not likely to be adversely affected and the stability of existing civil-military relations is not significantly threatened by this type of political role.

In Mckinlay's submission, the second level of political action by a



professional military is balance or aconjunctive role. He opines that such activity is in consonance with military professionalism in conditions of national crisis or war. Given that guardianship of national security is in jeopardy either from internal or external sources, the military is legitimately obliged to take action. Where the security threat is sufficiently grave, corrective action may involve not only the utilisation of physical force but also the mobilisation and deployment of other domestic resources to enable a more optimal use of force in respect of conscription, rationing, and the control and direction of the production and distribution of economic resources. At this level the military is clearly involved in policy-making which, though of relevance to its activities, lies outside the direct sphere of military competence. Mckinlay opines, however, that such political activity is quite in consonance with professionalism, to the extent that the military is acting with reference to its major function. Also the more localised or the less enduring the threat, the less salient will be the military political role in this respect.

Abrahamsson has in fact been more vitriolic in his attack of Huntington's treatment of the relationship between professionalism and ideal civil-military relations in Western European and American States. Abrahamsson bluntly asserts that military men are not and cannot be neutral and objective servants of the state, that in fact, military professionalism often tends to galvanise rather than exclude political activity. He argues that in a situation where civilian authorities want to pursue policies that are in disagreement with those proffered by the military, those authorities will meet greater resistance from a highly professionalised officer *corps*. Also, that military men cannot be neutral politically because they have certain corporate interests and should therefore be expected to favour and to pursue political activities that are consistent with those beliefs and interests. Abrahamsson opines that the military has become highly politically involved in the affairs of western countries. According to him, although military leaders have acted through history as advisers to kings and princes on matters of war and strategy, it is mainly during the present century that the officer *corps* as a whole is professionally trained and educated in a way that enhances their ability to exert far-reaching political influences.

Abrahamsson advances a number of reasons for this development: the growing complexity of modern warfare and the vast political implications of the employment of nuclear weapons; the character of total war, which requires the organisation of society as a whole for defence purposes and which tends to expand military jurisdiction into a large number of new areas, such as location of industries, roads, power plants, transport and



communication utilities; and the assumption of ancillary functions (especially in the post-World War II period), as for example, military administration of occupied countries, police tasks, counter-guerilla warfare and training of foreign troops in "civil actions." The overall effect of these tendencies is to gradually corrode the distinction between strategic and political issues and through this process the western military *croops* continue to gain significant foothold in the political sphere. And although Colton (1979) has argued that the involvement of the armed forces in the politics of Socialist and Western industrial nations generally occurs through channels of influence rather than participation; the line of demarcation between the two may sometimes be difficult to establish.

The above critical qualifications of Huntington's classical work on military professionalism and objective civilian control are significant in enhancing a balanced and rounded understanding of the contemporary relationship between military professionalism and the prevailing mode of civil-military relations in Western nations. It is important to note, however, that the characteristics and nature of civil-military relations in Western nations are sufficiently distinct and the level of political involvement relatively minimal and controlled as to allow a differentiation between Huntington's objective civilian control and the two other models of civil military relations which are examined below.

### *The Subjective Control Model*

According to Huntington and Perlmutter, the essence of subjective civilian control of the military is the de-emphasis of an independent military sphere. The political elites control the military by infiltrating and penetrating the rank and file of the officers and men so that they become politically 'reliable'. Subjective control of the military characterises the revolutionary military establishments of Socialist states and of many one-party states. Mckinlay (1971) and Nordlinger (1977) have noted that such control is ensured in diverse ways. The party overtly penetrates and infiltrates the military hierarchy, and officers' commitment to the party and its ideology is a necessary condition for commissioning and promotion. The party may distribute party cards among the military hierarchy in order to build up a core of loyalty; the polity may delegate government posts to top military leaders thereby involving the armed forces in the general policy-making process. The polity may utilise commissars both to encourage and supervise the propagation of political ideas within the hierarchy; the polity can engage in the political education and indoctrination of the officers through special ideological schools. The goal is to achieve a situation where the polity can maintain control of the military by virtue of the coincidence of



interests, values and convictions based on the overlap of personnel in the top military and political ranks. The military is controlled subjectively through coincidence of interests which serves as a more positive bond than simple division of labour and the internationalisation of the norm of civilian supremacy; the control derives from a common class and ideological base. As Nyerere puts it:

The task is to ensure that the officers and men are integrated into the government and party so that they become no more of a risk than, say, the civil service, (Bell, 1968:6)

In the same vein. Mao avers:

Our principle is that the party commands the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the party. (Joffe, 1965:128)

The armed forces of Socialist and one party states vary widely in their degree of overt politicisation. Nordlinger notes, for example, that many authoritarian one-party states have mild programmes of overt politicisation of the military whereas Communist countries such as Russia and China manifest a much higher and stronger degree of overt politicisation.

Although subjective control of the military *via* penetration represents a deviation from certain properties of professionalism such as institutional autonomy, universal and impersonal criteria of action and effective neutrality, it does not constitute a total negation of military professionalism in so far as certain conditions are met. These conditions include: uniformity of the politicisation process within the military hierarchy; the pursuance of expertise; responsibility to the state alone, and the condition that the one party constitutes the nation-state authority and that it is popularly accepted as such. Once these conditions are met, not only will overt politicisation ensure an effective civilian control of the military but the degree of professionalism can be very high and the military very efficient. Thus, both McKinlay and Perlmuter have submitted that Socialist Armed Forces are highly professionally sophisticated and that they sometimes manifest higher skill levels than many of the Western Armed Forces. The efficacy of subjective control of the military through infiltration is also evident in the fact that *coups* hardly ever occur in Socialist States and other one-party states which employ means of control.

Where, however, the one party system is not strong, or where the pattern of politicisation is not broad-based, homogenous and effective, or where the party is a channel for the mobilisation of bias or of sectional interests, attempts to politicise the military system may have



such deleterious effects as the weakening of the cohesiveness and '*esprit de corps*' of the military, hierarchically or it may eventuate into a *coup d'etat*. A classical example was the unsuccessful attempt of Nkrumah to infiltrate sections of the Ghanaian Armed Forces along socialist ideological lines while the older generation of Sandhurst-trained officers were strongly committed to Western liberal ideals. This situation resulted in the overthrow of that administration in 1966.

### *The Praetorian Model*

The third model of civil-military relations is that of 'praetorianism,' or forcible take-over of political power. 'Praetorianism' is a concept frequently used to characterise a situation where the military class of a given society exercises independent political power or take-over of political rule within it by an actual or threatened use of force. Such armed forces are referred to as 'praetorian' armed forces, the officers as 'praetorian' officers, and the state under their dominion as 'praetorian' state as long as the domination lasts. 'Praetorianism' involves the explicit assumption and direction of major governmental offices by the military, after having ousted the civilian occupants of these posts. At its lower level, military take-over of political power merges with a high level of military conjunctive political role, while in its most marked form it entails the occupation of virtually all top civil governmental posts by military officers. Total intervention is said to persist so long as the military occupies the chief executive office (such as Head of State or President), that major government posts, if not actually occupied by the military, are held by military appointees, and that major governmental functions remain under military direction.

History has revealed that the most unstable and crisis-ridden pattern of civil-military relations are experienced by the ex-colony states of Africa and Latin America. These states have experienced *coups*, counter-*coups* and kaleidoscopic alternation of military and civilian regimes. The officer *corps* have practically rejected the classical model of the civilian supremacy over, and control of, the military. Western scholars such as Perlmutter (1981), Huntington (1968) and Finer (1985) have been bemused by the failure of the military establishments of Third World states to conform to the normative schedule of military professionalism and civil-military relations charted in the classical literature. The failure of their works to aptly capture the crisis in the military establishments of African states arises from the fact that sufficient attention is not paid to the significant role played by the historical, systemic and material conditions and experiences of these states as they affect their armed forces. Commem-



ting on Huntington's work, Welch (1985), submits that it is relatively profitless,

to look at Western History, prior to the early 19th Century, to understand contemporary patterns of civil-military relations. The explicit historical limitation in Huntington's work is paralleled by a geographical limitation. With the exception of Japan, he utilises industrialised European and North Atlantic states. As a result, Huntington's conceptions of civil-military relations bear the stamp of their origin in the modern 'first World', in which the armed forces are usually confined to clearly subordinate roles in governance. The political facts of life in the Third World have had little direct impact on his and other 'orthodox' perspectives on the military and their effect upon the broad realm of governmental action. In other words, many basic scholarly views have reflected a selected historical slice, drawn from limited sections of the globe. (p. 83)

In our perusal of the literature, the historical, structural and systemic focus that the analysis of military professionalism and civil-military relations in Third World states requires, appears to have been captured by many African scholars. These scholars have attempted to locate the present crisis in the military organisations of post-colonial African nations and between their military and civil-political structures, within the context of the distortions of their natural development through the process of colonialism and Western Imperialism. For instance, the rise of military professionalism which Huntington, Perlmuter and Abrahamsson have discussed cannot capture the emergence of the military establishment in African nations. The kingdoms and states of pre-colonial Africa manifested various structural, political and military arrangements. While the armies of many of them (such as those of the Yoruba, Benin, Ashanti and Dahomey Kingdoms) were fairly well organised and manifested some expertise within the limits of the prevailing security challenges and the sophistication of their weapons, the concept of a standing army was an exception rather than the rule. African historians such as Johnson (1921), Ade-Ajayi and Smith (1964), Falola and Oguntomisin (1984) have noted that although in the 19th Century the military organisation of the Yoruba Kingdoms laid some emphasis on expertise and training and came to play dominant political roles due to the prolonged and incessant warfare into which the land was plunged at that time, the standard of military organisation was markedly different and by far more rudimentary than the demands of military professionalism in the modern context. This change is due, among other factors, to new developments in international relations, changes in the



nature of warfare and threats of warfare, technological advancement and complexities in the emergent state system.

Colonialism as a logical extension of Western Imperialism imposed the colonial states on African indigenous political formations in order to protect and reproduce the interests of the metropolitan capitalist economy. Various peoples, ethnic groups and kindoms with divergent values, world views and socio-political structures were forcibly jumbled and amalgamated together without respect for the diversities in their history and culture. Within the pluralistic and heterogenous formations that developed, the groundwork was already laid for their underdevelopment, instability and contradictions that would plague the inherited post-colonial states and their organisational apparatuses, of which the military establishment is a part.

British imperial power laid the foundations for the continued underdevelopment of the Nigerian economy and its dependence on foreign capital. As Falola and Ihonvbbers (1985) have rightly observed, the colonial system did not need to create a viable capitalist system in the colony in order to promote metropolitan capital accumulation. The imperial power was probably aware that if the colony was to serve as a source of raw materials and a market for the products of British industries, it was necessary to ensure that the colony never achieved a self-sustaining productive capacity. The consequence of the colonial policy in relation to industrial production therefore included the dependence of the Nigerian bourgeois class on the state for capital accumulation through the granting of sinecure posts in government and public corporations, the award of inflated contracts and the granting of loans for existing and fictitious projects. No serious attempt was made by the national bourgeoisie to forge an authentic and self sustaining national development.

The ultimate consequences of the situation just identified are: economic neo-colonialism, national poverty and an intense struggle for the control of the state apparatuses among and within the social classes and ethnic groups, since such control was the primary channel by which a good chunk of the national resources may be amassed. It is in this context that we may appreciate the inter-ethnic conflicts within African states and the intense competition within the dominant class for state control, as well as the wanton corruption and decadence of the bourgeois class, all of which provide apparent justification for the breakdown of the ideal model of civil-military relations and the intervention of the military elites in the politics of African states. Since, however, military ruling elites are often not mindful of pursuing a radical structural transformation of the political and economic systems, it soon becomes evident that they do not have an answer to the political and economic crises which galvanised



their intervention, that they are equally exposed to the corrupting influences of the system and that their involvement in politics inescapably corrodes and jeopardises the viability and combat-readiness of the armed forces. Thus, the search for a stable civil-military relations continues in Nigeria in particular, and in most African states in general.

### III

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF STABLE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The search for stable civil-military relations in Third World states emanates from an awareness of the deleterious effects of political underdevelopment and military political intervention on various aspects of national life. Political instability and an unstable civil-military relation hampers the evolution of a viable political culture in a nation. In the realm of economics, an unstable civil-military relation is not conducive to a planned economic development and technological transformation. But perhaps the most dysfunctional outcome of the involvement of the military in politics is manifest in the corrosion of military professionalism, cohesiveness and combat-readiness which such intervention leaves in its trail. Our research findings provide strong support to the effect that retired and serving military officers would desire to see Nigeria achieve a stable civil-military relations, and see the officers remain in the barracks pursuing their primary professional calling, because of their perception of the damaging effects of military-political rule on the viability and combat-readiness of the armed forces.

In all modern states, the military has a primary responsibility—the security and defence of its client, the state. The assumption of a multiplicity of roles such as the intervention of the military in politics in addition to its basic professional vocation has a great tendency of hampering military preparedness and readiness in effectively discharging its primary duty. The concept of combat-readiness is crucial for the military professional role and for the military mind. It hinges not only on the emphasis on deterrence in modern military science but also on the required pessimistic outlook of the military officer in his assessment of international politics. As Hall (1946) has argued, the duty of a professional military man obliges him to be a pessimist. He must be the 'no' man to idealism and wishful thinking. Unpopular as it makes him during periods of peace, he must assume that the pendulum of history will eventually swing back to the point where the country must risk its well-being and be involved in armed conflict with some other states. In the same vein, Janowitz (1960) submits that officers who aspire to high command must ensure that the combat spirit remains dominant even when the state enjoys relative peace. For the officer to aspire openly to a



world without war is thought irresponsible and professionally self destructive. Thus the significance of the emphasis and concern on the combat-readiness and viability of the military establishment of a state at any point in time comes to clear relief.<sup>1</sup>

It is in this light that we can appreciate the burden and agitation which both military and civilian elites have expressed in Nigeria concerning the jeopardising influence of military political rule on the viability and strength of the armed forces, the call for a lasting military disengagement from politics and the search for a stable civil-military relations. For instance, this burden was expressed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Babangida, while speaking with reference to the December 1985 abortive *coup* of Major-General Mamman Vatsa and his cohorts. According to the President:

It may be that our origin as a colonial force, our sudden and rapid expansion, the fact that the forces have had little experience of civil authority and control, our frequent exposure to political roles, the decision not to honour fully the military tradition at the end of the civil war and the lack of a deep-rooted national military tradition due to the absence of long-serving superior officers, may all have eroded our professional ethics. Whatever the cause, those two events (the 1976 and 1985 abortive *coups*), especially the most recent, must give every patriotic professional Nigerian soldier cause for anxiety and deep reflection. I am certain that unless we review our position and take necessary steps to recapture and reinstate our professional military virtues, we may sooner or later become no better than civilians with guns. If that happens, we shall have disgraced the military profession and placed the nation in double jeopardy.<sup>2</sup>

Other retired officers have expressed similar concern in respect of the destructive effects of military-political involvement on military professionalism and the need for a permanent military withdrawal from politics. The coverage of *This Week* magazine on a related issue is illuminating in this respect. Backed up with the views and affirmations of some military officers and civilian elites, the magazine submits:

Incessant *coups* and counter-*coups* have not only disrupted the nation's political and economic development but the military establishment itself. Retired Major General David Jemibewon, former Army Quartermaster General and Military Governor of Oyo state between 1986 and 1979, says intervention of the military in politics often results in lack of cohesion, jealousy and disloyalty within the set up. He says



that because of the politicisation of the military, hierarchical approach to issues are destroyed and military professionalism eroded.<sup>3</sup>

The magazine advances further concrete support for this position when it reveals that retired Major General Oluleye agrees with the above evaluation.

In his view, the deviation of the military from its historical mission of defending and protecting the territorial integrity of Nigeria 'has destroyed the *esprit de corps*, yielding place to ethnicity, distrust and mutual mistrust'. He says that *coups* and counter-*coups* have lead to a situation where the wastage rate in the officer *corps* has exceeded the acceptable rate.<sup>4</sup>

We submit that the ability of Third World states to achieve a stable civil-military relations will not only augur well for the political and economic subsystems, it will also enhance the quality and viability of the military profession in these states, which have been battered by their overt incursion into politics.

#### IV

#### THE PROSPECTS OF STABLE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

The perception of the significance of stable civil-military relations and of the dysfunctional effects of military-political rule and political instability in Third World states underlies the almost unanimous call for a permanent military withdrawal from politics in these states. In particular, it is proposed here that there is an evident link between the realisation by military officers of the devastating effects of military political rule on the quality and viability of the military profession on the one hand, and their decision to disengage from the political scene on the other. Nordlinger (1977) submits that disengagement appears to remain the logical step by a highly politicised and factionalised military organisation which feels concerned about its viability and combat-readiness. A review of other extant works on military withdrawal from politics have confirmed the plausibility of such a link (Sundhaussen, 1982; Danopoulos, 1984; Finer, 1985).

One is aware that military disengagement from politics cannot be aptly captured monocausally. Apart from the realisation by military officers of the dysfunctional effects of military-political intervention on military professionalism, there are other societal conditions which often make such withdrawal inviting, if not compelling. There may be a draining of



the military's self-confidence as governing turns out to be much more demanding and disheartening than was ever imagined or in the face of the virtual collapse of the national economy. There may be strong pressure from members of the civil society, calling for military withdrawal from politics and for the reinstating of civilian rule. This may be made visible by persistent protests, strikes, media criticisms and vitriolic opposition from strong pressure groups within the society, as exemplified in Acheampong's Ghana between 1976 and 1979. A combination of a number of these factors explain the withdrawal of the military from the politics of Nigeria in 1979, the planning of which had started some three years earlier. In the search for a stable civil-military relations in Nigeria, another military disengagement from politics is presently being witnessed; the processes have been set in motion since 1987 and will hopefully be consummated in 1992 when the Third Republic is ushered in.

Scholars and social observers have however been bemused by the fact that military withdrawals from politics do not last, that the most frequent sequel to military disengagement is a brief interregnum of civil rule and then another *coup*. In fact, few civilian successor regimes have lasted more than 10 years; Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico provide the few exceptions. The general explanation which Finer (1985) advances for this trend is that the motivations and facilitating conditions that account for the initial *coup* are not markedly different from those that explain subsequent take-overs, and that the scene is only played back again.

In the light of the historical observation noted above, we wish to address ourselves to the possibility of achieving a permanent military withdrawal from politics and of realising a stable civil-military relations in Nigeria. There are a few factors that appear to be capable of working in favour of such a prospect. One of such factors is the fact that presently, there appears to be a convergence of views among soldiers and civilians alike concerning the need for the attainment of a stable civil-military relations and the undesirability of future military intervention in politics in Nigeria. Recently, President Ibrahim Babangida publicly expressed the hope that an end would have come to the forceful overthrow of civilian governments in the country at the departure of the present military regime. His optimism is based on what he perceived as increased awareness in the country. As he put it:

I have expressed this before in this country. I did say that ours will be the last military regime in this country. We believe in democracy and we believe in true representation of the people, by the people. . . . People are getting more enlightened now and I think by the time the



Third Republic is put in place our political culture is going to be different from what it was in the past.<sup>5</sup>

The attempt to 'ensure' the fulfilment of this optimism underlies the systematically planned and gradual political transition programme which the present administration is undertaking. According to the President, the political programme is a gradually spaced transition in which a democratic government can proceed with political learning, institutional adjustment and reorientation of political culture. He opines that the Nigerian Military has resolved its crisis of mission, the characteristics of which consist of:

- \* Willingness to return to the barracks once our decision is accomplished.
- \* Absence of an independent political military organisation to stay in power.
- \* Setting up of a time-table for transition which involves a gradual learning process.
- \* Lack of willingness to impose any ideology on the people, and last but not the least,
- \* Concern with the development of professionalism in our armed forces.<sup>6</sup>

Apart from the desire of the military elites to undertake a lasting disengagement from politics as outlined above, at the level of the civil society the people clearly appear to have become psychologically resistant and negatively averse to future military intervention in politics. As Onoh puts it in a personal opinion write-up:

By precluding the discussion of the contradictions thrown up by the interplay of socio-political and economic forces in the system, under a *quasi* one party milieu, the army can only be bequeathing to the civilian faction of the power elite fundamental problems that will drown it. And this vicious cycle of ours would begin again. We must resolve to kill the authoritarian virus that so often carpets our efforts at building an enduring political culture along democratic ideals. In that case, we as a people should be ready to tell the army to get off our backs whenever a faction comes smashing its way to power.<sup>7</sup>

The people have started to discuss ways by which future military interventions may be resisted. Some of the means that have been suggested include mass protest, mass strike, the possession of arms by civilians and the formation of a "Citizens Army." T.O.S. Benson came up with the



"Citizens Army" option after having pointed out the impotence of good government and constitutional provision in barring future *coups*. He submits:

My own prescription to stem *coups* is the 'Citizens Army.' Let everyone be a soldier in his own right. The citizen is trained and armed for the defence of the nation both from internal and external aggression. The 'Citizens Army' is a counter-weight and counter-balance to the professional military establishment. Neither can bluff the other. Both become guardians of the organs of society.<sup>8</sup>

While it may be difficult to pre-determine the wisdom or possible efficacy of such methods to resistance, the fact that the idea of civilian resistance has started to surge up is significant in itself. It points to the aversion of the society to future military rule regardless of what the apparent justification of such intervention might be. One may therefore expect that the perception by the military of this negative societal response to military intervention, coupled with the professed desire and determination of the military to stay in the barracks pursuing their professional calling, should enhance the attainment of stable civil-military relations in a future Nigeria.

Many other factors however come into one's view which portend a gloomy future for a stable civil-military relation in Nigeria. One of such factors is the fact that the military mind appears to have been permanently disposed towards a sense of military (rather than civilian) supremacy in the Nigerian policy. Members of the military elites have at various points affirmed the superiority of the military over the civilian political elites in fostering political and economic development. Many of the officers that were interviewed in the process of the present study still believe that military political rules almost always tend to perform better than the civil politicians because of the assumed discipline, anti-decadence and precision of action which military professionalism produces. The issue of civilian control of the military has in fact become enigmatic in Nigeria. Many of our officer respondents have now attempted to reconcile military intervention in politics with the military constitutional role as defenders of the security and interests of the nation. Besides, the fact that the military men are not fully ready to accept the traditional concept of civilian supremacy is evidently manifest by the public statements of some key military officers. While speaking at the opening of 1988 Chief of Army Staff Annual Conference, President Ibrahim Babangida noted the hegemonic crisis which looms on the horizon of the relationship between the military and the civilians and added that they must work out a relationship that can lead to some



civil-military equilibrium. In a tone which epitomises a rejection of the traditional concept of civilian supremacy and control of the military, the President suggested that:

For the future, the hegemonic crisis which looms on the horizon of the relationship between the military and civilians should be tackled by the military itself. It is the military who can work out a relationship that can lead to some civil-military equilibrium and not the civilian political authority. I believe it is only the military that can successfully lead the Armed Forces back to the barracks.<sup>9</sup>

This apparent rejection of the classical concept of civilian supremacy puts a big question mark on the practicality of the President's optimism that the present military regime would be the last in the country. The probability that any faction of the military who similarly rejects the traditional concept of civilian control would seize political power in future with the least provocation or minimum justification is rather strong. By that time, the present cream of military leaders who are hoping that the present administration would be the last military regime would have retired from the service.

Even now, the nature of the transition programme smacks of an incomplete military withdrawal. In the context of the sociology of civil-military relations, the fact that the present military leaders are undertaking a conditional disengagement implies that they are only changing their status as guardian praetorians to that of moderator praetorians; they are still praetorians all the same. According to Nordlinger (1977), while guardian praetorians actually overthrow a civilian government and retain power in their own hands for a limited number of years, moderator praetorians exercise a veto power over a varied range of political decisions without however taking control of the government themselves. The civilians govern, but their power is checked by a military that does not accept anything near total civilian control. Moderator praetorians act as highly politicised and powerful pressure groups in relation to the civilian incumbents, sometimes backing up their demands with explicit threats. Once the moderator soldiers have made their demands known, it is up to the civilian incumbents to comply or at least to correctly calculate the minimal extent to which demands must be satisfied in order to retain political power. Evidently, it is this moderator status that the Nigerian Military will be assuming come the Third Republic, having laid down certain conditions which must be met in the Republic, such as the exclusion of certain categories of former political leaders from holding or vying for political posts in the coming regime. The threat which a moderator-type praetorian *corps* possess to stable civil-military rela-



tions comes to clear relief: while it is a negation of the ideal model of civil-military relations in itself, it is also noteworthy that moderator praetorians frequently transform themselves to guardian or ruler praetorians. This escalation pattern has been exemplified by Argentina, Brazil and Chile at different instances in the history of these nations.

Perhaps, the most significant focus in appraising the prospects of stable civil-military relations in Nigeria is the economic milieu. This is so in so far as the present socio-political crises are only a reflection of a much deeper economic crisis of underdevelopment, unproductivity and inequal economic relations. Many of our respondents, particularly among the military officers, are of the opinion that the only panacea for political instability is "good government;" so many questions however come to mind when one muses on such a suggestion. One may ask: What is 'good government?' What are the prior necessary conditions for the attainment of a 'good government?' Do military regimes last as long as they do because they are good? To what extent does the present transition programme promise the attainment of a 'good government.' These are questions, to which the proponents of 'good government' as a cure for future military intervention in politics have not properly addressed themselves.

In an earlier section of this paper, we have argued that, to explain the intervention of the military in politics in Nigeria, one must focus on the nature and history of the economic underdevelopment of the nation. This underdevelopment is reflected in the fact that the economic system lacks a productive base and the fact that the dominant class is unproductive, inept and is dependent on the control of the apparatuses of the state for its capital accumulation. Neither the military nor the civilian faction of the domestic bourgeoisie has been able to evolve an autochthonous and self-sustaining economic system which derives from technological transformation and innovation. Besides, the Nigerian politico-economic formation, both under the military and the civilians, have patently failed to evolve a definite ideology that will guide economic and political development, an ideology to which both the military and civilians alike will subscribe and be committed. The unequal and unjust relations of production and distribution has also encouraged a cut-throat inter-class and intra-class competition and contradictions, a situation that characterises all capitalist systems, although in varying degrees.

In our view it is these features of the economic underdevelopment of Nigeria (and indeed of most other Third World states) that explain the decadence and corruption of the civilian politicians, which often provides an apparent justification for military political intervention. It becomes clear, however, that the military elites are but a faction of this dominant class, that they intervene at will largely because of the



monopoly of the means of physical coercion and that they do not achieve any far-reaching or radical transformation in the politico-economic spheres before handing over to civilian politicians again. This maintenance of the structural *status quo* often ensures the certain collapse of whatever political power is handed over, which would then provide a seeming justification for their subsequent intervention. We thus submit that the prospect of attaining a stable civil-military relation in Nigeria is a function of the structure and conditions of the economic system and the associated mode and relations of productions; the possibility of achieving a stable civil-military relation is only epiphenomenal to that economic substratum.

## V

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this discussion, we have given a contextual clarification of the concept of civil-military relations and the various possible models of that relation. The significance of a stable civil-military relation has been advanced, as it affects political and economic development. In this respect, the tendency of military-political involvement to dysfunctionally affect the viability and combat-readiness of the military has been specifically treated. We have appraised the prospects of achieving stable civil-military relations in Nigeria. In this regard, while the apparent convergence of views of the present military rulers and members of the civil society concerning the undesirability of military intervention in the future politics of Nigeria appears to raise the hope of the attainment of civil-military relational stability, certain other factors that relate to the Nigerian Military psyche and the nature of the present political transition programme appears to threaten such a hope and raise the likelihood of future military intervention in politics. Most importantly, we have affirmed that the possibility of achieving political stability and civil-military equilibrium in Nigeria depends on the structure of the political economy and the mode and relations of production. In our view, the desired 'good government' will only be possible when authentic and self-sustaining economic development and technological transformation are evolved, coupled with an egalitarian and just production relations and distributive network, and a definite ideological position to which the military and civilians alike would subscribe and be committed. We opine that these are necessary conditions for the resolution of the present hegemonic crisis and crisis of underdevelopment and for the breaking of the prevailing vicious cycle of civil-military alternation in Nigeria.



## NOTES

- 1 We perceive that such sociological factors as cohesiveness, morale, patriotism and discipline among officers and men are significant determinants of combat-readiness and military effectiveness, and these are the variables that tend to be adversely affected by military political intervention. Although armaments and materials are important in determining military effectiveness, retired Brigadier Adekunle has rightly submitted that, "You can have all the materials you want. Its people who manipulate them. You can have few materials. The spirit is the man that fights the war. If materials could win a war, America should have defeated Vietnam. (*This Week*, 24 November 1986, p. 19. Interview with Rtd. Brigadier B. Adekunle)."
- 2 Quotation from President's Speech on the occasion of the launching of the Armed Forces Remembrance Day Celebration, January 1986. (*Source*: Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, Lagos).
- 3 *This Week*, 19 January 1987 ("Twenty-one Years After: Will the Military Ever Go?") Quotation from p. 15.
- 4 *ibid*.
- 5 Interview with the President on BBC Network African programme, 4 October, 1988 (Quoted from *The Punch*, 5 October 1988, front page).
- 6 Quoted from the President's 28th Independence Anniversary Speech, 1 October 1988.
- 7 Kasiem-Obi Onoh, "No More Soldier-Saviours, Please", *The Guardian*, 11 August 1988, p. 11.
- 8 T.O.S. Benson, "Bye-bye to *Caups*," *The Guardian*, 13 August 1988, p. 11.
- 9 Quoted from *The Guardian*, 26 January 1988, front page.

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## THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS

By CHRISTOPHER S. NWODO\*

### I

*In the majority of cases involving the protection of human rights, the general approach is to give human rights a legal status by incorporating them into some international charter or national constitution, thereby making them justiciable. This establishes two things simultaneously. It imposes certain obligations upon those wielding political power to protect and to promote human rights among their subjects; it also confers a legitimate claim upon those ruled to have their rights respected. There is more to a human rights claim however than the fact of its legal status. It is fundamentally a moral claim imposing a moral obligation. This additional consideration is not just a mere emphasis on the legal argument. It has a specific dimension of its own that most often involves a distinct category—the moral as opposed to the merely legal. The legal aspect as we have seen is established by the fact of these rights being incorporated into some international charter or national constitution. But legality does not always imply morality. For the legal to be at the same time moral, it has to satisfy some conditions that give it a moral status making it more binding a least in conscience.*

*The other, more fundamental, aspect of the human rights issue which gives both the legal and the moral their grounding is the human element. A legitimate claim to certain rights is based on the concept of the human being as a "person". Only persons have rights, right meaning a certain quality or property of relationship between persons, such that one **demand's** certain things and **insists** that he or she **must** have them as a matter of legitimacy. From this point of view one cannot strictly speaking, talk about the rights of animals, except in so far as these animals belong to persons. In the same way, moral claims and obligations make sense only in the context of persons. The fundamental assumptions of our human rights arguments therefore rest ultimately on the fact that human beings are persons who by virtue of their very nature have legal and moral claims that are intrinsic to them. A great deal of effort is being made to assign legal grounds to sanctions in case of their infringement. The necessity*

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for these sanctions derives from the fact that people can recognize the moral as well as the ontological basis for human rights and yet refuse to acknowledge, respect, protect or promote them. In this particular case, the sanction imposed by law takes effect. The ideal situation however should have been the recognition as well as the promotion of the legitimate claims of the human person not because of the fear of any sanctions, but because as a human person, he or she ought to be accorded those rights.

This paper will therefore try to investigate the philosophical basis for the concept of the human person upon which are founded human rights claims.

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

#### *Contribution of the Ancient Greeks*

THE ancient Greeks made two basic distinctions that started the long tradition in the Western world about the human being as a person. They distinguished between men and the gods on the one hand, and between men and beasts on the other.<sup>1</sup> The main characteristic they saw that distinguishes man from the gods is the latter's immortality. On the distinction between men and animals they saw the presence of rationality in man and its absence in the beast as the decisive factor. With the latter distinction the Greeks simultaneously separated man from the brute and also established the basis for the theory of natural law, the oneness of the human race and the equality of all men based on the concept of justice, the human possession of reason and language.

The very first reference in early Greek literature in this connection occurs in Hesiod's poem *Works and Days*. According to Hesiod, Zeus decreed that men are to live by justice while beasts by violence, "for to fish and beasts and winged birds he gave the rule (*nomos*) that they eat one another, since there is no justice among them; but to human beings he gave justice (*dike*)."<sup>2</sup> Here Hesiod links together the concept of law (*nomos*) with that of justice (*dike*) in relationship to the nature (*physis*) of man as distinct from that of animals whose own rule is violence. These seminal ideas of Hesiod were later picked up by Heraclitus who expanded and reformulated them. According to Heraclitus, law is made natural to man, is based on reason and fundamental to the unity of the human community. In other words, it is as natural to man to live in a society of other men under the rule of law as it is for him to be human. Furthermore, Heraclitus sees the uniqueness of human nature in man's possession of reason (*nous*) and speech (*logos*) that makes him capable of intelligible communication. In Fragment D 113<sup>3</sup> Heraclitus tells us that



thinking in general (*to phronein*), is common to all men: "Thinking is shared by all." He further qualifies it in Fragment D 116 to thinking well (*sophronein*), links it with self-knowledge (*ginoskein*), and maintains that both are characteristic of man: "It belongs to all men to know themselves and think well." He rounds it up in Fragment D 112 by saying that thinking well (*sophronein*) is the greatest excellence (*arete*) and wisdom (*sophia*). "Thinking well is the greatest excellence and wisdom, to act and speak what is true, perceiving things according to their nature." This is an interesting development since it constitutes a turning away from the old Greek (Homeric) concept of virtue (*arete*) in the sense of military valour (that later degenerated into the ruthless individualism of the Western world), and a turning towards the notion of *arete* in the sense of moral virtue that emphasises modesty, restraint and good sense or good judgment. Similarly, real wisdom has now become not so much a shrewd calculation based on logic and abstract rationality alone, but rather "to act and speak what is true (*aletheia Legein*), perceiving things according to their nature." It is also interesting to note how in Fragment D 116 Heraclitus maintains that wisdom is common to all men, that is, even if only very few actually become wise at least everybody has the potentiality to be wise.

In Fragment D 2 Heraclitus speaks of (*logos*) as another factor of the unity and shared characteristic of human nature. It reads: "Although the account (*logos*) is shared, most men live as though their thinking were a private possession."<sup>4</sup> This particular Fragment allows for various readings and interpretations because the key term *logos* has several meanings in Greek Literature generally and still more complex meanings in Heraclitus in particular. However, *logos* in Heraclitus is generally taken to mean first and foremost "discourse", as in other Greek authors like Hesiod and Hecataeus; secondly, it connotes the notion of a spiritual principle or soul; and finally the universe itself. According to Kahn, "the *logos* of Heraclitus is not merely his statement; it is the eternal structure of the world as it manifests itself in discourse."<sup>5</sup> It "is both his discourse and something more; something universal (all things occur in agreement with it), even eternal and divine (*eon aiei*), precisely in virtue of the fact that it is 'common' or 'shared' by all."<sup>6</sup> What we would like to emphasise here is the fact that *logos* understood as discourse in the sense of language is common to all men. Kahn sums it up this way: "By its rational structure and its public function in bringing men into community, language becomes a symbol for the unifying structure of the world which wisdom apprehends."<sup>7</sup>

There is another notion of *logos* besides language or discourse that equally emphasises the element of the oneness of human nature. This has to do with the notion of *logos* as universal law. Fragment D 114



rounds off this whole trend of thought and also points the direction that subsequent thinkers were to follow: "Speaking with understanding (*xyn nooi*) they must hold fast to what is shared (*toi xynoi*) by all, as a city holds to its law (*toi nomoi*) and even more firmly. For all human laws are nourished by a divine one. It prevails as it will and suffices for all and is more than enough."<sup>8</sup> It is reasonable here to link up "speaking with understanding" with the *logos* of the earlier Fragment (i.e., D 2). It makes sense to take the expressions: "what is shared by all," "all human laws," "suffices for all," as referring to common human characteristics. The reference to the law of "a city" followed by "all human laws" which "are nourished by a divine one" is crucially suggestive. Some later philosophers, particularly the 'Stoics' took this as a basis for their theory of divine or natural law.

The summary of Heraclitus' contribution to our line of argument runs as follows: Having established the fact of thinking well as common to all men in the sense of being intrinsic to their nature, he introduces the concept of *logos* which can be regarded as both an intrinsic principle (soul) and an extrinsic one (language) which serves in both capacities as another unifying factor; all pointing to the simple fact of the oneness and the shared characteristics of the human species. The connection that Heraclitus makes between law (*nomos*) and justice (*dike*), and their relationship to man is very significant. Equally significant is the fact that he makes law the principle of unity in a human society which is characterised by speaking (*logos*) with understanding (*noos/nous*). According to Kahn: "The unique status of human *nomos* and the political order is interpreted as a consequence of a common human possession of speech (*logos*) and understanding (*noos*), that is, as a consequence of the rational capacity to communicate one's thoughts and come to an agreement."<sup>9</sup> Thus both law and "the political order" are grounded upon the nature of man, which Aristotle later described as "rational" as well as "political." The point Aristotle was making is twofold. First, he was pointing to the fact that man is the type of animal whose habitat is the state or *polis*, such that we can say it is the nature of man "to live, in a *polis* (state)." Man is "political" in that sense. Secondly, for man to be an inhabitant of a state, he has to be equipped by nature with the necessary instrument namely, "the power of speech" which is "different from voice" or more sound because it is the "capacity for rational communication." Even before Aristotle, Plato following Heraclitus linked law (*nomos*) with reason (*nous*). He makes the point that both our private households and public societies alike should be ordered "in obedience to the immortal element within us, giving the name of law to the appointment of understanding."<sup>10</sup> Further down he speaks of law as bearing "a name so cognate with that of understanding"; part of its function being to



make "a better man of its student." Much later, St. Thomas articulated fully the essence of law, defining it as "an ordinance of reason, for the common good, made by him who has care of community, and had it promulgated."<sup>11</sup> St. Thomas divides his treatment of the essence of law into four articles dealing respectively with: "Whether law is something pertaining to reason?" "Whether law is always directed to the common good?" "Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?" "Whether promulgation is essential to a law?" It is the synthesis of these four articles that he put forward as the definition of law. It follows from all this that the binding force of law is based on the justice of it, its reasonableness and for the good (unity) of the community. The first considerations of any law must be whether it is just (fair), reasonable, and for the common good. The intrinsic relationship between the essence of law and human nature runs from Hesiod, Heraclitus, through Plato and Aristotle to Aquinas.

### *Aristotle's Analysis of the Nature of the Human Person*

After Heraclitus, Aristotle was perhaps the next Greek philosopher to delve into the structure of the fundamental principles that constitute the nature of the human person. He first divides nature into categories of substance and accidents. Substance, he says, is what makes a thing what it is and can exist by itself. Property or accident on the other hand is a mere attribute of substance and cannot exist by itself. He divides it into nine categories including quantity and quality. It is interesting to note that colour (quality) which constitutes such an important divide in the Western world, particularly in the United States and South Africa, belongs to the category of mere accident in Aristotle. After this basic distinction between substance and accident, Aristotle makes a further distinction between material and non-material substances, and in the material substance between the material element (pure matter) and the non-material (form). The type of non-material, non perishable substance that makes up the human being he calls soul, which is of an intellectual nature. In *De Anima* he defines soul as "the first actuality of a natural body potentially having life; that is organic."<sup>12</sup> The soul, according to Aristotle, then animates the human body and the composite is called a "person". The notion of person was later given a classical definition by Boethius: "Person is an individual substance of rational nature." What is important about this notion of substance as person is that, according to Aristotle, and subsequent tradition, a person is the highest being in nature whose essence is unique and incommunicable. Aristotle uses the concept of primary substance to refer to the existing concrete individual, and secondary substance to indicate human nature in general.



From a purely philosophical point of view, that is, with regard to a deep ontological analysis of the human person, Aristotle made perhaps the greatest contribution to our discussion so far with his analysis of the concept of person. Unfortunately, he failed to apply his notion of person to the treatment of every member of the Greek society, and went as far as to justify the institution of slavery. We must therefore distinguish between the negative and the positive contributions of Aristotle. At certain moments he speaks with "the most penetrating" insight into "universal principles." At others, he speaks like "a prosperous Greek citizen" of his time whose philosophy of life was "most narrow-minded and complacent, dominated and limited by the prejudices of his class, civilization and period."<sup>13</sup> Armstrong quotes Brehier's unkind but fairly accurate description of Aristotle's ethics as: "the morality of a middle-class lady in comfortable circumstances who is determined to make the best use of her social advantages."<sup>14</sup> Part of Aristotle's "social advantages" were two assumptions. He thought that as far as abilities were concerned, men are superior to women. Secondly, he assumed that the Greeks were superior to non-Greeks.

### *The Teaching of the 'Stoics'*

Just as Heraclitus reformulated and expanded Hesoid, the 'Stoics' reformulated and expanded the thought of Heraclitus. It is generally believed that 'Stoicism' which lasted from about 300 B.C. to about 300 A.D., in addition to the influence of Heraclitus, developed in response to certain social phenomena arising from the conquest of Alexander the Great. The rise of Macedonia meant the fall of Greece and the collapse of both the theory and the practice of the city state government. The individual became a citizen of a wider world, uprooted from the security of life in the city state and thrown into the insecurity and the anonymity of the Macedonian Empire. Two simultaneous efforts were needed to give the individual a sense of security and of belonging. As an individual he had his own personal problems, his own private and unique life to live. As a member of a group, he needed "the consciousness of man as a human being, a member of the race, possessing a human nature more or less identical everywhere."<sup>15</sup> Alexander the Great is believed to be the first political leader to set in motion this new idea of "human brotherhood," when, at a banquet at Opis, Alexander prayed for "a union of hearts (*homonoia*) and a joint commonwealth of Macedonians and Persians."<sup>16</sup> It does not matter very much whether it was the philosophers who first built up these ideas and ideals to be later incorporated by political leaders, or whether it was Alexander in his shrewd political calculations who started the whole idea of the oneness of the human



race in order to maintain peace and harmony in his vast empire, which was later picked up by the 'Stoic' philosophers. What is more important is the teaching of the 'Stoics'.

Centrally, *Stoicism* believed not only in the oneness of human nature but in the oneness of nature in general. There is however a special relationship between human nature and nature in general, the latter often being identified with God. Both man and God are rational, while animals live by instinct. All men are the children of God and brothers to one another. There is no distinction of status, sex or race. All men are "by nature equal." From the fact that all men are equal it follows that: "They ought all to have at least that minimum of rights without which human dignity is impossible, and justice requires that the law should recognize such rights and protect men in the enjoyment of them."<sup>17</sup> The 'Stoics' also adopted the connection made by Heraclitus between reason and law, and between human law and divine law which "nourishes" it. And so, to the notion of reason, law and oneness of the human species, is added the notion of God as being more or less the same thing as nature, from which the identification of natural law from divine law developed. From this arose also the conviction that nature (or God) is intrinsically good, moral, just and reasonable. Additionally, *Stoicism* held that man's rationality, capacity for speech and moral awareness equip him for life in a society that is truly human. This complex structure of relationship is summarized by Sabine in this manner: "Right reason is the law of nature, the standard everywhere of what is just and right, unchangeable in its principles, binding on all men whether ruler or subjects, the law of God."<sup>18</sup> As was stated earlier, it was this "law of God" that became Nature Law for later generations; and which remained in effect till the seventeenth century. And even then, it was still taken for granted by everybody. In other words, Natural Law was generally seen as "a fundamental law or law of nature, lying behind the civil law of every nation and binding, because of its intrinsic justice, upon all peoples and upon subjects and rulers alike."<sup>19</sup> Grotius was later to give it a definition that reflected the prevailing opinion: "The Law of Nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God."<sup>20</sup> Sabine emphasizes the point that Grotius was more interested in the logical necessity rather than the religious nature of this law.

This *Stoicism* in its early stages provided the required philosophy for a broadly based administration like the Roman Empire and the intellectual and moral binding force for such heterogeneous peoples. *Stoicism* did all this by adaptations and modifications. However, certain doctrines



remained constant throughout its development. Insistence on the equality of all men despite the differences of race, culture, wealth as well as wisdom, stayed basically unchanged. The relation between reason, justice and law was maintained and emphasized in such a way that reason is not just a mere guiding principle but a "law for all men just as justice is a law for all states and governments." Without justice a state loses moral claim even if it remains effective. Jacques Denis sums up the basic tenets of the later *Stoicism* thus:

The unity of the human race, the equality of man and therefore justice in the state, the equal worth of men and women, respect for the rights of wives and children, benevolence, love, purity in the family, tolerance and charity toward our fellows, humanity in all cases, even in the terrible necessity of punishing criminals with death—these are the fundamental ideas which fill the books of the later 'Stoics'.<sup>21</sup>

On the political side the union of hearts that Alexander prayed for at Opis was later translated into the "world-wide Roman citizenship, achieved by the Edict of Caracalla in 212 A.D.; and the abolition of class-distinctions."<sup>22</sup> It is important to note how much the 'Stoics' differed from Aristotle and how under their influence the political philosophy of the Macedonians, and later the Romans, differed from that of the Greeks. Equally important, as we shall soon see, is the influence of *Stoicism* on Christianity.

#### *The Emergence of Christianity: The Concept of All Men Being Equal*

The emergence of Christianity within the context of the Roman Empire that was already familiar with the notion of all men being the sons of God before whom all men are equal, did enhance in some significant ways what was already there. The core of the Christian message can be divided into the teachings of Christ himself and those of St. Paul. The teachings of Christ can be reduced to one—the Commandment of Love: love of God and love of our neighbour. And our neighbour means literally every human being who has now become precious in the eyes of God because redeemed by the death of Christ and therefore worthy of our love and respect. The subsequent development of Christianity revolved around the teachings of St. Paul. St. Paul himself, besides the inspiration of the Christian Spirit, was greatly influenced by the spirit of his age and culture. As a representative of a Church that is Catholic in the sense of Universal, as well as an example of an educated product of a Hellenistic civilization, St. Paul rejected the distinction of Jew and Gentile, Greek and barbarian. He equally took note of the individual



who was also a part of a larger group, the Church. And so he wrote in the First Letter to the Corinthians: "Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit, and there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh in all . . . . For as the body is one and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body, so also is Christ."<sup>23</sup> Sabine remarks pertinently that here St. Paul was "adapting to the purpose of Christianity what was by that time a commonplace."<sup>24</sup> The difference was that the Church is seen as a Sacrament, an instrument of salvation. And central to the whole Christian doctrine of salvation is the notion of the human soul that is both spiritual and immortal.

With time these key doctrines of Christianity evolved into a complex system especially in the Middle Ages. Combining the total experience of European cultural past, the Middle Ages built up a complex synthesis of philosophy and theology that has dominated every aspect of European life for a very long time. Through the revival and subsequent spread to monasteries throughout Europe, the Middle Ages, by combining feudalism with Christianity, forged a new social philosophy for Europe. It was a philosophy, or perhaps more accurately a sentiment, a "*feudal sentiment par excellence*, which is still so deeply embedded in our modern conscience, is *the sentiment of the value and dignity of the individual man*."<sup>25</sup> On account of the widespread presence as well as great influence of the medieval monasteries "this feudal sentiment became Christian in character, because Christianity placed upon each soul purchased by Christ's sacrifice an inestimable worth, and it furnished the poor and the rich and the great and the small with the same standard of value."<sup>26</sup> In addition to the feudal sentiment Medieval Christianity perfected the notion of the human soul by synthesizing what was available on the subject from the ancient Greeks as well as Oriental philosophers into a theory of the human person. The original definition of Boethius still remained in force—"individual substance of rational nature"—with the emphasis placed on the uniqueness of the individual and upon his rationality. Just as Heraclitus argued that man is rational and God is rational, Medieval Christianity placed man and God in the category of persons. This is the highest category that any philosophical system has ever raised the essence and value of the human person.

## II

### PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES

There was therefore in the Western world, a long tradition both philosophical and theological about the oneness of human nature, the dignity and equality of all men before God and before the law. This



ought to have made the emergence of slave trade and colonialism, with all the efforts to rationalise and justify their commencement and continued existence, if not morally improbable, at least "a serious human aberration.". It ought to have indeed, but it did not. Because side by side with the development of Christianity and civilization, there were also certain tendencies among Europeans that would appear unaffected by both Christianity and civilization. Involved here is much more than the usual appeal to human frailty. There is a fundamental difference between weakness and wickedness. Add the contact between the European and the non-European, despite the European's claim to a Christian civilization, has most frequently on the part of the European, been characterized by a show of perfidy and wickedness. The horrors of slave trade and colonialism are too well known to need recounting here. A close look at other aspects of the European past makes one suspect certain inbuilt tendencies which neither the highest level of philosophy, nor the most profound theology, nor even "Christian charity" has been able to temper or transform completely. Maurice de Wulf describes the efforts made by medieval monks to introduce "Christian ideals into the minds of feudal barons" in order to temper "all that was brutal in the ways of those developing Gallo-Franks and Anglo-Celts, whose blood was eager for war and for combat and for cruelty."<sup>27</sup> One wonders to what extent that eagerness "for cruelty" was ever completely "tempered" then or even now after several centuries of Christian civilization. A few pages of any objective account of the Crusades would be enough to show just how really deeply Christian Medieval Europe was. While a look at the situation in South Africa would be enough indication of the contemporary European/American interpretation of Christianity, of democracy, and of civilization in general. Incidentally, the situation in South Africa is sustained, it is claimed, in order to preserve the twin heritage of the white man namely, democracy and Christian civilization.

Any unbiased account of the Crusades gives a fairly good insight into the Medieval European's understanding and translation of the Christian message. At that time in Europe, at the beginning of the eleventh century, the dominant influence was Christianity, particularly the monastic life. After two centuries of concerted effort, the eleventh century began to see the flowering of the Christian impact on the European society. Of special significance is the spread of the Benedictine monasteries under the leadership of their mother-house at Cluny. Cluny "became a mother-house whose daughters spread rapidly abroad throughout all France and England and Germany and Northern Spain and Hungary and Poland."<sup>28</sup> The spread was so rapid that by "the beginning of the twelfth century, two thousand Benedictine houses were dependent on the Cluny system."<sup>29</sup> The question is, to what extent did the Medieval



European allow the real meaning of Christianity to influence all his actions? It is interesting to note that the same monks of St. Benedict and particularly the same products of the mother-house at Cluny were at the forefront of the Crusades. Maurice de Wulf is emphatic about the involvement of Cluny. "The First Crusade was in fact a strictly Cluniac enterprise, and Pope Urban II, who proclaimed it at the famous Council of Clermont, had been himself a monk of Cluny."<sup>30</sup> It is however in the actual prosecution of the Crusades that we get a glimpse of the paradox of the European mind. Stephen Raushenbush in his account reveals some very interesting details about the difference between the Christian crusaders and their Moslem counterparts in the treatment of their respective captives. The attempt to capture the city of Jerusalem by the Westerners gave rise to "a bloody occasion in which a great number of civilian inhabitants were killed after the fighting was over."<sup>31</sup> The killing of civilians did not bother the European crusaders, on the contrary, they "thanked their God after killing the civilians for His help in allowing them to do this good deed."<sup>32</sup> And of course, as was expected, there was jubilation all over Christian Europe at the news of the capture of the holy city of Jerusalem. "The event of the capture was great news to the Western world. Bells pealed in triumph all over Europe. It had been proved, as a thousand pulpits proclaimed, that God's Christian Church knew and expressed God's will."<sup>33</sup>

From touches of irony here and there Raushenbush's account moves over to very sensitive and fundamental issues regarding certain European tendencies which Maurice de Wulf described earlier. "The day was, however, also important in a reverse sense to the people of those two religions whose members were slaughtered so abundantly after the capture. The Moslems had experienced a few atrocities by some of their own leaders, but not as a matter of course or of principle, and only after a prolonged siege."<sup>34</sup> There are two disturbing facts here: the fact that civilians, men and women, who were not armed "were slaughtered so abundantly" after the city was already captured, that means in cold blood and unnecessarily. Secondly, and more disturbingly, the European Christian slaughtered civilians, "as a matter of course or of principle." We also learn from the same account that the practice among the Moslems was "usually" to give a captured Jew or Christian three choices: conversion to Islam, death or taxation. "They preferred to have them make the third choice." The Moslems "had developed a practice of allowing even captured warriors to ransom themselves or be sold into slavery . . . . They did not expect the indiscriminate slaughter of men and women by the Christians, were horrified, and remembered it years later when a *jihad*, a holy war of sorts, was preached before Saladin recaptured the city in 1187."<sup>35</sup> On the side of the Christian West the



## THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS

account is quite different. The slaughter was "indiscriminate." "The crusaders and priests did not draw any distinction between Jews and Moslems. They slaughtered them alike, as infidels."<sup>36</sup> A little further, we come across another disturbing European characteristic: the tendency to treat with intolerance those he considers different. "The explosive problem of coexisting with men of different beliefs, raised by the massacre of civilians at Jerusalem, has never been solved to everyone's complete satisfaction. The difficulties of sharing a life on earth with men of opposite values are considerable, even in modern days."<sup>37</sup> One would have said particularly "in modern days." The point is well made. The European or rather the white man in general, always creates excuses for his unaccommodating disposition towards anybody he considers different from himself. It is either that the other person has "different beliefs," or has "opposite values," or has a different skin colour or is a communist/socialist or simply not democratic/capitalistic enough. Finally, Professor Raushenbush describes what would seem to be a deliberately nurtured and sustained attitude of "antagonism" towards those considered "infidels." "In Western Europe in medieval years, the minds of the crusaders had been filled to the brim with antagonism for infidels who thwarted God's will and deserved extermination as a consequence."<sup>38</sup> It is questionable whether the issue of infidels thwarting God's will was the only excuse or even the major one for their *deserving* extermination. There was always that tendency which Maurice de Wulf earlier referred to as the eagerness "for cruelty." In addition, there was also the desire for economic gain and territorial expansion. After all, we know what really happened as soon as the same Europeans settled down to occupy the conquered Syrian territories. "But after they arrived in Syria and took up landholdings . . . certain virtues were found in the Arabic way of life, its chivalry and grace. Their physicians were so superior to those of the Franks . . . The settled Franks moved into Moorish homes, wore flowing silk robes, decorated their women in Oriental fashions, joined noble Arabs on hunting expeditions."<sup>39</sup> It is quite obvious that the European has not always in his actions, been motivated exclusively by the highest ideals and standards. In fact, for the most part, and especially in relationship to the non-European, he has constantly shown a mixture of grace and abomination; together with a capacity for ruthlessness in trying to achieve or sustain some advantage, usually inordinate and material.

## SOUTH AFRICA: CULMINATION OF WHITE MAN'S CRUELTY

The situation in South Africa is a culmination of the white man's eagerness "for cruelty." From whatever angle anybody would like to



look at South Africa, the profile is the same: an expression of human capacity for evil, a crude manifestation of wickedness. It is not a case of limited resources, of not having enough of literally anything, to go round. It is the case of the white man's innate "problem of coexisting with men of different" skin colour, of his unwillingness to share "a life on earth with men of opposite values," even when the white man's values are actually dis-values, and when that earth belongs to the other person, be he an African, a Latin American, an American Indian or an Australian native. The facts are there. There is no need to deny them, ignore them or sugar them over with paliative. There were always reasons, never the real reasons of course, to start something really abominable against the African. And there is always, as ever will be, an explanation why nothing can be done to redress a bad situation. The African has never been treated as a "brother" or even as a "neighbour."

In the light of the above analysis, one can understand why, despite a long tradition of philosophy and Christian civilization neither slavery nor colonialism nor even the horrible situation in South Africa, can be regarded as "a serious human abberation." Any serious discussion about human rights in Africa must be prepared among other things to take all this into consideration, unless of course it simply wants to be nice to the point of not wanting to face certain unpleasant facts. Additionally, it is important to note the circumstances under which the Western world decided to take definite steps towards the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was not because of the existing situation in South Africa, bad as it was then and is even worse now; neither was it on account of the horrors of salvery and the sufferings of the colonized peoples of Africa. No, it was primarily because of the Jewish holocaust. It was the experience of Nazi Germany that forced the Western world to take a close and hard look at the relationship between the moral and the legal as regards the nature of man, (the white man that is) who is supposed to be the subject of freedom, justice and equality. This is how the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into being.

More recently we started to talk of the three generations of human rights. There is no doubt that the three generations of human rights address themselves to different claims, but it is also true that at the centre of each of them is the concept of the human person and what it takes to make him realise himself as an individual and as a member of a group. There ought to be really no conflict between these two aspects which are as old as Aristotle who way back recognised the two elements in man: as an individual (substance in a primary sense) and man in general (substance in a secondary sense). What we really suspect here is some surprised disappointment or rather unarticulated irritation at the level of lack of initiative and laziness so rampant in the Third World



countries, Africa in particular. It is this sort of feeling of disappointment and irritation that informs some of the current objections to the last of the three generations of human rights. This show of disappointment and even of irritation is to some extent justified. What is not so easily justifiable is the associated racial overtones that go with it, and the intellectual arrogance sometimes blatant, sometimes subdued. Racial considerations rather than the legitimacy of any group of claimed rights would seem to be at the root of most human rights violations in Africa. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it must be pointed out that there is more to human rights violations in Africa than what happens in South Africa. We are aware of various forms of abominations and atrocities<sup>40</sup> among Africans themselves; as well as the double standards exhibited by African leaders especially at the United Nations. However, human rights violations in Africa among Africans would seem essentially<sup>41</sup> different from what obtains in South Africa.

The wisdom of the advocates of human rights in trying to incorporate these claims into some form of legal structure would seem to arise from the suspicion that although the situation may be clear to everybody, some might decide to ignore the obvious. In such a situation the force of law, if not the demands of morality, have to prevail. Unfortunately it is the same category of human beings who refuse to be influenced by moral and philosophical arguments that are able to flaunt the relevant laws and international opinion. There are two main reasons why neither morality nor the law is effective and why there is such a blatant double standard in the implementation of sanctions against human rights violations. One is racial. Many white people, no matter their disclaimer, are not convinced that all men are really equal. The other is economic. Many more are not prepared to give up their economic gains or advantages in the name of human rights, especially the rights of certain groups of people, the Africans in particular. The fact that a certain group of people cannot defend their rights does not by itself negate the philosophical basis for these rights. And that is why the distinction is made between the legal and the moral.

The moral is more than the merely legal. Although both imply the thought, there are times when the legal ought demands only an external conformity with an ordinance without any reference to the realm of the human conscience, and without reference to the intrinsic nature of things. A typical example is the traffic violation, like driving through the red light. Under such circumstances a person who breaks the law and escapes detection goes away free. In some cases like murder however, the legal and the moral are coextensive. If one drives through the red light and in the process kills a person, the fact that he or she can escape detection does not relieve him or her of all obligations such



that he could continue driving without even stopping. If what he killed were a dog he could continue driving not because the human person is bigger in size than a dog nor merely because there is a civil law against murder, but because a person is something special regardless of his or her size or skin colour. The murderer has destroyed something intrinsically valuable, the value of which is independent of any human legislation. It is in the light of the above distinction that we would like to see some of the violations of human rights as much more than the infringement of the laws of any country or of even the United Nations. The issue of sanctions therefore, would seem to compromise this fundamental distinction by creating the impression that once a country escapes the detection of international agencies it thereby escapes all forms of obligation.

### CONCLUSIONS

Part of the thesis of this paper has been that for the most part, some aspects of human rights violations, at least in Africa, constitute a form of racism. However, racism is nothing but a combination of racial superiority complex and sheer arrogance, together with economic interest or advantage, that any group or groups of people at any given time and place can afford to lay claim to, and sustain over others. There is really nothing intrinsically genetic or ontological about the whole issue. When the ancient Greeks could afford it, they called everybody else a barbarian. When the Romans conquered the Greeks they could not call the Greeks barbarians, but they could subjugate them and the rest of the then known world. So they claimed they were superior to everybody. In the same way the Jews of the Old Testament called everybody else a gentile. The British who were making all the fuss about their racial superiority especially during the heyday of their empire, and who led the rest of the world both in colonial expansion and slave trade, could not have forgotten the French dominion over them under William the Conqueror. The Europeans who bluffed everybody not too long ago, are now more or less mere spectators of the power games being played out between the United States and the Soviet Union, the latter being formerly regarded as inferior by the Europeans less than a century ago. As it is now, everybody is taking Japan very seriously to the point of regarding it as a major economic threat. Of course nobody dares talk publicly about the Japanese being racially inferior to anybody. Not any more. And if tomorrow China establishes itself in the two realms of economic and military power, all the experts will start singing the glories of Chinese accomplishments. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, genetic or racial about great achievements.



Of course nobody takes the Africans seriously. Nor does anybody seriously believe that the Africans will ever achieve greatness. But there are some very insidious aspects to the whole trick. Some people are furiously trying to "prove" the backwardness of Africa in terms of geography, intrinsic biological structures including such accidental properties as the colour of their skin (something Aristotle way back in ancient Greece established as a mere accident or property or a substance). Others much more perceptive have known from history and from past experiences, the importance of a combination of certain factors: competent leadership, management/organisation ability, personal integrity and commitment to progress; a virile and industrious population; internal cohesion; natural resources and the availability of capital investment. They also realise that wherever these factors (or most of them) are found to be present, it is difficult if not impossible, not to have progress and great achievement. It is in the light of the above that one should understand the various forms of sabotage organised by some people against certain Third World countries, the various attempts to destabilise certain governments; to set up puppet heads of state, to encourage ethnic rivalries and other forms of internal disagreement; the setting up of false and costly economic programmes, the giving of "expert" economic advice; the various "loan traps" and the subsequent structural adjustment programmes foisted on some countries; and above all, the deliberate plan to starve some parts of the world of the flow of meaningful and substantial capital investment. The principle is simple: if they cannot completely stop the progress of a group of people, they will slow them down and that will give them still more time to sustain a little longer, their theory of racial superiority before more of these people realize the truth. That will also allow them to continue to ignore these people's legitimate claims while luxuriating in the patronizing arrogance of insincere liberalism, talking about the protection and promotion of human rights, which, as far as they are concerned, are neither human nor rights.

Since according to the above analysis the problem of human rights violations especially in Africa revolves around race and economics, it might be good to offer a "modest proposal". With regard to race, there is not much one can do to change the colour of his or her skin. Besides, there is really no need. The race factor becomes important only in connection with other things. If the Africans were for the most part self-sufficient enough to feed themselves, and perhaps strike back when hit, other nations would take them seriously. And if they would go one step further, and become a world power economically and militarily, nobody will notice how black they are. So it boils down to how to



generate enough wealth to make most, if not all, self sufficient and comfortable.

There are two possible ways of looking at the problem. At the national/continental level we have talked about a combination of certain factors: competent and committed leadership, hard-working disciplined and virile population, internal cohesion, natural resources, and capital investment. This concerns those in key national positions. Since not everybody can become the national president at the same time, there will be need for effective organisation of the local level. A great deal can be accomplished at the local/village level without necessarily falling back on the Federal/Central Government. If these two factors are combined and the emphasis is not only on equitable distribution of available (sometimes only imagined, non-existent) wealth, but also on the generation of maximum wealth at all levels, there ought to be enough to go round. If the Africans are fairly comfortable, and they can definitely be if only they work hard at it, they may not have to shout as loudly as they now do, and yet people have to take them seriously as well as respect their rights. Now nobody takes them seriously mainly because they do not take themselves seriously enough. Their leaders are so very easily seduced. They do not respect the rights of their own people nor are they making the best use of locally available resources both human and material. There is a sense in which the African forms part of his problem. He must also form part of the solution. All these problems and their solutions are fundamentally human and should be treated as such.

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- 2 Quoted by Kahn, *Ibid*, p. 15. Here the *nomos* (rule or Law) among the beasts, the law of the jungle, is that natural tendency in them to devour one another.
- 3 Professor Kahn's arrangement of the Fragments differs from that of H. Diels. Since the latter is more generally known, we are here keeping to Diels' arrangement. The three Fragments under discussion here, D 112, D 113 and D 116 are found in Kahn, n. 1, pp. 41-43.
- 4 Charles H. Kahn, n. 1, pp. 29. Here Kahn lists the various meanings of *logos*: "saying, discourse, statement, report; account, explanation, reason, principle; esteem, reputation; collection, enumeration, ratio, proportion."
- 5 Charles H. Kahn, n. 1, p. 94.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 97.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 131.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 117. Rene Descartes was later to echo this claim of Heraclitus that "speaking with understanding . . . is shared by all" and also "suffices for all."



In Part One of his *Discourse of Method* Descartes writes: "Good sense is mankind's most equitably divided endowment, for everyone thinks that he is so abundantly provided with it that even the most insatiable appetites and those most difficult to please in other ways do not usually want more than they have of this. As it is not likely that everyone is mistaken, this evidence shows that the ability to judge correctly, and to distinguish the true from the false—which is really what is meant by good sense or reason—is the same by nature in all men; and that differences of opinion are not due to differences in intelligence, but merely to the fact that we use different approaches and consider different things." *Discourse on Method and Meditations* translated by Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis, 1960), pp. 3-4.

- 9 Charles H. Kahn, n. 1, p. 15.
- 10 Laws IV, 714A and Laws XII, 957 in *The Collected Dialogue of Plato Including the Letters*, Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, 1973), pp. 1305 and 1502).
- 11 The original Latin definition reads: "*qua edamrationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata.*" *Summa Theologica*, I-II: Q. 90 A. 4. Here St. Thomas appears to base the legitimacy of the law-giver on the duty to care for the community. The English translation is to be found in *The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Edited by Dino Bigongiari (New York and London, 1969), p. 91.
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- 32 Stephen Raushenbush, Ibid.
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- 37 Ibid., p. 74.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Laurie Wiseberg and Warren Weinstein pointed out that: "Several cases have involved alleged violations in Black Africa: the reign of terror in Uganda, genocide and racial discrimination in Burundi, mass killings in Equatorial Guinea and forced marriages in Tanzania." Nevertheless, at the United Nations, "African States have refrained from open debate on these cases." See "A Note From the Editors" in *Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion*, Vol. VI, No. 4, Winter 1976, p. 2.
- 41 Eddison Zyobgo has argued that the sort of human rights violations obtaining in South Africa is of a different nature from what we have in other Black African countries. See his article "The Abuse of Executive Prerogative: A Purposive Difference Between Detention in Black Africa and Detention in White Racist Africa." In *Issue* Vol. VI, No. 4, Winter 1976, pp. 38-43.



## NOTES AND VIEWS

### SMALL STATES AND THE REGIME OF THE ARCHIPELAGO

*This article examines the attitudes of "small states"\* in the formulation of principles which govern the conduct and behaviour of archipelagic states. In other words, it attempts to clarify the rules guiding the definition of the archipelagos in terms of their expected norms of behaviour regarding their national sovereignty, national interest, national defenses and security, given the uniqueness of their geopolitical realities. For the purposes of this research, "small states" constitute a constellation of Island States in the developing world, namely Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines that have contributed significantly to the establishment of the regime of the archipelago.*

*The research draws extensively from international experiences, contexts and precedents established by the decision of the International Court of Justice whose case serves as a frame of reference on which to test the legitimacy and application of international law principles on the problems and concepts of the archipelago.*

*The study concludes that indigenous requirements and practical needs established on the basis of historic rights determine the attitude of the archipelagos on their territorial claims.*

*Finally, the investigation found that on basic uncompromising issues and matters of national sovereignty and survival, customary practices take precedent over rules of International Law.*

#### INTRODUCTION

THE "archipelagic concept is new"<sup>1</sup> as a global issue. Indonesia and the Philippines sought to institute a new legal regime of the sea in which nations within a group of islands could be encircled by an imaginary line drawn around the outermost islands of the group. These archipelagic waters fall under the jurisdiction of the Island States, including passage through and over them, although the concept of

\*The term, "small states" was popularized by G.P. Sharp in his essay—"Small State Foreign Policy and International Regimes: The Case of Ireland and the European Monetary System and the Common Fisheries Policy," published in *Millennium*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1987.



archipelago falls short of general acceptance in the Conference on the Law of the Sea of 1958.

Many states have been reluctant to accept it because of the spillover effect, induced by other states who inappropriately apply the archipelagic principles without restraint. In such a situation, two basic options are left. They are either to acquiesce in the gradual erosion of the freedom of the high seas, or to be embroiled in interstate confrontation. It should be stated that it was not because of concerns regarding transit through the archipelagos in areas where its regime is applicable. Hence, "the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea offered a new and unique opportunity to resolve the issue."<sup>2</sup>

In relation to the unilateral action of archipelagic states in drawing baselines around them, and in proclaiming the waters so encompassed as internal, most of the opposition has come from the states whose lifeline depends extensively on navigation.<sup>3</sup>

Such states have inclusive claims based on their security needs which demand that large areas of ocean and airspace be open to shipping, overflight, unhampered transportation and communication.

The conflicting interests at stake are clearcut. An Island State has legitimate right to express concern over its overall security and economic interests. Unless adequate precautionary measures are taken, Island States may become vulnerable because of the protracted extent of surrounding coastlines and the extensive stretch of surrounding waters, whose access to land from many points pose some security problems.<sup>4</sup>

Two contending interests exist in the negotiations on the archipelago. They are those of the archipelagic states and those of the maritime states, articulated and presented by the United Kingdom on their behalf. The archipelagic proposal tolerates "innocent passage" of ships, provided it occurs through a designated sealane. The archipelagic states, under certain conditions, suspend innocent passage for security reasons, and come up with a substitute sealane.

In contrast, the British proposal relied heavily on final decisions in the hands of an international organization. Hence, the dichotomy of interest indicates that "the interests involved are those of the archipelagic states whose claims are exclusive in nature, and those of the maritime states and the international community which seek to make their claims look inclusive."<sup>5</sup>

The right of "innocent passage" is governed by Articles 14 and 23 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of 1958. It extends to government, private and military vessels. Included in the right are stopping and anchoring of warships, as far as such practices are incidental to ordinary navigation or are required for reasons of



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"*force majeure*" or distress. Passage is termed innocent, if it is not prejudicial to the peace, and security of a coastal state. The principles of "innocent passage" apply also to submarines. They are required to navigate on the surface and display their flags.

A number of rights are bestowed on the coastal states, in respect to "innocent passage". They include the provisions that while they will not deter innocent passage, they may temporarily suspend passage in specific areas, if there is justifiable reason to believe that such actions are essential for the protection of their security, and that the order of suspension be duly published *a priori*.

Relative to the warships, they are required to comply with the coastal states' regulations as they pertain to passage through their territorial seas. Otherwise, the warships may be required to leave the territorial seas of the coastal states.

On the contrary, it is not clearly defined as to whether the coastal state may exercise similar rights under the same condition or if the coastal states prevent the passage of nonmilitary vessels if they violate the laws and regulations of the coastal states. No right of overflight above the territorial sea for foreign aircraft was granted.

In the light of right of passage described in the proposal of the archipelagic states, inferences are drawn to establish how such provisions differ from the rights established in the Territorial Sea Convention of 1958 which equally addressed the issue of innocent passage.

The "right of passage through the archipelagic waters is more limited than the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea at least in the following respects."<sup>6</sup>

- 1 There is no prescription for the right of ships to stop and anchor where such incidents occur in the process of normal passage or are justified by reason of *force majeure* or distress.
- 2 The right of the coastal states to designate sealanes and institute traffic separation schemes implies that foreign vessels enjoy less freedom than in the passage through the territorial seas regime.
- 3 In the event that a trespassing warship fails to obey the laws and regulations on passage, the coastal state exercises right to suspend such vessel from using the territorial waters, or request it to leave the archipelago or even to prohibit the passage of such warship through its archipelagic sea for any length of time.
- 4 In the draft of the archipelagic states, no mention is made of fishing vessels. Thus, the rights of the archipelagic states in this respect are presumed to at least equate those of the coastal states in the territorial sea, since there is a general indication that ships



passing through this area must observe the laws and regulations of the archipelagic states in exercising the rights of innocent passage.

- 5 Similarly, in terms of the rights of the coastal states in the territorial sea, under the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, the rights of the archipelagic states are never stipulated in instances where passage of foreign vessels cease to be innocent, except in the case of warships.

According to Edward Miles, the bone of contention between the position of the archipelagos and those of the maritime powers of which the United States and the Soviet Union are members, hinged on two important concepts, namely "transit passage" and "unimpeded passage."<sup>7</sup> It has been observed that the archipelagic states have battled the Super Power positions over their strong insistence on the maintenance of impeded passage as their negotiating position.

The Island States contend that the possibility for a compromise could be reached when the maritime powers compromised to discuss the issue of transit passage in place of unimpeded passage, because the former concept would grant them an element of control over activities in their surrounding waters.<sup>8</sup>

The fundamental achievement of the archipelagic regime is that it has helped to emphasize the need to protect the unity of a nation composed exclusively of many islands to the extent that the international community can find reasonable ways to connect each island in a single national limit without risking serious erosions of high sea areas or transit rights.<sup>9</sup>

### THE ARCHIPELAGIC ISSUES

In the exercise to delimit the maritime domain, and the consequent realization of the extent of national jurisdiction, legal, political, geographical and geophysical factors, are subjected to critical evaluation.

This thesis is supported by the definition of an archipelago as a "cluster of formation of two or more islands which are regarded as a geographic entity."<sup>10</sup> The mere proposal that a group of islands may be treated as a unit with a single territorial sea, encompassing the entity, if the waters of the group are really enclosed, attests that there is some geographical criterion to which the law may refer.

With each archipelagic island considered as a separate part of land territory, with its own territorial sea, a problem of passage arises whenever the territorial seas of two islands overlap.<sup>11</sup>



In a detailed account published by the Institute of International Law and International Relations, two geographic considerations complicate the delimitation process where islands are involved. One involves an island or a group of islands off the coast of one state which is subject to its sovereign jurisdiction, while situated in close proximity to a nearby state. In a situation of this nature, an island, causes gross deflections in boundaries, if it depends extensively on its location and relationship to the coast.<sup>12</sup>

Another geographical situation in which islands severely complicate the delimitation process occurs where the island of one state lies immediately offshore of the land territory of another. In such a case, the maritime zones generated by the offshore islands affect the security and resource interests of the coastal state, and vice versa.<sup>13</sup>

#### PROPOSALS ON THE ARCHIPELAGO

The "purpose in referring to the unity of a group of islands is to find in their mutual attraction, a criterion for enclosing more waters within the group, than would be enclosed by the normal method of drawing the territorial sea."<sup>14</sup> Hence, the emergence of a more comprehensive definition of the "Archipelago" which is acceptable to the Convention.

The "archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such."<sup>15</sup>

One of the early suggestions that groups of islands be assimilated for the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea was made by Alejandro Alvarez. He was, until the 33rd Meeting of the International Law Association at Stockholm in 1924, the Chairman of the Committee on Neutrality. In this capacity, he oversaw a report and draft convention which recommended that the breadth of the territorial sea should be three nautical miles, and that in the case of islands situated outside the territorial limits of a state, a zone of territorial waters should be measured around each island.<sup>16</sup>

When the conference convened at the Hague, Netherlands, in March 1930, the United States proposed the deletion of the archipelagic concept, suggesting that "each island be enveloped by its own belt of territorial waters, measuring three nautical miles outwards from the coast."<sup>17</sup> The Hague Conference revealed that no agreement was possible without putting into consideration previous agreements on the extent of territorial waters. There is no doubt that a territorial sea of more than three miles shall enclose more Island Groups than one of



three miles, and as such affect more avenues of transit and wider fishing interests.<sup>18</sup>

The United States' position was further clarified in a press release to the occasion which read:

If you lump islands into an archipelago and utilize a straight baseline system connecting the outermost points of such islands and then draw a twelve-mile area around the entire archipelago, you unilaterally attempt to convert into territorial waters or possible even internal waters vast areas of the high seas formerly freely used for centuries by the ships of all countries.<sup>19</sup>

The Geneva Conference of 1958 did not take up the matter of archipelagos, despite the fact that initiations were made to that effect. Invoking Draft Article 5, the Government of the Philippines proposed the adoption of a new paragraph which would apply the strait baseline method to the archipelagos whose component parts were close to one another, to form a compact whole and which had been considered historically a single unit. The baselines would be drawn along the coast of the outermost islands following the general configuration of the archipelago. The waters within the baselines would become internal waters.<sup>20</sup>

At the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1960, both the Philippines and Indonesian delegates spoke with respect to their special position as archipelagos. It should be observed that they are among the nations who invoked the "archipelago theory" in order "to claim all water baselines joining the outer promontories of the outer islands of their groups as internal waters, and measured their territorial seas outward from those baselines."<sup>21</sup>

Indonesia "proposed a twelve-mile limit for its territorial sea, whereas the Philippines put forth a varying limit, ranging from three miles at some points to more than twelvemiles at others."<sup>22</sup>

The potential danger is that if the archipelagic theory was embraced by other states, the proclaimed internal waters status of the seas enclosed within the perimeters in question would abolish rights of free passage, the right of submarines to enter and travel submerged, and all rights of foreign aircraft to fly over the waters involved, unless special and adequate treaty rights were granted to the citizens and craft of concerned nations.<sup>23</sup>

The Philippines position was articulated by the leader of its delegation, Senator Tolentino. It was a reflection of its national policy agenda. He delivered his address to the Geneva Conference in 1960, crystallizing the general thought among the archipelagic states, that the



positions they had taken on their territorial waters showed that contemporary International Law does not impose absolute restrictions on the extent of coastal waters, but that special situations need special treatment.<sup>24</sup>

In his speech, Senator Tolentino gave a tripartite justification for accepting the sovereignty of the coastal state over the territorial sea as:

- 1 To provide security which allows a state to exercise control over approaches to its shore.
- 2 To promote commercial, fiscal and political interests which necessitate a close supervision of ships entering or leaving its coastal seas.
- 3 To ensure the exclusive enjoyment of the products of the sea near to the shores, which is essential for the existence and welfare of the coastal population.<sup>25</sup>

The Philippines' position implied that questions of the delimitation of the territorial sea should not be resolved on the basis of the application of abstract legal principles, but by reference to concrete political and economic considerations.

The philosophy alluded to above underlies the statement by the Philippines representative, that:

The territorial sea is not a mere juristic concept; it is vitally linked with the economic and political security of the coastal state. The question of the breadth of the territorial sea, is therefore, as to each coastal state, inseparably connected with the question of self-preservation or survival.<sup>26</sup>

The fact that it has been generally believed by the archipelagos that no established rule of International Law on the breadth of the territorial sea, could deprive a state of its traditional or customary claims, prompted them to conclude that:

It is unthinkable and impossible for us to lend our support to any proposal which may be interpreted, even remotely as impairing any of our historic rights, and which may be used as an excuse by foreign vessels and fishermen to penetrate with impunity into the very heart of our archipelago.<sup>27</sup>

The 1958 and 1960 Conferences on the Law of the Sea left the question of archipelagos undecided. Even the Conference on the Law



of the Sea of 1958 did not accept the archipelagic concept. Many states became reluctant to accept it because of concerns regarding passage through archipelagos in areas where the regime is appropriate. Also, they feared that the principles would be misused by other states.<sup>28</sup>

The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea offered a new and unique opportunity to resolve the issue. It raised hope that a global treaty would provide the only practical opportunity to confer a universal recognition to the status of certain states as archipelagic.

In the context of a 200-mile economic zone, the waters within the islands of archipelagic countries would be engulfed, if insular and continental territories enforced their desired territorial claims.<sup>29</sup>

One of the proposals was tabled at the United Nations Seabed Committee dealing with the question of a special regime for archipelagos. The proposal was made on 6 August 1973 by four archipelagic states, namely Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines. They reflected in general, the position of most archipelagic states.

The statement of principles contained in the proposal are as follows:

- 1 An archipelagic state, whose component islands and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, and historically has or may have been regarded as such, may draw straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands from which the extent of the territorial sea of the archipelagic state is or may be determined.
- 2 The waters within the baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, the seabed and the subsoil thereof, and the superjacent air space, as well as all their resources, belong to, and are subject to the sovereignty of the archipelagic state.
- 3 Innocent passage of foreign vessels through the waters of the archipelagic state shall be allowed in accordance with its national legislation, having regard to the existing rules of International Law. Such passage shall be through sealanes as may be designated for that purpose by the archipelagic state.<sup>30</sup>

The salient features of this statement of principles are reduced to the following terms:

- 1 Identification of an archipelago for the purpose of the regime is based collectively on geographical, economic, political and historical factors.
- 2 The waters, seabed, subsoil of the sea within the outer perimeter



and the air space above such waters are within the sovereignty of the archipelagic state and are part of the territory of such state.

- 3 Right of innocent passage is granted to foreign vessels through the waters within the perimeter, subject to national legislation which should conform to International Law, and the right of the archipelagic state at all times to designate sea lanes for such passage.
- 4 Foreign states seem not to have the same right of innocent passage and right of navigation for their vessels through international straits and territorial waters within the outer perimeter.<sup>31</sup>

The proposal, drafted by the archipelagic states elaborated on the statements of principles. It went further than the statement of principles, to address new areas of concern which account for its difference from earlier statements in various respects:<sup>32</sup>

- 1 It makes the historical factor predominant among other factors in the definition of an archipelago.
- 2 It lays down as a requirement that baselines should not depart to any appreciable extent from the general shape of the archipelago.
- 3 It specifically limits the drawing of baselines in such a way as not to cut off the territorial sea of another state, by granting priority to the determination of the territorial sea of other coastal states, where the special regime for an archipelago is applicable.
- 4 It provides that due publicity be given to charts indicating the straight baselines after they are determined.
- 5 It grants the right to archipelagic states to designate sealanes for the passage of foreign vessels through the archipelagic waters within the straight baseline by way of—
  - a Substituting sealanes for previously designated sealanes preceding due publicity.
  - b Instituting traffic separation schemes for passage through the designated sealanes.
  - c Imposing the laws and regulations pertaining to passage through designated sealanes and traffic separation schemes according to the provisions of International Law.
  - d Addressing the issue of the right of innocent passage to be exercised by warships by authorizing archipelagos not to suspend the right of innocent passage, through designated sealanes, unless when essential to their security, and after the requirements for 'due publicity' and 'substitution of other sealanes' have been met.<sup>32</sup>



Jointly, the statement of principles and the proposals have dual functions. In the first instance, they facilitate the drawing of straight baselines between islands for the purpose of determining the territorial sea. Furthermore, they make possible a regime for the waters within these baselines. It is the regime that distinguishes the waters within the baselines from those of internal waters; territorial waters and economic zone.

An examination of the archipelagic proposal reveals the overlapping characteristic of the archipelagic regime. In the first place, its preservation of the principles of innocent passage, while the archipelagic state maintains full sovereignty over the resources of the surrounding waters, seabed and subsoil makes it resemble more as the regime of territorial waters and less as that of any inland waters.

In contrast, the provision which allows the archipelagic states to exercise extensive control and limitation of passage by foreign vessels makes the regime look less of the territorial sea.

#### THE LEGAL PRECEDENT

The position taken by the International Court of Justice in certain international legal issues has helped to shape International Law. In the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,<sup>33</sup> the Court considered the question of straight baselines for the purpose of measuring the territorial sea off an archipelagic coast.

The case raised a number of issues which prompted the International Court to state some general principles on the Law of the Territorial sea. These principles have direct application in many respects to the problem of archipelagos. As extracted from the case, the following principles are manifested:

- 1 Considering economic interests peculiar to a region, and the reality and importance of which have been clearly evidenced by long usage, a state must be allowed the latitude necessary in order to be able to adapt its delimitation to practical needs and local requirements.
- 2 There would be an established close relationship between the sea and the mainland for the delimitation of the territorial sea in reference to drawing straight baselines.
- 3 The straight baseline method between islands of an archipelago would be acceptable when the general direction of the coast is followed.
- 4 The Court rejected any general rule of law limiting the length of straight baselines to a specific distance, but cautioned that



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'reasonableness' could be used as a criterion to control such lengths.

- 5 The waters enclosed by straight baselines in the case of coastal archipelagos should be regarded as internal waters.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, it is established that the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case laid down the basic principle, that a state should have the right to delimit its fisheries zone in accordance with its geographical, historical and economic circumstances, in lieu of generally accepted principles or rules of International Law. In this instance, customary practices take precedent over rules of International Law.

## CONCLUSIONS

The establishment of the archipelagic regime is intended to protect the unity of nation states composed exclusively of many islands while at the same time preserving rights of innocent passage and freedom of navigation. The articulation, proposal and adoption of the archipelagic principles were made possible by the concerted efforts of a group of small Island States namely the Philippines, Mauritius, Fiji and Indonesia. Given their special positions as archipelagos, their delegates argued their positions at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1960. Hence, they were responsible for invoking the theories of the archipelago.

The Philippines position, as articulated by its representative Senator Tolentino, in the Law of the Sea talks and in an address to the Geneva Conference crystallized the general thought among the archipelagic states that the Island States, by virtue of their unique circumstances needed special treatment on the basis of their political, economic and security concerns. They argued that customary and traditional claims and practices of the archipelagic states, as reflected in their historic rights should take precedence over established rules of International Law.

A modified and updated proposal reflecting the general position of the Island States was made on 6 August 1973 by Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and Philippines. It was presented to the United Nations Seabed Committee dealing with the issue of special regime for the archipelagos. It reiterated and reinforced basic tenets of earlier proposals that the identification of an archipelago should be based primarily on geographic, economic, political and historic factors.

The position stated above was supported by the decisions of the International Court of Justice on the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case which served as a litmus test to the problems of the archipelagos. The Court, which in 1951 considered the issue of straight baselines for the purpose of measuring the territorial sea off an archipelagic coast ruled



that indigenous requirements and practical needs, as evidenced or determined by long usage and customary and traditional criteria should determine the territorial claims of an archipelagic state.

It also maintained that no rigid and general rule of law should obtain in this circumstance, but that reason and moderation should be allowed to prevail as basic criteria. Hence, the Court elevated customary practices over International Law in matters peculiar to the sovereignty and national survival of the archipelagos.

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- 30 C. F. A nerasinghe, "The Problem of Archipelagoes in the International Law of the Sea," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 23, July 1974, pp. 547-48.
- 31 Ibid., pp. 548-49.
- 32 Ibid., pp. 551-52.
- 33 *International Court Justice Reports*, 1951, p. 116.
- 34 Ibid., pp. 116-33.

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\*Dr. Kamalu is an expert on Sea Law and has written extensively on issues of maritime boundaries and related areas.



## BOOK REVIEWS

### THE NON-ALIGNED AND THE UNITED NATIONS

#### A Review Article

THE present study on the non-aligned and the United Nations\* is yet another addition to the growing volume of literature on the world body in recent years. The international body after forty years of its existence is yet unable to get adherence to the provisions of the Charter in all its aspects. The diverse members of this fledgling organisation quite often pay lip service since they have no intention to strengthen the United Nations, but on the contrary they would like to use the world body as an instrument of their domestic and international policies. The fidelity of the member states to the organisation differs in intensity depending upon the purposes and objectives which they wish the United Nations to serve. There are member states who are part and parcel of major military alliances and pacts and who justify their defence arrangements by asserting that they are in consonance with the provisions of the Charter. On the other hand, the smaller nations see the United Nations as an insurance against global war. Different nations see different purposes in the world organisation. This appears to be a very important stage in the development of an international institution like the United Nations.

The compilation is divided into twenty-one chapters which are written by Indian and foreign scholars. These articles vary in range and depth of treatment, analysis and scholarship. The quality of the contributions are uneven in nature, since some are scholarly while the others are descriptive in nature and substance. Some look into the multi-dimensional aspects of the relationship between the non-aligned nations and the United Nations while other scholars are concerned with particular aspects of the interaction process between the Third World countries and the world body. As a framework for the various articles by scholars, the editors of the volume could have included a thorough and meaningful introduction. This introduction could have properly focused the discussion on different issues by the contributors to the volume.

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\*M.S. Rajan, V.S. Mani and C.S.R. Murthy (Eds.): *The Non-Aligned And The United Nations*, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1987.



The policy of non-alignment and the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) at the theoretical level are in harmony with the principles and purposes of the Charter. Though one could argue that in the last two decades or more the non-aligned group of nations have identified their survival as sovereign entities with the continuance and well-being of the United Nations. Obviously NAM has developed a sort of vested interest in the survival and success of the United Nations. The small and weak nations in the Non-aligned Movement regard the United Nations as a forum and an instrumentality of support and strength in times of crises and difficulties. The world organisation acts as a shock absorber when conflicts or disputes develop between different nations of the world. The small nations usually suffer from a fear or persecution complex. It is therefore necessary for the international organisation to provide the necessary protection to weaker nations of the world in respect of their social, political, economic and other problems.

#### UN's CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

The contribution of the United Nations towards the progressive development of International Law or to the judicial settlement of disputes between nation states has been disappointing and is a matter of grave concern given the uncertain and unstable condition in world politics. The International Court of Justice has generally been functioning in a conservative manner and is not susceptible to institutional and procedural innovations. Further, there is a preponderance of Western trained legal luminaries which fact is a great handicap for the new states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Even from the point of view of style and substance the Court has to show considerable adaptation and improvement. Added to this, the International Law Commission has declined in status and prestige over the years. Much was expected from this body to do the basic preparatory work leading to a progressive codification of International Law. As a body composed of specialists it can have a decisive role in precise formulation and systematisation of rules. But in reality this has not happened and the ILC has lost its credibility as the principal agent for the progressive development of International Law. Samuel Kin in his article writes about the decline of the ILC but he does not realise that this has happened because the ILC is only a recommendatory body and member states of UN as sovereign entities reserve the right to accept or reject such recommendations.

It is not surprising that the Third World countries have resorted to diversionary tactics to enhance the efficiency and efficacy of the law-developing process. These countries have increasingly resorted to



normative resolutions to develop a broad consensus on a wide range of international issues. Through such a process the Third World countries have demonstrated their capacity to regulate the resolution-making process with a view to legitimise their claims and interests. The 'old' International Law manifested itself in customary International Law but it has now yielded place to 'new' International Law which is mostly political-juridical in origin.

The United Nations has played a significant role in regard to the development and evolution of the Law of Sea Convention. It provides a useful platform to initiate the negotiating process, sets the pace for decision-making and most importantly works out the modalities for consensus-building. The UN also provides the basic organisational framework through its specialised agencies as models to settle complex issues like deep sea bed activities. The concept of common heritage in so far as its applicability to the deep sea bed is concerned and the idea of a New International Economic Order have provided great impetus to the Law of Sea Convention. V.S. Mani has made a good discussion of all aspects of the Law of the Sea and the role of the developing countries in its evolution.

#### EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NAM AND UN

The non-aligned group of nations which have formed themselves into a bloc is affecting the pattern of behaviour of the major powers. Apart from their influence on matters pertaining to economic, social and cultural affairs, even in primarily economic matters and in cases of conflict, the major powers of the world can no longer ignore this 'new force' in world affairs. However, the non-aligned group of nations is made up of loosely organised member nations who on many occasions have not been able to take a common stand on issues, thereby creating a genuine problem for the Movement by diminishing its impact on the United Nations. In spite of the failure to evolve a consensus in crises management the fact is that the United Nations has been the source of peace-keeping bodies and this has taken place during the period of a growing non-aligned presence in that organisation. The non-aligned nations feel somewhat secure in the use of the world organisation with its global representation to preserve and defend the establishment of a stable and peaceful world order. The two articles by Leo Mates and Allan James look into various dimensions of the evolving relationship between the non-aligned nations and the UN in respect of the maintenance of international peace. However, these scholars overlook the fact that the non-aligned nations are successful in the UN only when the



vital national interests of the Super Powers are not involved in issues before the world organisation.

### *Use of the UN for Protection of Human Rights*

The non-aligned nations have also used the UN to promote the protection of human rights. They have frequently championed the cause of the right to self-determination through deliberations, declarations and international law-making processes of the world organisation. In this respect the United Nations' activities are a barometer of the international situation, its multi-dimensional pulls and pressures within the framework of both struggle and peaceful competition between socio-economic systems. Multi-polarity through the United Nations is a potent source for defusing bipolar and global concerns on human rights. It is important for non-aligned nations to realise that super power cooperation for protection of human rights is essential otherwise the UN would lose its limited usefulness in this area. Professor Yogesh K. Tyagi's article on promotion and observance of human rights in non-aligned countries seeks to come to grips with many aspects of this problem, though it is difficult to understand how it is possible to meaningfully secure human rights when the world is divided between the haves and have nots, the privileged and the under-privileged and the rich and the plebian.

The articles by V.F. Petrovsky, Davidson Nicol, N.G. Nicholas and K.P. Saxena deal with the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United Nations, the USA and the UN and India as a non-aligned nation and UN. The non-aligned group can strengthen the United Nations provided they are prepared to do certain constructive things. In the first place, the Non-aligned Movement must ensure strict adherence to the principles of the Charter and International Law governing relations between nation states. In the second place, the non-aligned nations must take prompt and effective action to curb or put down those regional powers who follow an expansionist policy. The Non-Aligned Movement must also defend the rule of law and condemn in no uncertain terms any violation of fundamental human rights anywhere in the world. In the fourth place, the non-aligned nations must work out the mechanism to regulate conflicts and disputes among themselves through negotiation, mediation, good offices, judicial settlement, etc. Finally the members of the group must fully support all the progressive actions of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security.



### *NAM's Use of UN as a Forum for Conducting International Relations*

The non-aligned nations have attached great importance to the United Nations as a major instrument and forum to conduct international relations at the international level. This seems to be the main argument of Professor Rajan. He argues that the effort has always been for effective and meaningful cooperation and coordination between uncommitted nations and the international organisation. The policy of non-alignment is in consonance with the principles and objectives of the UN Charter, since the UN as a collective organisation seeks to achieve impartially, the purposes and objectives of the sovereign nation state system. Today the non-aligned nations constitute over two-thirds of the membership of the UN and consequently they have a tremendous potential to influence and shape the policies of the UN. Hitherto the powerful nations of the West dominated the deliberations of the world body, but now the situation has undergone a radical transformation with the developing nations playing an activist role in world politics thereby compensating for their lack of military or economic power. The non-aligned countries and the UN have a vital stake in cooperating with each other.

The non-aligned nations have brought a measure of stability to the United Nations. They have widened the area of peace or built bridges between the two power blocs. Generally they take a middle position and are motivated to find solutions to problems of an intractable nature. Without the non-aligned nations the UN would have become a permanent forum for confrontation between nations of differing ideological orientations. But on the other hand, the non-aligned nations have consistently objected to the ideological war. The non-aligned bloc is a *conditio sine qua non* for the effective functioning of the UN. In fact these nations have been responsible for many innovations in the UN system. For instance, they have encouraged the idea of 'preventive diplomacy' through the UN involving a shift in emphasis from collective security to maintenance of peace by removing the underlying causes of conflict and tensions in the world.

### *NAM Leads UN on Decolonisation Issues*

On the issue of decolonisation the non-aligned nations have taken the lead through the UN to remove the last vestiges of colonialism. These countries have fully backed UN efforts to provide speedy economic assistance for fostering economic development in the new nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America since 'poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere'. To a large extent the decolonisation process was fast and smooth thanks to the immense pressure generated



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by the newly independent states in the United Nations. The non-aligned nations are deeply interested in bringing about a stable world order but they have given priority for the promotion of self-determination and economic development. The vote of this group of nations is important in the sense that they have hastened the globalisation of inter-state relations. Today the United Nations has become a major forum for resolving conflicts of interests and ideologies of various nations. It is also a primary centre for harmonising the actions of nations.

*NAM's Moral Pressures Through Moral Majority*

The Western nations on the other hand have alleged that the non-aligned states are misusing or over-using their numerical or mechanical majority to distort the normal process through the UN platform for non-legitimate purposes. The so-called 'tyranny of the majority' of the non-aligned nations is the natural result of a large number of new states joining the U.N. There was a time in the early fifties when the Western nations used the UN as an extension of their foreign policies since they could command a majority in the world organisation. The position is now reversed and the Third World countries are adopting the same tactics as the Western nations did some years ago. In defence of the non-aligned group it may be stated that they are determined to make the UN reflect the hopes, aspirations and interests of the overwhelming majority of member states with their differing ideological, geographical and economic configurations. The strength of the non-aligned group is in terms of larger numbers and votes. It is essentially directed as a moral pressure through a 'moral majority' because the non-aligned majority does not have much economic or military strength to pressurise the unwilling majority which has preponderance of economic and military strength at its command.

One fact that is very obvious is that the concern of the world organisation has expanded considerably in recent years to include such areas as economic, social and cultural cooperation. This is due to the new states. These new states have played a very vigorous role in initiating and backing proposals for peace-keeping operations, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, regulating the use of outer space, developing norms for exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed, etc., which were hitherto regarded as in the realm of domestic jurisdiction of states. For the new states the United Nations is a very useful forum for the purpose of 'interest articulation' and 'interest aggregation' against those who have stakes in the maintenance of the *status quo*.



## APPRAISAL

However, independent observers of the United Nations scene believe that the overwhelming majority of the non-aligned in the world body must not be used for partisan or particularistic purposes or country to the basic purposes and objectives of the Charter. When a group of nations have a dominant majority the tendency to ride rough-shod the minority viewpoint is always a recurring possibility. It is true that on certain occasions the new states have acted impulsively and motivated to score debating points or gain propaganda mileage with their brute voting strength. Such instances have to be avoided at all costs since it could put into jeopardy the viability of the United Nations. The repercussions of such hasty decisions have been felt on the United Nations. For instance, the USA has refused to contribute its share for the maintenance of the UN. It is common knowledge that the United States provides a major chunk of the funding for the upkeep of the UN. Obviously, the new states must be careful to see that they do not rock the boat too much otherwise their efforts to seek justice may become counterproductive. The non-aligned nations have to workout a clear-cut formula so that they are able to balance their short-term interests with their long-term interests in which the UN mechanism has a distinct role. All this requires proper coordination in terms of programmes, projects and objects in fields of mutual concern. The articles by Peter Hansen and John Mathiason lay stress on this aspect of the problem in an incisive manner. There are two other articles by Robert S. Jordan and Thomas M. Frank which deal with the powers and influence of the UN Secretary General. It must be stated that the effectiveness of the Secretary General depends upon his personality, dynamism, dedication and over-all leadership qualities. Some Secretary Generals have been activists who visualise a potent and positive role for the Secretary General while others have given a rigid or conservative interpretation to the provisions of the Charter. The Secretary General of the United Nations is not a mere administrative head nor only a coordinator of the activities of different organs of the UN, but on the other hand he can play a very crucial role in harmonising the conflicts between member nations.

The discussion presented here does not present the whole picture of what goes on before the United Nations and the non-aligned group of nations. It is essentially a synoptic analysis of the role of the non-aligned group of nations in the United Nations. The relationship of the Third World countries with the United Nations has to be understood in terms of how their activities have fulfilled the objectives of the Charter and their national interests. There is no point in questioning the ongoing relationship between the UN and the non-aligned nations of the world.



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It is a political reality of the contemporary world scene. It is a truism to assert that the United Nations and the non-aligned nation states have become an integral part of modern world politics. In this two-way relationship, the UN and the non-aligned nations may not have been able to achieve their purposes because of the pressure of power politics. The United Nations as an association of sovereign independent states is unable to enforce its decisions and it has oftentimes not been able to protect the weak from the determined degradation of the stronger nations. However, the United Nations has provided a forum and a mechanism for mobilising and maximising the positive forces in the world for a just solution to many contentious problems. It is in this context that the UN must be given a due place in the foreign policy strategy of the non-aligned group of nations. The non-aligned nations must make a worthy and effective contribution in international affairs and they must be prepared to use the diplomatic instrument which the UN provides for the building up of a more just and stable world order.

V.T. PATIL\*

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## GENERAL

J.S. BAINS and R.B. JAIN (*Eds*): Contemporary Political Theory. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, xv, pp., 185.

THE book under review is a collection of eight essays written by different authors on different themes in contemporary political theory. Since the essays included in this book have no common theme except "a common concern for the well being of man," the present review has no other option but to discuss them separately one by one.

In the first contribution—"Theory of the Welfare State"—Prof. M.M. Sankhdher discusses in detail the origin and development of the concept of a welfare state distinguishing it from the *laissez-faire* state and examines the relations between liberty and welfare. Sankhdher rightly points out that the concept of welfare state was conceived within the liberal framework, had no fixed ideological principles but was strongly based on imperialism. The problem of poverty could not be solved by private charity or philanthropy. The poor law was far from adequate and the problem was too complex for a private enterprise. The public exchequer alone was in a position to bear the welfarist burdens. Electoral calculations too mattered. The State now assumed a positive role as a tool of society—a servant to carry out social burdens too heavy for society to bear. Unfortunately there are some repetitions in this otherwise good survey.

In the next essay—"Ethical Absolutism and Multi-disciplinary Political Science"—Prof. V.P. Verma underlines the importance of value in Political Science. Citing the great classic he tries to prove his thesis that political science has to be teleological. It is a science of ends. The political scientist has not only to analyse—to study empirical political behaviour (*jiva*) but also to set and endorse ends. It has to be guided by moral values (*atma*).

Verma warns us against emulating the Americans, for in America there is a deep commitment to the values of liberal democracy, to be ruffled by the advocacy of a value-free approach by positivists and behaviourists. But in developing countries where the tradition of institutionalised democracy is weak and where the battle between dictatorship and democracy is still on, a plea for a value-free social science may confuse the goals from being deeply committed to democracy. He also observes significantly that political philosophy cannot be divorced from historical consciousness for "no nation can afford to ignore the values enshrined in the treasure house of history."

In the third contribution—"Obligation, Justice and Ideology: A Critique of Some Contemporary Approaches"—Subrata Kumar Mitra



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discusses the classical problem of political obligation in the light of the complexities of the modern state. The immediate provocation was John Rawls's book *A Theory of Justice* (1971) which added a new dimension to this problem.

Mitra starts with the assertion that there is a close correspondence between moral and political obligation. In fact political obligation forms a subset of the whole range of moralization. In the light of the famous essay by Hannah Pitkin, he identifies two views on obligation—consent and virtue. With this he supplements two others—project and community. He synthesises these to state a general condition of obligation: identifying a person's duty to himself and his project as the original source of obligation. Further, he demonstrates the centrality of justice to any theory of obligation and that of a particular concept of justice for a particular community. Mitra concludes that justice is based upon a particular concept of the good and in operational terms fits neatly into a particular ideological order.

The next essay is Partha Chatterjee's on "Thinking About Ideology: In Search of an Analytical Framework." According to Chatterjee, the characterisation of belief system as ideologies is only possible with the development of the theoretical sciences, i.e. in the era of capitalism—as distinct from philosophical or theoretical controversies of earlier times. A scientific analysis of society enables us to impute an ideology to a particular social group though the actual belief or outlook of specific members of this group at any given time, may well be at variance with this imputed ideology. Naturally, the inadequacy of available scientific knowledge means the continued prevalence of non-scientific beliefs of some sort. If ever man were to possess complete and true knowledge, science would become irrelevant and history come to an end. This essay starts abruptly and ends without conclusion. The presentation is not always easy to follow.

In the next essay—"Religion, Nationalism and Conflict"—Prof. Ainslie T. Embree examines the interaction between religion and nationalism. He points out at the outset that religion and nationalism which reinforced each other in the conflict of the seventeenth century were replaced later by nationalism alone. Yet one of the inescapable facts of the 20th century is the reemergence of religion in the conflict that characterises contemporary national and international affairs. He, however, hastens to add that to explain these conflicts solely by religion is to distort complexities. Religion may not even be the primary causal factor, but religion must be taken seriously in analysing any conflict situation. The interaction is seen in three areas all of which also involve leaders, ideologies in transition, utopian thinking and religion. He



points out that in all the three what is significant is a belief that the leader posses truth and hence is unwilling to compromise. He concludes with a comparision between the social origin of Christianity with the case of religions in the east.

In the sixth contribution—"Existentialism in Contemporary Political Theory"—J.C. Johari discusses in detail the origins, meaning and nature of existentialism, the philosophy that arose as a serious revolt against the tendency of rational absolutism. Emphasis on subjectivity and primacy of individual constitutes the essential features of existentialism. The author discusses this philosophy with the special reference to the contributions of Jean Paul Sartre, one of its best exponent, nay, its very personification. Sartre appears both as a critic of the present socialist system and as an advocate of a new order in which human freedom and human social relations go together. The author is right in concluding that even as reason is not the sole determinant of human behaviour, neither is experience. As a matter of fact both reason and experience have their part in the manifestation of human behaviour. The existentalists are, therefore, accused of often going too far in their exclusive emphasis on existence.

The next piece—"The Concept of Political Development"—by Prof. V.R. Mehta highlights certain difficulties in this concept. He questions the basic assumption that the developing countries must follow western models of development in order to achieve the preferred goals of a stable polity. Mehta underlines the fact that political development is an integral part of an overall development and cannot be separated from the intricate web of relationship between its historical process, social institutions and value preference. The historical, social and economic background against which development is taking place in most of the third world countries is vastly different from what existed a century or two ago in the west. He suggests that for development for the Third World the need is for alternative models—strategies of development based on deeper understanding of a particularity and specificity of their historical situations.

In the last contribution—"The Quest for a Theory of Public Administration"—Prof. R.B. Jain discusses the dilemma inherent in the development of a theory of public administration. He says that though the significance and scope of the subject is expanding very fast and even much beyond the formerly accepted boundaries of the subject, yet a concerted theoretical foundation has so far continued to elude the scholars of the subject. This is for a variety of reasons and he discusses some of them here. He suggests that Public Administration should and must find a new paradigm that encourages both a focus and locus for the



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field. Jain concludes that "a theory of Public Administration may not easily emerge but cannot remain a distinct impossibility for all times to come." This reviewer would not mind agreeing with such a distinct possibility in some remote future time. It is better to travel hopefully!

As pointed in the beginning there is no common theme for this book. However, it must be pointed out that many of the authors—Prof. Mehta, Prof. Verma particularly examine and analyse their theme in keeping with the view and the problems and situations in developing countries and have not fallen a prey to western views. A welcome change in the writings of Indian political scientists. Verma profusely quotes *Mahabharat* (long before Shri B.R. Chopra came on the scene or screen). On the whole it is a useful book as it discusses some of the important themes in contemporary political theory.

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P.G. SALVI: *The Emerging Developing Countries*. Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, x, 195pp., Rs. 80.

THE book extensively deals with the multifaceted problems being faced by the developing and underdeveloped countries in the course of their economic development and suggests ways and means through which these shortcomings be removed for the attainment of development. The author strongly advocates for the need of a new international economic order.

The crucial problems plaguing these developing countries are high growth of population, unfavourable terms of trade, food deficiency, slow rate of industrial development, lack of energy resources especially petroleum which leads to serious balance of payments problems. The exploitative attitude of the developed countries further aggravates the developmental problems of these countries. The trends in development in the recent past have been encouraging although a lot remains to be achieved. These developing countries should, therefore, tighten their economies, eliminate wastage of any kind and follow a course of development based on research and development to attain an all round balanced development especially in agriculture and industry. The author feels that the call for a new international economic order by the



developing countries will be beneficial to both the developing as well as the developed countries.

The advanced Western countries, particularly the United States, had continued political, economic and military dominance over a number of developing countries. These countries, therefore, came out of the American orbit to emerge as an independent and mutually self-sufficient force. Yet the break-off is not complete since the developed and the developing countries continue to remain mutually dependent on one another. The need, therefore, is that the developing countries should make every possible effort to cooperate in a just and equitable economic order such that they too stand to gain along with the developed countries.

The world has been facing an unprecedented energy crisis. The mounting pressures on the demand for oil resulted in a substantial rise in oil prices in the mid-1970's and the developing countries were the worst sufferers of this price rise. The oil-rich countries should, therefore, make every possible effort to help the non-oil-producing developing and underdeveloped countries. In this context a three-tier price policy for oil where separate prices for the developed, developing and underdeveloped countries is suggested.

Talking of foreign aid, the author points out that the primary objective of any aid is to promote economic development of the developing countries. However, it is generally observed that aid whether from the Western countries, IMF, World Bank or IDA is basically aimed at sustaining the vested interests of the developed countries rather than helping the underdeveloped. As a result of the reduction in the Official Development Assistance various middle-income less-developed countries have had to resort to private foreign assistance which not only has a relatively higher rate of interest but also matures earlier. The loan receiving country is thus put to severe financial strain. The present international aid, therefore, needs to be restructured keeping in view the changing conditions.

The developing countries carried their struggle from Bandung to New Delhi for the removal of the existing inequalities in trade, investment and finance. There were simple aspirations of these countries but the negotiations failed to produce any progress in the international economic order. An urgent need is thus being felt to ensure greater cooperation among the developing countries themselves. These countries can redeploy the flow of trade among themselves and aid each other in order to achieve some of the goals for which they are at present striving. There is, therefore, need for promoting collective self reliance.

The commodity programme, trade policy, aid, investment, migration, world monetary reform and transfer of technology are the main



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components that link the developing countries to the developed. The world economy at present has a distinct bias in favour of the developing countries. A transformation of the present relations between rich and poor to a mutually beneficial partnership is the only remedial solution.

The average per capita income of the developing countries should be increased and the problem of maldistribution and unemployment be solved. What is equally desirable is a rapid and efficient transfer of technology which will increase domestic production, satisfy local needs and open new avenues for employment.

Finally the author deals with the scenario of developing countries under the present crisis. The new economic order, he feels, can be attained through equitable participation of the developing countries in the production and exchange of services. The world economy can be transformed into a prosperous one provided both rich and poor countries adopt measures which increase the purchasing power in the developing countries.

The author has analysed the plight of the developing countries systematically and in great detail and has also brought out as to how even the developed countries can stand to gain by offering better terms to the developing countries. However, some of the suggestions are based on certain underlying assumptions which in practice may not hold true and the solution to the problem does not appear as simple as perceived. For instance, the present attitudes of the oil rich countries shows that it is unlikely that they would, in the near future at least, agree to a three-tier price policy. Similarly, the thought that the developed countries will adopt policies more suited to the welfare of the developing countries is also not likely. The struggle from Bandung to New Delhi bears testimony to it. However, the author has certainly highlighted the situation in the developing countries very clearly and indicated the path which needs to be followed for bringing about the desired improvements. The book, therefore, should be of interest not only to the students interested in the developmental problems of the developing countries and academics but also for the policy makers.

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A. JOSHI



DHARNI P. SINHA (*Ed*): Consultants and Consulting Styles. Vision Books, New Delhi, 248 pp., Rs. 90.

THE complexity of environmental demands on organization is increasing at a pace that has turned the organizational autonomy to a myth. Therefore, not only keeping pace with change but coping with its complexity requires structural ability to respond. Growing individuals change their attitudes; organizations must change their cultures. It is to the latter that the Organizational Development (OD) Consultants aim at. Cultures, as Sheldon Davis puts it, have enormous inertia and great resistance to change. OD consultation essentially aims at equipping organizations to manage change.

In our country where organizational cultures are very much in a flux, those who are working in the field of OD must often wonder wherefrom or how to approach the problems. Dharni Sinha's book on the subject although first published as early as 1979 is very welcome not only 10 years after but for a long time to come.

This is an edited book contributed by 16 consultants (Indians and Westerners, mainly Americans) and poses the reviewer the hard task of presenting an integrated review. Luckily, as the editor points out in the Introductory Chapter, the book pertains to the collaborative model of consulting. For the benefit of the reader who would like to use the book as a guide to consulting styles, attitudes, and preparedness, it is excellent for confirming or clarifying ideas on OD.

Most contributors have discussed their approaches to OD consultation with regard to four basic questions:

- (1) The role of the consultant;
- (2) Method of problem diagnosis;
- (3) Nature of relationship between the consultant and the client and
- (4) The kinds of interventions.

#### *Role of the Consultant*

Although the language used varies, most consultants seem to be agreed upon the role of a consultant as that of facilitating change rather than bringing it about. In other words, the objective of the consultant's role is to help develop self-evaluating organizations, where key figures accept the usefulness of self analysis and self renewal. The consultant helps in arousing the willingness of the organization to act on its own behalf.

Many a consultant will have experienced the ambivalent feeling of the organizational actors towards the consultant and his new ideas. This



results in overdependence on the consultant, thereby defeating the purpose of his role. Most consultants therefore work for decreasing this dependence and gradually eliminating it. It has been found that in an active process of decreasing the dependence, there is more freedom to make suggestions.

### *The Nature of Relationship Between the Consultant and Client*

Influenced by the rigours and requirements of positive science's approach to the intensive study of any subject, psychologists and behaviouralists have for too long insisted on objectivity by the consultant. At the same time, he has always been advised to use the skills of empathy. For a consultant aware of pervasiveness and reality of emotional influences, it is reassuring to note from the person of W. Warner Burke that, "...objectivity for a consultant is not only an impossibility but a myth as well." Thus Golembiewski calls the relationship as being 'in' an organization and even intimately sharing its culture; a process of working emotionally with people, described by Udai Pareek as 'engagement.' That it is only this type of relationship that can be 'authentic' is endorsed by almost all consultants.

This type of relationship of course involves risk on both sides and it is not uncommon to find that the consultant is frequently perceived as a threat. As Cohen *et al* have found, the consultant has often to face sticky issues, such as the suspicions that OD interventions give rise to: for example being in or out of the changed target group; or the problems that are to be faced with the change in the personnel in the client organization. These problems can be unnerving experiences. The consultant also has to contend with being perceived as a member of the 'informal power structure' potentially affecting the acceptability of his interventions by those who do not participate in the consulting process.

Unlike other consultants, however, Maheshwari considers the relationship as that of a *Guru* to his follower. It is doubtful that any OD consultant will disagree with his view that consultation is only an extension of teaching. However, the Indian understanding of the *Guru* relationship may not admit of emotional involvement. Nevertheless, almost all consultants look at the relationship as a process of mutual learning and therefore worth the risks involved.

### *Method of Diagnosis*

The necessity of a correct diagnosis can hardly be over-emphasized. It is in this area that the skills of an OD consultant are most important. Most do not specifically state it but a number of contributors are agreed that diagnostically, it is important to understand at least some of orga-



nization's history. Besides, collecting preliminary data on the total system is important for appreciating the perspective of subsystemic problems.

Beckhard finds that it is helpful to distinguish between needed change and desired change, as also to determine an organization's readiness for change. He cites G'eicher and Little's formula to determine this readiness. It is mathematically described as  $C=(abd) \times$ , where  $C$ =change,  $a$ =level of dissatisfaction with the statusque,  $b$ =clear or understood desired state,  $d$ =practical first steps towards a desired state and  $\times$ ='cost' of changing. No consultant would disagree that this will help identify the intervention required for change. Blake and Mouton perhaps put the formula a little differently. They suggest that helping the group to select issues which are likely to lead to early accomplishment enhance the feelings of psychological success and pave the way for success of other interventions.

Ishwar Dayal's advice in this connection is more practical. From his experience he suggests that creation of an internal group for collection and interpretation of data make the diagnosis more realistic. Since an internal group has more intimate knowledge of the inner goings on, their help in examining alternative choices and evaluating possible consequences of actions helps in reducing the dependence on the consultant.

### *Kinds of Interventions*

According to Gordon Lippit, an organization seeks help when it is faced with dilemmas, and it is the consultant's ability to make a dilemma analysis that will determine the choice of interventions.

Blake and Mouton mention a typology of some ten kinds of interventions used by them and indicate their relevance for different kinds of organizational problems. For instance, according to them, culture intervention forces the organization to look at its habitual patterns of behaviour; the 'logic intervention' can point to contradictions between purposes and actions. Similarly, 'perspective intervention' puts the problem in proper context, and so forth.

Cohen *et al* have found that working with 'key groups' rather than 'T' groups helps focus on issues in a problem-centered way. They feel that working with small task groups and creating openness among them is strategically better for later transfer of this openness among bigger groups.

The choice of intervention seems to depend upon the consultant's perception of the influence dynamics in the organization. For Ishwar Dayal, OD requires change in role perceptions and role relationships. Therefore according to him, interventions must simultaneously aim at improving



the organizational design, role behaviour and policies. W. Warner Burke on the other hand, feels that the consultant's role varies according to the level at which, and the kind of intervention required; for example whether the intervention is required for changing interpersonal behaviour between superior and subordinates or whether the issue is departmental team building.

Maheshwari feels that people, apart from having specific roles and responsibilities are also engaged in interest articulation, power mobilization and conflict management where an MBO type of intervention may be more helpful than a structural intervention. If it is the latter, he prefers to intervene only at the top. Political processes occur in relationships and relationships as linkages within and outside the organization are important factors. The political processes, therefore, in Lippitt's view, require a good sense of timing by the consultant and good interpersonal skills also. To these, another consultant would add, conscious attention to emotional content of messages. Above all, it requires sensitivity to the self and others.

All interventions are ultimately objective-oriented. In my view the consultant essentially helps the organization to achieve integration at 4 levels mentioned by Maheshwari. These are:

- (1) Organization and environment:
- (2) Organization as a system and the different subsystems;
- (3) Organization and the individual and
- (4) Individual as a person and as a manager.

The consulting styles may vary, but every consultant poses the same questions that Dharni Sinha does which are imperative in any OD consultation. To quote Sinha, these are:

- (i) Who is my entry client, who is my real client? What is my client system? What is my target of change?
- (ii) Is there a mutuality of influence between me and my client? Is there an open collaborative relationship?
- (iii) Is the problem continuously defined and redefined as we move, or is it the continuing one?
- (iv) Is my intervention linked to the client needs or my own?
- (v) Am I facilitating development of internal capability to manage change within the client system?
- (vi) Is it the time for me to quit the organization? How soon can I do?

A write-up on the organizational development of the consultants themselves would have been a very valuable guide to upcoming consul-



tants. There is no mention of the motivation of the consultant when he is just entering the field. Or what are the compromises a consultant makes or has to make in order to be in business, when his bread if not butter depends upon it.

The book also does not dwell upon the acceptance of the consultant and his interventions at lower levels in view of the fact that he is appointed and paid for by the top men, and how does it affect the effectiveness of interventions.

On the whole the book is an excellent introduction to the consultant's role in Organization Development.

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MADHURI SHETH

JUSTICE V.R. KRISHNA IYER: *Our Courts on Trial*. BR Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 1987, x, 164 pp., Rs. 75.

THE book *Our Courts on Trial* by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, the former judge of the Supreme Court of India, is a series of eight lectures on judicial processes in India in all its ramifications by the author, in his inimitable style and prose. The title of the book itself suggests the deepening crisis in the justice-delivery system. Justice Iyer pinpoints that the message of the book "is to modernize, democratize, pragmatise and functionalise the court system *vis-a-vis* the millions of humans, who as Indians, seek the right to life and other fundamentals of justice as their constitutional birth right." (p.x)

The court system in India is cracking under its burden of arrears, thus distancing the time of obtaining of relief from the institution of cases at their disposal. The delay and arrears of the judicial system virtually denies justice to the affected populace.

Access to justice which has emerged as a new social right will have effective meaning only if justice is expeditiously meted out by the courts. Justice Iyer has given many constructive suggestions in combating judicial delays which involve active cooperation between the Bench and the Bar and simplifying procedures which still have a colonial flavour despite amendments in the post-independence period. Modernisation of court management, timely appointment of judges, etc., are some of the suggestions. In his own words, "The focus must turn on cardinal issues of modernization, liberalisation of people's access to courts, simplification of procedures, rationalization of the rules of evidence and promotion of social action litigation with *pro bono* para legals. Better



preparations of briefs, rationing of oral arguments, more intelligent homework and less loquacity by judges, fewer decks of appeal and quicker alternatives to court hearings, law clerks to research-assist judges, judicial executives to take over administrative aspects, release of maximum judge-time for substantial judicial work, pre-trial settlement of disputes with judicial activism...national colleges for judicial education and so on are on the agenda." (pp 30-31)

The author is a firm believer in and an ardent advocate of judicial legislation. He feels that social action litigation and public interest litigation can contribute greatly to upholding the principles of human dignity and distributive justice to the suffering masses. "The Indian judicial genius must show restraint but not retreat, must enforce rights and inhibit wrongs even if it superficially simulates the functions of the secretariat...An insensitive Judiciary is guilty of irresponsibility." Assessing the contribution of the Supreme Court in protecting the rights of people against the touchstone of the Constitution, Justice Iyer ends his lectures by quoting in Churchillian diction: "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few." (p. 160)

The book is a valuable addition to the literature on the subject of judicial process.

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ALICE JACOB



## FOREIGN POLICY

SRIKANT PARANJPE: *US Non-Proliferation Policy in Action: South Asia*. Sterling Publishers Pvt. (Ltd.), New Delhi, 1987, viii, 142 pp., Rs. 125.

THE NUCLEAR Non-proliferation Act of 1978 and American policies in pursuance thereof were an important area of disagreement and worse between India and the successive governments of the United States. While India has been a consistent and long-standing champion of disarmament in general and nuclear weapons reduction in particular, the non-proliferation regime the Super Powers sought to promote was completely unacceptable to India. The NPT was vehemently condemned by India because it did not even seek to stop all kinds of nuclear proliferation. The policy of allowing the nuclear powers to pile up more and better weapons (vertical proliferation) while curbing new nations to acquire nuclear weapons (horizontal proliferations), was characterised by India as the Super Power policy of "disarming the unarmed!" Such a callous lack of mutuality in the balance of obligations and responsibilities between the nuclear "haves" and nuclear "have nots" was perceived by India as contribution of colonialism in a new and even more sinister form.

*US Non-Proliferation Policy in Action* is an extremely useful source of information on the complex details of the American policy process and its implementation in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Though Dr. Paranjpe does not tell us too many "new," things the book is a welcome addition to the literature on the subject. His analysis gives us a peep into the process of interaction between the United States and India, especially in the structuring and actual implementation of the American policy of non-proliferation in South Asia. The political nuances and the scientific/technological dimensions that are inevitably interwoven into the complex game the US and India played with each other with respect to the NPT, Tarapur, nuclear fuel cycle regimes and the Pakistani factor, are analysed with skill and clarity. In fact the most impressive aspect of the study is its presentation of the technical and political (or the capability and intent) aspects of the non-proliferation issue. The regular social science scholar is enabled to grasp the scientific/technological constraints without being bombarded with the arcane jargon that has become the bane of most such studies. The book is enthusiastically recommended to all students of international politics, Indo-US relations and strategic studies.

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B. RAMESH BABU



DAWA NORBU: Red Star Over Tibet. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1987, 303 pp., Rs. 125.

IT is not possible to be neutral about Tibet, especially for an Indian. The Indian, especially, the Hindu culture has a northward and snowward orientation. The North is the holy direction, the direction of the mountains with the divine soul (Devatatma Himalaya), beyond which lies Kailash the abode of Shiva. Tibet is not just another place on the earth. It is the abode of the ultimate. Howsoever westernised we may be as individuals, this gut reaction is a reality. Yet there are so few books on Tibet and many of these are concerned only with the esoteric religious subjects. Dawa Norbu's book is an important statement. Though set in an autobiographical framework, it deals very successfully with the larger theme of Tibet.

Events do not happen in vacuum. Events happen to people and have to be judged by their effect on the lives of people. Otherwise, it could have as well happened in a remote galaxy. Tibet, till recently, had not received the kind of media attention which Afghanistan or Vietnam have. Hence the Lhasa disturbances of 1987 caught the world napping. The world had come to believe that a new generation had grown up in Tibet after 1959 which had been thoroughly brainwashed by the Chinese and the old magic of religion had no appreciable effect on them. This was confirmed by the fact that a large number of Tibetans took part in the destruction of monasteries and temples during the Cultural Revolution. Dawa Norbu's book provides insight into this contradictory phenomenon. In order to explain the fact that the Tibetans themselves have played no small role in the destruction of their own culture, the author points out that the worst that could happen to a Tibetan who is connected with politics or administration (cadres and progressive masses) is to be branded as local nationalist. Since the moderates, even while faithfully toeing the party line were always exposed to this danger, they had learnt by experience that it was safer to be leftist.

The people of Tibet can hardly believe the present liberalisation. They have learnt from past bitter experiences that uncertainty is the main feature of Chinese policy and every power struggle at the top is followed by avalanches of campaign after campaign. This also explains the complaint of the Chinese leaders that leftist elements are still strong in Tibet because to be leftist is to avoid many other blames like being a local nationalist.

The author has spent his boyhood as a student in Tibet and is a first-hand witness to many political campaigns, especially the three-anti and two-reduction campaigns and *thamzing* or attack and struggle



meetings. Though the campaigns in mainland China are well documented, the material regarding Tibet is very scanty and that too, mostly about urban centres. The author's description of these campaigns at Sakya in central Tibet is revealing. Everyone was forced to learn the campaign by heart like "*Om Mani Padme Hum*." The account describes how it was used to settle personal scores and how the accusation meetings used to be rehearsed like dramatic performances.

A very important point made at several places in the book is that whereas the masses had instinctively seen through the Chinese hypocrisy right from the beginning, it was the upper strata of the Tibetan society which provided the compradores. The author is sure that if dynamic leadership were available in March 1959, the Lhasa uprising would have been a country-wide revolt.

He also makes the point that Chinese indoctrination has failed on most Tibetans. For the Tibetan students, indoctrination became a training in defiance of the system. The author quotes a Chinese complaint about the Tibetan cadres, "The more you are educated on Mao's lines, the more reactionary tendencies and the more local nationalism you develop." This is perhaps the universal complaint of all imperialists. You cannot manage without the local cadres, nor can you trust them. It will be worthwhile to examine elsewhere why it is so.

The author, while not totally rejecting the Chinese claim of achievements in Tibet, takes it with a liberal pinch of salt, which is as it should be. The Chinese are not only extremely clever propagandists but also start believing in their own propaganda and are able to transmit their periodical enthusiasm to others also. The author rightly points out that China's new economic policy is not geared towards long-term-economic development of Tibet but is aimed at providing emergency relief. The Chinese claim that nearly half of the cadre strength in Tibet is Tibetan. The author quotes a *Guardian* report that, "almost all senior officials are HAN Chinese. Most of them do not speak a word of Tibetan, despite being stationed in Tibet for many years." However the author believes that some benefits of post-1980 liberalisation has trickled down to the grass roots level.

The author is right in saying that no major progress in Sino-Tibetan relations can be expected without an overall improvement in Sino-Indian relations, and cautions India against sacrificing Tibet for another phase of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai. This is most unlikely for various reasons. Firstly, India of 1988 is not the India of late fifties and 1962 was a traumatic experience not easily forgotten. Secondly, the Chinese proposals on the border have not been acceptable from the Indian point of view. China has also been too friendly to Pakistan in the past. He



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asks China to recognise India's genuine security interest in Tibet and also feels that the Soviet Union has a genuine security interest in Central Asia, including Tibet. He calls upon all parties to declare their legitimate interests in Tibet and convince China through diplomatic pressure of the geo-political necessity for a peaceful political settlement to accommodate minimally the political aspirations of Tibetans.

China has now embarked upon a prolonged course of modernisation and has decided to concentrate its efforts in the coastal areas. The present pragmatic leadership will no doubt like to reduce its problems in the remote areas like Tibet without of course in any way compromising its vital interests and security. Perhaps the future is not without hope as all interested parties may discover a large measure of convergence of interests. *Liaowang*, the Red Chinese ideological journal, in its issue of 26 August 1985 concludes that Tibet is a special zone, more special than Xinjiang or inner Mongolia. This gives rise to hope for the future. Already China is a country with many systems. There is no reason why a special one cannot be evolved for Tibet. Dalai Lama's speech at Strasbourg on 15 June 1988 goes far enough to accommodate the genuine Chinese interests. He has visualised Tibet as a self-governing political entity in association with the Peoples Republic of China. Significantly he has not used the word 'State'. He concedes to the Central Government of China the responsibility of foreign policy and defence. Though the immediate Chinese reactions have not been favourable, there exists the strong possibility of fruitful negotiations in future, though progress is likely to be very slow.

I may point out that it is unfair to accuse Pandit Nehru of playing a great chess game with Chou Enlai. (p. 148) Certainly he was over-idealistic in expecting a similar world view as his own from China in view of its similar colonial and quasi-colonial experiences. But surely he cannot be accused of Machiavellian subterfuge.

Dawa Norbu's book is an authentic voice from Tibet and therefore claims to be heard. Though the book has an autobiographical format, the author has been successful in universalising his experience. His voice is not that of an individual; it is the first authentic recorded voice of the commoners of rural Tibet. It enables the reader to get the feel of Tibet under Chinese rule. As Dawa Norbu rightly puts it, "Campaign after campaign has been coming like waves on a stormy sea. There was neither rest nor peace." He experienced both the old and the new Tibet and is uniquely qualified to make a comparison between the two. This he does without sentimentality, romanticism or rancour. The personality of his mother comes out loud and clear. She must have been a remarkable woman. I can do no better than quote her: "Tibetan rulers were bad,



but the Chinese are worse. Think back when you were a little boy. When I pinched your bottom hard when you were naughty, you cried a little and stopped. But when others, especially outsiders hit you, you cried aloud and wept as if your parents were dead. Yes the Chinese are Chinese and Tibetans are Tibetans." What better expression can be found of the Tibetan desire for self-rule?

The author is equally perceptive and unsentimental about the pre-1951 status of Tibet. He comes to the conclusion that though for 38 years from 1912 to 1950, Tibet was *de-facto* independent, it did not take adequate steps to convert the *de-facto* status into *de jure*. He blames it on the ignorance and fanaticism of the lamas, irresponsibility of the aristocrats and the utter simplicity and complete innocence of the Tibetan masses. These reasons are no doubt valid. But there is ground to doubt if the British Government, the one most vitally concerned, would have supported Tibetan independence. Perhaps the Government of New Delhi would have welcomed it, but I doubt whether the Government at Whitehall would have been of the same opinion. In the twenties and thirties, the bugbear was the Bolshevik expansion and for a long time the major threat to the Indian Empire was visualised from Soviet Russia. Perhaps the same concern for global imperial interests would have persuaded Whitehall to let Tibet remain a part of China as was the case in the first decade of this century (St. Petersburg Convention, 1907). Anyway, there does not seem much justification in examining various might-have-beens. As the author rightly concludes, "The whole system was rotten to the core and could not stand twentieth century pressures. It was ready to fall and it fell disastrously."

It may not be out of place to examine here the minority policy of the Chinese Government. China, India and the Soviet Union are three countries with large ethnic minorities. India has tackled this problem by forming states where the linguistic or tribal peoples are in a majority and transferring to them the political power as visualised in the Indian Constitution. This has proved eminently workable and even former insurgency movements have been successfully absorbed into the system. The Soviet system is similar and theoretically gives greater freedom to national minority areas. But the political apparatus is firmly controlled by the Communist Party. Thus while giving great scope to minority culture, there is political centralisation. We do not really have any idea how the situation will develop in future. Witness the recent conflict and tension between Armenia and Georgia. Nevertheless it has also proved as a workable system.

On the other hand, the basic Chinese policy has been 'Hanification.' Where possible the ethnography of a particular area was 'sinified' as in Manchuria and to a lesser extent in inner Mongolia and Sin Kiang



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(Xingiang). Sun Yat Sen favoured the self-determination of all national minorities. The first Communist Constitution of 1931 granted the right of secession to national minorities including the Tibetans. (Grunfeld, *Making of Modern Tibet*, p 228) But by 1936, Mao in his interview to Edgar Snow hoped that Outer Mongolia would automatically join China and the Mohammedan and Tibetan people would likewise form autonomous republics attached to the Chinese Federation—*China: March Towards Unity* (Edgar Snow, 1937) There is no longer any mention of the right to secession. Though the Chinese Communists have always talked of autonomy, they have never defined it. There has been no significant change since then, and even in 1975 China was defined as an unitary, multinational state. Perhaps the necessity to acknowledge the independence of Outer Mongolia rankles in the Chinese mind and since they are wary about minority areas their fear of local nationalism comes out very clearly in Dawa Norbu's book.

There is one point in Norbu's book about which I am not very sure; Norbu agrees that making all allowance for inflation of figures in Chinese statistics, some benefits have trickled down to grass-roots levels. Norbu's sources are unimpeachable. Yet a clearly pro-Chinese account—*The Making of Modern Tibet* by Tom Greenfeld—mentions, "It is probably safe to say that for the average Tibetan peasant living in a small village the availability of food has increased only slightly since 1950." (p. 172).

This book is strongly recommended for those who want an understandable analysis of the situation in Tibet without getting too much involved in esoteric scholarship. It is a human document and puts the events into a human framework, thereby giving it a taste of reality. Though primarily meant for the general reader, the specialists will also benefit from the personal experiences and "gut reactions" contained in the book to obtain a human perspective of the events. Norbu is to be commended for having provided this opportunity.

New Delhi.

U. MAHAPATRA



## INDIA

S. GOPAL (*Ed.*): *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. V. A Project of the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund.* Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1987, 610 p., Rs. 150.

ONLY seven months had elapsed since India attained independence, and in the wake of partition the country passed through a holocaust the like of which even long established governments would have found difficult to overcome. Apart from the communal frenzy and killings, millions of people moved across the borders leaving behind all that they possessed and cherished to begin life anew in unknown surroundings. The new Government of free India under the Prime Ministership of Jawaharlal Nehru was still groping around to get a grip on the tasks of reconstruction when this holocaust broke with a virulence seldom to be seen in human history. Simultaneously, the war in Kashmir was thrust upon an unprepared nation. It faced the challenge valiantly and yet true to its firm conviction to resolve all disputes through peaceful means, its Government was persuaded to take the Kashmir issue to the United Nations. The short period of about four months, with which this volume deals, thus became the most crucial period for the evolution of policies dealing with both internal and external problems which even after forty years still remain true and relevant. As the General Editor of the work, Dr. Gopal has observed in his opening note: "The speeches and writings in this volume reveal, in (such) a short period of time, almost every essential of India's future which came under scrutiny and was often under attack. It was Nehru's task to resist the forces of reaction on every front and place the country on the right road."

As one wades through the speeches, letters and memoranda in the volume one sees the evolution of India's basic policies of total commitment to secularism, acceptance of planned economic development with its commanding heights in the public sector, move towards self-reliance through conscious encouragement to scientific research in an institutionalised manner in the most frontier fields such as atomic energy, and finally the evolution of a national foreign policy of nonalignment. Of course, these policies were not defined in such precise terms as have been stated here. But one can discern these policies taking shape from letter to letter on the basis of a very perceptive analysis of internal and world events and what in the long run will serve the basic aim of a free and strong India. The volume is divided into nine major heads: Communal danger leading to the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi; Relations with Pakistan with special reference to the recovery of



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abducted women, border issues and the rehabilitation of large numbers of refugees who had poured into India in the wake of partition; The Kashmir problem and the United Nations; Integration of States; Prime Minister's fortnightly letters to Provincial Premiers keeping them informed of all developments; National Reconstruction—political, economic, educational, social, cultural and scientific; Role of the Armed Forces; Constitutional issues in relation to the role of the Prime Minister in the context of the dispute with Sardar Patel; and Foreign Policy. The last section includes certain general and personal letters which throw light on all these issues as they confronted the Government in those crucial months and how policy formulations evolved as a consequence. Let us now take these topic by topic.

*Communal Danger*

In a speech at Ajmer on 3 January 1948, following a riot because of the influx of a large number of refugees from Pakistan, Nehru reminded the people that the Congress had condemned and opposed the Muslim League for propagating factionalism and the two-nation theory. But now these evils find a place even among the Hindus and Sikhs. They not only retard the progress of society but also lead to its fall. As a consequence India's prestige had suffered a great setback in the eyes of world during that period. In that context he reminded the people that India had sent military aid to Kashmir to help "our Muslim brothers in their fight for freedom against the aggressors. Such distressing events as took place in Ajmer last month can naturally give rise to doubts in the minds of the people of Kashmir as to the treatment they might get from other people in India." Expressing his deep sorrow at these events, he said: "This is a problem not of Ajmer alone but of the whole country. It has to be solved if we do not desire our independence to perish." And then he went on to enunciate his Government's policy of secularism saying that the Government of India wanted everyone to enjoy equal freedom in pursuing any religion or faith. "Fear is the greatest enemy of man and you should get rid of it. He was particularly disturbed at the growth of organisations like the Muslim National Guards and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. In his view both were in the nature of private armies and had done a great deal of harm. Since the Muslim National Guard was confined to Bengal only, he was far more concerned about the RSS, for he had a great deal of evidence to show that many of India's troubles at that time had been caused by the RSS people. Indeed in some cases they had acted as *agents provocateurs*. He even went to the extent of suggesting that these two organisations should be banned,



Simultaneously, he was also concerned at the activities of the Socialists whom he described to the then Chief Minister of Bombay, B.G. Kher, as very irresponsible for organising a token strike in that State immediately after a three-year truce had been reached. Since the Socialists were still in the Congress at that time, he hinted that it [the Congress] would have to decide about it soon. In fact, the Socialists themselves had practically declared their intention of leaving the Congress and so little pressure could be exerted on them by taking disciplinary action. But this was only in the context of the token strike in Bombay. What constantly worried him those days was the atmosphere of communal hatred in the country in the wake of the continuous refugee influx. While the Government was engaged in the massive task of rehabilitating these uprooted millions, the two-nation theory propounded by Pakistan and the consequent hate propaganda carried on by it had its effect on some in India itself. In this context Nehru warned the country that it was wrong to think that all Muslims were traitors and all Hindus and Sikhs patriots. He was particularly concerned about conditions in Delhi in those days and warned that it was not merely the capital of the country but also a city with a historical past. Conditions here had their effect on other parts of the country. His only hope lay in Mahatma Gandhi who had shown a new way through his fasts against communal disturbances. Even in those days the Muslim League leaders, as today, used to charge the Indian leaders that they were out to destroy Pakistan and reunite it with India. Nehru's reply was a categorical assertion that India had no desire to reunite with Pakistan. Why should India take the added responsibility of Pakistan? What it wanted was to "build our nation as we desire." Even today things have not changed. Leaders in Pakistan continue to suspect that India wants to undo Pakistan. Over and over again Nehru repeated his firm conviction that India belongs to the people of all faiths who live here and not to one community or religion. These were the ideas which ultimately found expression in the Constitution with a firm commitment to secularism.

The assassination of Mahatma Gandhi was a big blow to him personally, but it did not deviate him from the path of secularism. The manner of Mahatma Gandhi's death, according to him, was a grim and urgent reminder of the forces of hate and violence that were at work in India at that time to imperil its hard-own freedom. Though deeply disturbed at the death of the Father of the Nation, Nehru did not allow himself or his government to deviate from the path shown by him and went on relentlessly to promote communal harmony even under the most trying circumstances. While speaking at a public meeting, Nehru made a promise on behalf of his Government that, "Those who preach



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communalism or maintain private armies will be destroyed." Unfortunately, even today that promise remains unfulfilled. He could not persuade even some of his colleagues in the Cabinet to ban such organisations as the RSS or the Muslim National Guards for good.

*Kashmir and the United Nations*

Prime Minister Nehru, a great votary of the United Nations Charter and of a world order to maintain peace, was deeply disappointed when he found that the Big Powers, particularly the USA and its allies, including the United Kingdom, in the Security Council were least concerned with the legality and rightness of the Indian case on Kashmir. As he stated in one of his public speeches, India had referred the Kashmir Question to the Security Council because the intention was that whatever India did, should be in a civilized manner. According to him, India had positive proof of Pakistan being implicated in the Kashmir affair. It undertook to defend it only on an appeal for help from the Maharaja and the National Conference. However, before sending our troops he (Nehru) made clear that ultimately the people of Kashmir alone would decide their future. But it was conveyed to India through a high western diplomatic source that the US approach to the Kashmir issue would be influenced less by intrinsic merit than by broad considerations of American world strategy in view of the state of tension between the USA and the USSR. It was further stated that America was pursuing a policy of support to Middle Eastern States, from Greece to Iran, in the hope that they would, by providing bases and otherwise, assist America in the event of hostilities with the USSR. If Pakistan should be willing to cooperate similarly with the USA, it is to be expected that the USA would try to befriend Pakistan in the solution of its dispute with India over Kashmir.

How true it has proved to be even today. India's reactions were predictable. Its policy of non-alignment with either bloc did not mean we wanted Russians to enter any part of the Indian sub-continent, including Pakistan. As Nehru put it at that time, "We have not secured our freedom from the British to lose it to another Great Power." Naturally it is not appreciated in Washington even to this day. Besides, the British too wanted to have things to their own advantage. In one of his telegrams to the leader of the Indian Delegation at the UN, Nehru clearly stated: "I am anxious that you should be careful about British delegation's attempts to play the role of the peacemaker. British attitude throughout has been unhelpful." Ultimately India came to the obvious conclusion that instead of discussing and deciding on India's reference of the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council in a straightforward



manner, the nations of the world, sitting on that body, got lost in power politics. That had opened the eyes of India a bit. Nehru put this feeling succinctly in his letter to Krishna Menon, dated 16 February 1948. He wrote: "The Security Council business has depressed and distressed me greatly. I could never have imagined that this Council could possibly behave so irresponsibly as it has done. I have felt very angry with the USA and the UK. Most of the others do not count." Apparently this has determined the relations between India and these two powers over the years. The reading is as true today as it was exactly forty years ago. As Nehru put it at that time, "We have already had a foretaste of the kind of pressures that the USA and the UK might exercise over us. The USA has practically refused to sell arms to us. The petrol position is also critical and our quotas from abroad are being reduced." The Prime Minister was so incensed that he conveyed to Krishna Menon in writing that, "legally and morally we are on strong grounds and I see no reason whatever why we should surrender either to the gangster tactics of Pakistan and the raiders, or to the attempts at bullying by the UK and the USA. Naturally we do not want to have to reject the final advice of the Security Council. But if this goes too far, then we have no alternative but to reject it and face the consequences."

### *Foreign Policy*

India's first brush with power politics in an international forum like the United Nations Security Council perhaps sharpened the contours of its foreign policy of non-alignment which holds good even today, but to say it arose out of this unhappy experience would be to ignore the whole background of India's struggle for independence and the direction it got from Mahatma Gandhi. This comes out sharply from some of the speeches and letters incorporated in this volume. For instance, replying to a debate in the Constituent Assembly Nehru stated categorically that India's general policy had been to avoid entering into anybody's quarrels. He had come to the conclusion from his short experience in dealing with the UN Security Council that, "The less we interfere in the international conflicts the better, unless India's own interest was involved, for this reason that it was not in consonance with our dignity just to interfere without any effect being produced. Either we should be strong enough to produce some effect or we should not interfere at all. Unfortunately, sometimes one could not help it. One is dragged into it." The situation since then has not changed much except that as an important member of the Non-aligned Movement, which has grown in strength over the years, India is now capable of taking stands on some of the ticklish international issues with the backing of the NAM. As Nehru saw it then, it



was not India's purpose to offend others or to come into conflict with them. Both in the long and short runs—independence of opinion and action would count. He preferred to be idealistic rather than practical if it meant surrendering independence of thought and action for some immediate advantage. Another difficulty India faced was because of its past anti-imperialist record which had it *persona non grata* with some people and groups who did not like India. The position continues with minor qualitative difference because of the changed conditions. "The fact that India is potentially a great nation and a big power, it is not liked possibly by some people for anything to happen which strengthens us." These perceptive remarks of Nehru then, hold good even today and that is why the policy that he ultimately evolved of non-alignment with peaceful co-existence is as relevant today as it was during his time.

It comes out sharply from some of his letters that quite early in his dealings with the great powers, particularly the two Super Powers, he had come to realise that in international politics idealism and principles did not play any part so long as the global interests of these powers were secured. What they wanted from the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa was conformity to their objectives rather than independence of judgement on issues. In two separate personal letters to his sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, then India's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, he made very perceptive remarks about the two Super Powers, which are true even today. Expressing his disappointment with the Americans, who considered themselves as the saviours of the so-called free world, he expressed astonishment: "How naive the Americans are in their foreign policy. It is only their money and their power that carries them through, not their intelligence or any other quality." Have things changed even a wee bit after forty years? In dealing with the Russians, he wrote, "One should never forget the whole background of the last thirty years (now 70). They have an accumulation of suspicion and hatred against some countries. Their whole psychology seems to differ from that of Western Europe and America. Perhaps we Indians can understand it a little better than Americans and yet most of us have been conditioned in the Western European atmosphere." The only difference today seems to be that the American influence through that conditioning has gradually increased and that is why over the years a powerful lobby has grown in this country which is uncritically pro-American and questions the growth of relations with the Soviet Union.

### *National Reconstruction*

In this section, the emphasis seems to be in evolving a political system which would help develop India, a multi-religious, multi-cultural, and



multi-lingual country, into a united nation drawing its strength from its diversity. But as Nehru rightly felt this would be possible only through fast economic growth and not through distribution of poverty. While he accepted the need for change in the functioning of the Congress, now a ruling party, he put greater emphasis on the individual, his character, morality and idealism. He tried to mould such an individual, but the task was stupendous and one cannot say with any certainty that he was able to succeed. Because of the lure of power and what flowed from it in terms of economic gains, the task became still more difficult. However, realising this Nehru visualised for his country a socialist pattern of society in which there was no blind following of any foreign doctrine but an effort to evolve an ideology suited to the soil. Some of his socialist colleagues often pressed him to go ahead with wholesale nationalisation. He had a tough time restraining them. Equally strong were views in his own Cabinet to follow a purely capitalist system of the Western pattern of economic development. Hemmed in by these two opposing forces, he found it difficult at times to sell the idea of planned economic development; it took him quite some years to get a consensus in his own party for setting up the Planning Commission. Some of his colleagues thought it was some kind of a super Cabinet over their heads and they did not like it. However, with perseverance he succeeded ultimately.

Nehru's emphasis all along was on laying the infrastructure for more production. In a national broadcast, for instance, he clearly said: "We talk of freedom but political freedom does not take us far unless there is economic freedom. Indeed, there is no such thing as freedom for a man who is starving or for a country which is poor." His emphasis therefore was on more production through planned development. In this context he talked a great deal of industrial peace. The increased production he visualised was not for enriching individuals, but to enrich the whole nation. While he was all for nationalisation of key industries, he felt, "We should not waste our resources in trying to nationalise existing industries, except where it is absolutely necessary." In other words, while he was for commanding heights for the State sector, he did not have a doctrinaire approach to this question.

### *Science and Technology*

It was Nehru's broad vision that laid the foundations of what has over the years become India's scientific think tank. Even as early as 1948 he realised the need for new sources of energy such as atomic energy and he initiated the process to set up its own atomic energy establishment which today compares with the best in the world. While moving a bill in the



Constituent Assembly to provide for the development and control of atomic energy he talked prophetically of the uses of this and other alternative sources of energy for a new structure of the world. He was thinking of the future progress of India and the world and wanted to prepare it to take full advantage of this new industrial revolution based on nuclear or other sources of energy and not be left behind as in the past. He was quite clear in his mind that it should not be harnessed for war or other destructive purposes but for peaceful development and in that he was certain the State must give every facility and encouragement to this development. It was at his behest that Dr. Homi Bhabha set up the nucleus of what today has become India's pride in this direction. He was against its use for purposes of war. But it is not well known that he himself kept the option open where he pointed out, what if India was "compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way." In other words even at that time while committed to the peaceful use of atomic energy, he had kept the option open. If today India's Prime Minister says the same thing it is nothing new.

This volume, which covers a very short period but a crucial one, also deals with various other problems that faced free India's first Prime Minister within seven months, such as differences over the constitutional role of the Prime Minister with his second in command, Sardar Patel; the demand of some Sikhs even of that time for private armies and certain special reservations; and, not the least, the relations between the political and the bureaucratic wings of the Government. He dealt with all these problems with a long-term perspective and never allowed them to undermine the newly gained freedom of the country. Despite his growing differences with Sardar Patel, the two continued to work together until the latter's death. Nehru was far too great a visionary to allow personal ambitions to overshadow his long term perspective and the grand vision he had of a strong and powerful India.

Nobody could have summed up his achievements better than his own daughter, Indira Gandhi, who as the third Prime Minister of India converted some of his dreams about India into reality. In a short Foreword to this volume she says: "His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as his pride in India and Asia." She goes on to add: "No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. . . . He was a Socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness."

This volume presents, as nothing else could, the image of a visionary, a thinker who was not only committed to uplifting his country, but in



the process giving a new political philosophy to a world sharply divided into two power blocs based on differing ideologies. He was perhaps the first statesman to try and marry on open democratic political system with planned economic development. How far he succeeded can be gauged from what India has achieved in the last forty years.

New Delhi.

C. S. PANDIT

MANZOOR AHMED: *Indian Response to the Second World War*. Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi (First Edition). 1987, xv, 292 pp. Rs. 134.

THE book under review, with exhaustive footnotes and a useful bibliography, is a thoughtful, refreshing and important contribution to the continuing examination of World War II. It is a lucid and authoritative academic explanation of the historic role of India in responding to the last great war which was imposed on the Indian people by the British Government. Concise and judicious in his account of the conflicts in various forums on the issue of opposing the British imposition of the War on India, the author goes on to examine multi-dimensional issues connected with the War and the Indian struggle for freedom taking them in their fascinating interrelationship. With an impressive array of examples and historical data the author offers a stimulating, authentic and readable book on a topic which still has an absorbing interest for social scientists.

The author correctly states that the Indian National Congress, the most prominent representative organization, voiced forcefully its estimate of the dangerous consequences of the Viceroy's unilateral announcement of associating the people of India with the War. Despite the fact that the people of India had sympathy for the Allied Powers' war against the anti-democratic fascist forces, the British Government's action of imposing the heavy burden of the War on the Indian people without consulting any popular body or organization was considered an outrage on the people of India. Even then, there were palpable differences of opinion in the Indian National Congress on the question of India's participation in the War. As the key foreign policy mover in the Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru argued that since complete independence was the solitary objective of the popular movement going on in the country, the issue of supporting the British Government in the War could be considered only on receiving



an unequivocal assurance to the effect that the people of India would be accorded independence soon after the War was over. Differences within the Congress leadership on the issue of supporting India's participation in the War caused a rift in the Party eventually leading to the formation of the "All India Anti-Compromise Conference." It was difficult for the nationalists, whether in the Congress or not, to accept the fact that while the British Government had been waging a war in defence of democracy against fascism and imperialism, it took a hardline policy of suppressing the democratic movement of the Indian masses for national freedom. The role of the Muslim League was, however, different. It supported the British Government with a view to achieving its short-term political goal of getting a separate Muslim homeland within undivided India. The British Government successfully exploited the "bogy of Congress-League disunity" and finally inspired Jinnah to adopt the Pakistan Resolution in March 1940.

The author also deals with the attitudes of Communist Party of India to the War. The whole issue still invokes academic and political controversy in India. (Arun Shourie's article on the role of the Communists during the War appearing in three issues of *The Illustrated Weekly of India* beginning 18-24 March 1984, once again sparked off the controversy. A passing reference to it has been made by the author at p. 246). One feels that the author could have dealt with this controversial issue more authentically even with the already available data.

The author discusses the question of national identity in India as it surfaced out of the National Movement itself. The question of Indian nationalism cannot be considered in isolation, because a global focus on this issue emerged in the course of the War. The ethnic questions in East and Central Europe and of the Arabs in the Middle East and the East West Africa under the broad concept of Pan Arabism may be cited in this regard. In India, the search for identity by different ethnic and religious groups began along with the freedom movement, but the broader forces of nationalism working at that time for the achievement of the singular objective of independence, overwhelmed the roots and branches of small nationalism. The author successfully projects the entire panorama of the Indian political scene accentuating the freedom struggle spearheaded by the Congress as the mainstay of the masses against the backdrop of the forceful activities of centrifugal elements. He also handles the extremely difficult topic of India's response to the War as it interpenetrated with such peripheral issues as the Quit India Movement, the 'CR' Formula and the Congress-League talks, with academic competence and without sidetracking.



Chapter 3, "Great Powers' Response to India," invokes much interest. It includes the attitudes of the major Allied Powers to India's struggle for freedom. The great powers, like the United States, Soviet Union and China, fighting along with Britain in the War, were not very much favourably disposed towards the freedom movement in India for political compulsions arising out of their involvement in the War. There was also disturbing news relating to the reported Soviet invasion of the eastern part of Poland and Finland. This naturally could not be looked upon without anxiety by the Indian leaders struggling for freedom from British domination. The author carefully deals with these delicate issues, but it would have been better if the Soviet sources on the subject had [not been altogether neglected. The occasional deficiency of cross-examination of the relevant data and information on such controversial issues appears to affect the value of the findings.

The last Chapter records India's response to the new idea of world order through the United Nations. Just as the outbreak and the different courses of the War had been of great importance to the peoples of India, similarly the efforts toward the establishment of an international organization were also monitored and followed by the Indian leaders with the hope that the emergence of a new international order institutionalized in the form of the United Nations would ensure peace and security involving all peace-loving and newly independent nations. This general aspiration of the people of India was clearly focused at the San Francisco Conference by the official Indian delegates sent by the British Government and by the un-official representative of the Indian people. The author rightly submits that the most important aspect in this connection was the international recognition in the full glare of publicity to the incontrovertible fact of India's forthcoming independence, which encouraged the Indian delegates to participate in the conference with confidence and authority.

The author convincingly builds up the commonly believed theory that the Indian leadership representing the masses (though minor segments of the Indian society might have taken different courses of action as always expected in any multi-racial and multi-national democratic system) showed wisdom, courage and far-sightedness in responding to the different courses of the War in a manner expected of a potentially great nation about to achieve national independence through a unique struggle. The book constantly reminds the reader of the need to appreciate the extremely difficult situation faced by the Indian leadership who in the midst of a non-violent struggle against a mighty imperialist country had to handle complexities created by the divisive forces within and outside the Congress. The author throws much light on how these problems at home were compounded with the complexities of a global war waged by



the world's mightiest powers. The focus on this interpenetrating scene appears to this reviewer to have been the author's primary preoccupation in the book.

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ABU NASAR SAIED AHMED

R.N. CHOPRA: Food Policy in India: A Survey. Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi, 1988, xii, 414 p., Rs. 275.

INDIA faced a grave food situation at the time of Independence. The memory of the Bengal Famine 1943 which took a toll of 3 million lives was still fresh in the people's mind. On account of the stagnant agriculture for 50 years preceding Independence, the country had been turned into a net importer of foodgrains every year since 1937. Partition of the sub-continent which accompanied Independence made the already bad food situation still worse. Pakistan took away 17 per cent of the total population of undivided India but 23 per cent of the total grain production. What is more, the areas of assured rainfall in East Bengal and canal irrigation in West Punjab and Sind, fell in the newly created Pakistan dominion. Next, the post-partition problems of refugee rehabilitation and resettlement and severe food shortages presented the biggest single challenge to the government which had assumed office on the withdrawal of the British power from the country. Imports to fill up the demand-supply gap in foodgrains and controlled distribution of the available supplies to the urban population, were the obvious policy choices to be made under the circumstances. This was done. There has been a sea-change in the food situation of the country since those dark days. Instead of endemic shortage the country now, in good years, has burdensome surpluses which are carried by the public sector Food Corporation of India at heavy expense to the Exchequer. The controlled distribution of foodgrains through the public distribution system has continued, the pretext now being that it helps the weaker sections of the population as well as the Government in containing inflation caused by its fiscal imprudence. Government management of the food economy begun to meet an emergency situation has thus continued and become a part of planning and Government economic policies at the macro-level.

The book under review tells the story of that management from the very inception of the system to the present day. In its earlier incarnation,



published in 1981, the title was *Evolution of Food Policy in India*. That title gives a better description of the contents of the book than the present deficit title *Food Policy in India*. The book is strong on historical narration; absolutely lacking in any analytical examination of India's food policy that the present title would suggest it to be concerned with.

On the narrative aspect, the book is authoritative and well documented. It is, of course, the official version of the management of the food economy of the country by the Government that the book gives. This was to be expected. The author, a member of the Indian Administrative Service was Chairman of the Food Corporation of India and Secretary to the Government of India in the Food Department from 1973 to 1977. Earlier he was posted as District Collector and Development Commissioner in Punjab and Haryana. These are the author's credentials for writing this book. He is not a professional economist or even a policy-maker. He is, by his own admission, a hard-boiled bureaucratic administrator and his main purpose in writing the book is "to depict" in an earnest manner "the rather creditable performance of the Government of India since Independence in keeping at bay a repetition of the 1943 Bengal tragedy." "The book" the author adds, "makes no pretensions, it is a mere account of how the food situation developed in the country from around 1943 and what steps were taken by the Central Government of the day to improve it and to alleviate the distress of the people in the conditions of short supply of grain." In view of these disarmingly frank statements, it would not be correct to apply the usual tests of objectivity, scholarship and analytical quality that a reviewer applies in reviewing a work of this type. Judged by those norms, the book falls far short of expectations. But there can be little doubt that the author has put in hard labour in collecting and collating the material spread over numerous Reports of Foodgrains Enquiry Committees, Annual Reports of Food and Agriculture Ministry and other official documents, to give us a connected and comprehensive account of the evolution of India's present food security system and its various aspects like working of the public distribution system; functioning of the Food Corporation of India; the need for building buffer stocks and determining their proper size; and problems of storage and transport of foodgrains from the surplus to the deficit areas. The reader, looking for detailed and authoritative information on these subjects, will find the book highly useful for the purpose. For any one trying to look for something beyond that will be but courting disappointment.

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- S. RAVISHANKAR and R.K. MISHRA (*Eds.*): *Management of Human Resources in Public Enterprises*. Vision Books, New Delhi, vi, 304 p., Rs. 150.

AT the time the book appeared the subject of management of human resources or human resource development was not so much in the limelight and under focus as it is today. So far as the public sector is concerned, passing references to this subject were made in the Annual Reports of the Bureau of Public Enterprises on the Working of Public Enterprises of the Central Government which are laid on the table of Parliament during the Budget Session. Also some public enterprises covered the subject in a thumbnail form in their Corporate Plans. Instead of dealing with optimal utilisation of human resources and thereby increasing the productivity in enterprises, the concern was shown to augmenting promotional prospects of those already in employment with emphasis on short-term training courses or seminars being available to them rather than the stress being brought on systematised training courses or programmes of six months to one year duration at specialised institutes, IIMs or at training institutes set up by enterprises individually or jointly with akin enterprises. Thus MHR or HRD in a somewhat nascent stage of development, the publication of a book of the nature of the present one was a very welcome addition to the literature on management of public enterprises in India. Several of the contributors to the volume are well-known authorities on the subject with national and international reputations.

In the absence of a round-up or crisp summary of the points covered by various contributors to the volume, the reader has willy nilly to wade through the entire volume to get hold of the strands of thoughts of the writers. This is a lacuna which the editors could have easily avoided. Notwithstanding this, on going through the volume, one finds that the authors have presented the problems of human resource management on a theoretical plane; the papers by R.P. Billimoria, George V. Haythorne, Asai Ozaki and Bogdan Kavcic are particularly noteworthy. The value of the publication would have been considerably enhanced had one of the Indian writers made a comprehensive empirical study of manpower planning, recruitment practices, training programmes, etc., in a dozen leading public enterprises. This would have brought out the sharpness of the thrusts contained in the HRD or MHR programmes of public enterprises on such aspects of management as (a) recruitment of staff on criterion of 'essential needs' with due safeguards, against excess intake of staff; (b) recruitment of qualified staff, qualifications strictly matched to the jobs; (c) upgradation of skills of staff



already in employment in the enterprise and the promotion to be strictly based on 'merit' and so on. It is time that a task force or team of management experts, professional managers and some experts from outside, evolve a scheme of MHR or HRD for public enterprises taking into consideration the operational efficiency of public enterprises juxtaposed with the competition from the external enterprises.

Notwithstanding its lacunae the book serves as a good introduction to the subject of management of human resources.

New Delhi

RAJ K. NIGAM

BISWANATH BOSE: *RIN Mutiny* 1946. Northern Book Centre, New Delhi, 1988, xxi, 253 p., Rs. 205.

**R**OYAL Indian Naval Mutiny, which is abbreviated as RIN Mutiny by the author, was less known to the peoples of India than the activities of the Indian National Army under Subhash Chandra Bose, the Mutiny of 1857 and the Gadar Party. The book contains a condensed account of the RIN Mutiny written on the basis of historical background imbibing the facts of the final phase of India's liberation movement and records the valorous deeds of the Indian sailors in the uprising. It has also covered the media—national and international reports—participating warships and the naval establishments all over the country.

The book is divided into four chapters. Chapter I describes the historical background of the Mutiny. Chapter II highlights the facts regarding the setting up of an Inquiry Commission to probe the matter of this Mutiny by the authorities with published and unpublished records. Chapter III summarises the views of the national leaders and the general masses while Chapter IV highlights the partisan attitudes of the Congress Party towards this Mutiny. According to the author, the Congress attitude changed because of public pressures and the British Empire which complimented the ratings by calling them the mutineers. Central and some other provincial governments made adequate efforts to rehabilitate the INA personnel but it is a pity, if true, that nothing was done to rehabilitate the RIN patriots.

This book is written by a person who has been a victim of such neglect not only by the Government but by the society in general. Their legal dues from the British Government were forfeited and the Ruling Party (Congress) seconded it.



The author deserves compliments on two accounts. Firstly RIN Mutiny of 1946 is laudable to all freedom loving people in India and secondly it contains the most authentic version of a leading participant which the author was with other associates in the Mutiny. Book will be of interest to the readers in general and students of history in particular.

New Delhi

V.K. ARORA

A. S. NARANG: Democracy, Development and Distortion. Gitanjali Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, X, 207 p., Rs 120

ACADEMICIANS of Marxist as well as non-Marxist persuasions would readily concur that high priority needs to be attached to understanding politics or the changing contours of politics. But this consensus on cognitive needs breaks down as soon as the question of method(s) and tools is raised; Marxists insist on studying politics as a reflex of the economy, while non-Marxists, specially Liberals, feel that politics is nothing but a flux of politics. This ideological wedge opens up the question as to whether to study politics as a political phenomenon or to encompass economic variables in the fold of political analysis. In the volume under review, Narang appears to take the second route, viz., elucidation of the trends of economic development for mapping the changing contours of politics, but the resultant product falls far short of attaining sophistication either in terms of economic analysis of India's model of religion-based-politics.

At one level, Narang has written an electoral history of the area now constituting the Punjab State of the Republic of India duly presenting percentage of votes polled by the major political parties since 1951-52. He has also tried to elucidate the political meaning of the changing vote-shares secured by the Akalis and the Indian National Congress, but the author has not been satisfied with writing a politico-electoral history of Punjab. Narang has made a bold attempt to place the shifting panorama of Punjab politics in the context of the overall political and economic developments in India since Independence. This he has sought to achieve by highlighting what he regards as "misplaced emphasis" of modern India's economic policies, viz', satisfaction of the growing demands of the richer classes and neglect of the essential needs of the poor. (p. 10) At this level the the unit-of-analysis is, obviously, the Indian economy



as a whole and not Punjab where the industrial bias of the Indian model of Plan investment is least visible.

Punjab is certainly a part of India and shares its political system and economic dynamism, but can its political crises be understood in terms of the deficiencies of the capitalist system of production-relations as they have evolved since 1947? The author certainly deserves praise for trying to elucidate the state-level political implications of India's industry-led strategy of economic development, but in our view, deciphering even the all-India political correlates of the all-India developmental policies would require much more sustained research than what the students of "Political Economy" school have been able to achieve so far, let alone the question of utilizing all-India economic trends analysis to elucidate the political dynamics of this or that region of India. Further, unravelling the political threads of the development trends in a "Mixed Economy" like India is complicated because political scientists do not possess the necessary skills to assimilate economic data into their own analyses with even the latest advances, viz., the 'Behavioural Movement' and 'Structural-Functional' models of political systems providing very little assistance in discerning the political meaning of development data. True votaries of Marxism seemingly offer a way to overcome this obstacle but then, most Marxist analyses of politics look like economic analyses rather than analysis of political events and political trends.

Being a political scientist by occupation, Narang has tried to strike a balance between the economic analysis of the all-India trends of capitalist development and political analysis of the one-state phenomenon of the Akali Dal's domination of Punjab politics without polling even a bare 50 per cent of the total votes, its vote-share actually being as low as 20.5 per cent in 1967. Accordingly, Narang's focus in the book is upon the deficiencies and contradictions of the all-India economic policies and their repercussions on Punjab politics. But to our mind, the author has not been successful in drawing an accurate profile of the all-India stimulus and Punjab response, let alone the question of drawing a realistic portrait of the multi-plex Punjab politics in which a political organization whose membership is open only to Sikhs has been allowed to flourish without ever being seriously challenged by the Indian National Congress with all its proclamations of being a secular all-India political party.

This basic political contradiction in the INC policies *vis-a-vis* Punjab has in fact, totally escaped Narang's attention while he has devoted considerable energy to highlight the economic character of the Indian bourgeoisie and the conflict of economic interests between the urban Hindus and rural Jat Sikhs in Punjab. Why did the INC fail, before or after 1947, to appeal to the Jat Sikhs? What is the status of the pro-INC Jat Sikhs in the Sikh community *vis-a-vis* the Akali Dal's Jat Sikhs? Are there sharp



differences of degree between the INC Jat Sikhs and Akali Jat Sikhs in terms of socio-economic status? What are the political consequences of the social partition of the Sikh community in terms of most non-Jat Sikhs supporting the INC and most Jat Sikhs being pro-Akali Dal? These are only a small sample of the type of questions which a perusal of the poll-percentages of the Akali Dal during 1952-1985 suggests. But, instead of analyzing the socio-economic bases of Punjab politics, Narang seems to be much more interested in highlighting the politico-economic contradictions of Plan policies at the all-India level.

Lest Narang feel that we are not being fair by listing the questions he has not asked, let us take a look at the answers he has provided for the resolution of the Punjab problem. Unfortunately, unlike his diagnostic pronouncements about the inherent defects and deficiencies of the model of economic development, Narang has been very reticent about proffering political solutions to the Punjab crises; such reticence being understandable in the light of his belief that, "the Punjab tangle has not fallen in the state from the blue heavens, *it is an inevitable consequence of the system,*" (p. 189, italics supplied) because once a problem (i.e. any problem) is declared to be inherent in the system the only therapy for it is to change the system. Narang does suggest such a change: "It can, therefore, be concluded that the resolution of the political crisis in general and the Punjab problem in particular requires a new model of society—a society based on full respect for human liberties, on pluralism and on a better social deal for all. . . ." (p. 188). But, as far as the "Punjab tangle" is concerned surely more quick-acting therapies are needed than "a new model of society" whose character and institutional coordinates are not specified except passing a negative omnibus value-judgement, viz., "A healthy and happy society has not so far been possible even in the industrially developed countries of the West. Such a society is even more difficult to achieve in an underdeveloped country like India, which lacks resources." (p. 188) Abandonment of the "capitalist path of development" may be an Indian leftists hobby-horse, but surely the solution of the Punjab crisis would require more concrete action-plans than an academic critique of India's developmental model which fails to realise the crucial difference between capitalism and public sector capital-formation. In any case, criticism of the Indian model of economic development suggests no specific policies for dealing with the distortions of Punjab politics in which a political party, not even fulfilling the basic definition of being a democratic political party, has been able to dominate the state-level political system while taking full advantage of the economic policies of the all-India model of economic development in terms of the so-called Green Revolution. Abandonment of this economic dynamism may dampen Akali Dal's religion-based political enthusiasm, but it is difficult



to believe that such a radical about-turn in developmental politics is the only way to silence the terrorists' guns which have claimed, as per *India Today*, 30 April 1988, as many as 4000 lives in 1987-88 alone, whereas the global toll of terrorist violence has only been 2,000 in the rest of the world between 1980-1986. Clearly, the exigencies of Punjab politics demand a more cogent political analysis rather than a vague vision of a new model of society or a non-specialists' critique of India's "mixed" economy.

The depth of Narang's "political analysis" can be judged from the last paragraph of the book wherein he sings a hymn to the glories of the 1950 Constitution and exhorts all of us to make a categorical commitment to it: "Both the left and right in India must realize that paths to the better future are through the fulfilment of the 1950 Constitution and not away from 'it'" (p. 189), without realizing that throughout the book he has never discussed the vexed question of amendments to the Constitution most of which have drastically altered the document which came into force in 1950. So sweeping have been these amendments that the Supreme Court now remains the only sentinel of its "basic structure" so that it is really difficult to treat it as a "... declaration of the next destination of a nation emerging from its colonial past" without first asking the author of any such statement to declare categorically as to which parts of the Constitution he regards as "entrenched" and which can be left to the mercy of the parliamentary majorities which have already watered down most of its liberal bed-rock of civil rights and political freedoms. To take a Punjab-relevant example, can the Constitution withstand the Sikh challenge to Article 25?

Political scientists certainly have a duty to study Punjab politics, if for no other reason than on account of the failure of the "all India" political parties like the INC, Lok Dal and BJP to penetrate and/or overcome its complex religio-political divisions. Economists also have a duty to analyze the equally complex socio-economic dichotomy which the Green Revolution has created in Punjab in which economic prosperity has bred political alienation amongst the Sikhs. In our humble opinion, the type of politico-economic analysis attempted by Narang fails to illuminate the politics as well as the economics of the Akali Dal's *Khalsa* psyche let alone the social roots of the Khalistani terrorism which, in any case, moved to a crescendo after the 1985 elections which the author seems to treat as a landmark in the process of repudiation of politics of separatism and violence. It is not that history has let him down because even without the benefit of hindsight in 1988 many people had condemned the 1985 Rajiv-Longowal Accord and many others had forecast its failure after Longowal was gunned down by the terrorists. Accord-



ingly, the book can be read as an election history, but this useful database is obscured by a polemical critique of the all-India model of economic development which fails to take into account the specificities of Punjab's economic dynamism. Hence, the book fails to do analytical justice either to "Punjab Politics" or to its "National Perspective."

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## INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By V. Machwe

The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of current Indian publications in the field of Social Sciences as are received from publishers. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the Social Sciences.

ABIDI, A.H.H. (Ed.): *Indo-Gulf Economic Relations (Patterns, Prospects and Policies)*. Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi, 1989. xi, 122 p., Rs. 100.

The book contains the Editor's Introduction and four core papers presented by scholars at a seminar organised under the auspices of Gulf Studies Programme of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, in 1986. The topics covered are trade, projects and manpower exports from India and Gulf investments in India.

BAJAJ, J.L. and C. SHASTRI, *Rural Poverty: Issues and Options*. Print House Lucknow, India, 1985, 252 p., Rs. 175.

The book evaluates concepts and propositions relating to poverty, its measurement, causes and remedies, keeping in view the theoretical dimensions with reference to implementation of anti-poverty programmes by the planners. With a wealth of statistical data, including field data, the authors, one a senior administrator and the other an academician, discuss the issues and analyse the policy options regarding regional dimensions of poverty, poverty and under-development, land reforms, integrated rural development and the question of enlisting the support and participation of the rural poor to tackle the problem of poverty.

BANERJEE, GOOROO DASS Sir. *Handbook of Education* (Reprint edition) Cosmo Publications, New Delhi, 1989, xx, 343 p., Rs- 225.

The author of this reprint edition of the book (Edn. two published in 1909) had been in the field of education in various capacities. He deals with imparting of education at three levels, namely, infancy, boyhood and youth and discusses the topics, courses of study, teaching techniques, text books, examinations, etc. He also deals with physical, moral, religious, legal, technical and national education. The author gives detailed and practical suggestions for improving these aspects of the educational system in which some problems like study through foreign medium of instruction and western methods and systems of education still persist.

BASU, Kalipada *West Bengal Economy: Past Present and Future*. Firma KLM, Calcutta, 1989, xvi, 316 p. Rs. 200.

The author analyses the causes of the decline of West Bengal's economy since the time of Independence. He studies the successive plan allocations, the invest-



ment climate, selected industries, the institutions connected with provision of infrastructural facilities and the working conditions in Writers' Buildings, the apex administrative centre of the State Government. The book also contains a section on rural development and highlights the need to review the state's financial relations with the Central Government.

**CALLAGHAN, James** *Democracy and Leadership: Our Interdependent World* (Rajaji Edowment Lectures, 1981). Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1982, 57 p., Rs. 8.

Second in the series, the two lectures were delivered by the former Prime Minister of Great Britain. The first lecture deals with the various aspects of the present state of democracy like its different forms and the spirit in which it is practised. In the second lecture, the distinguished speaker discussed the Brandt Commission Report and the Commonwealth Experts' Report and speaks about the difficulties encountered in North-South Cooperation. The book also contains the welcome speeches, the Presidential addresses and other speeches given at the function.

**CHAUDHARY, K.C.** *Non-aligned Summitry*. Capital Publishing House, Delhi, 1988, vi, 303 p., Rs. 240.

The book gives an account of the growth of the Non-aligned Movement from its sporadic rise (1945-1954) till the Eighth Summit meeting held in 1986 at Harare. The author examines the role of summit meetings in imparting the necessary cohesion to the heterogeneous non-aligned states. With reference to each of the summit meeting, he discusses the background and the organisation craft of the meeting, state of homogeneity among participating nations and in their subsequent operational efforts and the state of cohesion. Some of the topics discussed under these headings are: prevalent international situation, admission of new participants, perception of non-alignment, perception of goals, strategies of action and assessment of the summit. The book is a revised version of the author's Ph. D. thesis.

**CHOPRA, R.N.** *Green Revolution in India: The Relevance of Administrative Support for its Success—A Study of Punjab, Haryana, UP and Bihar*. Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, xvi, 255 p., Rs. 225.

The author analyses the reasons for the success of the Green Revolution in Punjab and Haryana and its implications for improving the food production in states like Bihar and Eastern Uttar Pradesh. With the help of statistical tables, the author, who was closely associated with food administration, gives the description of the progress made in food grain production since Independence, writes about the introduction of Green Revolution, its essential components, its impact on the four states and gives suggestions for making the Green Revolution a success.

**DAS, N.K.** *Ethnic Identity, Ethnicity and Social Stratification in North-East India* (Tribal Studies of India Series, T 134). Inter-India Publications, New Delhi, 1989, 323 p., Rs. 275.

A special feature of North-East India, which is divided into seven states



has been the rise of ethnic consciousness, aspirations and social, economic and political problems created by this phenomenon. The author, who has conducted research in the region, is associated with the Anthropological Survey of India. Taking into consideration the existing literature on the subject, he gives a brief ethno-historical background, discusses patterns of social structure with reference to unilineal and cognatic kinship/dissent principles, and examines the relationship between authority and power to social structure. He also deals with tribal political systems and state formation, economic dimensions of social stratifications, cultural revivalism and current problems of ethnic conflict in the region. An Appendix contains a list of ethnic groups of North-East India.

ENGINEER, Asghar Ali *Communalism and Communal Violence in India: An Analytical Approach to Hindu-Muslim Conflict*. Ajanta Publications, Delhi, India, 1989, 344 p., Rs. 250.

This book is a collection of the well-known author's articles written from time to time. While some articles have an academic angle and deal with the historical, religious, social and economic causes of the problem, the other articles analyse the recent communal incidents in Bombay, Bhiwandi, Ahmedabad, Delhi and Meerut. The author who is an activist in the cause of communal harmony pleads for objective and dispassionate investigation of communal incidents to ensure that these do not recur.

GANDHI, Rajmohan, *India Wins Errors: A Scrutiny of Maulana Azad's India Wins Freedom*. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, x, 108 p., Rs. 100.

The aim of this study by the well-known author is to note and correct the 'misstatements' in Maulana Azad's book *India Wins Freedom* (1959), which is an account of political India between 1935 to 1948 and the Maulana's role in that period. The present study has been done after the release in November 1988 of the closed portion of the Maulana's book. The author points out errors in respect of several well-known events and finds discrepancies between the 1959 and 1988 editions of the book. The author ascribes the errors to the Maulana's personality including his age and health factors as also to the Editor's lack of vigilance regarding the verification of facts. In conclusion the author points to the legacy left by the Maulana and his writings.

GHOSH, Oroon K. *How India Won Freedom*. Ajanta Publications, Delhi 1989, 115 p., Rs. 80.

The author, a free-lance writer who has written on various subjects relating to India, traces the history of the freedom movement starting from the wars and revolts against the British during the period 1757 to 1857. He recounts in brief the subsequent course taken by various strands of the Indian National Movement till 1947 when India became free. The author emphasises the role played by ideas and the various renaissance movements and writes about the contribution made by prominent leaders and thinkers to the national movement. The purpose of book is to acquaint the younger generation with the story of the Indian Freedom Movement.



GOSWAMI, Badri Prasad *Problems of Misplacement, Mutilation and Theft of Books in Libraries* (Edn. 2). Radhakrishna Publications, Varanasi, 1989, 224 p., Rs. 195.

The book examines in detail the problems relating to malpractices indulged in by unscrupulous readers of library books. It also deals with mutilation of books by insects, fire and because of unsuitable weather conditions. The author suggests remedies to prevent such loss of books. The first edition of the book was much appreciated by seniors working in the library profession.

GUPTA, M.G. *Contemporary Social and Political Theories*. MG Publishers, Agra, 1989, xv, 344 p., Rs. 275.

The author examines the classical political and social theories of Plato and Aristotle and describes the leading stoics, cynics, sceptics and epicureans and their teachings and tenets. He brings out the relevance of their theories and teachings to the later day and modern political and social theories for the current political and social conditions. The author also discusses the scientific, medical, astronomical, etc., knowledge prevalent in the Vedic and post-Vedic periods and writes about different systems of Indian philosophy and religion like Jainism, Buddhism and its variant school of Ajivikas, Sankhya system and the philosophy of Charvakas. Regarding medieval thought, the author finds that the value system of this period is still prevalent in many parts of the world including India. The other concepts and their relevance today discussed by the author are fundamentalism, Machiavellism, legitimacy, Social Darwinism, racialism and functionalism.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT, *SAARC*. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1988, iv, 117 p., Rs. 40.

Describes the evolution of the South Asian Association for Regional Coöperation (SAARC) and briefly notes the developments till the Third Summit Meeting held in Kathmandu in November 1987. It also contains the SAARC Programme of Action, Indian press comments, gleanings from Indian Parliamentary discussions, twelve documents and a select bibliography.

INDIAN PARLIAMENTARY GROUP, SEMINAR ON THE WORKING OF THE LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT NEW DELHI, 1988, *Proceedings*. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1989, viii, 70 p., Rs. 15.

Organized on the occasion of the Diamond Jubilee celebrations of the Lok Sabha Secretariat. Participants included former Lok Sabha Speakers, ministers and Members of Parliament belonging to various political parties.

ISVARMURTI, V. *Oxford and Other Essays on Education*. Vadamalai Books, Bangalore, 1989, xxi, 274 p., Rs. 300.

This volume of essays mainly deals with education and educational issues in which the author is personally involved as a student, observer and participant. The author recalls the days which he spent at Oxford and at Santiniketan and brings out the significant role played by these Universities. He writes about education in French and Swiss schools which he visited on a study tour. The



other essays in the book are on the role of public school system in India, on Auroville project (Pondicherry) and on author's experience of founding a rural secondary school which was later forced to close-down. The final essay in the book is critical and is entitled "What is Wrong with Indian Education."

KHILNANI, Niranjan *Iron Lady of Indian Politics (Indira Gandhi in Balanced Perspective)*. H.K. Publishers and Distributors, Delhi, 1989, 204 p., Rs. 175.

Bibliographical sketch of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi describing the evolution of her personality from childhood to her emergence on the national scene and as a member of the illustrious Nehru family. This assessment of Mrs. Gandhi describes her role in the Indian National Congress and as a leader of the country and contains comments on her qualities as an individual and as a leaders. The author, a former head of the Historical Division of India's Ministry of External Affairs, also writes about her programmes for poverty eradication and about her vision of India. The book contains several appendices.

LIMAYE, Madhu *Cabinet Government in India*. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, x, 346 p., Rs. 300.

The author who has been a well-known parliamentarian and leader in the Socialist Movement critically examines the genesis, evolution and decline of the cabinet government. The author, who has written on contemporary Indian politics, assesses in the the present volume, the functioning of cabinet government under successive Prime Ministers from Jawaharlal Nehru to Rajiv Gandhi—and advocates the reform of the system to stem the erosion of the Cabinet form of government. Extensive chapter notes and appendices are important parts of the book.

MAHENDER REDDY, J. Et. al. (Eds.) *(Financing India's Five Year Plans)*. Serling Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, xvi, 152 p., Rs. 125.

Papers presented at a Seminar organised by the Department of Economics, Osmania University, Hyderabad, in April 1988. These papers, mostly by academics from southern universities and academic institutions, deal with the integration of physical and financial planning, pattern of financing, domestic debt, and role of external fiance and foreign aid. Two papers examine the resources, including those generated by state level public enterpises for the financing of the Seventh Plan of Andhra Pradesh.

MALHOTRA, Vinay Kumar *Contemporary Socialist Thought: A Critical Study*. Anmol Publications, New Delhi, 1990, xv, 352 p., Rs. 350.

Different types of socialist states have emerged since the end of the Second World War. This book examines Yugoslav and Cuban Socialism and assesses the personalits of Tito and Castro. It also studies New Left and Eurocommunism. Each of these varieties of Socialism are discussed under the headings: "Meaning and Nature," "Genesis and Growth," "Characteristics and Assessment" and other headings like "How Far These Conform to Marxism or to Marxism-Leninism." the book also contains two chapters devoted to the thought of Herbert Marcuse and to the Indian Communist Movement.



MIKHIN, V. *Western Expansionism in the Persian Gulf* (The World in Focus Series) Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, 172 p., Rs. 80.

The author, who is a journalist and diplomat writes about the "discovery" of the Persian Gulf by European Powers, namely, the Portuguese and the British who followed them. He writes about the beginning of the twentieth century when oil was discovered in the area and of the subsequent period when fierce competition and rivalry led to the apportioning of the Persian Gulf's oil riches between the world's top oil companies backed by their respective governments. In subsequent chapters the author writes about the political, economic and military impact of the policies of outside powers on the region and about problems faced by countries of this troubled region.

MISRA, R.C. *Emergence of Bhutan*. Sandarabh Prakashan, Jaipur, 1989. 156 p., Rs. 150.

The author, who is with the South Asia Studies Centre of Rajasthan University, Jaipur, describes the land and people of Bhutan and gives the history of the country since the advent of the British. In subsequent chapters he deals with Bhutan's relations with India, China and Bangladesh. Three separate chapters discuss the question of Tibetan refugees, the political system of Bhutan and the role of Indian developmental aid.

MITRA, B.B. *Guardians and Wards Act (Act VIII of 1890)*. Edition 13, edited and revised by A.N. Saha. Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1988, 63, 507 p., Rs. 195.

The present edition has been completely revised keeping in view the concept of modern welfare state and the importance given to children's welfare in society. The editor, who has authored many law books, has dealt with the subject matter in a lucid style and has organised it neatly under suitable headings. Reproduction of various High Court rules, acts and specimen forms and an index is a useful feature of the book.

MUZAMMIL, Mohammad *Financing of Education*. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1989, xv, 346 p., Rs. 250.

Adequate education at various levels and planning for it is necessary for economic growth. The present study by the author, who is a university teacher in economics, analyses (i) the sources of finance for education in Uttar Pradesh; (ii) the expenditure on education by the Government both in the aggregate and at different levels of education. With numerous supporting tables the author discusses topics like education as investment, relative significance of different levels of education, role of public and private finance, budgetary allocation of funds, and suggests the reforms needed in the funding of education.

NAIK, J.A. *The Opposition in India and the Future of Democracy*. S. Chand, New Delhi, 1983, viii, 228 p., Rs. 100.

The book contains an analytical study of the functioning of Opposition Parties and the Indian National Congress (I) and is critical of the present "Western style" democratic political system. It also discusses the "Khalistan issue." Has a chapter



on "Economic Planning for Removal of Poverty" and studies the occurrence of the phenomenon of "Indian Electoral Wave", according to which, the author feels, outcome of Lok Sabha Elections can be correctly predicted. Chapters two and eight of the book have been reprinted from the author's earlier book.

PAREKH, Bhikhu *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform: An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse*. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1989, 288 p., Rs. 190.

The well-known author of many books in the field of political philosophy and Indian political thought writes in the present book about Mahatma Gandhi's quest for new moral and political principles to guide the regeneration of contemporary Indian Society. He discusses Mahatma Gandhi's ideas and actions which the latter propounded after trial and error and critically examines the way Mahatma Gandhi took recourse to the useful features of Indian tradition. The manner in which Mahatma Gandhi made efforts to solve the problems of colonial rule, of moral crisis facing the Indian Society and the question of untouchability are examined in this context. Other topics discussed are: non-violence, revolutionaries and sex. The last chapter deals with the autobiography as a genre of writing and Mahatma Gandhi's autobiography.

PRASAD, Saroj *Nehru's Concept of Freedom*. Chugh Publications, Allahabad, 1989, xi, 249 p., Rs. 200.

The author discusses, with ample quotations from the writings of Nehru, his philosophical reflections and views on many aspects of freedom. The book starts with a short biographical account of Nehru as a fighter for Indian independence. Against this background, author discusses Nehru's ideas about national, personal, social, economic and cultural (reference is to national culture, religion and role of science and technology) freedom. In the end she deals with Nehru as a historiologist and compares him with Hegel with reference to their respective views about the concept of freedom.

RAGSDALE, Tod A. *Once a Hermit Kingdom: Ethnicity, Education and National Integration in Nepal*. Manohar, New Delhi, 1989, xv, 252 p., Photographs, Rs. 200.

Study based on research conducted by the author, a World Bank consultant during 1973-74 in Nepal. It studies the impact of the New Education Plan of 1971 on the Gurungs, an ethnic minority. The study which is divided into five chapters, contains information on Nepal's population, its economic development and on educational planning. It describes the various facets of Gurung life, examines the New Education Plan of 1971, studies the complicated relationship between the Gurung villages and their schools, which have become an organic part of the community and includes recommendations concerning education of Nepal's ethnic and caste communities.

RAY, S. K. *Economics of Development*. Prentice-Hall of India, New Delhi, 1988, xviii, 434 p., Rs. 150.

The author analyses the theory and concepts of economic development as formulated by various economists (including a separate chapter on economic



development and (Keynes) and discusses the characteristics of growth of the Third World economies. The author, who writes in an easy style of an economic journalist and who was a member of the delegation to a United Nations Conference in New Delhi in 1981, chronicles the international efforts made towards the cause of world development. He discusses some important issues like inflation, parallel economy and role of planning with special reference to India and emphasises the relevance of matching growth between developing countries and the developed countries for optimum world development.

SAIKIA, P.D. and PHUKAN (Eds.): *Rural Development in North-East India*. B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1989, vii, 283 p., Rs. 150.

The book contains twenty-two papers contributed to a Seminar organised by the Agro-Economic Research Centre for North-East India, Assam Agriculture University in March 1986. The papers deal with the concept of rural development and trace the changes in its content and form and also with change in policy matters. They deal with the causes of unsatisfactory progress of rural development in the region and give recommendations. The papers, interdisciplinary in nature, deal with the North-Eastern region as a whole, with Meghalaya and with Assam in particular.

SAIN, Bhim *Alcohol Addiction: A Study in Nature and Dimensions of Drinking and Prohibition*. H.K. Publishers and Distributors, Delhi, 1989, 299 p., Rs. 225.

The book covers all the aspects of alcohol abuse. Starting with different kinds of alcoholic drinks and giving major reasons for drinking, the author writes about the mental and physical effects and about chronic drinking. The book also deals with treatment of alcoholics, with the issues of prohibition and with social efforts to contain alcohol abuse.

SESHADRI, R.K. *The Indian Financial System*. Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras, 1985, II, 287, v, II p., Rs. 75.

Former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India describes the evolution and functioning of India's financial system. The description of the financial system-policy, procedure and practices based on statutory enactments and rules and deals mainly with the topics currency, government and exchange accounts and other related accounts.

SHAGHIL, M. *The World Economic Order: Proposals for Monetary and Non-Monetary Reforms*. Cosmo Publications, New Delhi, 1989, xiii, 387 p., Rs. 350.

The author, who was associated with the United Nations, describes the major world problems which are impediments to the new economic world order. He suggests a new approach for restructuring the world economic order. This approach adopts the concept of "one world" in which natural global resource are to be used for the collective benefit of humanity. According to the author, basic structural changes like abandonment of monetary mechanism and market-oriented economy are required. The author reviews efforts made at resolving the world economic problems and gives his suggestions.



SHARMA, J.K. *Total Revolution*. Jai Hit Prakashan, Delhi, 1988, xi, 304 p., Rs.150.

The author takes stock of the present day situation in India and highlights the failure of the democratic system of government and the problems faced by the common man like poverty and disparity. As an alternative the author suggests "Total Revolution" (or people's participation in grass roots democracy) and discusses its implications and application. In this context, the author, who was associated with Sarvodaya activities and who is a founding member of The Citizens for Democracy, discusses the concept of Democratic Socialism and suggests remedial alternatives in various fields like education, economy, political participation by people, judiciary, etc.

SHARMA, Ram Autar and Sushma YADAV, (Eds.), *Political Culture in Post-Independent India*. Published by the Editors, New Delhi, 1989, 360 p., Rs. 200.

Collection of responses by eminent Social and Political Scientists and others to a questionnaire regarding Indian political culture. The editor's introductory and concluding sections elaborate on the concept of political culture and summarise the main characteristics of Indian political culture.

TONKI, S.M. *Aligarh and Jamia Fight for National Education System*. People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983, vii, 99 p., Rs. 25.

English translation of the Urdu version of the book first published in 1971 under the title *Baniye Jamia*. The book, written by a distinguished ex-alumnus of the Aligarh and Jamia Millia Islamia Universities, has been revised. It gives the historical background, shows the role played by the two universities in the National Movement, especially the Non-cooperation Movement and describes the role of leaders associated with these universities.

*Yearbooks on India's Foreign Policy, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85 and 1985-86* (four issue (Eds ), Satish Kumar. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988, 266, 270, 286 and 320 pp. Price Rs. 250 each for the first three volumes and Rs. 300 for the 1985-86 volume.

Each volume in this useful series contains three sections pertaining to the Year with which the volume deals: (i) comprehensive review of India's foreign policy; (ii) Analytical essays by wellknown scholars, diplomats, journalists and others which focus on specific areas or issues which figured prominently in the conduct of India's foreign policy; (iii) Statistical tables (except in volume for the Year 1982-83) and documents (texts or excerpts) relevant to India's foreign policy. The series thus provides a continuous survey of India's foreign policy and compilation of documents and relevant statistical data for each year in a single handy volume.



## JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: PANCHSHEEL AND INDIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL VISION OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER

By D.P. VERMA\*

*The law of nations was not concocted by 'bookworms', 'jurists' or 'professors', but was created and elaborated by the deeds of statesmen, diplomats, generals, and admirals.<sup>1</sup> This statement of the celebrated English jurist, Professor Holland, appears very much true, when attention is given to the achievements of the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru. Being a world statesman, he projected India's constitutional vision of international order, which reflects in the doctrine of Panchsheel, as five principles of peace.*

*The aim of this paper is to study, in general, Nehru's contribution to the maintenance of peace, good neighbourliness and the idea of moral conduct in international relations. To keep this paper within limits, it is addressed to two objectives: **First**, a survey of the Constituent Assembly debates in order to provide an account of the thoughts of the framers of the Indian Constitution and to find out how far Nehru's ideas influenced the drafting of articles relating to India's international relations; and **Second**, an evaluation of the concept of Panchsheel that characterizes the development of International Law in Asia. It is also felt useful to take this opportunity to note Nehru's idea of peace and the Asian phase of his political thought. It will be concluded that Nehru's Panchsheel message reflected India's constitutional vision of world order, and it will be further submitted in respect of the doctrine that the contribution has, at least, at the normative level, strengthened the regime of the principles of International Law and peace. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part deals with Nehru's constitutional vision; the second discusses his idea of peace and the third analyses the doctrine. Finally, the fourth part is the conclusion.*

### NEHRU'S CONSTITUTIONAL VISION OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER

**T**HOUGH the end of World War II is seen as a turning point in the history of the development of International Law because of a shift of emphasis from war to peace, the 'pioneering enterprise' of substituting constitutional commitments for the use of force in the

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conduct of international relations had begun during the inter-war period.<sup>2</sup> After the devastation of the world holocaust of 1939-45, peace and security became the chief concerns of International Law and organization. The phrase '*maintenance of international peace and security*' appeared as the first and the most important purpose of the United Nations Charter, while the development of friendly relations, international cooperation and harmonization of the actions of the nations were the other purposes.<sup>3</sup> They constituted the *raison d'être* of the organization. In the same order of ideas, the Charter included seven principles to be the methods and regulating norms according to which the United Nations and its members should endeavour to achieve common ends.<sup>4</sup>

Asian countries—India, China, Japan and Pakistan—have adopted in their constitutions specific provisions about international relations. The foreign policy of nationalist China was based on the principles of equality and reciprocity, to cultivate good neighbourliness, respect for treaties and the United Nations Charter with an object not only to protect the rights and interests of overseas Chinese nationals, but also to promote international cooperation, advance international justice and ensure world peace.<sup>5</sup> Japan declared its constitutional commitment that it would renounce war as its sovereign right and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes; it accordingly, aspired to international peace based on justice and order.<sup>6</sup> The Constitution of Pakistan 1962, speaks about the bonds of unity amongst Muslim states, promotion of international peace and security, goodwill and friendly relations amongst all states and pacific means of settling international disputes.<sup>7</sup> However, the constitutions of other Asian countries, except that of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Philippines, do not carry any provision about international relations.<sup>8</sup>

India's constitutional vision of international order is traced in Article 51 of its Constitution, where it is stated that the "State shall endeavour to (a) promote international peace and security; (b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations; (c) foster respect for International Law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another; and (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration." Article 51, as its final and amended text in the present form, was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1948.<sup>9</sup> When the Constitutional Adviser, Sir Benegal Rao had issued on 2 September 1946, two notes on the subject of fundamental rights for the use of the members of the Assembly, Part A of the note contained seven clauses—the first clause having been taken from



the Declaration of Havana (1939) that:

*The state shall promote international peace and security by the elimination of war as an instrument of national policy, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments and by the maintenance of justice and the scrupulous respect for treaty obligations in the dealings of organized people with one another.*<sup>10</sup>

The draft clause was discussed by the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights, and the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc., during April-August 1947. As a result of discussion, the words 'by the elimination of war as an instrument of national policy' were deleted from the draft clause and the rest of the text appeared as draft article 40 of the draft constitution submitted by the Constitutional Adviser in October 1947 for consideration.<sup>11</sup>

By a simple amendment to the draft, B.R. Ambedkar divided the original text into three parts separating each from the other so that the article could give a complete idea of what was exactly intended.<sup>12</sup> A consensus appears to have prevailed in the Constituent Assembly that India's international relations be based on peace. However, some Assembly members approached the same idea but from different perspectives. *Firstly*, it was held by K.T. Shah that international peace cannot be established unless an open and frank declaration of policy—pledging a nation unreservedly to peace, to the maintenance of International Law and friendship—was given. According to him, international peace was a first step towards progress in an allround disarmament. *Secondly*, Mahavir Tyagi who had, in fact, argued for a militarily strong India, supported Shah. He was of the opinion that no one would care nor would any one listen to India unless it was strong. To fight for a cause of peace, a road to disarmament was required. Tyagi advocated that the future government of India be given directive in that regard, if the laudable objective of international peace was to be achieved. *Thirdly*, B.H. Khardekar said, while discussing the positivist-naturalist controversy on the nature of International Law, that the law of nations was neither a panacea nor a chimera but an evolutionary process. From this perspective, there were, he observed, great expectations from India to develop International Law. *Fourthly*, another member, Damodar Swarup Seth critically evaluated the draft article and found that it had ignored some fundamental issues like political and economic emancipation of the oppressed and backward



peoples. He was the only member to move a substantive amendment to Ambedkar's text on draft article 40, that the following words be added: "It shall also promote political and economic emancipation and cultural advancement of the oppressed and backward peoples and the international regulation of the legal status of workers with a view to ensuring a universal minimum of social rights to the entire working people." But the proposed amendment was not accepted. The Ambedkar division of draft article 40 was accepted with a few minor modifications in certain words. *Lastly*, the suggestion of Ananthsayanam Ayyangar was agreed upon by the members and a new clause on encouragement "of the settlement of international disputes by arbitration" was added to the text.<sup>13</sup>

The sentiments expressed in the Assembly also reflected the country's traditional culture concerned with peace. It was expressed that it was only India in the world, which can with ancient culture, spiritual heritage and centuries old tradition of non-aggression lay the foundations of international morality. To support, the reference was made to the mission of peace right from the thoughts of Ram Tirth Paramhansa and Swami Vivekananda down to Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi.<sup>14</sup>

This exercise of looking back into the history of the drafting of Article 51 of the Indian Constitution, clearly reveals that Nehru had not participated in the Assembly debate on India's constitutional vision of international order. It was only the speech on the *Resolution Regarding Aims and Objects of the Assembly*, 13 December 1946, where we find him moving a resolution, including therein paragraph 8 that:

"This ancient land attains the rightful and honoured place in the world and makes its full and willing contribution to the *promotion of world peace* and the welfare of mankind."

He had asked the framers of the Constitution to bear that larger international aspect in mind as India had, on the verge of independence, begun to play an important role in international affairs. Perhaps for this reason, it has been observed that Nehru's world perspective and vision of the future role of India in world affairs *must have* exercised on the minds of the framers. It was natural for these directives, therefore, to find a place in the Constitution.<sup>15</sup> There is no gainsaying the fact that Article 51 is a pledge that India will work for the promotion of world peace and security, enhancement of International Law and treaty obligations and settlement of its differences with other countries by peaceful means. Paranjpe writes that it was only Article 51 in Chapter IV of the Constitution of India that has been imple-



mented to the fullest expression through the foreign policy of India.<sup>16</sup> It does not only lay down what India is expected to do, it also states the limitations within which this country has to play an important role in international relations. To quote Bishwanath Das:

The role is honest; the role is upright; the role is open. . . .  
There is nothing hidden in our ways. There is nothing secret in our ways.<sup>17</sup>

#### NEHRU'S IDEA OF PEACE

In an attempt to evaluate India's crusade for *Panchsheel* all over the world, and particularly in Asia, it would not be correct to overlook the significance of Nehru's ideas of peace and the Asian phase of his political thought.

Nehru had begun taking interest in international relations since his participation in the Conference of the League Against Imperialism, held at Brussels in February 1927. Earlier, he was so much involved in Indian politics that he could not show much interest in international problems. According to Michael Brecher, the Brussels Conference proved to be a turning point in the development of his political thought and gave him a broad international outlook.<sup>18</sup> After his return from the Conference, he observed on 13 September 1927, that it was difficult for India, during foreign domination, to develop an independent external policy. But the League Against Imperialism had offered a general line of future policy of which India should take full advantage. Nevertheless, he was cautious that India should not confine to the framework provided by the League. He had no intention to dance to the tune of the League; his final break with it came in April 1930.<sup>19</sup> In 1936, Nehru wrote in an article that an independent India would address its future role in international affairs to "world peace and against Imperialism and its offshoots." According to him, the foundation of peace meant the elimination of Imperialism, Colonialism, Racism and the dominance of one country or people or class over another.<sup>20</sup>

Nehru was "an arch rebel and an angel of peace." If, on the one hand, he was of the opinion that the colonized countries should revolt (if possible, by non-violent means) against their colonial masters, he also held that international peace and order could only be maintained by the principles and practice of mutual tolerance and non-aggression.<sup>21</sup> He knew that a fixed pattern of international behaviour, if pursued in the light of pre-colonial experience, would be totally different from what was relevant in the contemporary international order.<sup>22</sup> Therefore his



message to the Constituent Assembly was that of international peace and friendly relations and not the message of anti-Colonialism and anti-Imperialism.

At a state banquet in his honour by the Chinese Premier in Peking, Nehru said that peace was a way of life, thinking and action; it was a state of mind. On another occasion, he expressed that whenever one desired peace, "one must think of peace, and prepare for peace, instead of thinking of war and preparation of war."<sup>23</sup> To him, peace was not an absence of war; it could only be preserved by methods of peace. The goal cannot be achieved only by 'condemnation or mutual recrimination' but rather by creating an environment of peace. He expressed his concern about the complex and overwhelming problem of the day, that the language of war was being used to promote peace. Therefore, he insisted on developing the temper of peace.<sup>24</sup>

This approach was not new to India; its philosophical outlook had come into being with the teachings of Lord Buddha as early as the Sixth Century B.C., when a common heritage was provided to the Asian countries and they were linked by Buddhist civilization. In a speech in the United States' House of Representatives and the Senate on 13 October 1949, Nehru had commented that India had stood for peace throughout its long history and that "every prayer that an Indian raises, ends with an invocation to peace." The basis of India's foreign policy was, according to him, "to plead for and endeavour to practice... a binding faith in peace and an unfailing endeavour of thought and action to ensure it."<sup>25</sup> India in fact, has always been, since the ancient times, a peace loving country and has never desired aggression and expansion in its relation with other countries.

There is, no doubt, a great measure of truth in the fact that a country's external policy reflects its cultural traditions and has domestic roots; the role of Indian cultural traditions of peace and non-aggression in India's foreign policy can be emphasised more and more, but we should not forget that our philosophical and religious thoughts also bear evidence that India has produced a political thinker like Kautilya.<sup>26</sup> Though certain principles of International Law were applied in interstate relations, it is also true at the same time that the "racial expansion, religious differences and personal ambitions" had brought wars of aggression resulting in the rise and fall of many empires in different states in India. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that mutual tolerance and non-aggression were preached from time to time in this country, and in the post-independent days' Indian history, traditions and philosophy were extended into the external relations of India.<sup>27</sup>

Being a world statesman and man of cosmopolitan outlook, Nehru was not a pacifist like Mahatma Gandhi and his views on international



peace and affairs exercised more influence than any other politician. His views were twenty years ahead of many leaders of the world. Though an idealist, Nehru could visualize as to what was possible in international relations and what was not. Vincent Sheean has characteristically defined his policy as "The pursuit of peace—when possible", which had appreciable result of such a nature that India came on better terms at that time with China, the Soviet Union, the United States and other big powers, than they were with each other. All that he tried to do was to be of some service in the preservation of peace, the idea inherited from India's past.<sup>28</sup>

### *Nehru's Intellectual Make-up*

Since Nehru was so much responsible for shaping the foreign policy of India it becomes important to keep in mind the realm of his thought to arrive at a correct understanding of India's international relations. It is no exaggeration to say that all credit for formulating external policy of independent India be given exclusively to Nehru.<sup>29</sup> He had assumed the role of "the philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the outside world." But this should not mean that his personality and thoughts had so much influence that the foreign policy could be termed his "private monopoly."<sup>30</sup>

There were a number of different cross-currents in Nehru's intellectual make-up. Almost all the ideological currents—Classical Liberalism, Fabian Socialism, Gandhian message for non-violence, Marxist theory of classless society, ethical norms of western humanism, the precepts of *Vedanta*, and the ancient system of the Hindu philosophy—"appealed at various stages in his growth of intellectual maturity." Brecher submits that none of these dominated his outlook nor could they be systematically integrated by Nehru into a consistent personal and political philosophy, as he was "an eclectic in intellectual matters."<sup>31</sup>

Nehru has been generally portrayed to be an idealist, because he was, according to some writers, "not adequately aware of security and power factors" and many weaknesses of his external policy were attributed to it. But some other writers, have found him a realist. However, Misra correctly submits that it was unfair to place Nehru either in an idealist or realist category. To quote him: "In a sense, he was both, and yet in another sense, he was neither of the two. . . . It would lead to better understanding if it is realized that he constituted a category for himself, in which he combined the finer elements of both."<sup>32</sup> Nehru had tried "to harmonize and balance beneficial elements



of idealism with his basic realist approach", because idealism was, according to him, "the realism of tomorrow." Nehru's idealistic realism can be found in his "deviation from, a substitute for an alternative to, traditional power-oriented approach", which did not ignore the realities of power but rejected power politics.<sup>33</sup>

Being a realist, Nehru recognized power and security factors of India for the purpose of national defence and not for developing armaments as an instrument of power against other countries. As an idealist, Nehru made efforts to shape the international events with a view to ease the cold war tension without resorting to the methods of power politics.<sup>34</sup> To put it in other words, it can be said that India, under Nehru's leadership, "has tried to adapt, however effectively, the theory to reality in so far as she could. . . at the same time she brought it a touch of her idealism."<sup>35</sup> Nehru was not a pure idealist. He used to refer that India's national interest was the important determinant of his foreign policy. He was very much critical of the purely realist view of international politics based on military and economic power. He supported "the idealist political tradition of modern India in general and the Gandhian insistence on non-violent and right means in particular, as an important element of Indian foreign policy."<sup>36</sup>

### *Asian Phase of Nehru's Political Thought*

Pan-Asianism was "an article of faith" with Nehru's policy. An origin of this phase of his political thought is traced from his idea of peace and his participation in the Brussels Conference of the League Against Imperialism in 1927. In his Report on the Conference, dated 19 February 1927, he had mentioned that a strong desire of the delegations from Asian countries could be noticed right from the beginning of the Conference that some sort of Asiatic federation was needed. A feeling of togetherness among the Asian countries was due to "recognition of a common bond of unity among them."<sup>37</sup> After ten years of the League Against Imperialism, he addressed the plenary session of the Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi on 23 March 1947, that Pan-Asianism was not directed against Europe or America. He made it clear that the Pan-Asian Movement was a design to promote peace all over the world.<sup>38</sup> However, the Bandung meet of 1955 represented the high point in Pan-Asianism.<sup>39</sup>

Keeping in view that the "geography of International Law" had radically changed, and it was "no longer the almost exclusive preserve of . . . European blood,"<sup>40</sup> Nehru believed strongly that the unity of Asian countries was very essential for a new world order. The Asian states had gained their right place on the world stage after a too long



subordination under the European Powers, and this incident agitated Nehru's mind that he began to think of a permanent peace in Asia which would alone be capable of banning war altogether from the world. In a burst of enthusiasm, he addressed the concluding session of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung that Asia had been passive enough in the past, when it had tolerated submissiveness for a long period. Asia was now no longer passive and submissive; it was dynamic and full of life.<sup>41</sup> He interpreted others to Asia and Africa, and interpreted Asia and Africa to others. Therefore, President Nasser of the United Arab Republic had commented that Nehru was "the finest example of mutual interpretation."<sup>42</sup> Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, a number of collective self-defence alliances had been concluded on ideological basis. International Law was, at that time, more concerned with the rivalry between the Communist and the non-Communist countries. Against this background, the main problem of the day, Nehru felt, was how to avoid war, relax international tension and lessen the grip of cold war, when the two hostile blocs were out to destroy each other.<sup>43</sup> Since fear was the basic cause of war, the chief question was ultimately to end that fear. Establishment of the "right psychological climate" to remove that fear was the only means that Nehru wished.<sup>44</sup>

Many Western international lawyers held a pessimistic view about International Law after World War II. Most of them had predicted a crisis in International Law, due to the emergence of the newly-independent countries in Asia and Africa. The new states were, according to them, not going to accept the law in the formation of which they had not participated, and the anti-colonialist rebellion was likely to shake the foundations of traditional International Law. A doubt was expressed that the states would consider the law as an alien system imposed on them by the European states.<sup>45</sup> While expecting such a crisis, H.A. Smith asserted in 1947 that the very roots of International Law—the Eurocentric culture, legal traditions and common convictions—were being threatened. However, Chou Geng-Sheng observed that the pessimistic views "had warrant neither in theory nor in fact."<sup>46</sup>

Nehru was very much opposed to the oppressive, imperialistic, colonialistic and exploitative principles,<sup>47</sup> but he did not reject traditional International Law. He always emphasized that there must be intercourse between nations and no nation had a choice except to subscribe to the principles and rules of international peace which were necessary for its regulation. India explicitly acknowledged, perhaps for this reason, the effectiveness of International Law in its Constitution, and it was mentioned in Article 51(c) that the State shall foster respect for International Law. It was, undoubtedly, an unquestionable acceptance of the



validity of and respect for International Law. But the Constituent Assembly did not discuss which of the four possible positions with regard to traditional International Law—the total rejection, total acceptance, partial acceptance and eclectic selection<sup>48</sup>—would be accepted by an independent India. The question still remains unanswered whether they were aware that (1) a denial of that International Law could imply a denial of rights accorded under the law of nations, or (2) a replacement of the traditional International Law was impossible to be achieved at that time.

However, Nehru knew it quite well that the Asian states were also not prepared to reject the existing International Law in its entirety. The Asian countries would need a system of norms which would help in establishing an orderly and just society in Asia at various levels of growing intensity of their communications. It was easier for the Asian countries, against this background, to accept without any objection the ideas of territorial integrity, non-intervention, non-aggression, sovereign equality, reciprocity and peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus, Nehru created a climate of dedicated endeavour and moral aspiration, which he had thought would become an enduring feature of India's international relations. He regarded that *Panchsheel* was India's special contribution towards creating that climate, an environment, which in the words of Burke, "demanded nothing from its converts beyond a verbal affirmation of five well worn cliches."<sup>49</sup>

### DOCTRINE OF PANCHSHEEL

#### *The Concept of Panchsheel: Formulation and Reaffirmation*

The principal taking off point of the Nehru era of Indian foreign policy has been the concept of *Panchsheel*, the five foundations of peace. The doctrine represented a catalogue of "cardinal general principles" *in abstracto*,<sup>50</sup> whose ultimate source was believed to be found in Indian history and philosophy. There were three objects behind the concept: *first* being the positive objective, to establish a peaceful climate where international tension be relaxed; the *second*, a negative objective, to the futility of the recourse to violence and hatred; and finally, the *third* objective that a power-vacuum, created in the Asian states by the withdrawal of imperialist powers, may not induce the other big military powers to extend spheres of influence in that area.<sup>51</sup>

The idea of *Panchsheel* was given precision and formal seal of recognition on 29 April 1954, when the Five Principles were first given expression in a five-point preamble to an agreement between India and the People's Republic of China—"On Trade and Intercourse Between



Tibet Region of China and India.”<sup>52</sup> Though the agreement was mainly concerned with the establishment of trade agencies in India by China and in Tibet by India and recognition of pilgrims’ travels in India and Tibet and other matters, the agreement included in its preamble the following principles, which are known as *Panchsheel*:

- (i) *Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty;*
- (ii) *Mutual non-aggression;*
- (iii) *Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs;*
- (iv) *Equality and mutual benefit, and*
- (v) *Peaceful co-existence.*<sup>53</sup>

Speaking in Parliament on the pact with China, Nehru called the preamble “the major thing about the Agreement”, and further added that many problems of the contemporary world might disappear “if these principles were adopted in the relations of various countries with one another.” An adherence to these principles created an “area of peace” between India and China, and Nehru wished that the area of peace was “spread over the rest of Asia and over the rest of the world.”<sup>54</sup>

During 1954-56, Nehru visited twenty-six countries and hosted forty-one Heads of State, Heads of Governments and foreign ministers with the message of *Panchsheel*.<sup>55</sup> As a result, the principles were adhered to, by the end of 1956, by a number of countries like Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Egypt, Indonesia, Laos, People’s Republic of Mongolia, Nepal, Poland, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union, Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Yugoslavia; the term *Panchsheel* became an ‘international coin.’<sup>56</sup> The principles were reaffirmed in the Asian-African Conference held in the West Java city of Bandung in Indonesia on 18-24 April 1955. Having been sponsored by “the Colombo Powers”—India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, and Pakistan—the Conference was attended by twenty-nine countries of Asia and Africa.<sup>57</sup> Despite “strenuous pleading”, Nehru could not make the leaders of twenty-eight countries to agree to limit themselves to *Panchsheel*. The final communique of the Conference included a most significant document “Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation”, in which ten specified principles were listed with an expectation that they would regulate the relations of the nations of the world with each other. It must be noted that a reference to peaceful co-existence was completely omitted, while the right of collective defense was included.<sup>58</sup> However, Nehru welcomed the clause relating to collective defense in the Bandung Declaration and did not express any objection to it. The reason stated was that the Declaration had referred to self-defence in terms of Article 51 of UN Charter where the inherent



right of individual or collective self-defence was recognized in case of an armed attack against a member of the United Nations until the Security Council had taken measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>59</sup>

Nehru claimed that the Bandung Declaration had fully embodied the Five Principles and an addition to the ten specified principles had reinforced *Panchsheel*. The principles were not, according to him, the 'divine commandments' nor was there any particular sanctity about their number or formulation, rather "the essence of them (was) the substance." He considered the achievement of the Conference to be 'epoch making.' He had observed that it was a misreading of history to regard Bandung as an isolated occurrence. A more correct view, he said, was to see it as "a part of a great movement of human history." Ever since its inception *Panchsheel* has been endorsed many times by world statesmen and it has been regarded in the west, as a central creed of India's foreign policy.<sup>60</sup>

Since *Panchsheel* had emerged from the Sino-Indian Pact over the Tibet Region of China, the names of Nehru and Chou En-lai are associated with it. The Chinese Communist sources associate the name of Prime Minister U Nu of Burma alongwith the names of the Indian and Chinese Premiers.<sup>61</sup> It is interesting, however, to note that in an interview with Brecher, Krishna Menon mentioned the name of T.N. Kaul, the then Indian Ambassador in Peking, who was responsible for the mootng of the concept of the Five Principles.<sup>62</sup> The principles were, for the first time, termed as *Panch Shila* by K.M. Pannikar in a broadcast talk over the All India Radio on 28 July 1954. But the word *Panchsheel* found its first expression by Nehru in his speech in Indonesia on 23 September 1954.<sup>63</sup> While in Indonesia, Nehru had in fact, heard the words '*Panch Shila*' used but in a different context. Its Indonesian interpretation—meaning thereby nationalism, internationalism or humanism, consent of democracy, social prosperity and faith in God—fired in him an imagination that it might be "a suitable description of the five principles of international behaviour" to which India can subscribe. According to him, these words having been derived from Sanskrit, were easily received in India. He preferred the spelling *Panchsheel*, as the expression has been in use from the ancient times to describe the five moral precepts of Buddhism relating to personal behaviour, which were "enshrined in the rock edicts of Emperor Ashoka and echoed more than two thousand years later in (Mahatma) Gandhi's teachings."<sup>64</sup>

### *Significance of Panchsheel*

The formulation of *Panchsheel* was a great contribution to International Law. Not only it conforms to the obligations and aims of the



United Nations Charter, it has over the years been enlarged by bilateral statements and agreements by many countries.<sup>65</sup> None of the five principles were new to the law of nations, each principle existed as an independent and recognized part of International Law. The great significance of the concept lies in the fact that it has collected all the principles in "a single rubric and in this embodiment has become established as the foundation of contemporary International Law."<sup>66</sup> While speaking before the *Lok Sabha*, Nehru had stated that there was nothing new about this concept except that the old idea had gained a new application to a "particular context", in which it had begun to acquire a specific meaning and significance in world affairs.<sup>67</sup> To this, Karanjia adds that, *Panchsheel* was not "the most historical legacy from the past but also... a most useful historical imperative in the context of contemporary problems."<sup>68</sup>

Each of the five principles of *Panchsheel* can be found in the UN Charter. The first principle, namely *mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty*, is similar to Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter which states that, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . . ." The second principle, *mutual non-aggression*, can be found identical to Article 2, Para 3 of the Charter, that international disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in such a manner that "international peace and security and justice are not endangered." The third principle, *mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs*, resembles Article 2(7) of the Charter, which carries a provision on non-intervention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. . . ." The fourth principle about *equality and mutual benefit* resembles Paras 1 and 2 of Article 2 of the UN Charter, where it is provided that the United Nations is "based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members", and that "all members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them. . . ." Lastly, the fifth principle, dealing with *peaceful co-existence*, has similar expression in the preamble to the Charter in the following words: "To practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours. . . ." Thus, the five principles of *Panchsheel* and the UN Charter can well be compared to reveal identical ideas.<sup>69</sup>

It was a novelty of India's contribution that these principles were made the foundations of practical state policy and conduct in international relations. If these principles are of ancient lineage in Buddhist literature and have similarity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, a need for reaffirming those principles in *Panchsheel* cannot be questioned. Rajan argues that when similar



principles were incorporated in the UN Charter, most of the Asian countries were not members of the United Nations. A subscription to *Panchsheel* by those countries "both reinforced the United Nations and provided those states the basic norms of international behaviour."<sup>70</sup> It can be said without any exaggeration that India has played a significant role in that regard. While the American leaders were persuading the countries to join western systems of collective defence in the name of peace, Nehru asked them to join "the alternative method of winning peace by mounting the *Panchsheel* bandwagon."<sup>71</sup> He saw in the five principles a challenge to the World. The principles were designed to be a proper structure for building a new international order and to be instrumental in maintaining international peace and security. In fact, *Panchsheel* can be seen as "a fairly good example of a normative balance of power policy."<sup>72</sup>

Nehru's major contribution of lasting value to India and its international relations has been the formulation of this doctrine as an alternative political ideal. Various ideologies were struggling for support in the Afro-Asian region, but Nehru was able to select from the various positions the idea of promotion of peace which he thought was the most suitable. He had proceeded on this approach on the assumption that peace could not be promoted by creating positions of strength—for they were a threat to peace, and there was more possibility of war as a result of military alliances. Nehru knew quite well that a peaceful approach was not a guarantee for peace, but he insisted that it be tried as there was no alternative.<sup>73</sup> Late Judge Nagendra Singh mentioned that the significance of the concept can also be assessed from the fact that it has taken deep roots in the hands of the UN General Assembly.<sup>74</sup> During the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations in 1970, the General Assembly adopted without vote, a significant Resolution 2625 (XXV), entitled "Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."<sup>75</sup> Having embodied the formulation of the seven principles of International Law referred to in operative Paragraph 1 of General Assembly Resolution 1815 (XVII),<sup>76</sup> the Friendly Relations Declaration bears important evidence to show how the principles underlying *Panchsheel* have found expression of close resemblance after intensive efforts of the international organization with regard to the promotion of peace in the world community.



### *Criticism of Panchsheel*

Criticisms have been made against *Panchsheel* right from its inception. First, Friedmann has argued that there was nothing more than a verbal identity between the doctrine and *Panch Shila* of Buddhism. The argument is advanced on the ground that Lord Buddha had given the Ten Precepts or Laws of Priesthood, where the first five precepts—abstinence from destroying life, from theft, from fornication and all uncleanness, from lying, and from liquor, spirits and strong drinks which were a hindrance to merit—had formed a central theme of the Buddhist moral code. This code of morality was meant for personal conduct and it was wrong to state that *Panchsheel* has been derived from Buddhist literature.<sup>77</sup> Second, Bozeman commented that a reference to Buddhist morality in the context of Indian external policy was spurious. Buddhist ethics, as originally constituted, was not meant for political ideologies, rather was designed for the “development of non-political morality”, as a result of which, an attempt by Emperor Ashoka to translate Buddhist morality in international relations had proved to be a dismal failure.<sup>78</sup> Third, *Panchsheel* was criticised on the ground that the Five Principles had put a seal of approval upon the destruction of Tibet, an ancient country, which was spiritually and culturally associated with India. Tibet had a distinct culture, language and geography and had been independent since 1911 when the Chinese revolution had ended the Manchu Dynasty. Later, the Tibetan Government broke off diplomatic relations with China in 1949 and did not maintain foreign relations with that government since then. Thus, according to the critics, *Panchsheel* was born out of the surrender in Tibet, and the debacle of Tibet was a debacle of the Five Principles.<sup>79</sup> Tibet wanted to live its own life. Non-intervention, the very fundamental principle of *Panchsheel*, was broken, as Tibet was not allowed to live its own life and Nehru endorsed the Chinese claim that Tibet was an integral part of China.<sup>80</sup>

Fourth, the Chinese attack on Indian territory and the Soviet invasion of Hungary made “mockery of the high-sounding phrases.” It was stated that *Panchsheel*, as a code of international morality, was not effective in new situations. A violation of the Five Principles by China, a principal subscriber, proved that there was no respect for the concept. And the critics argued that the concept of *Panchsheel* had met with a serious setback in the context of Sino-Indian relations.<sup>18</sup> Fifth, there was always a danger, it was added, that principles of coexistence may lead to *status quo* in international relations, where Imperialism, Colonialism, exploitation and inequality could be allowed to co-exist.<sup>82</sup>



Though Nehru was compelled to admit that people's faith in *Panchsheel* or the Bandung spirit had suffered considerably, despite all the criticisms, he defended the principles and expressed that he would not think of a change in the Five Principles of Peace. *Panchsheel* was the only alternate way to peace. If China had not remained faithful to the concept, "India must adhere to", said Nehru, "what she had always preached and remained steadfast in the faith." To Nehru, it was not a matter of faith on one party, it was rather a question of creating an environment, a condition, in which the other party could not break its words. He regarded *Panchsheel* a "practical idealism."<sup>83</sup> Whenever any principle takes birth or is strengthened in international relations, there is always a possibility that the parties subscribing to it may depart from it because of weaker sanction in International Law. Nehru was aware of such a possibility and wrote that there was never anything certain in international relations. A friend may turn enemy tomorrow, but India should not go the way of enmity and suspicion nor should it give a chance to other approaches. Though one should be prepared for any eventuality, it was always better, according to him, to have an honest and sincere faith for the best.<sup>84</sup>

### CONCLUSIONS

Knowing Nehru from his numerous speeches and writings, and having followed his efforts towards the maintenance of peace, good neighbourliness and moral conduct in international relations, it can be concluded that he could very successfully give not only shape to the constitutional vision of international order for which India has stood, he contributed as well a concept, a doctrine, which has strengthened the regime of the principles of International Law. Though his contribution has been largely at the level of fundamental principles, it can be seen as a development of International Law in Asia.

The greatest contribution of Nehru was the doctrine of *Panchsheel*. The Five Principles were not merely desirable in themselves, they were also unavoidable. It is difficult to ignore completely the idea and its importance; we cannot underestimate it. Given the polarization of the world into two power blocs on ideological basis, given the fact that an abstract formulation of the doctrine would not be liked by the militarily powerful countries of the West, particularly during the Cold War situation, and given the conflicting interest of many states, the fact that it was accepted by the newly independent states of Asia and Africa, is indeed a great achievement of Nehru. It did set, in fact, certain standards of international conduct. The perspective of *Panchsheel* determines its value and



it is the extent to which the doctrine be studied. It tends to concentrate much on the normative aspects of international peace.

Those who see the concept as one which had gone wrong in international relations, it appears to them sadly incomplete and lacking in balance. To some critics, the ambiguities or inconsistencies in the wordings of the doctrine may appear attributable to the fact that its text was not well drafted nor carefully thought of. However, there should be little doubt that Nehru made strenuous efforts, through the idea of the Five Principles, to find the best possible common ground on which the Asian countries and the rest of the world could live in peace with each other. No doubt, the common ground is limited and it conceals many pitfalls, but it cannot be denied that some progress has taken place in strengthening and developing International Law in Asia. There is always a possibility that some subscriber to such principles would never hesitate in violating them for short-term political objectives. A sacrifice of these moral conducts may profit one and hurt others, but the message of *Panchsheel* will never go in vain; it is bound to work, it will work.

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  - 19 *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Vol. II (Delhi, 1972), at p. 363 (Hereinafter cited as *Selected Works*).
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  - 21 K.V. Rao, "Peaceful Co-existence," in: Harnam Singh (Ed.), *Studies in World Order* (Delhi, 1972), at p. 244.
  - 22 Upendra Baxi, "Some Remarks on Eurocentrism and the Law of Nations," in R.P. Anand (Ed.), *Asian States and the Development of International Law* (Delhi, 1972), at p. 7.
  - 23 M.S. Rajan, *India in World Affairs 1954-56*. (New Delhi, 1964), at pp. 41-42.
  - 24 Jawaharlal Nehru, "India Today and Tomorrow," in: Jawaharlal Nehru, Arnold Toynbee and Earl C.R. Attlee, *India and the World* (New Delhi, 1962), at pp. 26 and 28; Sarvepalli Gopal (Ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology* (Delhi, 1980), at pp. 392 and 418-424; C.D. Narasimhaiya (Ed.), *Selections from Speeches by Jawaharlal Nehru* (Madras, 1959), at p. 80.
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  - 26 A.P. Rana, "The Nature of India's Foreign Policy," *India Quarterly*, Vol. 22, 1966, p. 121.
  - 27 A. Appadorai, *The Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy 1947-1972* (Bombay, 1981), at pp. 25-57; M.C. Chagla, "Fundamentals of Policy," in Rafiq Zakaria (Ed.), *A Study of Nehru* (Bombay, 1960), at p. 229; K.V. Rao, *Supra*, n. 21, at pp. 243-244.
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  - 29 Bimla Prasad, *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and World Affairs, 1885-1947* (Calcutta, 1962), at p. 1;



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- 30 Michael Brecher, *Supra*, n. 18, at p. 564.
- 31 *Ibid.*, pp. 598-599.
- 32 K.P. Misra, "The Nature of Jawaharlal Nehru's Realism in Foreign Policy," in M.S. Rajan (Ed.), *Studies in Politics: National and International* (Prepared in Honour of Dr. A. Appadorai, Delhi 1971), at p. 506.
- 33 J. Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Processes and Personalities* (Bombay, 1970), at p. 232.
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- 36 Bandyopadhyaya, *Supra*, n. 33, at p. 67.
- 37 *Selected Works*, *Supra*, n. 19, at pp. 289-290; A. Appadorai, *Essays in Indian Politics and Foreign Policy* (Delhi, 1971), at p. 156; Satyavrata Ramdas Patel, *Foreign Policy of India: An Inquiry and Criticism* (Bombay, 1960), at p. 32.
- 38 *Selected Works*. Second Series, *Supra*, n. 20, at p. 506; J.S. Bright (Ed.), *Before and After Independence: A Collection of the Most Important and Soul-stirring Speeches Delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru* (New Delhi), at p. 424-429. In a speech in the Canadian Parliament, Ottawa, on 24 October 1949, Nehru mentioned that "the philosophy of Asia has been and is the philosophy of peace." Sarvepalli Gopal, *Supra*, n. 24, at p. 369.
- 39 Robert A. Scalapino, *Asia and the Road Ahead; Issues for the Major Powers* (Berkeley, 1975), at p. 112.
- 40 *Yearbook of the International Law Commission* 1957. Vol. 1, at p. 158.
- 41 Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*. Fourth Edition (London, 1956), at pp. 555 and 561; *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. II, August 1949-February 1953 (Delhi, 1954), at p. 395; *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. III, March 1953-August 1957 (Delhi, 1958), at p. 289; George McTurnan Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference—Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955* (New York 1956), at pp. 73-75; Jagat S. Bright, *India on the March: Statements and Selected Quotations from the Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru* (Lahore, 1946), at p. 87. Similar ideas were also expressed by Nehru in his inaugural speech delivered at the Asian Conference in New Delhi on 23 March 1947. See Jawaharlal Nehru, *Independence and After: A Collection of the More Important Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru from September 1946 to May 1949* (Delhi, 1949), at pp. 295-301; C.D. Narasimhaiyah, *The Human Idiom: Three Lectures on Jawaharlal Nehru* (Bombay, 1967), at p. 61; Sarvepalli Gopal, *Supra*, n. 24, at p. 393; Michael Brecher, *Supra*, n. 18, at p. 593; V.B. Karnik, "Jawaharlal Nehru—Foreign Policy," in A.B. Shah (Ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Critical Tribute* (Bombay, 1965), at pp. 100-101; S.L. Poplai (Ed.), *The Temper of Peace—Select Documents 1954-55* (New Delhi, 1955), at p. 29.
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- 48 J.J.G. Syatauw, "The Relationship Between the Newness of States and their Practices of International Law," in R.P. Anand, *Supra*, n. 22, at p. 12.
- 49 Tibor Mende, *Conversations with Mr. Nehru* (London, 1956), at p. 81; S.M. Burke, *Supra*, n. 44, at p. 80.
- 50 Edward McWhinney, "Peaceful Coexistence" and *Soviet-Western International Law* (Liden, 1964), at p. 34.
- 51 A. Appadorai and V.K. Arora, *India in World Affairs 1957-58* (New Delhi, 1975), at pp. 6-8.
- 52 *United Nations Treaty Series*, 1958, 299, No. 4307, pp. 57-81; Lok Sabha Secretariat, *Foreign Policy of India—Texts of Documents 1947-58* (New Delhi, 1958), at pp. 87-93; H.E. Richardson, *Tibet and its History* (London, 1962), at pp. 278-285.
- 53 V.K. Krishna Menon appears to be very critical of it. He had stated that it was "not well drafted. It was not as though it was a prepared formula. It emerged out of the conversations—that is all there was to it . . . . It was rather like a communique. It was not a revelation. It was not a creed or part of formulation of our policy . . . . It shows only that both countries required it. All this does not detract from the value of its content and minimise the impact it made on us and other countries. Those who ridicule it do so because it does not fit in with expansionism and imperialism." See Michael Brecher, *India and World Politics—Krishna Menon's View of the World* (London, 1968), at pp. 142-143.
- 54 *Nehru's Speeches*, *Supra*, n. 41, Vol. III, at pp. 262-263; Frank Moraes, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography* (New York, 1958), at pp. 451-452.
- 55 S.M. Burke, *Supra*, n. 44, at p. 146.
- 56 M.S. Rajan, *Supra*, n. 23, at pp. 51-52.
- 57 George McTurnan Kahin, *Supra*, n. 41, at pp. 1-11. A Appadorai, *Supra*, n. 37, at p. 178.
- 58 Russell H. Fifield, "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," *A J.I.L.* (1958) 52,506; S.M. Burke, *Supra* n. 44, at p. 151. *The following were the ten principles: "1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; 2. Respect for the sovereignty and*



- territorial integrity of all nations; 3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small; 4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; 5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; 6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers, 6. (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries; 7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; 8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; 9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation; 10. Respect for justice and international obligations." For the text of the Final Communique of the Asian African Conference, see George McTuan Kahin, *Supra*, n. 41, at pp. 76-85; D.N. Sharma, *Afro-Asian Group in the U.N.* (Allahabad, 1969), at p. 364.
- 59 Lok Sabha Debates, Ninth Session, 1955, Vol. IV, Part II, No. 53, Col. 6970; *Nehru's Speeches*, *Supra*, n. 41, Vol. III at p. 298.
  - 60 Lok Sabha Debates., *Ibid.*, Col. 6973; *Nehru's Speeches*, *Ibid.*, pp. 297 and 301; Ram Sharma, *India's Foreign Policy: The British Interpretation 1947-57* (Gwalior, 1961), at p. 125; Shashi Bhushan, "Vision of Peace: Starting Point of Stabilization of Peace," in P. Gopinath Menon (Ed.), *Peace and Security in Asia* (Bombay, 1974), at p. 63.
  - 61 Quoted in Russel H. Fifield, *Supra*, n. 58, at p. 505.
  - 62 Michael Brecher, *Supra*, n. 53.
  - 63 M.S. Rajan, *Supra*, n. 23, at p. 52.
  - 64 Russel H. Fifield, *Supra*, n. 58, at p. 505; Frank Moraes, *Supra*, n. 54, at p. 442.
  - 65 Edward McWhinney, "The 'New' Countries and the 'New' International Law: The United Nations Special Conference on Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States," *A.J.I.L.* 1966, 60, 2
  - 66 J.J.G. Sytauw, *Some Newly Established Asian States and the Development of International Law* (The Hague, 1961), at p. 217.
  - 67 Lok Sabha Debates Tenth Session, 1955, Vol VII, Part II, Col. 14198; *Nehru's Speeches*, *Supra*, n. 41, Vol. III, at pp. 306; K.T. Narasimha Char, *The Quintessence of Nehru* (London, 1961), at p. 81.
  - 68 R.K. Karanjia, *The Mind of Mr. Nehru* (London, 1960), at p. xv.
  - 69 S Radhakrishnan, *Occasional Speeches and Writings: First Series*, October 1952-January 1956 (Delhi, 1956), at pp. 160-162; C.J. Chacko, "Peaceful Co-existence as a Doctrine of Current International Affairs," *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs* 1955, 4, pp. 39-40.
  - 70 M.S. Rajan, *Supra*, n. 23, at p. 53.
  - 71 N.M' Burke *Supra*, n. 44, at p. 145; A.P. Rana, *Supra*, n. 26, at pp. 101-102.
  - 72 A.P. Rana, *Ibid.*, p. 126.
  - 73 A. Appadorai, *Essays in Politics and International Relations* (Bombay, 1969), at p. 49; A. Appadorai, "The Foreign Policy of India," in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (Ed.), *Foreign Policies in a World of Change* (New York,



- 1963), at p. 490; A. Appadorai, "On Understanding Indian Foreign Policy," in K.P. Misra, *Supra*, n. 34, at pp. 132-133.
- 74 Nagendra Singh, "India and International Law," in R.P. Anand, *Supra*, n. 22, at p. 40. *Panchsheel* had entered the vocabulary of the United Nations when the General Assembly had considered the Declaration Concerning the Peaceful Co-existence of States on the Initiative of the Soviet Union in 1957. But General Assembly Resolution 1236 (XII), originally sponsored by India, Sweden and Yugoslavia, did not mention the term *Panchsheel*. See R.J. Vincent, *Non-intervention and International Order* (Princeton, 1974), at p. 238.
- 75 United Nations, *General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Fifth Session Resolutions*, Supplement No. 28 (A/8028), at pp. 121-124.
- 76 UN, *General Assembly Official Records, Seventeenth Session, Resolutions*, Supplement No. 17 (A/5217), at pp. 66-67. The seven principles are namely: "(a) The principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; (b) The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered; (c) The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accordance with the Charter; (d) The duty of States to cooperate with one another in accordance with the Charter; (e) The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (f) The principle of sovereign equality of states; (g) The principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter."
- 77 Wolfgang Friedmann, *The Changing Structure of International Law* (New York, 1964), at p. 322; Henry Clarke Warren, *Buddhism in Translations: Passages Selected From the Buddhist Sacred Books and Translated From the Original Pali into English* (Cambridge: Mass, 1953), at p. 397. However, there are some scholars who do not find any difficulty in equating some of the (Buddhist) ten precepts of priesthood to the five principles of *Panchsheel*. For example, "abstinence from injury to life" is equated with "non-aggression"; "abstinence from theft" equated with "respect for territorial integrity"; "self-restraint" equated with "non-interference in the affairs of other countries," and "abstinence from falsehood" and "sincere cooperative brotherhood" equated with peaceful coexistence, See, K. Satchidananda Murty and A.C. Bouquet, *Studies in the Problems of Peace* (Bombay, 1960), at p. 116.
- 78 Adda B. Bozeman, "India's Foreign Policy Today: Reflections Upon its Sources," in K.P. Misra, *Supra*, n. 34, at pp. 41-42.
- 79 David Howard (Ed.), *My Land and My People: The Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama* (London, 1962), at pp. 69-72 and 228-231; Girilal Jain, *Panchsheel and After—A Reappraisal of Sino-Indian Relations in the Context of the Tibetan Insurrection* (Bombay, 1960), at p.2; Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, *Tibet—A Political History* (New Haven, 1967), at pp. 299, and 323, The Legal Enquiry Committee on Tibet, constituted by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), presented its report in 1960 that Tibet was "a *defacto* independant State when the Agreement on Peaceful Measures in Tibet was signed in 1951 . . . . Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of statehood as generally accepted under International Law." International Commission of Jurists, *Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic*, Indian Edition (Delhi, 1966), at pp. 5, and 139-165.



- 80 Brig. J.P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder (The Curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962)* (Bombay, 1969), at pp. 6-11. *Bharatiya Jana Sangh and Praja Socialist Party* opposed Nehru's policy of appeasement of, and surrender to, China's sovereignty over Tibet. See Balraj Madhok, "India's Foreign Policy—The Jana Sangh View," *India Quarterly*, Vol. 23, Nos. 4&5, 1967, 4-5; Surendra Mohan, "India's Foreign Policy—The PSP View," *Ibid*, 9.
- 81 Taufiq Ahmad Nizami (Ed.), *Asia in Perspective (Selected Works of Prof. Richard L. Walker)* (New Delhi, 1974), at p. 8.
- 82 A Appadorai, *Supra*, n. 27, at p. 229; A. Appadorai and V.K. Arora, *Supra*, n. 51, at p. 294.
- 83 *Lok Sabha Debates Seventh Session, 1954*, Vol. VII, Part II, Col. 3687; *Lok Sabha Debates, Supra*, n. 59, Col. 6972-6973; *Nehru's Speeches, Supra*, n. 41, Vol. III, at p. 300; Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru—A Biography*. Vol. II, 1947-1956 (Delhi, 1979), at p. 239; George McTurnan Kahin, *Supra*, n. 41, at p. 71; Girilal Jain, *Supra*, n. 79, at p. 131. It is also true, at the same time, that India's role in world affairs was conceived "in terms of a preacher of moral principles and to rely more on the declaration of such principles than on the skilful practice of diplomacy and military preparedness, vital national interests." See Bimla Prasad, *Supra*, n. 29, at p. 277.
- 84 Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (New Delhi, 1961), at pp. 104-105; Charles H. Heimsath and Surjit Man Singh, *A Diplomatic History of Modern India* (Bombay, 1971), at p. 193.



## NEHRU'S WORLD-VIEW: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SUPERPOWERS' MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By RITU SHARMA\*

*Jawaharlal Nehru's keen sense of history and his intense nationalism played a key role in the evolution of his world-view which pioneered to give new direction to international politics in the post-Indian independence period. This world-view had developed gradually but formidably over a span of half a century entailing and synchronising the turmoil at the national and global level and finally leaving a profound impact on Nehru's mind.<sup>1</sup> The vulnerable Western colonial domination of the world; the gripping struggle between the fascist and the liberal forces within the West itself and the confrontational poise between the Communist Soviet Union and the non-Communist Western countries were all considered to be the basic issues by Nehru, on the outcome of which would emerge a new world order. Nehru was ambitious enough to envisage top grading of India in the comity of nations following elimination of its colonial subjugation as a part of the well construed basis of the new order and it rhymed perfectly with the broad contours of his world vision.*

NEHRU consequently adopted a two-pronged approach to the prevalent world order. He simultaneously tried to obtain commutative and distributive justice for India without challenging the fundamental basis of the classical world order i.e., a power-based hierarchical international state system. On the contrary, with pre-conceived lucidity, in the Constituent Assembly (22 January, 1947) he announced his determination to systematically work for and attain India's rightful place in this power hierarchy:

*India is a great country, great in her resources, great in manpower, great in her potential, in every way. I have little doubt that a free India on every plane will play a big part on the world stage, even on the narrowest plane of material power.<sup>2</sup>*  
(emphasis mine)

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And then,

I hope that while India will no doubt play a great part in all the material spheres, she will always lay stress on the spirit of humanity. . . . May the time come when in the words of this Resolution, this ancient land will attain its rightful and honoured place in the world and make its full and willing contribution to the promotion of world peace and welfare of mankind.<sup>3</sup>

This is a comprehensive statement that manifests Nehru's mind imbibing the balance that he struck between his global ambition for India and commitment to establishing peace and justice for the nations oppressed by Western domination. Nehru, thus clearly aimed at widening the world power-base to accommodate Indian opinion that intended to highlight the common good or interest of all the peoples of the world. This opinion stressed the non-traditional normative aspects of international politics based entirely upon consensus rather than politic-military conflict strategies that had dominated the world so far. Obviously, Nehru was trying to build an alternate model of international relations that deviated strongly from the prevalent world environment and challenged the global-power oriented model advanced by the Super Powers, i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union shortly after Indian independence. Indeed, the militarisation of nuclear technology and the Super Powers' exclusive mastery over it had coupled with their diametrically opposite ideological tenacities to fundamentally change the course of international politics. It truly developed an unprecedented global perspective with both the Super Powers acquiring the comprehensive capability to influence world politics at micro and macro levels. The bipolarity of the world, emergence of cold war politics involving bilateral and military alliances, race for conventional and nuclear armaments and materialisation of the hegemonial patron-client state relationships the world over were some of the common creations of the inherent compulsions of the Super Power status shared by the United States and the Soviet Union. Their commitment to enhance their power and influence all over the globe was in the name of ideological and military containment of each other by endorsing their supremacy over the "new nations" of Asia and Africa of which India happened to be a part.

It was this common framework of the Super Powers' activity that Nehru found unpalatable enough so as to systematically work towards its demolition. Nehru had little choice in this as the dominant model could hardly accommodate his aspirations for militarily and



economically weak India. Hence, the imperative need to build an alternate model of international relations!

### NATURE OF NEHRUVIAN MODEL

There is no gainsaying the fact that at no stage did Nehru undermine the pivotal role that the Super Powers had assumed *vis-a-vis* the rest of the world.<sup>4</sup> He, however, regretted the Soviet-American antagonism but accepted it reluctantly. What he consciously refused to accept even partially was the Super Powers' global designs to involve oriental countries in their power game. Ostensibly, making a subtle move to counter this design at a philosophical plane, Nehru speaking at the Bandung Conference on 24 April 1955, exhorted the Afro-Asian countries not to follow the European legacy blindly as "Europe has been in the past a continent full of conflicts, full of trouble, full of hatred. Europe's conflicts continue, its wars continue and we have been dragged into these wars because we were tied to Europe's chariot wheels. Are we going to continue to be tied to Europe's troubles, Europe's hatreds and Europe's conflicts? I hope not."<sup>5</sup> This, however, did not imply that Nehru was oblivious of conflicts in oriental societies. On the contrary he realised that power politics was an universal phenomenon but believed "that only in Europe power politics [had] been elevated into a political way of life supported by elaborate theories to justify it. . . . There [was] nowhere else anything like the historical habit of conflict that [had] persisted in Europe."<sup>6</sup> Since both the Super Powers had inherited the "European legacy" in *toto*, they were generating conflict all over the world, in Nehru's view.

On the one hand, Nehru rejected conflict strategies of the Super Powers, on the other he tried to provide an alternative to these options. A conscious effort was made by him to highlight the Asian and later the African perspectives. The holding of the historic Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 in New Delhi even before the country's independence was the first such concrete step taken by Nehru to mobilise a well-defined Asian opinion on global issues. This strategy found further consolidation by extending its support base at the Bandung Conference of April 1955 attended by the Afro-Asian countries. Nehru clearly amplified the purpose and nature of the upcoming Afro-Asian bloc in international politics at this conference: "We are trying to understand the big problems of the world and to fit our problems into this larger context, because in the ultimate analysis, all our problems, however important they may be, cannot be kept apart from these larger problems." But he went on to add, "We are determined



not to be dominated in any way by any other country or continent.''<sup>7</sup>  
And then,

Europe and Asia and America are all dependent on one another. It is not right to think in terms of isolation in this modern world which is moving towards the ideal of 'One World.'

At the same time,

We are not copies of Europeans or Americans or Russians. We are Asians and Africans. It would not be creditable for our dignity and new freedom if we were camp followers of America or Russia or any other country of Europe.<sup>8</sup>

In short, Nehru wanted Afro-Asian nations to cooperate and deal with the Super Powers only as equals without submitting to the dictates of the latter. The Super Powers thus, had good reason to be annoyed with Nehru as he was questioning not only their *modus operandi* but also the very basis of their existence as global powers. If Nehru had had his way the United States and the USSR would have been left with no client states in the entire Third World to sustain their hegemonistic tendencies and compulsions.

At another plane, a frontal attack was made by Nehru at the Super Powers' perceptions and operations by emphasising upon the futility of the 'cold war' politics generated and sustained by the latter's policies. Consequently, a by-product of the 'cold war,' viz., emanation of bilateral and multilateral military alliances around the United States and the USSR found little favour with Nehru. Most naturally then, Nehru emerged as the greatest critic of these alliances and spearheaded a formidable opinion campaign against them. He propounded the argument that all military alliances were hierarchical in nature and, therefore, they tampered with the client-nation's independence. He enunciated his thesis further by defining freedom mainly in terms of a country's foreign relations as all else was nothing but local autonomy.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the military build-ups also escalated tensions everywhere and threatened the prospects of peace which Nehru wanted to maintain at every cost to promote India's development prospects. He, therefore, not only outrightly condemned military treaties like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact representing the Western and the Eastern blocs respectively but also the subsequent regional alliances that surfaced the world over in the 1940s and 50s like the Inter-American Treaty For Reciprocal Assistance/the Rio de Janeiro



Treaty, Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), etc. Moreso, because over the years, Nehru was more convinced than ever that these alliances catered not only to a dangerous approach but also had the tendency to extend their scope and nature to become something bigger and wider than they were originally supposed to be.<sup>10</sup>

A committed model builder that Nehru was, he was not just content to oppose these military pacts tooth and nail but tried to make a positive contribution by attempting to present an alternative to these pacts by floating the idea of "areas of peace." This concept was meant to contain the expansionist tendencies and policies of both the Super Powers. The "areas of peace" were to comprise the countries opposed to military pacts and willing to befriend both the Super Powers. Naturally, then, these areas were to be kept free from bloc alliances and guarded against penetration of the 'cold war'. Nehru was convinced that in this manner prevailing tension and acrimony in the world at large would be lessened and in turn would cater to the developing countries' security and economic needs. Obviously, Nehru was once again trying to assert his own understanding of the international situation. He was also daring to offer a substitute to Super Powers' strategy of mutual deterrence in terms of military build-ups everywhere in the world. Consequently, unfolding this idea, Nehru exhorted the developing nations to "make it clear to [the] warring factions and... great countries... that they [developing countries] themselves will remain cool and not enter the arena of warfare whatever happens and that they will try at least to restrict the area of conflict, save their own regions, and try to save the rest as best as they can."<sup>11</sup> And if no other country came forward, Nehru was willing to go it alone, so firm was his conviction.<sup>12</sup>

The roots of India's strategy of non-alignment can partly be found in Nehru's dream of building "areas of peace" all over the globe. True to his word, Nehru gave a lead to the Afro-Asian countries in this direction and succeeded in somewhat diluting the impact of Soviet-American influence in these continents. No wonder then, Stalin called the Indian leadership "a lackey of Western Imperialism" and the American foreign policy "King"; John Foster Dulles called India's non-alignment "immoral" in the early 1950s.<sup>13</sup> Conspicuously, both the global powers resented Nehru's somewhat ostensible measures to help India emerge as a third force in international order though Nehru himself denied this allegation hotly and unsuccessfully tried to clarify that he thought only in terms of creating collective moral pressure on these powers.<sup>14</sup> The formal launching of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at Belgrade in 1961 symbolised upto an extent the sustenance and triumph of Nehru's world-view in the face of the stiff counter-view of the Super Powers.



Apart from opposing the US-USSR mutual antagonism based upon the race for global hegemony the Nehruvian analysis will-nilly, favourably, or adversely, affected either of the Super Powers. For instance, Nehru's China policy in the first half of 1950s accommodated—though unintentionally—the Soviet interest in Asia to the corresponding neglect of American priorities in the region. Nehru, however, was little concerned with the nature of these fall outs of his perception and its ramifications vis-a-vis the Super Powers. The Chinese Revolution (1949) was a major world event for Nehru because it set Beijing on the path of becoming a world power of consequence. The issue, as Nehru emphasised, need not “get mixed up and tied up with the rather superficial arguments, important as they might be, of Communism and anti Communism. It [was] far better to forget these for the moment in order to analyse the world situation. But the misfortune [had] been that in Western countries, or in some of them, they [were] so obsessed with Communism and anti-Communism that they completely failed to see the forces at work in the world.”<sup>15</sup> The ideological considerations of big powers, apparently, failed to move Nehru; what mattered most to him was acknowledging the hard facts of the global situation without any pretense or reservation. Communist China was a reality that could not be wished away. Nehru, therefore, not only recognised the new regime shortly after its inception but also seriously endeavoured to bring the latter into the mainstream of the Afro-Asian community at and after the Bandung Conference.

What needs to be highlighted in this regard is an element of theorising that Nehru tried to provide, though somewhat unsuccessfully, to the nature of contemporary international relations by attempting to build a genuine friendship between an ideologically-militarily aligned state and a totally non-aligned country, i.e. China and India respectively. The doctrine of *Panchsheel* (five principles of peaceful coexistence) was devised carefully to become the “tenacious foundation” of this experimental sub-model of the Nehruvian macro-model of world politics. That the experiment was heading for a collapse became apparent in the late 1950s and early 60's but the crux of the issue lay in Nehru's total commitment to go ahead with his own conviction rather than yield to what the Super Powers extolled and preached to rest of the world.

The vulnerability of the Nehruvian view—both potential and actual—was natural considering that India had no *locus standi* in the power structure of the world politics of that time. A few compromises<sup>16</sup> that Nehru made during his tenure as the Prime Minister need to be assessed in the light of various constraints operating on him and the country. Needless to say that the most outstanding of these pressures had their



genesis in a rather weak eco-military base of the Indian polity. The subjective misperceptions of Nehru *vis-a-vis* the nature of international realities also qualitatively inflated this vulnerability. The Nehruvian model, however, not only withstood these pressures well but also showed a great deal of resilience by making necessary adjustments as and when the need arose without losing its essence even in the most adverse circumstances.

Nehru had seventeen effective years (1947-65) to firmly cement the foundations of his world-view and raise the stable superstructure of Indian foreign policy on it, his misperceptions notwithstanding. His successors continued and still continue to confront the Super Powers with the same basic perception symbolising the spirit of the Nehruvian model, though structural modifications were made wherever necessary to serve the national interest. An ostensible departure from the policy of maintaining "equi-distance" *vis-a-vis* the Super Powers in the post-Nehru years needs to be analysed in pragmatic terms. In gist, Nehru's India successfully conveyed the message to the Super Powers that they could not take it, unlike many other countries in the Third World, for granted in international dealings. Most of the problems that came in the way of Nehru's interaction with the United States and the Soviet Union emanated from the latter's (Super Powers') failure to either comprehend or fully appreciate the former's indelible stance of maintaining independent cognizance in international politics.

No wonder then, the die was cast for an inevitable collision with the Super Powers to which Nehru had willy-nilly drawn India at macro-level. That bilaterally however, there was still enough ground to build positive relations with Washington and Moscow was the sanguine disposition of the Nehruvian model. Nehru, for instance, believed that American and Indian Republics shared a common faith in "democracy, peace and freedom" and that understanding and accommodation between the two could benefit them as well as the world. Even with the Soviet Union, Nehru found the structural differences superficial and non-conflicting because "the basic thing [was] the regard for each other, for each other's integrity of outlook and friendship. . . [having] much deeper roots which [could] survive occasional differences of opinion,"<sup>17</sup> and do them, as also the world, some good.

Gradually, these giant countries came around to accepting the bilateral dimensions of the Nehruvian world-view and started cultivating India at political, economic, technological, military and cultural planes, which over the decades exhibited the content and nature, strength and weakness, of the Nehruvian model to handle the Super Powers to the maximum advantage of India with minimum compromises *vis-a-vis* its



dignity, sovereignty and ambition to become a forerunner state in the world.

Our discussion leads us to one final query, i.e., Did the Nehruvian model deliver the goods sought in the first place? The answer is constrained to be both equivocal and categorical because of some serious pitfalls in its implementation which pulled back India on its ladder of ambition to match the best of the countries in the power equation. That India has developed politico-military clout in Asia, over the years, which has been well recognised by the Super Powers<sup>18</sup> itself vindicates the paramountcy and farsightedness of the Nehruvian model to serve the Indian interest on possibly the most thrifty terms. And, there is ground for more—as many indicators of the present foreign policy portend—a fact that itself proves the point in question.

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- 8 Ibid., pp. 271-72.
- 9 Ibid., p. 240.
- 10 Speaking in the *Lok Sabha* on 22 September 1954, Nehru cited the NATO example whose membership had been extended to non-Atlantic countries in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Moreover, Portugal raised the Goa question in NATO thereby extending the scope of the treaty to Indian shores. See Ibid., p. 90.
- 11 In the Parliament, 12 June 1952, Ibid., p. 58.
- 12 Nehru in the *Lok Sabha*, 25 February 1955, Ibid., p. 67.
- 13 See Baljit Singh, *Indian Foreign Policy: An Analysis* (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1975) pp. 25 and 32.
- 14 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Selected Speeches*, n. 2, pp. 78 and 594-95.
- 15 Statement made in the *Lok Sabha*, 30 September 1954, Ibid., p. 305.



- 16 For instance, India did not openly denounce the Soviet role in suppressing the Hungarian uprising in 1956 partly because it would have adversely affected the newly started flow of Soviet aid and technology to India. Similarly the Indian criticism of the American involvement in Vietnam was very mild in the *Special Report* (1962) published by International Control Commission for Vietnam of which India happened to be the Chairman, because of the American support that India sought to neutralise the massive pressure being generated by China at its Indian border.
- 17 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Selected Speeches*, n. 2, pp. 578-79.
- 18 For details see Ross H. Munro, "Super Power Rising Propelled by an Arms Build-up: India Asserts its Place on the World Stage," *Time*, (Chicago), Vol. 133, no. 14, 3 April 1989, pp. 6-13.



## JAWAHARLAL NEHRU AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA AT THE TIME OF THE 1938 EUROPEAN CRISIS

By MILOSLAV KRASA\*

THE relations between Czechoslovakia and India have a comparatively rich tradition of long standing.<sup>1</sup> However most of the time they were but unilateral: it is obvious that first informations about the great Asian country were coming to the Czech lands and to Slovakia much earlier than the population of the Indian sub-continent was becoming aware of the existence of the Central European nations of the Czechs and Slovaks. Already the Czech literature of the period of the National Revival (since the beginning of 19th Century), when the knowledge of Sanskrit opened before the learned men in the West the rich treasury of ancient Indian culture, showed traces of direct influence of the Indian literature and wisdom that were to gain permanent domicile there for all the years to come.

But it was only after the World War I that deeper changes in the relations among Asian and European nations generally manifested themselves. At first, they remained almost unnoticed but in the course of time they were making themselves more strongly felt with the urgency and weight of ripe historical necessity. The development in the period between the world wars were conducive to a further *rapprochement* between the two countries: Czechoslovakia had regained its political independence and also in India the struggle for freedom was increasingly gaining ground. Consular relations had been established, mutual trade exchange developed and the number of visits grew intensively. Significant progress was made especially in the sphere of cultural life bringing along values of permanent nature. Charles University in Prague established a separate Chair for Indology, the Oriental Institute came into being and the number of books on India published in Czechoslovakia increased a great deal. Prague Professors Otakar Pertold, Moritz Winternitz and Vincenc Lesny were active in India as direct exponents of Czechoslovak-Indian friendship and had become, in fact, non-accredited ambassadors of India in their own country. By happy coincidence it was by works and performances of the most prominent Indian artistes that Czechoslovak public became acquainted with the modern Indian culture: in the twenties Rabindranath Tagore visited Prague twice and translations

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of his poems met with great response as well as the many performances of the dancers' group of Uday Shankar and Ravi Shankar's orchestra.

However, it was in the sphere of political development that the pre-war destinies of Czechoslovakia and India were confronted most significantly and remained deep in the memory of the people of both countries. The upsurge of the Indian liberation movement after World War I and the new wave of opposition to the colonial rule in the late twenties and early thirties attracted attention of the entire world. The names of the Indian National Congress and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi were ever more frequent also on the pages of Czechoslovak newspapers and in radio news bulletins.

On the other hand, the tragic political development in Central Europe in 1938 aroused considerable interest in India. The aggressive policy of Nazi Germany, endless concessions of the Western Powers to Hitler and the betrayal of an allied democratic country met there with unequivocal opposition. In those fateful moments of the Czech and Slovak nations the friendly attitude and support of the Indian public became expressive symbols of the unity of common interests of the people of the two countries. And precisely the dramatic events of the summer of 1938 brought to Prague the well-known representative of the Indian National Congress from among the younger generation, Jawaharlal Nehru.

Today it is difficult to say when Jawaharlal Nehru showed closer interest in Czechoslovakia for the first time. In his book "Glimpses of World History" which was written originally in the form of letters to his daughter Indira in various Indian prisons from October 1930 to August 1933<sup>2</sup> Nehru already made several references to the past of Czechoslovakia. Referring to the historical development in Central Europe he mentioned in particular the Hussite Wars (using evidently Herbert George Wells, as the main source), the revolutionary year of 1848 and the inception of independent Czechoslovakia after World War I. The friendly personal relations between the Nehru family and the outstanding expert on India, Professor Vincenc Lesny, were also of long standing. At the end of 1935 Jawaharlal Nehru sent to V. Lesny through the then Secretary of the Indian National Congress Acharya Kripalani a consignment of Congress political literature and also a copy of the before-mentioned book of his. It was his wish that direct contacts between the Indian National Congress and the Indian Association which at that time was created in the Oriental Institute in Prague with the objective of getting people in Czechoslovakia acquainted with India, promoting knowledge about one another and friendly relations, should be intensified.<sup>3</sup> At that time Nehru was in Europe, his wife Kamala underwent treatment at Badenweiler in the Black Forest, his daughter Indira was preparing at Bex in Switzerland for her entrance examination to the Oxford Univer-



sity and Professor Lesny invited them all to visit Czechoslovakia as soon as possible.<sup>4</sup>

Nehru's intention to come to Prague already at that time is confirmed in a letter of Indira Nehru dated in November in which she wrote to Professor Lesny: "I hope I shall accompany my father when he pays a visit to Prague this Christmas."<sup>5</sup> But the worsening state of health of Nehru's wife and her decease on 28 February 1936 was a heavy loss for Nehru so that he decided immediately to go back to Allahabad. But the idea to visit Prague was not abandoned which is attested to by other letters to Professor Lesny. Indira Nehru wrote several days after her father's departure for India: "My father wants me to spend some time in Prague and indeed I would love to. But my plans for the next few months are settled. . . I should however like you to know how glad I shall be to come to your beautiful city, whenever I get the opportunity to do so."<sup>6</sup> Nehru himself confirms it when thanking Professor Lesny for his condolence.<sup>7</sup>

A new occasion for Nehru's visit to Czechoslovakia was given by his next journey to Europe or rather by the political situation at that time connected with the Nazi expansion in the Central European area.<sup>8</sup> Nehru was preparing to leave India without a fixed plan but he did not exclude the possibility of returning on land *via* Western Asia or *via* the United States and China. In Great Britain and in the European continent he intended to study political problems, to meet political personalities and to take part in various rallies. After previous experience he decided for the first time to travel in the second class not so much to save money but rather because he considered the first class as too snobbish. He left Allahabad for Bombay already in the first half of May 1938, about three weeks before the sailing of the ship to Europe.<sup>9</sup>

According to a report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Bombay Jawaharlal Nehru was visited by the then German Consul Graf von Donhof-Kraftshagen and was officially invited to visit the Nazi Germany "which was allegedly wrongly understood in the world."<sup>10</sup> Similarly as he refused to meet Mussolini in 1936 when in transit in Rome, Nehru avoided to accept also that invitation to Berlin. However, he had already decided to visit Czechoslovakia and even showed interest in joining the Indo-Czechoslovak Society which was being founded in Bombay at that time under the chairmanship and with active participation of the President of the Indian National Congress Subhas Chandra Bose.<sup>11</sup>

On June 2, Nehru sailed off from the Bombay harbour on board of "Conte Biancamano", a ship of Italian Lloyd Triestino, for Genoa and made use of a stop at Suez to make a short trip to Cairo,



Alexandria and Port Said.<sup>12</sup> Before having come to Prague he spent some time in Western Europe; the longest period, about one month, in London as guest of Lord Lothian. His first steps on European mainland led to the beginnings of fighting by democratic Spain where he had been invited by the Negrin Government. Upon his arrival at Genoa (14 June) he left for Marseille by plane and continued immediately to Barcelona. He was accompanied by V.K. Krishna Menon, a leading representative of the India League in London and Chairman of the Spanish-Indian Committee, established by Indians living in Great Britain.<sup>13</sup> In total he spent five days in Spain: in Barcelona he witnessed the daily barbarous bombardments of the civilian quarters of the city, visited US and British members of the International Brigade in the front lines and met many outstanding representatives of the democratic Spain. He visited General Lister in his headquarters, had talks with Foreign Minister Alvarez del Vayo and made personal acquaintance with Dolores Ibarruri. Already during his short stay in Spain Nehru realized the situation and the consequences of the policy of appeasement which he formulated later in one of his articles:

Munich and all that followed was yet to come and our senses had not then been completely dulled by repeated betrayal and mendacity. But the farce of this 'non-intervention' was an astonishing thing and showed up how rotten were the standards and methods of international affairs. Non-intervention in Spain was the parent of Munich.<sup>14</sup>

In London Nehru again met his daughter. He acquainted himself well with the situation, spoke with numerous people about events and general developments in the world and sounded out the views of British statesmen and political officials of various political parties. He spoke with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax, was received by the State Secretary for India, Lord Zetland, met the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow who was just in London, met officials of the Conservative Party and the Labour Party Anthony Eden and Clement Attlee respectively and a number of other politicians.<sup>15</sup> All these talks were held against the rapidly worsening political atmosphere in Europe, when after the occupation of Austria the clouds of Hitlerite aggression hung over Czechoslovakia. Nehru was shocked by the fact that "Chamberlainism" was firmly established in the Government circles of Britain and was depressed by evading answers and hints with which the leading British political personalities reacted to his anti-Nazi views.<sup>16</sup>

Assessing today Nehru's position of the time to the political developments in Europe and in the world, we find it surprising how



quickly Nehru penetrated into the situation which seemed to be so complex from the outside and how, despite all camouflage could estimate the final ends of the policy of appeasement. As a convinced democrat to whom the ideals of bourgeois democracy and especially the British democratic traditions were very close, Nehru hoped to the last moment that in the end there will be no capitulation to fascism and he was convinced that united and common procedure of democratic countries was a sufficiently realistic force to prevent Nazi offensive. Neither did he have from the very beginning any illusions about the genuine intentions of politicians of the type of the British Prime Minister of the time. After all, Nehru had a long and direct experience with British imperialism as it concretely manifested itself in the strategy and tactics of the colonial rule in India towards the national liberation movement. That these political methods were not entirely without an inner link may perhaps be attested to by a minor detail of the diplomatic preparation of Runciman's mission, certainly typical for the method of approach and way of thinking of the British Government officials about Czechoslovakia—"a far-away unknown country." When an appropriate personality was sought who might best accomplish the delicate mission in Prague, Viscount Halifax (former Viceroy in British India from 1926 to 1931) sent a telegram to Prague Envoy Newton (dated in the Foreign Office on June 18, 1938) saying that the best type of expert who should be sent to Prague as a mediator would, in his mind, be "...someone with practical experience of administration and of minority problems, such as an ex-Governor of an Indian Province."<sup>17</sup>

Nehru knew, of course, that the core of the problem was elsewhere and openly spoke against presenting it distorted and obscure. "As events have shown, they (the Czechs and Slovaks) are prepared to go to extraordinary lengths" he wrote after some time in an open letter to the editor of the Manchester Guardian, "to satisfy every minority claim and preserve peace, but everybody knows that the question at issue is not a minority one. If it was a love of minority rights that moved people, why do we not hear of the German minority in Italy or the minorities in Poland? The question is one of power politics and the Nazi desire to break up the Czecho-Soviet alliance, to put an end to the one democratic State in Central Europe, to reach the Rumanian oil fields and wheat, and thus to dominate Europe. British policy has encouraged this and tried to weaken that democratic State."<sup>18</sup> Later he aptly characterized Runciman and the true nature of his mission in Czechoslovakia saying that "he was sent to break the back of the Czechs and encourage the Nazis."<sup>19</sup>

Nehru did not miss any opportunity to inform the British and the European public opinion of the development and problems of the Indian



national liberation movement. He did so in his speeches, interviews and talks and he also wrote a special article on the subject to the *Labour Monthly*.<sup>20</sup> He always linked the prospects of the development in Asia with European political crisis; this is also apparent from Nehru's statement at the London Conference on Peace and Empire sponsored by the Indian League and the London Federation of Peace Councils. The Conference was held on July 15 and 16 with the participation of political personalities from left-wing circles, including Labour Party official Sir Richard Stafford Cripps and Communist Party representative Harry Pollitt. In his presidential address Nehru gave reasons supporting his theory that imperialism was logically stepping to the side of fascism and that it was impossible to separate one from the other. He stressed that "The problem of Central Europe, Czechoslovakia, Spain, China and many other problems... ought to be taken together and considered as a whole."<sup>21</sup>

Nehru regarded the world communist movement as the natural ally in the struggle to protect threatened democracy; he was evidently aware of the deeper causes of objective evaluation of the contemporary political development he met among British Marxists with whom he agreed in such an evaluation and whose position he appreciated.<sup>22</sup>

On the way to Prague Nehru made another stop in Paris. The capital of France lived in July 1938 under the impression of the British Royal visit which should have externally emphasized the unity and common interests of the two countries and was also a place of several important rallies aimed against fascism and war with a wide international participation.

In the days from 22 to 24 July<sup>23</sup> the Conference on the Bombardment of Open Towns and the Restoration of Peace convened by the *Rassemblement Universel pour la Paix* (RUP) took place there which dealt also with the question of the endangering of Czechoslovakia by the Nazi Germany. Representatives of many democratic organizations, trade unions and political parties from about fifty countries, among them together with Jawaharlal Nehru representing the Indian National Congress also e.g. Leon Blum, Marcel Cachin, Pierre Cot, Edouard Herriot, Dolores Ibarruri, Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Lloyd George, Robert Cecil, Nicolai Mikhailovitch Schwernik and many other statesmen and public personalities came to Paris. Likewise numerous delegates from Czechoslovakia representing various social and peace organizations of Czechs, Slovaks and democratic Germans were present. The Conference took a resolute stand against the German aggressive policy in Central Europe and adopted a special resolution on Czechoslovakia. The resolution appreciated the stringent measures on the borders taken by the Prague Government on 21 May as an answer to



the threat of the Nazi attack (partial mobilization and the placing of troops to defensive posts in Czechoslovak border territories) and since the danger remained still acute the Conference called upon "public opinion of the democratic and pacifist states to watch carefully the development in Central Europe" and protested against "threats of military and economic character which might be used against Czechoslovakia under a false pretext that the minorities there have not sufficient rights."<sup>24</sup>

Last day of the Conference in the afternoon Jawaharlal Nehru addressed two thousand participants of the Conference and supported the requirements of Dolores Ibarruri who spoke before him. He paid a tribute to the heroism of the Spanish and Chinese people and on behalf of India he denounced the policy of non-intervention and appeasement. He declared that the Indian National Congress would despatch a special medical unit within a short time to help the fighting China, that the people of India had started boycotting Japanese goods and that upon the appeal of the Congress Indian workers out of solidarity for Chinese workers had been leaving tin and iron mines in Malaya.<sup>25</sup>

Simultaneously with the Conference on the Bombardment of Open Towns and the Restoration of Peace also the International Congress of Progressive Writers took place in Paris (from Czechoslovakia Vitezslav Nezval and Robert Ponican attended) and on 26 July the World Committee against War and Fascism discussed there Czechoslovakia (among others the later Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Vlado Clementis made a statement on the problem).

The Czechoslovak public was informed from Paris about Nehru's views concerning topical international problems and the developments in India by the correspondent of the Prague daily *Rude pravo*. Its Sunday issue of 31 July contains a relatively detailed and comprehensive report on the correspondent's interview given to him by Jawaharlal Nehru whom the former characterized in the following interesting way: "The leader of the Indians, Nehru is a representative of more people than is the population of all capitalist powers of Europe and is at the same time a genuine representative and a genuine leader of India. He did not gain his position owing to the darkest powers in the world or thanks to various terrorists as various dictators and *Fuhrers*. And Nehru does not travel in Europe accompanied by numerous policemen or as an operetta star. Here in Paris Nehru is simply Monsieur Nehru who accompanied by taciturn Indian students sits in the hall of a quiet Paris hotel not far from the Parliament and gladly receives anyone interested in the state of affairs in and the position and intentions of the gigantic people of India."<sup>26</sup>



Nehru discussed the question of Spain, spoke about his impressions from his visit to Barcelona and to the front and expressed the position of the people of India on the struggle of the Republican forces against Franco. We learn also from the interview that the day before Nehru visited a party in honour of Chinese delegation attending the Paris Conference. He delivered a speech there and spoke about the solidarity of colonial and semi-colonial countries and the freindship of India towards coloured peoples struggling against imperialism. When speaking about China, Nehru raised that topic with "passionate interest" and said: "All Asians are conscious of the fact that the Celestial Empire struggles for their common cause. The sympathies of India with China are very understandable since China is our closest neighbour and our relations with her have lasted for thousands of years. India helps the Chinese struggle with all means at her disposal. One of the most effective actions is the boycott of Japanese products. It was most successful in India." As to the situation in India Nehru obviously considered it important to emphasize that the Indian National Congress was a sort of "popular front" encompassing national revolutionaries, socialists and communists and representing in this way all forces of the Indian people. He spoke about the growing political maturity of broad strata of population, about the influence of Gandhi and about his relation to other national leaders and pointed out that the solution of the agrarian problem was the most important domestic problem of India. In his speech Nehru mentioned the Soviet example of agrarian reforms and said: "In India, the agrarian policy won the Soviet Union tremendous sympathies. I need not add that Great Britain fights with all her means against the contacts of India with Moscow. To begin with direct personal contact is almost impossible. The respective literature reaches us only in English coming from the English democratic sources. We greatly appreciate the foreign policy of Moscow and the support it gives to the peoples threatened by an aggression."

Nehru did not consider the cautiously and shyly raised question how would India react in case of an international conflict in which Great Britain would take part either embarrassing or indiscreet and answered it smiling with a slight exaggeration but in such a way so as not to raise any doubts:

There are no fascists in India. Among a hundred million of Indians there is hardly any to sympathize with the parties of the totalitarian powers. We know very well what Berlin, Rome and Tokyo want and we shall never let the strength of our national anti-imperialist movement to be put to their waggon. We shall never be allies of such powers—not even if they were willing to



'support' us—since their endeavour is directed against democracy; they want to drown the world in blood. We do not wish to change the present oppression for a greater one, still more ruthless. We want to pursue a consistent anti-fascist policy. If there occurs an international conflict our attitude will depend on that of England. We demand a change of the Constitution. If London satisfies our demand we will help it. If it rejects our just demands and claims we shall hardly feel like supporting it.

At the conclusion of the debate a remark was made that Nehru himself would [shortly leave for Czechoslovakia in order to "...be able to voice the sympathies with this country and to make himself acquainted with the situation on the spot".

At the time of the publication of the discussion the Czechoslovak public had been already informed about Nehru's planned visit from the report of the London branch of the International Association for Peace concerning the prepared celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic in Great Britain on 28 October. The report contained also the news about the visit of Jawaharlal Nehru—the future successor of M.K. Gandhi and chairman of the Indian branch of the International Association for Peace.<sup>27</sup>

As mentioned before Nehru rejected already in Bombay the official invitation to visit the Third Reich. This invitation might have been repeated since Nehru later when imprisoned in the Ahmadnagar Fort (in 1944) recalled:

...in the summer before Munich, I was invited, on behalf of the Nazi government, to visit Germany, an invitation to which was added the remark that they knew my opposition to nazism and yet they wanted me to see Germany for myself. I could go as their guest or privately, in my own name or incognito, as I desired, and I would have perfect freedom to go where I liked. Again I declined with thanks. Instead I went to Czechoslovakia, that 'far-away country' about which England's then Prime Minister knew so little.<sup>28</sup>

However, as evident from Nehru's letter of 29 May 1963 to the editor of his statements and essays, Dorothy Norman, he interrupted his trip to Prague and stopped after all for at least one day in Munich. He wrote that the main purpose of his short stay was to show his daughter the Deutsches Museum. He had no other programme, he only met several Indian students. Nehru may have visited one of their rooms and may



have spoken to them. He recalled how he had been depressed by Hitlerite atmosphere and had the impression that he had been shadowed.<sup>29</sup>

Nehru intended to stay with his daughter about one week in Czechoslovakia, including a few days in the Capital.<sup>30</sup> They arrived in Prague by an express from Paris on August 9th, not long after the appearance in Prague of Lord Runciman with his suite, a visit to which much attention was paid by both the Czechoslovak and foreign press. In such a situation, the arrival of a popular representative of the national liberation movement of the biggest British colony and, moreover, an uncompromising opponent of fascism and the British policy of appeasement, caused certain embarrassment in the Czechoslovak official circles. Formally, Nehru's trip was of private nature, but it was obvious that he represented in fact the general public opinion of India and he was also being received as such. He himself commented on his journey as follows:

I had gone to Europe in a personal capacity, but inevitably I had a certain representative character... I took care therefore to send full and detailed reports of all my political activities, public or private. . . I sent several such reports, and copies of each one went to the Congress President (Subhas Chandra Bose), to the General Secretary of the Congress for the members of the Working Committee and to Gandhiji.<sup>31</sup>

The Czechoslovak authorities gave Nehru enough opportunities to acquire an insight into the atmosphere of the political situation of the day and to familiarize himself with the public opinion, nevertheless they did not want to become directly involved. With regard to the sojourn in the country of Lord Runciman and the attention of Great Britain focussed on Czechoslovakia it was not held possible to arrange either an official audience of the President of the Republic or a call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of another member of the Government. The authorities were also mindful of the undesirability of Nehru's visit arousing excessive attention either in the press or in the public.<sup>32</sup> Thus it was primarily their old friend, Professor V. Lesny, at the time Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Charles University, who looked after the Indian guests.

In Prague, Nehru met with a number of prominent public figures, M. P. S. University Professors and journalists. His interest in questions of the relationship of the Czechs and the Germans led him to visit areas of minority population. He travelled mostly in Northern Bohemia: he went to see several large towns as Litomeice, Usti nad Labem, Teplice and Podmokly. He made a sightseeing of Plzen and its renowned Skoda



Works and made a one-day trip by plane to Zlin. Finally, after having left Prague by train for Budapest, he spent one day and a half in the Slovak metropolis Bratislava, where he saw especially the housing projects for workers.<sup>33</sup> In Prague Nehru was received in the Oriental Institute, visited the Faculty of Philosophy of the Charles University, where he met the indologist Otakar Pertold, and Winternitz' disciple Vilem Gampert accompanied him on his tour of the historical halls of the University Library in the Clementinum.

The milieu in which he lived and the general political atmosphere around him in Czechoslovakia surprised Nehru very pleasantly. Here he confirmed his view that peace cannot be saved by concessions to the aggressor. The articles on Czechoslovakia he then sent to India, published mainly in the Lucknow daily *National Herald* provided an excellent picture of the mood prevailing in the country and an objective information to Indian readers. They undoubtedly influenced the position of the leadership of the Indian National Congress and to a great extent contributed to a better knowledge of Czechoslovakia and general sympathies for the Czechoslovak people in the period of their hard historical trial. Nehru himself reviewed his one-week visit, the trips within Czechoslovakia and numerous meetings before his departure in his interview with an editor of *Lidove noviny* on August 17th, and gave a very positive account. The interview was published under the headline "India Against Dictatorships". In this interview Nehru referred to the importance of seemingly internal Czechoslovak problems for the peace and future of the world, expressed optimism as to the final settlement and warned against a violation of the principles of democracy and a weakening of Czechoslovakia in the existing world situation. He criticised the wavering policy of the British Government and gave assurances of unequivocal support by the people of India. He said that there were still enough erroneous conceptions abroad and expressed the desire that the other countries should be informed as best as possible about the real situation in Czechoslovakia.<sup>34</sup>

After his departure from Prague Nehru tried to contribute to better information on the development in Central Europe and shortly after his return to London he summed up his impressions in the before mentioned open letter to the editor of the *Manchester Guardian*:

It is true that Herr Hitler has the last and determining word in this matter, but Herr Hitler's decision itself will largely depend on the British attitude. . . Recently I spent some time in Czechoslovakia and came into contact with numerous people, both Czech and German. I returned full of admiration for the admirable temper of the Czechs and the democratic Germans



who, in face of great danger and unexampled bullying, kept calm and cheerful, eager to do everything to preserve peace, and yet fully determined to keep to their independence.

However, Nehru's stay in Prague was significant also from another point of view: it promoted information among the Czechoslovak public on the situation in India, on the problems of the national liberation movement and on some topical aspects of the foreign political orientation of the Indian National Congress. Despite the endeavours of the authorities to restrain publicity of his visit, Nehru aroused interest and received inconspicuous but friendly comment in the press.<sup>35</sup> Nehru gave interview to another Prague daily paper in German *Prague Tagblatt*. The guest from India explained India's views on the Sino-Japanese war, on the civil war in Spain and on the invasion of Japanese troops into the territory of the Soviet Union which at that time was being liquidated. He described the character of the Congress as a unified Indian front which is directly identical with India. Questioned about the relation of the national movement towards the contemporary European problems he answered:

Our fight for democratic independence depends on whether it will be democratic principle that will prevail or the fascist and imperialist. It would be preposterous to believe that we should support some fascist country only because it fights against England. In India, the Italian or national-socialist propaganda came off badly. We are against the English colonial rule. But do you think perhaps, to mention just one problem, that we support the idea of passing the colonies from the hands of one power to the hands of another ?

There are yet other parts of that interview worth mentioning particularly because they reflect, although still hypothetically, yet quite clearly, the position of the Congress actually adopted a year later after the outbreak of World War II. When answering the question whether India had any influence upon the British foreign policy Nehru stated:

Not the immediate one as we still do not enjoy full freedom. But India has an influence upon the English foreign policy to such an extent that the English are really worrying: what would the 350 millions do if England entered war? Well, I have already hinted that. They will never stand up for a non-democratic country but they will reserve the right to make decisions, whether they enter war or not, for themselves and would not leave



it to London. When India has attained freedom it will behave towards England as a friendly nation.<sup>36</sup>

The events in the late summer found Nehru already in capitals of Western Europe. He lived very intensively during the pre-Munich crisis changing his residence in Geneva, Paris and London. The feverish behind-the-scene negotiations and the diplomatic activities did not create great confidence and the growing danger of an open capitulation to Hitler's demands widened in the opinion of the Indian politician ever more the dividing gap between the forces of imperialism and fascism on one hand and of democracy and progress on the other hand. On 13 September he sent a message containing greetings to the XV Congress of the Communist Party of Great Britain to Birmingham. In a condensed form it contained the characteristic of the situation at that time, the position of the Indian people and a concrete programme of joint action of all anti-Fascist forces and it was probably the most precise formulation of Nehru's political views at that time:

It is not necessary for one to be a Communist... (to send greetings and good wishes to the Congress), for in these grave times when unimagined perils face us and catastrophe threatens to overwhelm the world, party labels must lose their narrow significance and our actions must be governed by larger considerations. These... are the maintenance of peace and democracy, their extension, and their establishment on a firm basis of freedom... The forces of democracy and progress must hold together and co-operate to meet this menace (of fascist aggression). The foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been one of the strongest pillars of peace in the world and there is no doubt that if there was co-operation in this policy by other powers peace would become unassailable. The British Government, however, pursues a different policy... which has in the past and in the present encouraged Fascist aggression and thus brought war nearer. To this policy the people of India are entirely opposed. In India we stand and struggle for national independence, but because of that we are equally interested in the great world struggle between Fascism and anti-Fascism, and all our sympathies are with the latter. A free India will throw her entire weight on the side of democracy. A subject India, denied freedom and democracy, will resist decisions imposed upon her by British Imperialism. Therefore, both the interests of the hundreds of millions of India and of the world struggle demand



the ending of imperialism there and the establishment of a free democratic state.<sup>37</sup>

The articles which Nehru was sending off to India in the second half of September and in October showed the absorbing interest with which he was following the developments after Lord Runciman's departure from Prague and then at the time of Chamberlain's travels to Hitler to Berchtesgaden, Godesberg and in the end to Munich. By this series of articles on the development in Czechoslovakia and in Europe some parts of which had character of dramatic reportage Nehru tried to draw attention of the Indian national movement to international problems and their connection with the development in India. He considered "sound and informed" public opinion as a necessary precondition for the maturity of the liberation movement at a time when India began to be faced with the question of forming her own foreign policy which after all was evident from the course of the annual session of the Congress at Haripura in February 1938.<sup>38</sup>

Some of the descriptions of events in Czechoslovakia were so immediate and realistic that it is obvious that Nehru had always fresh news and direct sources of information; sometimes he referred to broadcasts of the Radio Prague. On 22 September he described the mood in the capital of the Republic after the French and British demarches had been received:

We have been abandoned, betrayed' cried a vast multitude of the Czechoslovakian people in their agony. News had come that their cabinet, after nearly forty-eight hours of almost continuous sitting, had decided to accept the Anglo-French ultimatum, and a hundred thousand citizens of the city of Prague poured out into its streets, sorrowful beyond words, tasting the dregs of humiliation. Only a few days before when war appeared inevitable, and danger and death faced them, they were high-spirited, full of courage and determination. Even the thought that their beautiful and much-loved city of Prague might be reduced to dust and ashes did not deter them from their grim resolve to fight and, if necessary, die for their freedom. But now? What can one do with a stab in the back? What can one say when the assassin is one whom one has counted as a friend? . . . And yet behind all their sorrow there is still determination. 'We are alone' they cry, 'let us be strong. Czechoslovakia shall live!

These are words of heartfelt sympathies and profound under-



standing and Nehru drew immediately from them an important lesson for his countrymen at home:

We have long experience of promises broken and betrayals by the British Government. Yet it is well that this new experience has come to us also, lest we forget . . . To rely on the friendship or protection of these (England and France) is to invite disaster. Let India learn this lesson again well and not be swayed away by soft words and promises meant to be broken. Let India cut herself away from this connection with Britain . . . We must rely on ourselves alone and on our own strength and so achieve independence.<sup>39</sup>

Nehru continued in his notes immediately after having sent this article and the next day he added to them, almost every hour, records of fresh events, his new impressions and ideas. He repeatedly stated that in those days the Indian people were facing vitally important decisions and had to understand the true causes of what was going on in Europe. He pointed out that a powerful peaceful front was still capable of halting aggression at the last moment and that it was only the unwillingness of the British Government to co-operate with the Soviet Union and thus release popular forces all over the world that, for class motives, was driving it into the arms of fascism. He was particularly reminding the Indian reader to remember that the case of Czechoslovakia was not only a case when an ally and a friend was abandoned, but when even a threat was made to join the enemy.<sup>40</sup>

However, the events in Europe were marching too quickly ahead and when Nehru's articles reached their destination, they were often outdated by new developments. Nevertheless the editorial board printed his information in full as documents of events that should be brought to the attention of readers time and again. And then "... who can do it for India better than Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru?"<sup>41</sup>

The author of these articles was personally present in the historical debate on Czechoslovakia in the palace of the League of Nations<sup>42</sup> and in the critical moments after the declaration of general mobilization in Prague, he sent from Paris, on September 24, a telegram to the President of Czechoslovak Republic with the following encouraging words:

In the hour of great peril may I convey to you deep sympathy and admiration of Indian people for people of Czechoslovakia stop We earnestly trust that Czechoslovakia will emerge triumphant citadel (of) democracy Jawaharlal Nehru.<sup>43</sup>



When Chamberlain's policy of appeasement entered its final phase, on September 28, 1938, Nehru was present at the visitor's gallery of the London House of Commons and witnessed the theatrical announcement of the British Prime Minister on the invitation by Hitler to a meeting of the four powers in Munich that he had just received. Immediately after that he sat down at the desk to write and send to India another article the headline of which, *London in Suspense*, expresses also the mood of the author. In that article Nehru made a review of Chamberlain's speech which he considered to be very weak, recalled that the Czechoslovak Minister Jan Masaryk and the Soviet Charge d'Affaires came to listen to the speech and expressed his indignation at the fact that only a slight mention had been made about Czechoslovakia and no reference to the courage of its people.

Was there going to be another betrayal again, the final murder of that nation" he wrote in his article. "This sinister gathering of four at Munich, was it the prelude to the Four-Power Pact of Fascism-cum-Imperialism to isolate Russia, to end Spain finally and to crush all progressive elements? Mr. Chamberlain's past record inevitably makes one to think so.<sup>44</sup>

In the hours of tension and threat of war, right before the publication of the results of the Munich meeting, Nehru was reverting in his mind to the great dilemma of the Indian attitude in case of an immediate conflict and again sees one and only way:

We sympathise with all our heart with Czechoslovakia in her struggle for freedom, we realise the world significance of it, the momentous consequences which flow from it. We want to help her in her struggle to the best of our ability, for thereby we help the cause of freedom and democracy throughout the world. We want to combat fascism. But we will not permit ourselves to be exploited by imperialism, we will not have war imposed upon us by outside authority, we will not sacrifice to preserve the old injustices or to maintain an order that is based on them.

Only the India which will have its freedom safeguarded will be in a position to stand up with all its weight to the defence of democracy.

She will most willingly join ranks in defence of Czechoslovakia and to combat fascism, and work for a settlement to do



away with the injustices of the past and the present and lay the foundation of a true world order.<sup>45</sup>

The worst of Nehru's apprehensions became a reality. The topics of his further reports included the Munich *Diktat* and the events that followed. It must have been for him a sorrowful course of events, but he did not relinquish his former conclusions and neither did he reconcile himself to the illusions of "preserving peace". He addressed sharp criticism at the course of the Chamberlain's Government, in detailed recapitulations of the entire pre-Munich developments traced back the roots of British policies and concrete examples serve him to point out the growth of anti-democratic trends in Great Britain.

He condemns the opportunism of the Labour Party, the attitude of some members of the Independent Labour Party, the behaviour of European pacifists and opposes even the spirit of writing of some Indian papers (e.g. *Hindustan Times*) which praised Chamberlain's policy. A relatively precise analysis of the situation permitted him to make daring prognoses of the coming development which in fact did not wait long to be tested.<sup>46</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru left Europe for India directly (November 17, 1938), with only a short stop in Egypt where he conducted negotiations with representatives of the Wafd party. It seems that, originally, he thought of going back via the United States but the developments connected with Munich made him return to his country prematurely.<sup>47</sup> The events he witnessed during his stay in Europe were deeply rooted in his memory. His political experience served him to draw necessary conclusions both for himself and the national movement in India. For quite a long time Nehru returned to his stay in Prague in his statements, essays and books, which contain numerous reminiscences, topicalizations and considerations underlining rather inevitable consequences and prospective development. These portray Nehru as a dialectic thinker whose political foresight e.g. as concerns the policy of the West in relation to the Soviet Union appears to be today, viewed with historical perspective, as exceptionally penetrating and realistic. Even during the following annual session of the Congress at Tripuri, commenting, on March 12, 1939, the resolution on foreign policy, which he himself proposed, could not but address sharp words of condemnation of the betrayal of Czechoslovakia by Britain and France and call the Geneva League of Nation "a tombstone of peace".<sup>48</sup> Three days later, the occupation of the remaining part of Czechoslovakia and the liquidation of its independence gave the first sad satisfaction to the correctness of his political conclusions. At the end of March he



reverted to the Munich question at Lucknow:

Czechoslovakia used to be on the map of Europe; it is no more, and Harr Hitler's minions trample on her brave children, betrayed so shamefully by England and France. . . But let us not forget recent history. It is not Hitler or Mussolini who has created the present crisis in Europe. Ultimately it is the policy of the British Government, supported by the French Government. There is a great deal of talk of the democracies defending freedom against the onslaughts of Fascism. But it is these very so-called democracies of Western Europe that have helped and encouraged Fascism and Nehru and done to death the Spanish Republic and Czechoslovakia.<sup>49</sup>

As late as one month after the occupation of Czechoslovakia Nehru sent a short cautious letter to Professor Lesny thanking him for his book on Rabindranath Tagore and recalling all friends he had met in Prague.<sup>50</sup> And in September 1939 he expressed his conviction that in Bohemia, Moravia and probably also in Slovakia the Germans would meet with constant opposition and that the people of Czechoslovakia, humiliated by the betrayal of its friends, would take revenge.<sup>51</sup> At the time, however, the storm of the Second World War was on and Nehru was wholly drawn into the whirlwind of events at home, in India. And at the end of war the entire India was rising to launch the final attack against colonialism.

Already in the spring of 1946 the Czechoslovak press brought the first interview with Jawaharlal Nehru after the war made by the Calcutta correspondent J. Bartos which the Indian press assessed as the first step towards establishing co-operation between the two countries, interrupted by the years of war. Nehru said in his interview:

I still cherish a fresh remembrance of my visit to Czechoslovakia in summer 1938. Those were critical days for you and I had an opportunity to observe how the Czechoslovak people resisted the crisis then. I admired the Czechoslovaks for their brave composure and self-reliance with which they were facing the situation. I admired them still more when, deserted by their allies, they were bearing their national misfortune courageously.

Much has changed since the time. People of Czechoslovakia, unbroken, lived through the years of their fatal fight far the



national existence. Czechoslovakia is free at last, your gigantic fight has left, however, its wounds and marks behind.

"I have no doubts that the people of Czechoslovakia adhering to their tradition will be soon again making quick advances and will have an important task to fulfil in the reconstruction of the world shattered by the war and development. I believe the contacts among the people of Czechoslovakia and India to be most friendly in future. Today, the majority of the national and ethnic problems extends far beyond the national borders and is in fact international in their conception. (I believe that in this international field) the free India and free Czechoslovakia will find ways to a mutual and cordial co-operation.<sup>52</sup>

As a leading statesman of an independent dominion and later of the Republic of India, Jawaharlal Nehru participated in the further mutual co-operation which after the war began developing between the two countries in economic, diplomatic and cultural fields. He renewed his original ties with the Oriental Institute in Prague and resumed corespondence with Professor Lesny.<sup>53</sup> Of course, the character of the hitherto relations has substantially changed under the impact of revolutionary war time and post-war changes. In general, international relations have been intensifying, free India has played an important role in international politics and science and technology have facilitated better knowledge between nations throughout the world in an unprecedented way. Likewise, the relations between Czechoslovakia and India have become more intensive and India's Prime Minister shook hands of many guests from Czechoslovakia—ranging from official representatives to young students of Indology. And in the spring of 1955, on June 6, accompanied by his daughter Indira Gandhi he came to Prague for the second time—this time for an official State visit. His visit was brief, only one day of stop on his way to Moscow, but it became a significant stimulus for the development of mutual co-operation.

Soon afterwards both Nehru's most popular books—*The Discovery of India* and *Autobiography*—were published in the Czech language. Nehru wrote a special preface for the Czech edition of his *Autobiography*. He wrote it almost twenty years after his first visit to Prague, during a brief holiday spent in the middle of the splendid nature of the Kulu Valley. And yet he could not help remembering again his pre-war visit connected with so many dramatic events and strong impressions. His words of introduction to the volume confirm what we have been endeavouring to demonstrate through this brief retrospective treatise on the relationship



of the Indian statesman towards Czechoslovakia: that he remained forever affected by the joint experience of Czechoslovak and Indian peoples from the historical period which, despite of its tragedy, became a source of an important lesson for the future of the two countries. Therefore, Jawaharlal Nehru's message to his Czech readers will be probably its most appropriate conclusion:

It is nearly twenty years since I visited Czechoslovakia; it was at the time of a great distress, disturbance and danger for the Czechoslovak people who were living in the shadow of an impending tragedy. I remember well that visit and also the sympathies I felt with the fate of the Czechoslovak people. Then the tragedy came, followed by the war and later on the defeat of those who attacked this country.

While I am writing this preface my thoughts fly back into that gloomy time twenty years ago and I recollect all that has happened since. I have a firm hope that the international disputes will never more be solved by war and that hatred and force will gradually cease to rule over the international relations.

I am writing this short preface in a remote valley of the Himalayan mountains where peace rules even when the world is perturbed by contradictions. I send in this way Czechoslovak people all the best wishes and I believe that our countries will understand each other in future still better and that they will become friendly in their common work for peace and welfare of all the mankind.<sup>54</sup>

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- 14 *China Spain and the War*, p. 81.
- 15 *An Autobiography*, p. 605; *Narodni Politika* (Daily), Prague, 10 August 1938.
- 16 F. Moraes, op. cit., p. 272.
- 17 E. L. Woodward, R. Butler (Ed.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, Third Series: Vol. I, London 1949, No. 425. Cf. also Newton's telegraphic reply of 21 June which says: "With regard to the personality of mediator I think it would be better to avoid choosing anyone whose experience is limited to India or Colonial Empire since, however foolishly, the connection might be considered derogatory by both sides . . ." Ibid., No. 431.
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- 25 D. Norman, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 573-574. The proceedings of the Paris Conference as well as Nehru's participation in it was commented by a part of Czechoslovak daily press: *Rude Pravo*, 21, 23, 24, 26 and 27 July 1938, *Ceske Slovo* (Prague), 22 July 1938, etc.
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Kamath from the Indian Institute of Technology in Bombay for the information that after his visit to Czechoslovakia on his return journey from Budapest to Western Europe Nehru stayed about one day in Vienna then occupied by the Nazis. It was approximately on 25 August and he lived there in the hotel Ile-de-France. Likewise there he met only a group of Indian students and spoke to them on the situation.

- 30 Nehru's letter to V. Lesny of 28 July, ACSAV.
- 31 *The Unity of India*, p. 114.
- 32 AMZV, III/138-94.821.
- 33 Journalist A. C. N. Nambiar, then residing in Prague, who accompanied Nehru, recalls interesting episodes from Nehru's stay in Prague and his journeys to Zlin and Bratislava in his article "With Nehru in Czechoslovakia", *Hindustan Standard* (New Delhi), 14 November 1964. Nehru's visit to Zlin was briefly reported in the daily *Pravo Lidu* (Prague), 17 August 1938; his meetings with representatives of the German Social Democratic Party are mentioned in *A Bunch of Old Letters*, pp. 448-453; cf. also AMZV, III/138-94.821.
- 34 *Lidove Noviny*, 18 August 1938; the interview was published in an abridged version by *Rude Pravo*, 19 August 1938.
- 35 The only exception was the Prague daily paper of right-wing Agrarian Party *Venkov* which the next day after the publication of the interview with Nehru in *Lidove Noviny*, 19 August 1938, made a sharp attack on the interviewing editor Hubert Ripka, for having received "the Indian opposition to the British Government" the very day when the President of the Republic had talks with Lord Runciman and that he emphasized common sympathies for the Spanish Republic and China.
- 36 *Prager Tagblatt* (Prague), 13 August 1938. An extract from this interview was published the same day in the evening issue of *Pravo Lidu* under the headline: "Pandit Nehru Declares: India Will Never Help Fascism."
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- 47 "In 1938, I went to Europe with the full intention of visiting America also. The Czechoslovak crisis and other developments prevented this." (Letter by J. Nehru



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49 *The Unity of India*, p. 149.

50 Letter of 18 April 1939, ACSAV.

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54 Retranslated from Czech.



## APPENDICES

## APPENDIX I

## THE STRUGGLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA\*

I met Reuter's man early in my stay in Prague and told him that I could not express any opinion about the particular problems affecting minorities without much more study, but that it was obvious that in Czechoslovakia the question of minorities was a mere excuse. The real problem was one of German expansion towards the east and practically breaking the independence of Czechoslovakia. It was a problem of the power politics and thus an international one. Our sympathies were entirely with the Czechoslovakian Government and we were opposed to the Nazi aims. We felt that it was very important for a democratic country like Czechoslovakia not to be weakened in any way.

I also admired greatly the calm and determined attitude of the Czechoslovak people and democratic Germans in the face of this great crisis. The Nazi attitude was one of pure bullying and it was astonishing how this bullying was being supported by the British Government through the Runciman Mission and otherwise.

As for the war, if this occurred, our sympathies would inevitably be with Czechoslovakia, but I added that we were not prepared for England to exploit India for her imperialist purposes. It was a little absurd for England to talk of democracy and to deny that to India.

I gave several interviews to Czechoslovak and German papers in Prague. Naturally, it was not easy for me as a visitor to give advice to any party or make criticism. That would have been improper, but I made it quite clear that the Indian sympathies were entirely with Czechoslovakia and against the aggressors who were trying to bully her.

\*Extracts from a letter of Jawaharlal Nehru to T. K. Menon of the Indo-Czechoslovak Society, Bombay, published in the *National Herald*, 24th September 1938,



## APPENDIX II

## THE BETRAYAL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA\*

Jawaharlal Nehru

We have passed through incredible days, when every hour brought fresh news of betrayal and humiliation for the British and French people, yet in spite of all this war approaches. We must understand the inner meaning of events and realize how the British and French Governments have gone to unheard of lengths in order to placate the vaunting ambition of German dictator. Fundamentally this is as in Spain because of the fascist character of the British Government. The one way of assuring peace by forming a peace bloc in cooperation with the USSR and France, they have rejected, preferring the friendship of the fascist powers, and have paid a price in the most shameful betrayal in history. And even that price is not sufficient to stop war from coming. We will no doubt hear a great deal about democracy, but we have seen how far the British Government cares for democracy and we should beware of assurances, which are only meant to be broken.

With war coming, all our sympathy will be for Czechoslovakia, whose people have behaved with courage and dignity and raised themselves in the eyes of the world. We would gladly do all we can to help them but it must be clearly understood that we are not going to be pawns in imperialist adventures, nor are we prepared to help the governments which will betray democracy whenever they have a chance to do so. It is we who will decide, not the British Government, and our decision will depend not on promises but on definite action which takes us to our goal.

It is pitiful and absurd for the Indian princes to shout out their loyalty and promise to fight for democracy. It is scandalous that they should crush their own subjects denying democracy, yet talk tall what they will do abroad. The High Commissioner for India in London, forgetting his own business, has also made some astonishing remarks in Quebec. Whom he speaks for I don't know. It is most objectionable that he should abuse his position and carry on British propaganda.

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\*This statement was published in *Hindustan Times*, 27 September 1938.



## APPENDIX III

## THE BETRAYAL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA\*

Sir,

An Indian, intensely interested in Indian independence and world peace, I have followed recent developments in Czechoslovakia and Spain with anxious interest. For some years past the Indian National Congress has criticised and dissociated itself from British foreign policy, which has seemed to us consistently reactionary and anti-democratic, and an encouragement to fascist and Nazi aggression. Manchuria, Palestine, Abyssinia, Spain agitated the people of India. In Manchuria the foundations were laid for encouraging triumphant aggression, all covenants and rules of international law were ignored, and the League of Nations sabotaged. With all our sympathy and goodwill for the Jews in their distress in the face of fierce and inhuman persecution in Europe, we considered the struggle in Palestine as essentially a national struggle for freedom which was suppressed by violence by British imperialism in order to control the route to India. In Abyssinia there was a gross betrayal of a brave people. In Spain little was left undone in order to harass the republic and encourage the insurgents. Having decided that the Spanish Government should lose, or was going to lose, the British Government tried in a variety of ways to hasten the desired end—and even insult, injury and gross humiliation by the insurgents were endured.

The fact that everywhere this policy has been a disastrous failure has not and does not discourage the British Government from continuing to pursue it. The consequences of the rape of Manchuria we see all around us in the world today. The problem of Palestine grows from day to day and violence counters violence and the government uses ever-increasing military forces and coercion in an attempt to subdue a people. It is not always remembered that the problem is largely the doing of the British Government and it must shoulder the responsibility for much that has happened. Abyssinia, as your correspondent points out, still remains unconquered and is likely to remain so. In Spain a heroic people have refused to fall in with the wishes of the British Government and have demonstrated that they will not be and cannot be crushed or subdued.

It is a remarkable record of failure. And yet the Government of Great Britain is not capable of learning from it and mending its ways.

\*Jawaharlal Nehru's letter to the editor, *Manchester Guardian*, 8 September 1938, reprinted in *Unity of India*, pp. 284-287.



It pursues even more intensively its policy of encouraging aggression and giving support to General Franco and the fascist and the Nazi Powers. No doubt it will carry on in this way if allowed to do so, till it puts an end to itself as well as the British Empire, for overriding every other consideration are its own class sympathies and leanings towards fascism. That would certainly be a service it will render, howsoever unwittingly, to the world, and I would be the last person to object to an ending of imperialism. But I am deeply concerned with the prospect of world war and it distresses me exceedingly to realise how British foreign policy is directly leading to war. It is true that Herr Hitler has the last and determining word in this matter but Herr Hitler's decision itself will largely depend on the British attitude. This attitude has so far done everything to encourage him and to bully and threaten Czechoslovakia. So if war comes, the British Government can have the satisfaction or otherwise of feeling that they were largely responsible for it, and the people of Britain, who have put this government in power, can draw what comfort they can from this fact.

I had thought that nothing that this government did could surprise me (unless it suddenly turned progressive and worked for peace). But I was mistaken. Recent developments in Czechoslovakia and the way the British Government, directly and through its mediators, has baulked and threatened the Czech Government at every turn has produced a feeling of nausea in me, and I have wondered exceedingly how any Englishman with any liberal instincts or decency could tolerate this. I have wondered still more how those who talk so loudly of peace could have supported, actively or passively, this obvious invitation to war.

Recently, I spent some time in Czechoslovakia and came in contact with numerous people, both Czech and German. I returned full of admiration for the admirable temper of the Czech people and the democratic Germans who, in face of grave danger and unexampled bullying, kept calm and cheerful, eager to do everything to preserve peace, and yet fully determined to keep their independence. As events have shown they have prepared to go to extraordinary length to satisfy every minority claim and preserve peace but everybody knows that the question at issue is now a minority one. If it was the love of minority rights that moved people why do we not hear of the German minority in Italy or the minority in Poland? The question is one of power politics and the Nazi desire to break up the Czecho-Soviet alliance, to put an end to the democratic state in central Europe, to reach the Rumanian oil fields and wheat, and thus to dominate Europe. British policy has encouraged this and tried to weaken that democratic state.



In any event, we in India want no fascism or imperialism and we are more convinced than ever that both are closely akin and dangers to world peace and freedom. India resents British foreign policy and will be no party to it, and we shall endeavour with all our strength to sever the bonds that unite us to this pillar of reaction. The British Government has given us the final and unanswerable argument for complete independence.

All our sympathies are with Czechoslovakia. If war comes, the British people, in spite of their pro-fascist government, will inevitably be dragged into war. But, even then, how will this government, with its openly expressed sympathies for fascist and Nazi aggression or a like government, advance the cause of democracy and freedom? So long as this government endures, fascism will always be at the doorstep.

The people of India have no intention of submitting to any foreign decision on war. They alone can decide and certainly they will not accept the dictates of the British Government which they distrust utterly. India would willingly throw her entire weight on the side of democracy and freedom but we heard these words often enough twenty years ago and more. Only free and democratic countries can help in freedom and democracy elsewhere. If Britain is on the side of democracy then its first task is to eliminate empire from India. That is the sequence of events in Indian eyes and to that sequence the people of India will adhere.

Yours etc.,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

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## APPENDIX IV

## THE CHOICE BEFORE US

Jawaharlal Nehru

In this grave hour when the fates of nations hang in the balance and world war threatens humanity, the people of India cannot remain passive spectators of the march of historic events. They stand to gain or lose from them, as do others, and they have to decide how best to serve the cause of freedom that is dear to them. To wait on others to decide for them, or not to decide at all is to prove unworthy of our historic destiny. All the peoples of the world desire peace, but individuals and those in power and authority are driving the world to terrible war even though they talk glibly of peace. The people of India are even more committed to the way of peace than other peoples.

The Congress has clearly laid down the principle which must govern our action in times of world crisis and war. By those principles we must stand. But the time is fast approaching for the application of those principles in the light of events and recent developments. A negative attitude of protest or the mere enunciation of a principle is not enough when a positive policy and constructive action become necessary. Our movement long ago passed the stage of protest in our national affairs and we took to constructive action. In foreign affairs also we are passing that purely agitational stage and India's voice counts today and is listened to with attention in international councils. It becomes essential, therefore, that we should fashion our policy accordingly and link our national struggle with that policy.

Striving for national freedom, we have inevitably become anti-imperialists and have resisted not only foreign domination in India, but imperialism itself. We saw in Fascism a development of and a more dangerous form of imperialism and we condemned it. We looked upon the two as twin brothers which crushed freedom and prevented peace and progress. We realised that the conflict between fascism and imperialism on the one side and freedom and democracy on the other was worldwide and gradually we ranged ourselves with the forces of progress and freedom. In Abyssinia, Spain and China we condemned imperialist and fascist aggression. It is true that this very memory of the past will cling to us and be a constant reminder to us of what we should not do. It is true also that there is a greater realisation of the issue today, a vaster mass consciousness, more vigilance in the people.



The fact of the existence of the Soviet Union itself and the astonishing fight for democracy in Spain are significant. And yet who can say that vast numbers of people will not be misled again and their courage and sacrifice and idealism not exploited for base ends, leaving after the holocaust of war the same misery, the same injustices, imperialism and fascism?

How to avoid this terrible danger and yet how not to be a mere looker-on when the most vital issues are at stake? It is question most difficult to answer for every person who cares for freedom and democracy and world peace and order. For us in India the difficulty is no less. We sympathise with all our heart with Czechoslovakia in her struggle for freedom, we realise the world significance of it, the momentous consequences which flow from it. We want to help her in her struggle to the best of our ability, for thereby we help the cause of freedom and democracy throughout the world. We want to combat fascism. But we will not permit ourselves to be exploited by imperialism, we will not have war imposed upon us by outside authority, we will not sacrifice to preserve the old injustices or to maintain an order that is based on them. We will not and cannot forget our own struggle for freedom for slogans which may sound pleasant to the ear but have little reality behind them or vague promises which have been broken often before. Will anyone dare to ask us to fight for democracy and deny us that democracy?

It is a terrible predicament and a difficult question to answer. Yet the answer must be given and given in clear language. The Congress, in its resolution, has already clearly indicated what this answer must be. We have to amplify this and apply it, in terms of constructive statesmanship, to the needs of the honour.

Whether there is war or a so-called peace which is continuous conflict and a herald to war, we must be clear what we are aiming at, and hold to that. We must not permit vague slogans, or what are termed military necessities, to take away such liberties as we possess and to divert us from our objective. We must have no imperialist settlement at the end but the liquidation of imperialism itself. We must have a real League of Nations controlling armaments and air services, and collective security, based on freedom and social justice. And those who have the conduct of war or peace must be people who believe in these objectives.

Fascism crushed all progressive elements and set up new standards in cruelty and inhumanity. It gloried in brutality and openly aimed at war. Imperialist Powers talked in terms of democracy but aided and abetted fascism and helped it to grow. International morality decayed, all idea of collective action for peace was given up, and an unabashed gangsterism among nations grew up and was tolerated. Yet it was clear



that only by collective action could the aggressor be stayed and peace maintained. A surrender to violence and aggression was no basis for peace, for the aggression and blackmail grew by every surrender and brought world war ever nearer. It was not difficult for this aggression to be checked and peace ensured if those who believed in peace acted together, for their strength was far greater than that of the fascist aggressor. But many of these very powers who talked of peace and democracy were imperialist and they sympathised with fascism and encouraged it.

The British Government was a special responsibility for the growth of fascism and thus for bringing war nearer. They tolerated aggression in Manchuria, took part in the betrayal of Abyssinia and indirectly aided the fascist rebels in Spain. Their general policy was one of consistent encouragement of Fascism and Nazism. They did not succeed in Spain because the people of Spain refused to fall in with their wishes and fought with unsurpassed courage and determination for their freedom.

In Czechoslovakia the incredible happenings of the past few weeks have shown to what depths the British and French Governments can sink in their desire to increase the power and prestige.

If I was an Englishman I would not trust the present British Government in war or peace and I would not like to commit myself to their care to be used and exploited as they wish. Their talk of peace and democracy has been pure bluff, for peace they could have ensured in cooperation with France, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, and as for democracy, they have done their utmost to slay it in Central Europe. I would demand that this Government must go. So long as it remains, I would fear betrayal.

### IMMEDIATE TASKS

But as an Indian I must confine myself to India. It is time that the problem of our independence was faced and settled finally. We have had delay enough, and if every group of people are considered worthy of self-determination, the three hundred and seventy millions of India have waited long enough for it. There is no other way of settling this question except by recognition of our right to independence and through a constituent assembly. The proposed Federation is dead, let there be no further talk of it. We have bigger questions to decide, vaster problems to settle, and the sooner we set about them the better. More and more people even in England have come to realise that it is both good politics and good sense to have a friendly and free India by their side rather than a hostile India ever giving trouble and weakening them in times of crisis. As a prelude to the new age of freedom and democracy, for which we work and may have to fight, India must have the full sense of freedom.



But we are in the midst of a crisis and intricate schemes cannot be evolved in a day. What can be done without delay? India's right to independence must be recognised as also the fact that her constitution will be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly elected by adult franchise. A committee, consisting of representatives of the people, should be set up to work out the details for the election to this Assembly. And immediate steps should be taken for the transitional period so that a popular direction is given to affairs. With this background, questions of trade and economic relations between India and England will be considered in a friendly spirit, and I have no doubt that India will seek to do justice to all just interests of the British people in India.

Nazi Germany has indulged in the destruction of democracy in Central Europe and the coercion and dismemberment of a gallant and friendly state which has put faith in their word. This act of gross betrayal and dishonour did not even bring peace, but has brought us to the threshold of war. Yet peace was to be had for the asking by building up a joint peace front between England, France and Russia and other powerful states for Nazi Germany to dare to challenge. The British Government refused to line up with Russia and made Hitler believe that he could deal with Czechoslovakia singly, with England and others looking on. They ignored Russia in all their negotiations and worked in alliance with Hitler for the crushing of Czechoslovakia. They preferred to risk making Hitler dominant in Europe to cooperation with Russia in the cause of peace. Their class feelings and hatred of the new order in Russia were so great that everything else was subordinated to it. They gladly agreed, at the bidding of Hitler to the termination of the alliance between Russia and Czechoslovakia and thus sought to isolate Russia. The next obvious step was a Four-Power Pact between England, France, and Germany and Italy, an alliance between imperialism and fascism in order to make the world safe for reaction and the crushing of the progressive elements all over the world. But the over-weening ambition of Hitler has come in their way and an outraged public opinion has cried halt. They have talked of peace, but have deliberately avoided the obvious way to peace and every step they have taken has been an encouragement to Hitler to have war.

They have arrived at a precipice from which, perhaps, retreat may be impossible, and yet there is not even yet a marked change in their pro-fascist policy. If war comes, they will talk of democracy, but if they continue as governments they will still act in the imperialist-fascist way and betray that very democracy if they have the chance to do so. No one who has followed their activities in the past can doubt this or rely on them.

An India with her freedom assured to her, and working for the



establishment of a democratic state, will throw her weight and resources, in war or peace, for the defence of democracy. She will most willingly join ranks in defence of Czechoslovakia and to combat fascism, and work for a settlement to do away with the injustices of the past and the present and lay the foundation of a true world order. Then India and England, if England also pursues the paths of freedom and justice will cooperate together for peace and the good of humanity.

*London, 29 September*

### WITH THE DEMOCRACIES

And yet whether there is war or peace, the fate of Czechoslovakia is a vital matter to the world and to all who stand for democracy and freedom. The momentous struggle between fascism anti-fascism is being and will be fought on this issue and the result of it must have far-reaching consequences. India must be vitally interested in it for it affects her own future. We cannot tolerate the defeat of democracy and the world domination of fascism-imperialism. Britain, preserving her outward forms, would then turn more obviously fascist; France may do likewise. If this grave danger threatens then no people or individuals can be neutral or onlookers, and we have to cast our full weight on the side of democracy, serving thereby the cause of our own freedom. Not to do so might help fascism and reaction.

Governments have power to shape a country's policy and to give it a right or wrong turn. But in moments of crisis, of war and potential war, popular forces rise up and grow and make a vital difference. They change governments or compel them to set in a certain way. It is these progressive forces that we see growing up around us and if the crisis develops into war or otherwise, they will grow all the more. We have to reckon with these forces, to welcome them and to cooperate with them. It is fear of these that has prevented the British Government from cooperating with the Soviet Union in ensuring peace and has made them seek alliance with the Nazis even at the cost of weakening their empire.

### *Obvious Dangers*

Yet there are obvious dangers with an imperialist and reactionary government exploiting for its own purpose in war the slogan of democracy. Do we not have now even Hitler and Mussolini giving their approval to the principle of self-determination, choosing to forget what they



have done and are doing to many of their own people? Have we forgotten the fine phrases and slogans used by the British Government during the last war? Obviously we cannot be taken in by phrases again and allow ourselves to be exploited for imperialist purposes. We cannot be parties to the horror and disillusion of the last war.

*National Herald*

6 October, 1938.

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## JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: SELECT SPEECHES

1. *Defining Foreign Policy\**

I MUST first of all apologize to this House for not being able to attend this debate in person. We, in the Government, have sometimes to attend to the business of two Houses and when something is before the two Houses simultaneously, it adds to the difficulty. I have tried, with the help of my colleague here, to keep in touch with the trend of the debate and have read reports of some of the speeches made here. Both here and in the other House, it is my business and duty to listen very carefully to the criticism that is made and to the suggestions that are offered. It is my desire to learn from them and to accept them where possible.

The public and sometimes the Press have criticized the President's Address as a mere repetition of the policies of the Government. The President is not going to launch a new policy in the country and, therefore, his address is bound to be a repetition of our policy. It gives or purports to give a broad survey of foreign and domestic affairs and does so in language that becomes him as the Head of the State.

Every government should have an integrated outlook consistent with its foreign and domestic policy. However, it is not particularly easy to have an integrated outlook because many unknown factors have to be dealt with. We are not in charge of the world and the other countries do not necessarily carry out our dictates or follow our wishes. We have to take things as they are and they are, I assure you, in a very difficult state. Vast changes are taking place; the whole world is in turmoil. Some countries are actually engaged in war; the rest live in constant fear of war and suffer the havoc fear brings with it. Enormous technological changes take place from day to day although they do not always come to our notice. The entire economic and social structure of the world is being changed by them. They change the structure of society and the thinking of man. Therefore, it may be that a policy which was good for us yesterday is not good today. A policy which was idealistic and advanced in the 19th century may be out of date today. All of us have been hurled suddenly into the middle of the 20th century, irrespective of whether we wished it or not; but our minds lag behind in remote past. Even economic and social problems are discussed in terms of the past, although the enormous changes that have taken place as a result of the

\*Speech during the debate on the President's Address, Parliament, New Delhi, 17 February 1953.



last two great World Wars are obvious enough. At the end of the last war, we saw two mighty giants rise among the nations—the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Other countries are far behind them in terms of power and technological growth. This situation has upset all the old balances. Therefore, all theories and policies based on the old balances are of little use today. Yet, I find people still talking in old terms without realizing or appreciating that nothing in the world of today can remain static.

The situation in the Far East is also completely different from what it was in the past. I merely mention this to point out to you that we must be alert about the changing conditions. It is true that we must have principles; we must have ideals and objectives. But that is not enough. The application, the implementation and the working of our principles and ideals depend, to a large extent, on external circumstances. Those circumstances are hardly ever wholly in our control. We have to accept things as they are.

I have no doubt that every one here would like to build a new world according to his heart's desire. Similarly, we also aim to go in a particular direction but it is not always possible, because we cannot ignore certain factors, much less in a democratic society. Of course, rapid changes consistent with the aims of a government can be brought about in a country even though the wishes of considerable numbers of people have to be disregarded; but such a thing is conceivable only in a particular type of political and economic set-up where one group wields supreme power. We, for instance, cannot ignore large groups. Sometimes the majority has its way, as it should. When honourable Members accuse us of complacency—even of smugness—I feel that they have little understanding of how my mind or that of my colleagues functions. Even if we were so foolish as to be complacent, the circumstances we have to face every day make it impossible for those of us who are in responsible positions to be complacent.

I cannot speak for those who are responsible for the government of other countries but I can certainly speak for my colleagues and for myself. I want to tell you that we approach our problems in all humility of spirit and with feelings utterly devoid of complacency and smugness. We feel that, however small we might be as men, our problems, those of our country and those of the world, are big. We must approach them with all the wisdom we possess and with such experience as we have. Although we have to advance step by step, we must constantly be on the alert so that we can change our step wherever necessary. We must always take counsel with others and never forget to maintain our spirit of humility.

I am anxious to seek help and guidance in every important matter



that comes up before this House. Apart from such knowledge as we may have of world history, most of us have been conditioned by India's national movement and have a common background of thought and a common approach to problems. Many of us, thus conditioned, subsequently took different paths and they were entitled to do this. It was not necessary that all of us should have thought alike. Our understanding of problems—ours as well as those of the world—is necessarily influenced by our background which we have to adapt to new conditions as they develop. Having once been part of the nationalist movement, we cannot possibly think of functioning negatively. Of course, negation inevitably had its place during our fight for freedom but now that we are building India anew, it is imperative that we function positively.

Hon. Members of the Opposition will realize that positive functioning is more difficult because one wrong move can expose the country to danger. Independence has meant added responsibility. Besides our own, we have to try and help solve the problems of world. Not that we wanted to interfere with the affairs of other countries but in the present circumstances it cannot be avoided. A multitude of political, economic and social issues demand consideration in our own country. Large numbers of these problems had been overlooked for generations but when foreign rule was removed, new problems were added to the old ones and we are supposed to solve the whole lot of them at once. I want you to remember that it is not possible to consider our troubles in a vacuum; nor is it easy to decide what is right and what is wrong; even more difficult is the proper application of what one considers right in principle. In order to do that one must have full control over the situation in the country, if not, indeed, in the world.

Our foreign policy has been criticized from various points of view. The most common criticism is that it is not a policy at all because it is too vague. Some hon. Members believe that we are tied up with the Anglo-American bloc because we expect help from it. Others talk frequently of building up a 'third force' or 'third bloc'. An hon. Member wants us—he says so—to align ourselves with the rival bloc. It is not that he is against an alignment as such but he would rather that we had ties with the other bloc. According to the general consensus of opinion in this country, we should follow a policy independent of this or that bloc. You may, of course, sympathize with one or the other; that is quite another thing. To become part of a power bloc means giving up the right to have a policy of our own and following that of somebody else. Surely, that is not the kind of future any self-respecting person would like to envisage for our great country. I am not saying that we should not cooperate with others or consult them but at the same time



we must follow an independent policy. It is perfectly true that no country can function in a vacuum. To achieve anything, it has to take the rest of the world into account and then decide upon its course of action. Although our foreign policy is a continuation of the stand we took during our struggle for independence, we are, sometimes, constrained to vary it according to circumstances.

A country's foreign policy is really a collection of different policies, though they have a common basic outlook. When we deal with America or England or Russia or Japan or China or Egypt or Indonesia, we have to deal with the peculiar circumstances that obtain in the country concerned as well as with those in each of the rest. No single broad rule can apply in every case, because the nature of our relationship varies with each country. The only rule we can lay down is that we shall try to be friendly with all the countries.

Finally, a foreign policy is not just a declaration of fine principles; nor is it a directive to tell the world how to behave. It is conditioned and controlled by a country's own strength. If the policy does not take the capacity of the country into account, it cannot be followed up. If a country talks bigger than it is, it brings little credit to itself. It is easy for you or me to lay down beautiful maxims; but if that is done by a government or nations, it would probably come to nothing. In any case, what do we achieve except the satisfaction of having made fine speeches?

The strength which limits or, at any rate, conditions the foreign policy of a country may be military, financial or, if I may use the word, moral. It is obvious that India has neither military nor financial strength. Furthermore, we have no desire to—and we cannot—impose our will on others. We are, however, anxious to prevent catastrophes and wars and, where possible, to help in the general progress of humanity. We do express our opinion and work for our goals with the limited strength that we have but if we adopt a policy which we are not in a position to implement, we would be discrediting ourselves in the eyes of other nations and be dubbed irresponsible. It is difficult for me to praise or even defend the foreign policy we are pursuing, for I have had a great deal to do with it. I hope I am not being vain when I say that our policy has, indeed, secured us the friendship of a large number of countries. I am confident that today there is no country which is actually hostile to us. Naturally, some countries are more friendly than others but those who are occasionally critical of us do not harbour any permanent resentment against us. We owe this to the policy we are pursuing and the manner in which we are pursuing it. We have tried not to join in the new diplomatic game of maligning, defaming and cursing other countries. That does not necessarily mean that we agree with what they say or do; we may not agree but merely shouting against them does not help, apart from the fact that



it is indecorous, too. We have to deal not only with political and economic considerations but also with a large number of imponderables like fear, for instance. It is alarming to see fear gripping some of the largest and most powerful countries in the world. It is heartening—and I think it is true—that although we cannot be compared with the great countries of the world in terms of power, yet, if I may say so, we as a people, are less influenced by the fear psychosis. Of course, some people may attribute this to our ignorance of the facts. Facts certainly have to be reckoned with; but imponderable things also come in the way of humanity and, if we are to deal with them effectively, the least we can do is to adopt a manner that would help rather than hinder. That is to say, we must refrain from merely running down other countries. We can certainly express our opinion when it is necessary; we can say that we do not agree with a country or that certain things are, in our opinion, wrong; but we must not go farther than that.

Mention has been made of a 'third force'. I have not been able to understand quite what it means. If by the term is meant a power bloc, military or other, I am afraid I do not consider it desirable, apart from the fact that it is not feasible either. The biggest countries today are small compared with the two giants. It would be absurd for a number of countries in Asia to come together and call themselves a third force or a third power in a military sense. It may, however, have a meaning in another sense. Instead of calling it a third force or a third bloc, it can be called a third area, an area which—let us put it negatively first—does not want war, works for peace in a positive way and believes in cooperation. I should like my country to work for that. Indeed, we have tried to do so but the idea of a third bloc or a third force inevitably hinders our work. It frightens people, especially those we wish to approach. Those countries, who do not want to align themselves with either of the two powerful blocs and who are willing to work for the cause of peace, should by all means come together; and we, on our part, should do all we can to make this possible. That is our general policy and I think we should follow it without too much of shouting. I am not afraid of shouting but we want to achieve certain things and shouting may embarrass the countries we have to approach.

The Far Eastern problem is on the agenda of UNO and is due for discussion at its next session. I cannot say now what our representatives may have to do then, because so much depends on the circumstances which may develop in the course of the next two weeks or so. All I can say is that they will broadly try to follow the policy we are pursuing. What I wanted was to refer briefly to the Korean Resolution which we sponsored at the United Nations. Ever since the Korean war started, we have been very much concerned with it, not because we wanted to



interfere or bully others but because we were perhaps in a position to help more than any other country could. Our relations with the countries in conflict were cordial. This was not true of other countries and, therefore, it was difficult for them to do anything. We realized our peculiar responsibility to the poor people of Korea and strongly felt that the utter ruin and destruction in Korea should be stopped at any cost.

I do not want to go into past history; but several steps were taken by us which did not yield immediate results but which, it was subsequently realized, were the right steps. The very first thing that strikes us about the situation in the Far East and about which we are all agreed is that it is unreal and that unless we deal with that great country, China, we can do nothing effective. We, therefore, recognized the People's Republic of China right from the beginning and urged other countries in UNO and elsewhere to do the same regardless of whether or not they liked the policies of China. The fact of China is patent enough and not to recognize it was and is a fundamental breach—I do not know if 'breach' is the right word—and contrary to the very spirit and charter of the United Nations. Nobody can say that UNO was supposed only to represent countries subscribing to one policy. That, unfortunately, is the trend that has gradually come to exist at UNO. The result is that a country as tremendous as China has been treated as though it did not exist and a small island off the coast of China is accepted as representing China. That is very extraordinary. My contention is that this fact is the crux of the situation that has developed in the Far East. The non-recognition of realities naturally leads to artificial policies and programmes and that is exactly what is happening.

We had been in continuous touch with the Governments of China, the U.K. and the U.S.A. as well as those of other countries a few months before we sponsored the Korean Resolution at UNO. We were very anxious not to take any step which would embarrass us or some other party because that would only have made it more difficult for us to help. Occasionally we informed one party about the general outlook and point of view of another. We were in a position to do this because the heads of our missions abroad made it a point to keep in touch with the countries they were accredited to. That is why we were able to frame our resolution largely in accordance with the Chinese viewpoint as we thought it to be. I do not say it was a hundred per cent representative of the Chinese viewpoint but it was certainly an attempt to represent it. The burden of it was that in the matter of the exchange of prisoners, the Geneva Convention should be followed.



Let me not be understood to mean that we were committed to the statements made by our representatives to those of China. We only tried to find out how China would like things to be done. It is, of course, not possible for a party, however big, to have its own way in every respect and we did not overlook this aspect of the problem when we framed our resolution.

Now, another factor to be borne in mind is that this resolution dealt only with the problem of exchange of prisoners. Those who want to know why it did not deal with the question of a cease fire forget the facts of the case. All of us know that truce negotiations were being carried on at Panmunjon for a year and a half before this. After great difficulty an agreement was arrived at in every matter except that of the exchange of prisoners. Obviously, the primary aim of the truce negotiations was a cease fire and that was the first consequence of an agreement. Therefore, we took up only the still unsettled question of exchange of prisoners, subject to the settlement of which a cease fire had already been agreed upon. The principles which governed the resolution had been drawn up in great detail before it was actually framed. Those principles were communicated to the People's Government of China for their opinion early last November. A fortnight passed—I am speaking from memory about the period—and we were told that our communication was being carefully considered. I might say that on many occasions we had been encouraged by various Governments, including the Chinese Government, to persevere in our endeavours for peace. It was not our desire to thrust ourselves where we were not wanted. It is true that the Chinese Government had not committed itself to cooperating with us but it had not refused to do so either and we felt that we might safely go ahead. It may have been a wrong decision but we made considerable progress and things were developing. There was no great difference between the principles we had drawn up and the final resolution. Anyhow, we sent the latter to the parties concerned and a few days elapsed—I forget how many—before we actually proposed the resolution. As the House will remember, the first reaction to it was one of disapproval and an immediate rejection on the part of the United States Government. Till then we had no idea what the reaction of the Chinese and Soviet Governments would be. They, at length, informed us that they did not approve of it. Naturally, we were greatly disappointed. What were we to do then? Some people are of the opinion that we should have withdrawn the resolution at that stage. It is true that the mere passing of a resolution has little meaning when the aim is an agreed settlement. We realized that; but, on the other hand, there were not many alternatives. Before we put our resolution to UNO there were a number of others, all of which were, if I may say so,



aggressive and would certainly have made the situation much worse. We did not approve of them and would have voted against them had the occasion presented itself. A resolution proposed by the Soviet Union or by some other country of Eastern Europe laid stress on the importance of an immediate cease fire. We should have welcomed a cease fire but it was absolutely clear that the resolution would not be passed. Many countries felt that if the issue of prisoners could not be resolved after a whole year's argument, in spite of the pressure of a war, it would never be resolved even if a cease fire took place. Therefore, they preferred to continue negotiations till all the issues could be decided once and for all to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. This was the difficulty so far as our resolution was concerned. Furthermore, it had been very largely supported but some of the principal parties concerned unfortunately did not agree to it. As a matter of fact, the resolution was not ours but one that had been sponsored by the House. We had to adopt a realistic course but we did not know whether or not we should withdraw the resolution and let matters drift. The resolution, however, was not a mandate but in the nature of a proposal and we thought it might possibly help in the further consideration of the subject.

May I say one other thing in this connection? I understand that some Members have disapproved of our action in sending a medical unit to Korea. We sent this unit to Korea purely for medical relief work and, I must say, it has done remarkably well, gaining for itself, in addition, some very valuable experience. Of its kind, it is one of the best units in the world today. It did not take part in the fighting because, though we are prepared to give medical succour, we have nothing to do with the war as such.

I am afraid I have taken a long time over this matter and I should like to pass on to another subject. I am told that my friend, Acharya Narendra Dev, whose opinion I value very greatly, expressed himself in despondent tones about the economic situation in the country and said that the Five Year Plan was not likely to succeed.

It is not easy to take an overall view of the economic situation in the country and sum it up in a few sentences. None of us can take a complacent view of it but the point is how to overcome our difficulties in regard to food, land, industry and, ultimately, better production and better distribution. All this was considered at great length when the Five Year Plan was formulated.

The main virtue of the Five Year Plan is that we have come to grips with our problems for the first time. Theoretical approaches have their place and are, I suppose, essential but a theory must be tempered with reality. In this instance, we have to realize that we cannot go far



beyond our resources. And I think that in the Five Year Plan we have come to realistic conclusions, not forgetting our objectives. I should like the pace at which we are making progress to increase and, indeed, I shall be very happy if Hon. Members would suggest practical measures to achieve this end.

I believe that the food situation has improved considerably and I am sure that, of the various factors responsible, Government policy is certainly one. People refer to the famine or near-famine conditions that prevailed in Rayalaseema last year and do in parts of Karnataka and Bombay State this year. They are right. I would, however, like the House to remember that though we use the word 'famine' today—I do not like using the word—we do so in an entirely different sense than we did in the old days when the British were here. Then, a famine meant millions of people dying like flies. Whereas, if a person dies of hunger or from other causes today, there is an outcry of protest. There is, at the present moment, a new political consciousness and I am very glad about it. In the Bengal famine of 1942-43, 35 lakhs of people died. And I do suggest that the situation is vastly different now. I mention this because a foreign visitor went to the famine areas the other day. He said: 'You talk about famine in these areas! I do not find any people dead or dying. This is not a famine.' Doubtless, he had got his conception of famine from the British days.

It is no small achievement that in spite of tremendous natural calamities, such as the failure of the rains and drought, which affected vast areas, the State Governments, with the cooperation of the Central Government, have prevented the situation from deteriorating and have controlled it by giving work or doles. Unfortunately, they could not always prevent misery and hunger. The Government of Bombay State, for instance, recognizes its responsibility of providing food in scarcity areas whether it is through works—which some Hon. Members must have seen in Rayalaseema and in the Karnataka areas—or other means. Two years ago, a huge administrative venture was undertaken with considerable success in Bihar. Unfortunately, we cannot deal satisfactorily with accidents, such as the failure of the monsoons. As I said, natural calamities have done considerable damage but we are building up our strength so as to be able to deal with the situation. It is difficult to cope with great disasters; but we should be able to overcome natural calamities in the course of the next two or three years. By then, I think, it should be possible—I dare not give any promise—to become more or less self-sufficient in food.

Some people say that we are always talking about agriculture to the neglect of industry. I attach the greatest importance to the development of industry but I doubt whether any real industrial development can



take place in India till we have a firm basis for our agriculture. Of course, we must make progress on all fronts. The nation's economic growth is no simple matter. We have to plan the nation's savings and long term investments with great care. Saving for future generations means exerting some pressure on the present generation. It means, if I may say so, a certain austerity. It is all very well for an authoritarian government to dictate a policy it considers good for the country; but it is not so easy for a democratic country to do so. It is difficult to ask people to starve today to have jam tomorrow. Even great countries like the United Kingdom and the USA took 150 years to build themselves up. Those Hon. Members who are acquainted with history know that this meant extreme suffering for their working classes. The proprietors themselves were not men who liked luxury; they were austere people who saved so that their industrial apparatus might grow and they did this at a terrible cost. It was not difficult to do this in England where Parliament at that time was controlled by a small group of propertied people. Conditions were different in America where there were vast areas. We are differently situated in many ways; for one thing, we have an enormous population which grows every year and which has to be maintained. Also, we have adult suffrage in a democratic set-up.

Some people suggest that we should have a capital levy in order to save for investment. Others want to improve the general standard of living which, apart from the psychological good it may do, will not gain much for us. What really counts is the increase in our rate of production. To build up an adequate apparatus for an increase in future production, you naturally have to save today. To do this and to solve our other problems, we must have definite industrial, financial and land policies. Therefore, we have inaugurated the Five Year Plan and the great point in its favour is that it has made people plan-conscious generally. It has also made us aware of the basic realities, such as the true nature of our position and resources. Of course, we can vary the Plan whenever we like, although it is dangerous to think of changing it constantly.

The House will remember that in the President's Address there is a reference to the Welfare State. He has also said that the real test of progress lies in the growth of employment and in the ultimate ending of unemployment. Obviously, there can be no Welfare State if there is unemployment. Anyhow, the unemployed themselves are not parties to the Welfare State but just outside its pale. To realize the ideal of a Welfare State requires hard work, tremendous effort and cooperation from us and I appeal to this House and to the country to give us that cooperation,



Finally, I should like to say a few words about the Praja Parishad agitation. My friend, the Hon. Archarya Narendra Dev, referred to it and said that in his opinion it was a wholly communal agitation initiated by those who had been supporters of the former Maharaja and the landed gentry. He also suggested that an investigation should be made to find out why this agitation, which was primarily a class agitation, should have affected other people. I agree that there should be an investigation but we must remember that some aspects of this question may not be as well known as others. To understand the significance of the agitation, we must distinguish its purely economic aspect from the other, which is political, constitutional and, perhaps, even international.

As the House knows, an official commission, with the Chief Justice of the State—a very responsible and able officer—as its president, has been appointed to deal with economic matters. Had the commission been non-official, it should immediately have been condemned as not being representative. I submit to the House that it was hardly possible for the Kashmir Government to appoint a commission constituted by the very people who were against the former. If it had appointed non-officials, other non-officials might have said: 'These are your party men.' I think the Kashmir Government very wisely appointed a purely official commission whose findings it can accept and give effect to.

Many things are said about other matters which are of a political nature. The Hon. Member who spoke before me said something about our National Flag. The Constituent Assembly of Kashmir has repeatedly said that the Union Flag is the supreme flag of Kashmir State as it is of the rest of India and it has, therefore, been displayed from time to time. It is interesting to note that many of those who talk about their respect for the National Flag have, in the past, openly declared their intention to replace it by their own party flag. Communal organizations, be they in Jammu or in Delhi, have seldom shown respect for our flag and now they exploit it in order to gain other people's goodwill for this agitation. My chief grievance and sorrow in this matter is that legitimate things have been exploited for unworthy objectives.

There is nobody here who does not want the State of Jammu and Kashmir to have the closest association with India. There is no difference of opinion on this objective but the way that has been pursued has made its realization very difficult. Our union with Jammu and Kashmir State can only be based on the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir; we are not going to achieve a union at the point of the bayonet. Our policy, therefore, should be to try and win them over instead of frightening them. We must not disturb the status of Jammu and Kashmir State but let it remain a separate entity in the Union of India. The



accession of Jammu and Kashmir State was identical with that of any other State in India, although it was thought at the time that there might be a variation in the degree to which States would be integrated with India in the future. We certainly did not think it possible that all the States could be integrated with India to the same degree. I am talking of 1947 or perhaps early 1948. When Jammu and Kashmir State acceded, it did so as fully as any other State, so that the question of partial accession does not arise. I should especially like to point this out to people who talk about the reference to the United Nations on the possibility of a plebiscite. This does not detract from Kashmir's accession to India in any way. The accession is complete. Accession must, however, be distinguished from integration. Jammu and Kashmir State acceded first and then integrated as the other States had done and in the same degree. However, the late Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel wisely followed a policy of fuller integration for the other States; but in the nature of things, we could not follow a similar policy in Kashmir where a war, which had almost become an international issue, was going on.

Last year, the question of further accession arose—not as such but in connection with certain other arrangements with Kashmir. The agreement between the Governments of India and Kashmir had to do with a number of things to which this House agreed and the implementation of which was tantamount to a further degree of integration.

We are sometimes asked why that agreement has not been fully implemented yet. The question is apparently justified but the fact is that the Jammu and Kashmir Government is, even more than the others, an autonomous government. It is up to it to shoulder the responsibility for the situations it may have to face. If something happens in Bengal or Bombay or Madras, we can only give advice because they are autonomous States and must deal with the local situation themselves. The same is true of Kashmir also. We cannot order the Government of Kashmir about or foist a time-table on it. We leave it to it to judge its own affairs and take such action as it deems fit.

In view of the war and the other events which have given it an international significance, Kashmir had to be treated as a special case. The Jammu Praja Parishad agitation started the very day the agreement between the Governments of India and Kashmir was given effect to in part and when the new head of the State, the Sadar-e-Riyasat, elected by the Kashmir Assembly and approved by our President, arrived in Jammu. The Parishad workers tried to interfere with the welcome given to the Yuvaraj and tore the triumphal arch down. That was how it started but it has continued ever since. Had the Kashmir Government been anxious to implement the rest of the agreement, it could not have done so without dealing with the existing situation first. Its hands were



thus tied to some extent because of the agitation. The history of Kashmir, going back a little over a hundred years, bears evidence that the State has had to experience repeated conquest, transfer, purchase and so on. The Jammu province of the State was most important from political and other points of view just as Hyderabad was in the old days when the Muslim community dominated. Now, things are completely different. Naturally, Hyderabad has changed. The feudal order that existed has gone, taking with it the big *jagirs* and inevitably causing considerable distress among those who depended on that feudal order as also among those who depended on the armed forces which were disbanded. I cannot compare the two; there are very great differences. But there are resemblances, too, because both Jammu and Hyderabad had dominant groups which resisted the political changes that were taking place and disapproved of the new land reforms. Also, the background of the economic difficulties of both has some common features.

The agitation soon assumed a violent form. I have here with me particulars of over a hundred officers of the Jammu and Kashmir Government—Deputy Commissioners, Superintendents of Police, schoolmasters and constables—who have been injured. Numerous school buildings have been ransacked, furniture and other things destroyed and small Government offices and treasuries looted. This is a curious kind of 'peaceful' *satyagraha*. However, the Kashmir Government has to deal with the situation but the agitation will, as the House must realize, have unfortunate repercussions. The demand of the Parishad is the complete integration of Jammu with India but if Jammu were to have its wishes carried out and Kashmir were left out of the picture, it would obviously amount to the disruption of the State.

This is an extraordinary attitude to adopt and it can certainly aid and comfort the enemies of India. I am amazed when responsible people in India support an agitation which can only result in injury to India as a whole and the people of Jammu inevitably. If the agitation succeeds, it will be the people of Jammu who will suffer. I had occasion to read reports of some of the speeches made in the course of the agitation. Appeals were made to subvert the Government of India so that a different policy could be followed. Everybody has a right to ask for his own government but such demands on the part of the Jammu Parishad were merely an excuse for something bigger. Whether or not the demands are feasible is a matter which is being discussed at Geneva at the moment. Naturally, we are anxious that this conflict should end, normality should return and legitimate grievances be removed. I am certain that the Kashmir Government is as anxious as we are but how are we to decide complicated constitutional and international problems?



It is difficult for us to discuss them with other people because we have to consult so many parties. We are supposed to discuss these problems in the market place with the Praja Parishad people! I just do not understand how this can be done.

Principal Devaprasad Ghosh suggested that the question of the aggressors and the plebiscite in Kashmir should be discussed at Geneva. I had discussions with the leaders of the Jan Sangh about how the aggressors can be got rid of. However, the question involves military matters, political matters, constitutional and national matters. Since Pakistan is the aggressor, the question involves the entire problem of war and peace between India and Pakistan. Let us realize the nature and depth of the problem and discuss it dispassionately. By connecting it with the Jammu Parishad agitation, we are giving it a communal outlook and that, I think, is fatal for the whole country. It will disrupt the country and put an end to our freedom. And there is such a wide gap between the two approaches that one cannot be too optimistic about the possibility of an agreement.

My honourable friend Dr Kunzru showed grave concern and expressed his disapproval of the fact that certain persons in the Punjab had been arrested and detained in the course of the past week or ten days. I believe about a dozen or so have been arrested. I do not know whether Dr Kunzru meant that under no circumstances should a person be so arrested and detained or whether he thought that in the peculiar circumstances now prevailing in the Punjab this should not have been done.

If he means the former, I would submit that it is difficult to agree with him and, indeed, I cannot do so; nor can any other country agree with him in a final sense. Of course, it is a thing which should not normally be done and I hope it is not normally done; but it is done under the stress of special circumstances. When the Punjab became a source of supply to the people of Jammu, the latter used all kinds of methods to excite the people there and to create trouble on communal lines. Their techniques are still being employed in Delhi and in some cities of western U.P. Processions are being taken out with the shouting of explosive slogans. Surely, that can lead to a very grave situation. Some of the trouble occurred almost within a stone's throw of the cease fire line. Since the Pakistan forces were on the other side, we were anxious that our Army should keep completely out of this. In fact, the disturbances were planned presumably to excite the Army. I know that the Punjab Government was gravely concerned for weeks because the ultimate responsibility was theirs, whether they did anything or not.

I am sorry to have taken up so much of your time but the subjects before the House in connection with the President's Address cover not



only India but the world and the responsibility largely falls upon us, as a Parliament, to face our problems with dignity and restraint, always keeping our principles before us and always in a spirit of humility.

## 2. *An Evolving Policy\**

FOREIGN POLICY in the past, I suppose, related chiefly to the relations of a country with its immediate neighbours—whether they were friendly or otherwise.

As our Chairman reminded you, our neighbours now are all the countries of the world so that we cannot relate our foreign policy just to a few countries around us, but have to think of practically every country in the world and take into consideration all the possible areas of conflict, trade, economic interest, etc. It has been recognised now that if there is a conflict on a big scale anywhere in the world, it is apt to spread all over the world, that is, war has become indivisible and, therefore, peace is indivisible. Therefore, our foreign policy cannot limit itself to the nearby countries. Nevertheless, the nearby countries always have a special interest in one another and India must, inevitably, think in terms of her relations with the countries bordering her by land and sea. What are these countries? If you start from the left, Pakistan; I would also include Afghanistan, although it does not touch India's borders; Tibet and China, Nepal, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Ceylon. In regard to Pakistan, the position has been a very peculiar one owing to the way Pakistan was formed and India was divided. And there have been not only all the upsets that you all know, but something much deeper, and that is, a complete emotional upset of all the people in India and Pakistan because of this. It is a very difficult thing to deal with, a psychological thing, which cannot be dealt with superficially. A year and a half or more has passed, and there is no doubt at all that our relations have improved and are improving. There is also no doubt at all in my mind that it is inevitable for India and Pakistan to have close relations—very close relations—sometime or other in the future. I cannot state when this will take place, but situated as we are, with all our past, we cannot really be just indifferent neighbours. We can be

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\*From speech delivered at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 22 March 1949.



either rather hostile to each other or very friendly with each other. Ultimately, we can only be really very friendly, whatever period of hostility may intervene in between, because our interests are so closely interlinked.

As far as the other countries are concerned, our relations with them are quite friendly. Take, for instance, Afghanistan. Our relations with Afghanistan are exceedingly friendly and our relations with Tibet, Nepal and all the neighbouring countries are also very friendly. In fact, I think I am justified in saying that there is no country in this wide world today with which our relations may be said to be inimical or hostile. Naturally we will be attracted more towards some or our trade or economic interests might link us more with some countries and less with others, but there can be no doubt about it that we are friendly with all and I think that is a good thing and some achievement.

If our neighbouring countries have in a sense the first place in our minds, then the second place goes to the other countries of Asia with whom we are also fairly intimately connected. Now, India is very curiously placed in Asia and her history has been governed a great deal by the geographical factors plus other factors. Whichever problem in Asia you may take up, somehow or other India comes into the picture. Whether you think in terms of China or the Middle East or South-East Asia, India immediately comes into the picture. It is so situated that because of past history, traditions, etc., in regard to any major problem of a country or a group of countries of Asia, India has to be considered. Whether it is a problem of defence or trade or industry or economic policy, India cannot be ignored. She cannot be ignored, because, as I said, her geographical position is a compelling reason. She cannot be ignored also, because of her actual or potential power and resources.

Therefore, whatever our own views may be, by virtue of her practical position and other reasons, 'India is bound to play an important part in Asia—in all parts of Asia—whether it is Western Asia or the Far East or South-East Asia.' It so happens, of course, that even culturally speaking, our bonds are very great with all these parts of Asia, whether it is Western Asia or the Far East or South-East Asia and these bonds are very old and very persistent.

A very curious thing happened when, roughly speaking, British power came to India and British dominion was established here. This was the reason why we were cut off from our neighbouring countries of Asia. Our contacts were then with England across the seas, and while to some extent we struggled against that domination and resented those contacts, nevertheless, they were there and we saw the world more and more through that window, the British window. Very few people went to the other Asian countries from India and very few came here from



there. And even those few people from Asia we met, we met in Europe and not in Asia. Now in recent years that process has been reversed or is being reversed for a variety of reasons. Initially, I suppose, the one major factor was air travel. Air travel brought us immediately into close contact with our neighbours, because if we went to Europe, we passed through Baghdad and Teheran and other places. Air travel is not the only factor; there are also political reasons that are now bringing about this change. And more especially since India became a free and independent country, you find several things happening. As we know, the Asian Conference was convened two years ago and various matters of common interest were discussed there. When a proposal was made to hold the conference—when it was tentatively put forward—we did not quite know what the reaction to it would be. And invitations were sent to a number of countries and we were amazed to find what the reaction was. It was an overwhelming reaction in favour of it and the conference, as we very well know, was a great success.

So we see something working in the mind of Asia, not only in India, but all over Asia. We find something germinating and whenever we give it a chance to come out, it comes out. We are convinced that there is a keen desire on the part of Asian countries to work together, to confer together and generally to look to one another. Possibly this is due to a certain resentment against the behaviour of Europe in the past. It is also due, undoubtedly, to feeling that the Asian countries might still be exploited or dominated by Europe or the countries elsewhere. I think all this arises from a certain flow-back in memory of our ancient contacts, for our literature is full of them. We earnestly hope that we shall be able to develop our contacts still more for our future growth. That is why whenever any step is taken such as the recent Conference on Indonesia in Delhi, there is immediately a good response. This conference was held at a very short notice. But it attracted all these people. It attracted them, no doubt, because they were interested in Indonesia, but I think even more important was the desire to confer together and cooperate closely, and a certain looking in the direction of India on the part of all these countries, the feeling that India might possibly play a fairly important part in bringing Asian countries together.

Some people talk rather loosely, and, if I may say so, rather foolishly, of India becoming the leader of this or the leader of that or the leader of Asia. Now, I do not like that at all. It is a bad approach to this business of leadership. But it is true that, because of the various factors I have mentioned, a certain special responsibility is cast on India. India realizes it, and other countries realize it also. The



responsibility is not necessarily for leadership but for taking the initiative sometimes and helping others to cooperate.

Now, foreign policy is normally something which develops gradually. Apart from certain theoretical propositions we may lay down, it is a thing which, if it is real, has some relation to actuality and not merely to pure theory. Therefore, we cannot precisely lay down our general outlook or general approach, but gradually it develops. We are as an independent country a fairly young country at present, although we are a very ancient country, and we have all the advantages and disadvantages of being an ancient country. Nevertheless, in the present context of foreign policy we are a young country and, therefore, our foreign policy is gradually developing and there is no particular reason why we should rush in all over the place and do something that comes in the way of this gradual development. As I said, our general policy has been to try to cultivate friendly relations with all countries, but that is something which anyone can say. It is not a very helpful thought. It is almost outside, if I may say so, of politics. It may just be a verbal statement or a moral urge. It is hardly a political urge. Nevertheless, something can be said for it even on the political plane. We cannot perhaps be friendly always with every country. The alternative is to become very friendly with some and hostile to others. That is the normal foreign policy of a country—very friendly with close relations with some, with the consequence that you are hostile to others. You may be very friendly to some countries and you cannot just be equally friendly with all countries. Naturally you are more friendly with those with whom you have closer relations, but that great friendliness, if it is active friendliness, is good; if it merely reflects hostility to some other country, then it is something different. And ultimately your hostility provokes other people's hostility and that is the way of conflict and leads to no solution. Fortunately, India has inherited no past hostility to any country. Why should we then start this train of hostility now with any country? Of course, if circumstances compel us it cannot be helped, but it is far better for us to try our utmost to keep clear of these hostile backgrounds. Naturally, again, we are likely to be more friendly to some countries than to others, because this may be to our mutual advantage. That is a different matter, but even so, our friendship with other countries should not, as far as possible, be such as brings us inevitably into conflict with some other country. Now, some people may think that this is a policy of hedging or just avoiding pitfalls, a middle-of-the-road policy. As I conceive it, it is nothing of the kind. It is not a middle-of-the-road policy. It is a positive, constructive policy deliberately aiming at something and deliberately trying to avoid hostility to other countries, to any country as far as possible.



How can we achieve this? Obviously, there are risks and dangers, and the first duty of every country is to protect itself. Protecting oneself unfortunately means relying on the armed forces and the like and so we build up, where necessity arises, our defence apparatus. We cannot take the risk of not doing so, although Mahatma Gandhi would have taken that risk, no doubt, and I dare not say that he would have been wrong. Indeed, if a country is strong enough to take that risk it will not only survive, but it will become a great country. But we are small folk and dare not take that risk. But in protecting ourselves, we should do so in such a way as not to antagonize others and also so as not to appear to aim at the freedom of others. That is important. Also we should avoid in speech or writing anything which worsens the relationship of nations. Now, the urge to do or say things against countries, against their policies and sometimes against their statesmen is very great, because other people are very offensive at times; they are very aggressive at times. If they are aggressive we have to protect ourselves against their aggression. If there is fear of future aggression we have to protect ourselves against that.

If war comes, it comes. It has to be faced. To some extent it has to be provided for and all the consequences of war have to be accepted with it if it comes. But surely we do not want war. As I said some time ago, I take it that the vast majority of people of the world do not want war. Then our policy should primarily aim at avoiding war or preventing war. The prevention of war may include providing for our own defence and you can understand that, but that should not include challenges, counter-challenges, mutual cursing, threats, etc. These certainly will not prevent war, but will only make it come nearer, because they frighten the other governments and the other governments issue similar challenges and then you are frightened and so everybody lives in an atmosphere of fear and anything may come out of such an atmosphere of fear.

Today international questions are looked upon from the point of view of how they will affect some future conflict, with the result that we find groupings on either side forgetful of the actual merits of the case. And a country like India which talks in a different language is looked upon as a nuisance in every way; unfortunately, not only as a nuisance, but every group suspects it of joining hands with the opposite group. But now, I think, there is a certain amount of realization by other countries that we really mean what we say. It is not some deep game or plot and we mean to consider these questions on their merits, and of course merits include other factors also in relation to which we consider such questions. Take our attitude in regard to two or three recent issues—Korea, Palestine and atomic energy. This atomic energy



business came up in the last session of the U.N. General Assembly in Paris and there was a fierce debate on it as to what should be done. India was made a member of the committee appointed to consider this and our distinguished representative on the committee, who is an ideal person for this kind of thing and who never gets excited—while others get excited he gives calm and dispassionate thought to the problem—was able to change the atmosphere in the committee. Whether any wonderful result was achieved or not is not the point, but the way to achieve the result was shown by us. Some countries refuse to be thrown off their feet whatever happens. Now, I do not say that we are so wise and steady on our feet that nothing pushes us off our balance. Of course not. It is anyhow an attempt to stand on our feet, not to hop about or dance about or fall down.

May I say that I do not for an instant claim any superior vantage point for India to advise or criticize the rest of the world? I think we are merely trying not to get excited about these problems and anyhow there is no reason why we should not try. It follows, therefore, that we should not align ourselves with what are called power blocs. We can be of far more service without doing so and I think there is just a possibility—and I shall not put it higher than that—that at a moment of crisis our peaceful and friendly efforts might make a difference and avert that crisis. If so it is well worth trying. When I say that we should not align ourselves with any power blocs, obviously it does not mean that we should not be closer in our relation with some countries than with others. That depends on entirely different factors, chiefly economic, political, agricultural and many other factors. At the present moment you will see that as a matter of fact we have far closer relations with some countries of the Western world than with others. It is partly due to history and partly due to other factors, present-day factors of various kinds. These close relations will, no doubt, develop and we will encourage them to develop, but we do not wish to place ourselves in a position where, politically speaking, we are just lined up with a particular group or bound up to it in regard to our future foreign activities. India is too big a country herself to be bound down to any country, however big it may be. India is going to be and is bound to be a country that counts in world affairs, not I hope in the military sense, but in many other senses which are more important and effective in the end. Any attempt on our part, that is, the Government of the day here, to go too far in one direction would create difficulties in our own country. It would be resented and we would produce conflicts in our own country which would not be helpful to us or to any other country. While remaining quite apart from power blocs, we are in a far better position to cast our weight at the right moment in favour of



peace, and meanwhile our relations can become as close as possible in the economic or other domain with such countries with whom we can easily develop them. So it is not a question of our remaining isolated or cut off from the rest of the world. We do not wish to be isolated. We wish to have the closest contacts, because we do from the beginning firmly believe in the world coming closer together and ultimately realizing the ideal of what is now being called One World. That is our general outlook in regard to our policy.

We find that there has developed a fatalistic tendency to think in terms of war. It is rather difficult to say anything with certainty yet the prospect of war is so bad and the consequences of war are going to be so bad, that, regardless of the result of war, I want every human being to try his utmost to avoid war as far as possible. We do not want war anywhere. We want at least fifteen years of peace in order to be able to develop our resources. If there is war anywhere in the world then what happens to the rest of the world? You can imagine starvation for millions following the war.

If we strive earnestly for peace and try to take advantage of the fact that the very grave crisis of the past autumn has toned down and might tone down still further, I think we can well increase the chances of peace. As far as we are concerned, we ought to try to do that. There are other kinds of conflict now—in Berlin and in other places in Europe. Apart from these, there are two other issues in the world which, unless satisfactorily solved may well lead to conflict and conflict on a big scale. One is the issue typified by Indonesia, that is, the issue of domination of one country over another. Where there is continued domination, whether it is in Asia or Africa, there will be no peace either there or in the people's minds elsewhere. There will be a continuous conflict going on, continuous suspicion of each other and continuous suspicion of Europe in the minds of Asia and therefore, the friendly relationship which should exist between Asia and Europe will not come about easily. It is, therefore, important that all these areas of colonial domination should be freed and they should be able to function as free countries.

The second important issue is that of racial equality. That too, in some parts of the world, you know, has come very much to the forefront. For example, take the question of Indians in South Africa. It is a matter which concerns us all. It is not merely a question of Indians or South Africans, but it is a matter of vital significance to the world, because that too symbolizes something in the world. If that is to continue in the world, then there is bound to be conflict and conflict on a big scale, because it is a continuous challenge to the self-respect of a vast number of people in the world and they will not put up with it. The matter is thus before the United Nations and I hope the United



Nations will help in its solution. But quite apart from the United Nations, there cannot be the shadow of a doubt that if such a policy is continued, it will breed conflict. And that conflict will not be confined to particular areas in South Africa or elsewhere; it will affect peoples in vast continents.

I am not touching upon the third matter, the basic matter, that is, economic policies—it is too big a subject—except that I would like to say in regard to it that the only way to proceed in the world today as far as I can see is for each country to realise that it must not interfere with another country's economic policy. We must realize that there are different types of economic policies in the world today, in different countries, and they are believed in by their people. Well, the only thing to do is to leave them to work out their destiny.

May I just say one word before I close? We are striving for One World, and what with the development of communications and everything, we come close to one another. We know a great deal more about one another than we used to do. Nevertheless, I have a feeling that our knowledge of one another is often extraordinarily superficial, and we, living in our grooves, big or small, seem to imagine, each country seems to imagine, that we are more or less the centre of the world, and the rest is on the fringe, that our way of living is the right way of living and other people's way of living is either a bad way or a mad way, or just some kind of backward way. I suppose it is a common human failing to imagine that we are right and others are wrong. But it is difficult to judge who is right and who is wrong. Both may be right, and both wrong; anyhow, in so far as the people's manner of living is concerned, there may be differences, not only as between Europe, America, Asia and Africa, but also internally in some of the continents. Europe and America, because they have been dominant continents, with a dominant culture, have tended to think that ways of living other than theirs are necessarily inferior. Whether they are inferior or not I do not know. If they are inferior, probably their own people will change them. But this method of approach of one country to another is a very limited approach and does not indicate much wisdom, because this world is a very varied place. Even in India, our whole culture testifies to our understanding of the variety of humanity—laying stress always on the unity, but also on the variety and diversity. The world is a very diverse place, and I personally see no reason why we should regiment it along one line. Perhaps it may be due to the whole philosophy of life behind us in India. Whatever we may do in our limited outlook and failings, we have had a type of philosophy which is a live-and-let-live philosophy of life. We have no particular desire to convert other people to any view or thought. We are prepared to talk it out with everybody and



convince him, and it is for him to accept it or not, and we are quite happy if he goes his own way. We are not at all happy if he interferes with our way.

So we recognize that this world is a diverse place and there are diverse ways of living and functioning and thinking in it, then let us try to get rid of the evil in the world and allow the variety of the world to continue. There are forces strong enough to unify it today, and probably it will come together, and the diversity will probably grow less. It would be unfortunate if it were to disappear one day and we were to become one regimented whole; it is a terrible thought.

### 3. *Asia and Africa Awake\**

FOR seven days we have been in this pleasant city of Bandung, and Bandung has been the focal centre—I might even say the capital of Asia and Africa during this period.

We have met here because of an irrepressible urge amongst the people of Asia and Africa. We have met because mighty forces are at work in these great continents, moving millions of people, creating in their minds urges and passions and desires for a change in their condition.

So we met and what have we achieved? Well, you have seen the draft statement which has been read to you. I think it represents a considerable achievement. But I should like to draw your attention even more to the importance of the fact that we have met here together, seen and made friends with one another and argued with one another to find a solution for our common problems.

My friend the Hon. Prime Minister of Burma referred to our diversities of opinion as differences, and we wrestled with one another these seven days because we wanted to arrive at a common opinion and common outlook. Obviously, the world looks different according to the angle from which you look at it. If you are sitting in the far east of Asia, you have a certain perspective of the world and the world's problems. If you are sitting in the far west of Asia, you have a different perspective. Again, if you are in Africa, it will be quite different.

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\*Speech at the concluding session of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, 24 April 1955



We all came with our own perspectives, each considering his own problem the most important in the world. At the same time, we are trying to understand the big problems of the world, and to fit our problems into this larger context, because in the ultimate analysis, all our problems, however important they may be, cannot be kept apart from these larger problems. Thus, how can we solve our problems if peace itself is in danger? So our primary consideration is peace. All of us are passionately eager to advance our countries peacefully. We have been backward. We have been left behind in the race, and now we have a chance again to make good. We have to make good rapidly because of the compulsion of events. If we do not make good now, we shall fade away not to rise again for a long time to come.

We are determined not to fail. We are determined, in this new phase of Asia and Africa, to make good. We are determined not to be dominated in any way by any other country or continent. We are determined to bring happiness and prosperity to our people and to discard the age-old shackles that have tied us not only politically but economically—the shackles of colonialism and other shackles of our own making. No doubt there were differences in our discussions, and great criticism was levelled at certain resolutions; we had to meet such criticism because we wanted to achieve a common goal. But it is not resolutions that will solve the problems that face us today. Only our practices and actions will bring success to our aims and ideals. It is only then that we can make good what we lost in the past. We have to take a realistic view of all things and face them in a realistic spirit.

But there is yet another spirit in Asia today. Asia is no longer passive; it has been passive enough in the past. It is no longer a submissive Asia; it has tolerated submissiveness too long. The Asia of today is dynamic; it is full of life. Asia might make mistakes, but they do not matter so long as she is alive. Where there is life there is advance.

Our achievements at this Conference have been great—because we have been in general agreement in all our resolutions—but much greater has been the background of all those agreements. We had to wrestle with our differences. We are not yes-men sitting here to say 'yes' to this country or that, not even to one another. We are great countries of the world who live in freedom without dictation. If there is anything that Asia wants to tell the world, it is that there is going to be no dictation in the future. There will be no yes-men in Asia nor in Africa, I hope. We had enough of that in the past. We value the friendship of the great countries, but we can only sit with them as brothers.

I say this not in any spirit of hatred or dislike or aggressiveness in regard to Europe or America. We have sent them our greetings, all of us here, and we want to be friends with them and to cooperate with them.



But in the future we shall only cooperate as equals; there is no friendship when nations are not equal, when one has to obey the other and when one dominates the other. That is why we raise our voices against domination and colonialism, from which many of us have suffered for so long. And that is why we have to be very careful to see that no other form of domination comes our way. We want to be friends with the West and friends with the East and friends with everybody. The only approach to the mind and spirit of Asia is the approach of toleration and cooperation, not the approach of aggressiveness.

I wish to speak no ill of anybody. In Asia, all of us have many faults as countries and as individuals. Our past history shows that. Nevertheless, I say that Europe has been in the past a continent full of conflicts, full of trouble, full of hatred. Europe's conflicts continue, its wars continue and we have been dragged into these wars because we were tied to Europe's chariot wheels. Are we going to continue to be tied to Europe's troubles, Europe's hatreds and Europe's conflicts? I hope not.

Of course, Europe and Asia and America are all dependent on one another. It is not right to think in terms of isolation in this modern world which is moving towards the ideal of one world. Nevertheless Europe and some other great countries, whatever their political persuasion may be, have got into the habit of thinking that their quarrels are the world's quarrels and that therefore the world must submit to them. I do not follow that reasoning. I do not want anybody to quarrel in Europe, Asia or America, but if the others quarrel, why should I quarrel and why should I be dragged into their quarrels and wars?

I realize, as the Prime Minister of Burma said, that we cannot exercise any decisive influence on the world. But there is no doubt that our influence will grow. It is growing, in fact, and we do exercise some influence even today. But whether our influence is great or small, it must be exercised in the right direction, in a direction which reflects the integrity of purpose and ideals and objectives embodied in our resolution. This resolution represents the ideals and the new dynamism of Asia. We are not copies of Europeans or Americans or Russians. We are Asians and Africans. It would not be creditable for our dignity and new freedom if we were camp followers of Russia or any other country of Europe.

As I said, we mean no ill to anybody. We send our greetings to Europe and America. We send our greetings to Australia and New Zealand. And indeed Australia and New Zealand are almost in our region. They certainly do not belong to Europe, much less to America. They are next to us and I should like Australia and New Zealand to come nearer to Asia. I would welcome them because I do not want what we say



or do to be based on racial prejudices. We have had enough of this racialism elsewhere.

We have passed resolutions about conditions in this or that country. But I think there is nothing more terrible than the infinite tragedy of Africa in the past few hundred years. Everything else pales into insignificance when I think of the infinite tragedy of Africa ever since the days when millions of Africans were carried away as galley slaves to America and elsewhere, half of them dying in the galleys. We must accept responsibility for it, all of us, even though we ourselves were not directly involved. But unfortunately, in a different sense, even now the tragedy of Africa is greater than that of any other continent, whether it is racial or political. It is up to Asia to help Africa to the best of her ability because we are sister continents.

I am sure that the Conference has left its powerful impress on the minds of all who are here. I am sure that it has left an impress on the mind of the world. We came here as agents of historic destiny and we have made history here. We have to live up to what we have said, and even more so, to what the millions in these countries expect of us. I hope we shall be worthy of the people's faith and our destiny.

#### 4. *Conference of Non-Aligned Nations\**

IT WAS a happy and wise thought of the sponsors of this conference to have convened it. Our meeting would have been important in any event but it has become more important because of the developments of the last two or three months when we have been made aware of the abyss stretching out before and below us. This conference would have attracted attention in the normal course, but that attention is much more because we meet at the time of this particular crisis in human history.

Today everything, including the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racialism, which is important and to which reference has been made repeatedly here, is over-shadowed by this crisis. Therefore, it becomes inevitable for us to pay attention to this crisis which confronts humanity. The great powers also watch us.

\*From speech at the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, Belgrade, 2 September 1961



We call ourselves non-aligned countries. The word "non-aligned" may be differently interpreted, but basically it was coined and used with the meaning of being non-aligned with the great power blocs of the world. "Non-aligned" has a negative meaning. But if we give it a positive connotation it means nations which object to lining up for war purposes, to military blocs, to military alliances and the like. We keep away from such an approach and we want to throw our weight in favour of peace. In effect, therefore, when there is a crisis involving the possibility of war, the very fact that we are unaligned should stir us to feel that more than ever it is up to us to do whatever we can to prevent such a calamity coming down upon us.

If in this crisis some action of ours helps to remove the fear of war, then we have justified and strengthened ourselves. I know that the key to the situation does not lie in the hands of this conference. It lies essentially in the hands of the two great powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this conference or rather the countries which are represented in this conference are not so helpless that they look on while war is declared and the world is destroyed. The time, the place and the occasion are now and here to take up the question of war and peace and make it our own and show to the world that we stand for peace and that, so far as we can, we shall fight for it in the ways open to us. The power of nations assembled here is not military power or economic power; nevertheless it is power. Call it moral force. It does make a difference obviously what we in our combined wisdom feel and think about this issue of war and peace.

Some six, seven or eight years ago, non-alignment was a rare phenomenon. A few countries here and there asked about it and other countries rather made fun of it or at any rate did not take it seriously. "Non-alignment? What is this? You must be on this side or that,"—that was the argument. That argument is dead today. The whole course of history of the last few years has shown a growing opinion spread in favour of the concept of non-alignment. Why? Because it was in tune with the course of events; it was in tune with the thinking of the vast numbers of people, whether the country concerned was non-aligned or not, because they hungered passionately for peace and did not like this massing up of vast armies and nuclear bombs on either side. Therefore, their minds turned to those countries who refused to line up.

We have arrived at a position today where there is no choice left between an attempt between negotiations for peace or war. If people refuse to negotiate, they must inevitably go to war. I am amazed that rigid and proud attitudes are taken up by the great countries as being too high and mighty to negotiate for peace. I submit that it is not their



prestige which is involved in such attitudes but the future of the human race. It is our duty and function to say that they must negotiate.

I believe firmly that the only possible way to solve many of these problems ultimately is complete disarmament. I consider disarmament an absolute necessity for the peace of the world. I think that without disarmament the present difficulties, fears and conflicts will continue. We cannot expect to achieve disarmament suddenly even if this conference wants it. For the present moment the only thing which we can do is to lay stress on the need to negotiate with a view to getting over these fears and dangers. If that is done, the next and other steps follow.

I would venture to say that it is not for us to lay down what should be done in regard to Germany or Berlin which is the immediate cause of the present tension. It seems to me obvious that certain facts of life should be recognized. There are two independent entities; the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the German Democratic People's Republic. As things stand, we find the great City of Berlin divided by what might be called an international frontier. It is a very awkward situation, but there it is. West Berlin is very closely allied to West Germany and to Western countries and they have had access to it. I am glad that Mr. Khrushchev himself has indicated that that access will not be limited and it will be open to them as it is now. If that is made perfectly clear and guaranteed by all concerned, I should imagine that one of the major fears and causes of conflict will be removed. I am merely putting this forward to indicate how some of the big things which are troubling the people are capable of solution even if the entire problem is not solved.

The most important thing for the world today is for the great powers directly concerned to meet together and negotiate with a will to peace. And if this conference throws its weight in favour of such an approach, it will be a positive step which we take in order to help.

May I say that the danger of war coming nearer has been enhanced perhaps by the recent decision of the Soviet Government to start nuclear tests? I regret it deeply because it may well lead to the other countries also starting the tests, and apart from the inherent danger of nuclear fall-outs, this brings us to the very verge of the precipice of war. Therefore, it has become even more urgent that the process of negotiation should begin without any delay.

I should like to refer briefly to some of our other problems. Many of the countries represented here have only recently become independent. They have tremendous problems and have, above all, the problem of making good economically and socially, because most of these countries are under-developed. It is right and proper that the affluent countries



should help in this process. They have to some extent done so. I think they should do more in this respect, but ultimately the burden will lie on the people of the countries themselves. This problem has to be faced by each one of our countries.

There are some countries represented here which are struggling for their freedom. There is Algeria which has paid a fantastic price in human life and suffering in its struggle for freedom and yet has not so far succeeded in achieving it. There is Tunisia with its recent extraordinary experience. I am referring particularly to Bizerta, which is a foreign base, because the very idea of a foreign base in a country seems quite extraordinary to me. There are then the problems of the Congo. There is the horror of Angola. It is a closed book.

Then there is the situation in East Africa, where some countries, such as Tanganyika, have been promised independence. The situation in Central Africa is not good. Further south in South Africa we have the supreme symbol of racial arrogance, racial discrimination, and apartheid which is an intolerable position to be accepted by any of us. And this is imposed upon South-West Africa in challenge to the United Nations' decision! All these problems crowd upon us. We have to face them.

The most fundamental fact of the world today is the development of new and mighty forces. We have to think in terms of the new world. There is no doubt that imperialism and the old-style colonialism will vanish. Yet the new forces may help others to dominate in other ways over us, and certainly the under-developed and the backward. Therefore, we cannot afford to be backward.

We have to build in our own countries societies where freedom is real. Freedom is essential, because freedom will give us strength and enable us to build prosperous societies. These are for us basic problems. When we think in terms of these basic problems, war becomes an even greater folly than ever. If we cannot prevent war, all our problems suffer and we cannot deal with them. But if we can prevent war, we can go ahead in solving our other problems. We can help to liberate the parts of the world under colonial and imperial rule and we can build up our own free, prosperous societies in our respective countries. That is positive work for us to do. Therefore, I venture to submit to this assembly that we must lay the greatest stress on the removal of this major danger of war today. Not only is this incumbent on us but if we do this we shall be in line with the thinking of millions and millions of people. Non-alignment has received strength from the fact that millions of people are not aligned and that they do not want war.

Let us use this strength rightly, with courtesy and with a friendly



approach so that we may influence those who have the power of war and peace in their hands. Let us try, if not to prevent war for all time, to push it away so that in the meantime the world may learn the ways of mutual cooperation.

### 5. *Asia Finds Herself Again\**

FRIENDS and fellow Asians! What has brought you, the men and women of Asia, here? Why have you come from various countries of this continent of ours and gathered together in this ancient city of Delhi? Some of us, greatly daring, sent you invitations for this Conference and you gave a warm welcome to that invitation. And yet it was not merely the call from us, but some deeper urge that brought you here.

We stand at the end of an era and on the threshold of new period of history. Standing on this watershed which divides two epochs of human history and endeavour, we can look back on our long past and look forward to the future that is taking shape before our eyes. Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has suddenly become important again in world affairs. If we view the millennia of history, this continent of Asia, with which Egypt has been so intimately connected in cultural fellowship, has played a mighty role in the evolution of humanity. It was here that civilization began and man started on his unending adventure of life. Here the mind of man searched unceasingly for truth and the spirit of man shone out like a beacon which lighted up the whole world.

This dynamic Asia from which great streams of culture flowed in all directions gradually became static and unchanging. Other peoples and other continents came to the fore and with their new dynamism spread out and took possession of great parts of the world. This mighty continent became just a field for the rival imperialisms of Europe and Europe became the centre of history and progress in human affairs.

A change is coming over the scene now and Asia is again finding herself. We live in an age of tremendous transition and already the next stage takes shape when Asia assumes her rightful place with the other continents.

It is at this great moment that we meet here and it is the pride and

\*Inaugural Address at the Asian Relations Conference held under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 23 March 1947.



privilege of the people of India to welcome their fellow Asians from other countries, to confer with them about the present and the future, and lay the foundation of our mutual progress, wellbeing and friendship.

The idea of having an Asian Conference is not new and many have thought of it. It is indeed surprising that it should not have been held many years earlier; yet perhaps the time was not ripe for it and any attempt to do so would have been superficial and not in tune with world events. It so happened that we in India convened this Conference, but the idea of such a conference arose simultaneously in many minds and in many countries of Asia. There was a widespread urge and an awareness that the time had come for us, peoples of Asia, to meet together, to hold together and to advance together. It was not only a vague desire, but the compulsion of events that forced all of us to think along these lines. Because of this, the invitation we in India sent out brought an answering echo and a magnificent response from every country of Asia.

We welcome you, delegates and representatives from China, that great country to which Asia owes so much and from which so much is expected; from Egypt and the Arab countries of West Asia, inheritors of a proud culture which spread far and wide and influenced India greatly; from Iran whose contacts with India go back to the dawn of history; from Indonesia and Indo-China whose history is intertwined with India's culture, and where recently the battle of freedom has continued, a reminder to us that freedom must be won and cannot come as a gift; from Turkey that has been rejuvenated by the genius of a great leader; from Korea and Mongolia, Siam, Malaya and the Philippines; from the Soviet Republics of Asia which have advanced so rapidly in our generation and which have so many lessons to teach us; and from our neighbours Afghanistan, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma and Ceylon to whom we look especially for cooperation and close and friendly intercourse. Asia is very well represented at this Conference, and if one or two countries have been unable to send representatives, this was due to no lack of desire on their part, but because circumstances beyond our control came in the way. We also welcome observers from Australia and New Zealand, because we have many problems in common, especially in the Pacific and in the south-east region of Asia, and we have to cooperate together to find solutions.

As we meet here today, the long past of Asia rises before us, the troubles of recent years fade away, and a thousand memories revive. But I shall not speak to you of these past ages with their glories and triumphs and failures, nor of more recent times which have oppressed us so much and which still pursue us in some measure. During the past two hundred



years we have seen the growth of Western imperialisms and of the reduction of large parts of Asia to colonial or semi-colonial status. Much has happened during these years, but perhaps one of the notable consequences of the European domination of Asia has been the isolation of the countries of Asia from one another. India always had contacts and intercourse with her neighbour countries in the north-west, the north-east, the east and the south-east. With the coming of British rule in India these contacts were broken off and India was almost completely isolated from the rest of Asia. The old land routes almost ceased to function and our chief window to the outer world looked out on the sea route which led to England. A similar process affected other countries of Asia also. Their economy was bound up with some European imperialism or other; even culturally they looked towards Europe and not to their own friends and neighbours from whom they had derived so much in the past.

Today this isolation is breaking down because of many reasons, political and other. The old imperialisms are fading away. The land routes have revived and air travel suddenly brings us very near to one another. This Conference itself is significant as an expression of that deeper urge of the mind and spirit of Asia which has persisted in spite of the isolationism which grew up during the years of European domination. As that domination goes, the walls that surrounded us fall down and we look at one another again and meet as old friends long parted.

In this Conference and in this work there are no leaders and no followers. All countries of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis in a common task and endeavour. It is fitting that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development. Apart from the fact that India herself is emerging into freedom and independence, she is the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia. Geography is a compelling factor, and geographically she is so situated as to be the meeting point of western and northern and eastern and south-east Asia. Because of this, the history of India is a long history of her relations with the other countries of Asia. Streams of culture have come to India from the West and the East and been absorbed in India, producing the rich and variegated culture which is India today. At the same time, streams of culture have flowed from India to distant parts of Asia. If you would know India, you have to go to Afghanistan and West Asia, to Central Asia, to China and Japan and to the countries of South-East Asia. There you will find magnificent evidence of the vitality of India's culture which spread out and influenced vast numbers of people.'

There came the great cultural stream from Iran to India in remote antiquity. And then began that constant intercourse between India and



the Far East, notably China. In later years South-East Asia witnessed an amazing efflorescence of Indian art and culture. The mighty stream which started from Arabia and developed as a mixed Irano-Arabic culture poured into India. All these came to us and influenced us, and yet so great was the powerful impress of India's own mind and culture that it could accept them without being itself swept away or overwhelmed. Nevertheless, we all changed in the process and in India today all of us are mixed products of these various influences. An Indian, wherever he may go in Asia, feels a sense of kinship with the land he visits and the people he meets.

I wish to speak to you not of the past, but rather of the present. We meet here not to discuss our past history and contacts, but to forge links for the future. And may I say here that this Conference, and the idea underlying it, is in no way aggressive or against any other continent or country? Ever since news of this Conference went abroad some people in Europe and America have viewed it with doubt, imagining that this was some kind of a pan-Asian movement directed against Europe or America. We have no designs against anybody; ours is the great design of promoting peace and progress all over the world. Far too long have we of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and to cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of others.

In this crisis in world history Asia will necessarily play a vital role. The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others; they are bound to have their own policies in world affairs. Europe and America have contributed very greatly to human progress and for that we must yield them praise and honour, and learn from them the many lessons they have to teach. But the West has also driven us into wars and conflicts without number and even now, the day after a terrible war, there is talk of further wars in the atomic age that is upon us. In this atomic age Asia will have to function effectively in the maintenance of peace. Indeed, there can be no peace unless Asia plays her part. There is today conflict in many countries, and all of us in Asia are full of our own troubles. Nevertheless, the whole spirit and outlook of Asia are peaceful, and the emergence of Asia in world affairs will be a powerful influence for world peace.

Peace can come only when nations are free and also when human beings everywhere have freedom and security and opportunity. Peace and freedom, therefore, have to be considered in both their political and economic aspects. The countries of Asia, we must remember, are very backward and the standards of living are appallingly low. These



economic problems demand urgent solution or else crisis and disaster may overwhelm us. We have, therefore, to think in terms of the common man and fashion our political, social and economic structure so that the burdens that have crashed him may be removed, and he may have full opportunity for growth.

We have arrived at a stage in human affairs when the ideal of One World and some kind of a World Federation seem to be essential though there are many dangers and obstacles in the way. We should work for that ideal and not for any grouping which comes in the way of this larger world group. We, therefore, support the United Nations structure which is painfully emerging from its infancy. But in order to have One World, we must also, in Asia, think of the countries of Asia co-operating together for that larger ideal.

This Conference, in a small measure, represents this bringing together of the countries of Asia. Whatever it may achieve, the mere fact of its taking place is itself of historic significance. Indeed, this occasion is unique in history, for never before has such a gathering met together at any place. So even in meeting we have achieved much and I have no doubt that out of this meeting greater things will come. When the history of our present times is written, this event may well stand out as a landmark which divides the past of Asia from the future. And because we are participating in this making of history, something of the greatness of historic events comes to us all.

This Conference will split up into committees and groups to discuss various problems which are of common concern to all of us. We shall not discuss the internal politics of any country, because that is rather beyond the scope of our present meeting. Naturally we are interested in these internal politics, because they act and react on one another, but we may not discuss them at this stage because, if we do, we may lose ourselves in interminable arguments and complications. We may fail to achieve the purpose for which we have met.

I hope that out of this Conference some permanent Asian Institute for the study of common problems and to bring about closer relations will emerge; also perhaps a School of Asian Studies. Further, we might be able to organize an interchange of visits and exchanges of students and professors so that we might get to know one another better. There is much more we can do, but I shall not venture to enumerate all these subjects; for it is for you to discuss them and arrive at decisions.

We seek no narrow nationalism. Nationalism has a place in each country and should be fostered, but it must not be allowed to become aggressive and come in the way of international development. Asia stretches her hand out in friendship to Europe and America as well as to our suffering brethren in Africa.



We of Asia have a special responsibility to the people of Africa. We must help them to their rightful place in the human family. The freedom that we envisage is not to be confined to this nation or that or to a particular people, but must spread out over the whole human race. That universal human freedom also cannot be based on the supremacy of any particular class. It must be the freedom of the common man everywhere and full opportunities for him to develop.

We think today of the great architects of Asian freedom—Sun Yat-sen, Zaghlul Pasha, the Ataturk Kemal Pasha and others, whose labours have borne fruit.

We think also of that great figure whose labours and whose inspiration have brought India to the threshold of her Independence—Mahatma Gandhi. We miss him at this Conference and yet I hope that he may visit us before our labours end. He is engrossed in the service of the common man in India, and even this Conference could not drag him away from it.

All over Asia we are passing through trials and tribulations. In India also you will see conflict and trouble. Let us not be disheartened by this; this is inevitable in an age of mighty transition. There are powerful creative impulses and a new vitality in all the people's of Asia. The masses are awake and they demand their heritage. Strong winds are blowing all over Asia. Let us not be afraid of them, but rather welcome them; for, only with their help can we build the new Asia of our dreams. Let us have faith in these great new forces and the dream which is taking shape. Let us, above all, have faith in the human spirit which Asia has symbolized for those long ages past.



## NOTES AND COMMENTS

### SUPPLYING AUSTRALIA'S ROLE-MODELLING NEEDS: ONCE BRITAIN AND USA, NOW CANADA

**A**LTHOUGH independent and autonomous nations, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have relied upon each other to quite a large extent in formulating national policy. Obviously there is no compulsion involved, but these nations have found it useful to suggest, often at a semi-conscious level of cultural contacts, to one another various policy orientations, and in a more formal way, adopt each other as role models, a process well known to sociologists.

Every human society develops a culture 'something which man interposes between himself and his environment in order to ensure his security and survival',<sup>1</sup> and thus the three remaining 'old Commonwealth' partners of Australia, Canada and New Zealand each possess an individuated culture but also one with a large degree of similarity by virtue of their common origin. These cultures or 'bundles of closely correlated belief and rules of conduct on the basis of which whole communities act and interact', as in Borkenau's definition,<sup>2</sup> are in close and constant contact. As environmental circumstances change, cultures must respond to those changes in order that those societies may adapt, and they can change through internal initiative or by borrowing which involves far less tension. Cultures do change by internal means but more often it is by contagion, to use Hartz's term,<sup>3</sup> or affiliation, as in Borkenau. The adoption of a cultural change that has been successfully implemented elsewhere avoids the tensions of the learning costs, and so therefore has a far greater chance of taking hold. Although cultural contact is highly contagious, and a process of global cultural homogenisation is taking place,<sup>4</sup> cultures do also resist change. It would seem unlikely for example that Australia and New Zealand would follow Canada in the adoption of baseball and ice-hockey in the place of cricket and football! Nonetheless, in many other areas, evidence of the processes of cultural transmission and role-modelling can be seen.

### IMMIGRATION AND POST-SETTLEMENT POLICY

In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the Australian colonies, New Zealand and British Columbia (along with California) were all target areas for Asian migration. As the colonies increased their



relative degrees of autonomy, so did their selectivity as to immigrants. Indeed in 1840, it had only been with the utmost difficulty that the Canadian exiles from the uprising of 1838-39 had been admitted to New South Wales. It was the wish of the Governor that they be sent on to Norfolk Island, and it was only the vigorous intercession of the highly bilingual Catholic Bishop Polding, acting on the references of the bishops of Lower Canada, who succeeded in changing this view.<sup>5</sup>

The colonies had been predominantly British in ethnic composition, as the nations they now form still are but to a lesser extent today. The Australian colonies in 1891 were estimated to be 90.5 per cent British, New Zealand 95.5 per cent in late 1880's, and as one observer proudly commented

the purity of the British race is being well conserved in New Zealand,<sup>6</sup>

while in British Columbia it was weaker but still 80 per cent in the census statistics of 1881.<sup>7</sup>

In the and 1830's 1840's there had been some movement of Chinese, Indian and Pacific Island labourers, but in the 1850's the first great waves of Cantonese gold-diggers flooded into California, then eastern Australia, then New Zealand, and then finally British Columbia, followed by further floods in the late 1860's and 1870's, producing a reaction in all the target areas such that by 1888 all of the colonies and countries had severe restrictions on Chinese immigration and severe discriminatory controls on those Chinese already settled.

In this response, British Columbia was ahead of Australasia, and followed closely upon the California initiatives. In 1876 the provincial government decided to support a policy of restricted entry which it urged the Federal Government in Ottawa to adopt. Although unsuccessful in this, British Columbia passed a Chinese Tax Act (1878) imposing an annual poll tax of \$40 on every Chinese over 13, and this Act remained in force until declared invalid by the Supreme Court of British Columbia. After much federal-state wrangling, the Federal Government in 1885 finally passed a restrictive immigration act which reduced Chinese immigration from an average of more than 3,000 per year (1881-5) to 700 per year (1886-9).<sup>8</sup>

The suggestion that Chinese immigration must be restricted further was transmitted itself across the Pacific to Australia and New Zealand, where it had in any case already been under implementation in Queensland with a State Act in 1877 and in New Zealand in 1881, and then in the other Australian colonies. In New Zealand the Census of 1881



identified 5033 Chinese by 1926 had fallen to 2943 about the same level as 1871.<sup>9</sup>

Having settled the 'Chinese problem', the young colonies then turned their attention to other non-European peoples such as Indians and Japanese, and when the Australian colonies joined in a Federation in 1901, the first act of the first parliament was an Immigration Act, institutionalising the White Australia Policy which was to last for over 60 years. By the 1920's, Canada, Australia, New Zealand (and the United States) all had heavy restrictions on new entry and close surveillance and control on those non-Europeans already settled, and these remained in force throughout periods of unprecedented migrant intake in the early post-World War II periods. Though not called a 'white Canada policy', Canada's immigration policy was, in relation to Australia's 'hardly less discriminatory', as two observers described it,<sup>10</sup> as was New Zealand's.

But in the 1960's, Canada was the first to take a major step towards abolishing a racially restrictive immigration policy, which it did in 1962, when the system of preferred nationalities was replaced under regulations with a system emphasising education, training and skills. As a result, the Black and Asian group, as a proportion of the total immigration to Canada, rose from 14.6 per cent in 1967 to 36.6 per cent in 1974.<sup>11</sup> This change in immigration source was the natural expression of a re-evaluation of Canada's Asian role: Japan had now moved to third place after the U.S.A. and Britain as a trading partner, while China, India and the ASEAN nations moved into new places as markets and trading partners. But in addition to the trading relationships, Canada was seeking to establish for itself a new role as diplomatic mediator and 'peacekeeper' and as a precondition to this, it was necessary to remove any suggestion of prejudice and discrimination in its dealings with other nations at the level of immigration, and thus cultural change followed policy imperative.

With Australia, the changes commenced by Canada were slower and more difficult but certainly followed the suggested change in immigration policy orientation. In the 1950's Australia saw the need to develop closer relations with such neighbouring countries as Japan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and it entered into a number of defense agreements such as S.E.A.T.O and cooperative agreements such as the Colombo Plan. In 1956 it commenced the dismantlement of the White Australia Policy by allowing non-Europeans with families already resident in Australia to apply for citizenship. It was in 1964 that the rules covering the admission were eased, which enabled the admission of Anglo-Indians and others. However, Australia's assisted passage scheme still heavily favoured Britain and European sources,



Finally in 1973 all discrimination on racial and ethnic grounds was abolished from Australia's entry requirements, and as a consequence, the percentage of those from Britain and Europe fell from 81.5 per cent in 1967-68 to 61 per cent in 1974-75.<sup>12</sup> Thus Australia had followed Canada's lead in the field of immigration intake policy, though Australia's new policy was less vocationally oriented than Canada's.

New Zealand's immigration policy had also shown some liberalisation of its racial and ethnic criteria, but as late as 1975 one commentator was still impelled to write that

It could almost be said that New Zealand practices not merely a 'white' but a 'white British' New Zealand Policy<sup>13</sup>

But in New Zealand, the issue of race and sport, as highlighted by the Springboks tours of the 1974's had caused great internal upheaval. New Zealand had also received considerable numbers of Pacific peoples, mainly Cook Islanders and Tongans, such that the issue of Asian immigration has been less sharply defined than in either Canada or Australia, but instead was one of Pacific immigration.

It should also be mentioned that the U.S.A. moved to a non-racially restrictive immigration policy with the Kennedy Immigration Act in 1965 which became effective in 1968; however Britain was to move in the opposite direction of erecting a colour bar in the late 1960's.

Another development of the immigration policy was that of the post-settlement policy of multiculturalism.

In the late 1960s, when Canada was experiencing considerable anguish as French Canadians re-evaluated their own society as well as their assigned position in Canadian society in a process which became known as the Quiet Revolution, the Federal Government set up a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Its policy recommendation was basically that embodied in its title: that Canada should become officially bilingual and bicultural, to a far greater degree than it had hitherto been. The effect of this recommendation was to greatly antagonise the third language groups (i.e. those whose language was neither English nor French) who formed nearly a third of the population again. The inspired solution to this difficult impasse proposed and adopted by the Trudeau Government was that Canada was to be officially bilingual in the languages of its two "founding races" but to have no single or dual official culture, that it was to be officially 'multicultural', and on 8, October 1971, the Prime Minister announced in the Canadian House of Commons that the Federal Government would proclaim a policy of 'multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.' In this policy, all of Canada's cultures, indigenous, 'charter' and immigrant would receive



official recognition. As a policy, multiculturalism was hardly one that could challenge the non-official but all-embracing dominance of Anglo-American culture in Canada (even in Quebec a majority of households watch Anglo-American television) so that its acceptance was immediate.

The Australian Government had also faced similar problems, and so it was realised that the Canadian policy had great relevance to Australia also, and thus multiculturalism came to be adopted as official policy in Australia as well.<sup>14</sup>

In both nations various administrative and consultative offices were created: in Canada a post in Cabinet for a Minister of State responsible for Multiculturalism and a Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism and in Australia, an Australian Ethnic Affairs Council and an Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs. The policy appears to have support from a wide spectrum of political parties in both nations, with the exception of the *Parti Quebecois* in Canada. Clearly it is a policy which appears to make meaningful the large input of immigrants (and immigrant cultures) to both nations in the period since World War II (3.5 million to Australia and 4.5 million to Canada).

In both countries, the policy has received fairly widespread popular support and acceptance, particularly at the level of popular cultural expression. As yet, in both countries, there has been little penetration of persons of other cultures into the deep interior structures of governmental, administrative or academic power and therefore some impatience and criticism.

While New Zealand has not officially adopted multiculturalism as a policy, it has been active in the ethnic policy area, and its Race Relations Act of 1971 predates the Australian one by four years. In view of the fact that New Zealand's post-war immigration intake has been relatively smaller than that of either Australia or Canada, there is a lesser need for a multicultural policy *per-se* but a greater need for *Maori-pakeha* partnership type concept. In this area New Zealand has provided a role model for Australia and Canada though not one that has been taken up, but in any case is one that has its sceptics. As some critics were to comment:

Given the vigour of various social programmes, especially those that have originated with the Department of Maori Affairs in recent years, we could be forgiven for thinking that New Zealand is on the verge of embracing a form of cultural pluralism. But the undoubted progress that has been made should not hide the variety of problems that continue and are unaffected by the programmes that exist.<sup>15</sup>



In addition New Zealand's early constitutional development of allowing special representation in the form of four seats in Parliament is an initiative not taken up by either of the other two constitutions. However, the exceptions notwithstanding, it is clear that the broad hypotheses of cultures responding in series to environmental changes and in turn influencing policy, is true. Though there is a clear pattern of stimulus and response through role-modelling, it would not be correct to identify any one culture as the leader or pace-setter, it can simply be said that they closely watch each other and sometimes select a response as appropriate.<sup>16</sup>

### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In relation to Canada's international position the late Barbara Ward was to write

Of all the middle powers, Canada has the greatest resources, the most central position, the finest web of contacts and influence and, relatively speaking, the highest proportion of experts, both bilingual and in each language, of any nation in the world.<sup>17</sup>

In the international sphere Canada has earned for itself a unique position as a middle power close to but independent from the super-powers, Britain in its heyday and more recently the United States, and as a nation with an extensive range of contacts and reserves of respect among third world nations both from within the anglophone and franco-phone worlds. This position has not come by accident, but as the product of Canadian strivings at the cultural level to develop and maintain a distinct identity and also resolve the tensions of the anti-Anglo Saxon orientation of its French component. Yet in so doing, Canada has forged a path which Australia and New Zealand have often decided to follow, and sometimes have certainly regretted that they did not.

Although superficially, particularly in many American eyes, Canada is still very 'British', Canada has long demonstrated a wish to assert its independence from Britain. In 1887, despite the traditional Canadian hatred of the Fenians, a conservative majority in the Canadian federal parliament passed a resolution recommending Home Rule for Ireland. Canadian unhappiness with Britain long predates this action though, and focused on a feeling that Britain was too ready to placate the Americans at Canada's expense. After the War of 1812, when boundaries might well have been adjusted to provide easier communication between New



Brunswick and Quebec, Britain settled for the *status quo anti bellum*. Again in 1842, Britain ceded territories to the Americans under the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. In 1903, well after confederation, came an even greater disappointment, when three American, two Canadian and one British negotiator met on a commission to settle the boundaries of the Alaska Panhandle, the coastal strip which separates northern British Columbia from the Pacific Ocean. As the original Alaska boundary treaty had been negotiated between Russia and Britain in 1825, a British representative, Lord Alverstone was included in the settlement negotiations, and took the American side. As George Woodcock was later to write

By voting with the Americans, Lord Alverstone deprive Canada of access to the sea, but assured British friendship with the belligerent regime of Theodore Roosevelt.<sup>18</sup>

Of course in World War I Canada loyally served Britain, (though French Canadian reactions were anti-conscriptionist); however in the 1920's Canada again felt it necessary to assert its independence from Britain. In 1922, at the time of the Chanak incident, Canada refused to back the British Government in its threats to Turkey; in 1924 it independently acted in the official recognition of the Soviet Government in Russia, and in 1925 it refused to accept the obligations of the Locarno Treaty.

Canada was a prime mover in persuading the British Government to pass the Statute of Westminster in 1931 which marked the end of the Empire and the creation of the Commonwealth, thus creating a new role of independence within a wider framework which both Australia and New Zealand would enjoy.

In the conduct of World War II, many Canadians (other than the small pro-Axis minority) were critical of Churchill's deployment of Canadian forces. Concerning the disastrous raid on Dieppe, one Canadian was to state

The colonised always serve as common fodder for the imperialist, even in a war against fascism.<sup>19</sup>

Since the end of World War II Canada has moved fairly quickly to loosen the ties with Britain in for example: the Canadianization of British capital, the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in 1949, the nomination of the first Canadian Governor-General in 1952. However, in 1962 the Conservative Government in Canada was firmly opposed to the entry of Britain into the European Economic Community, and in 1964,



after ninety-seven years of Canadian Federation, the federal government had considerable difficulty in gaining the adoption of a distinctive Canadian flag.<sup>20</sup>

Canada also abolished its system of imperial honours in 1967 and replaced it with an indigenous system.

More remote geographically from Britain and also from the United States, and without an anti-British-French component, the cricket-loving nations of Australia and New Zealand have moved far less quickly in the direction of independence from Britain, (although Australia had appointed an indigenous Governor-General in the 1920's.)

Upon Britain's call to arms, Australia and New Zealand have given similar responses to that of Canada. In the Boer War (1899-1901) in which Britain put down an uprising by the Afrikaners (i.e. those of Dutch origin) there was resistance among those of Irish origin in Australia and New Zealand for similar reasons to that of many French Canadians.

During World War I, all three nations passed acts of conscription, which met with bitter opposition among Irish Catholics in Australia and French Canadians in Canada. This, of course, was the acutest of recent periods of Britain's domination of Ireland, culminating in the unsuccessful uprising of 1916 which was followed by a long drawn-out series of executions. Of course, France was also an ally in World War I, but many French Canadians were isolationist in outlook, believing that France had betrayed its own people in Canada before and after 1759. Indeed, not only did France have very little to do with Quebec, but did not even establish direct relations with Canada until 1855, nearly 100 years after the battle on the Plains of Abraham.<sup>21</sup>

In World War II, conscription was not an issue in Australia, but it was in Canada though to a far less bitter extent than in World War I. In this case, the nature of the aggression of the Axis Powers was far clearer than in the case of World War I, but there was still some support for Vichy's France and the Axis Powers and also for the concept of anti-semitism.

In the post-1945 period, the United States became dominant, and here Canadian independence of will became more clear. However, in some important respects, Australia and New Zealand were not to follow that lead that had been given at both cultural and governmental levels.

Canada of course had long viewed the United States as a threat, with considerable justification, both in the military as well as economic domains. As late as 1933 Defence Scheme No. 1 of the Canadian General Staff was

A war plan the general assumption of which was that there



existed a clear and present danger of attack upon the Dominion of Canada by the armed forces of the United States.<sup>22</sup>

However, in World War II Roosevelt overcame the anti-British sentiment traditional to his nation and came to the defence of Britain, and also signed Ogdensburg Agreement on Common Defence with Canada. However it is significant that when Churchill and Roosevelt met at Quebec City in 1943 and again in 1944 as guests of the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King was none the less excluded from their discussions.<sup>23</sup>

As Canada had been forced to turn to the United States for help, so Australia was obliged to do. The fall of Singapore in 1942 marked the end of British influence in the Asian and Pacific theatres, and Australia's Prime Minister, John Curtin, was compelled to make his dramatic call for help to the United States and also to advise Churchill of his most unwelcome decision to withdraw all Australian forces from the North African theatre.

In the post-1945 period Canada played an active role in the signing of the N.A.T.O. pact in Brussels in 1949, acting as a bridge between America and the Western European powers. Later Canada was to sign the NORAD Agreement with the United States which led to a coordination in depth between the air-forces of the two nations.

Despite its close cooperation with its powerful American neighbour, Canada nevertheless maintained an independent stance on many issues. For example, Canada and Mexico were for a considerable period the only nations in the Americas to keep trading with Cuba, on the grounds that isolation would only serve to strengthen Communist ties, and Canada also traded with China, much to the disapproval of the Americans, at the time when China was not recognised *de jure* or *de facto* by the U.S.A.

In the Vietnam War, Canada refused to accept a military role, though both Australia and New Zealand did. Canada officially condemned the bombing of the North and was a member of the International Control Commission under the Geneva Agreement, which forbade foreign interference in Vietnamese affairs. At the height of the Vietnam War, US President Johnson received a tumultuous welcome in Australia during a visit which was culminated by a public proclamation by Australia's Prime Minister, Harold Holt, of the election slogan 'All the Way with LBJ'. Not only did Australia and New Zealand suffer the military casualties of the War, but also intense internal turmoil of conscience and political expression, the like of which was not of course, seen in Canada.



Like Pirandello's characters in search of an author, Australia and New Zealand have been in search of an international role-model, first seeking cues from Britain, then from the United States, and when both these powers had been overtaken by events which made their leadership less valid, to other mentors and models even if on a somewhat more modest scale. But nevertheless there were many times when New Zealand and Australia were at odds with Britain. In the 1880's both New Zealand and the Australian colonies urged Britain to annex certain Pacific Islands. As Angus Ross has written

When the British Governments proved reluctant to undertake fresh and more or less expensive responsibilities in the Pacific, the New Zealand leaders offered to pay the cost involved and to conduct the administration of Samoa and the other islands they hoped Britain would annex for them.<sup>24</sup>

However New Zealand remained fairly fervent in its loyalty to Britain. As Ross continued

... despite their bitter disappointment over the attitude adopted by imperial authorities to the Pacific questions about which they themselves felt so keenly, the New Zealanders did not allow their loyalty to the Empire to be weakened in any serious way. . . New Zealand politicians were, if anything, more emotionally involved and more easily moved in their imperial loyalties than their opposite numbers in the other self-governing colonies.<sup>25</sup>

On the issue of Home Rule for Ireland the New Zealand Parliament debated but failed to pass a resolution in 1887. In Australia, however, resolutions in favour of Home Rule were passed in 1904 and again in 1919.

Despite the tensions created within the Empire and then the Commonwealth, and those arising over conflicting strategic plans for the conduct of war, Canada, Australia and New Zealand entered the post-World War II period with a strong sense of admiration as well as genuine loyalty to Mother Country, particularly in view of the heroism of its resistance to the Nazi onslaught. But the post-war period was also to see Britain decline from its place as one of the top ten world economies in 1955 to a place in the mid-twenties in 1980, and from a position where in 1960 one-third of the world currency reserves were in pounds sterling to a position today where hardly more than one per cent are.<sup>26</sup>



Thus, as Britain's significance as a trading nation diminished, it was no surprise that it should seek and gain admittance to the European Economic Community in 1973, and so depriving New Zealand farmers, and to a lesser extent those in Australia, of their major market.

Thus, from the perspective of its Pacific partners Australia and New Zealand, Canada is a Commonwealth nation that has developed a considerable body of expertise, at the cultural level and at the policy level, of working closely with, but at the same time maintaining its independence from both its still influential Mother Country and its powerful American neighbour. As a Canadian Prime Minister had expressed it

Canadians, of course, could look on this Anglo-American relationship with the detachment and understanding of a third party who knew well the good and the not so good qualities of both sides, even if we possessed our own share of each from our heritage and our environment.<sup>27</sup>

Canada had been forced to move further along the road to independence within the Commonwealth than the other two dominions, but it is undoubtedly a route they will follow. Australia and New Zealand still retain systems of imperial honours, flags which contain the Union Jack, and 'God Save the Queen' as a partial national anthem. Indeed, Australia is yet to recover from the trauma of the dismissal of its elected government in 1975 by a representative of the British Monarch.

Australia and New Zealand have both been deeply scarred by two events which have dramatically lessened the strength of their two traditional major mentors: the entry of Britain into the European Economic Community and subsequent loss of the major market for primary producers in both countries, and the unsuccessful American intervention in Vietnam which both countries followed and therefore from which they suffered and with 'Agent Orange' are still likely to suffer.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

This deprivation of the traditional twin role-models of British administrative culture and American efficiency, has thus caused a vacancy of role-model which has to some extent fallen upon Canada's shoulders, particularly in the areas of administrative practices. The process is not new, in fact Canada's federation where British Parliament



and American federalism were married was the model for Australia but not New Zealand.<sup>28</sup>

The National Film Board of Canada served as the model for the South Australian Film Corporation, Film Australia, the Tasmanian Film Corporation and other semi-government film producing and marketing boards. The Canadian Foreign Investment Review Agency was the model for Australian Foreign Investment Review Board which had similar guidelines and an exchange of personnel. The Australia Council was closely modelled upon the Canada Council and the Art Bank in Australia is modelled upon the Canadian Art Bank and in addition, the assistant director of the Australian body is at this moment himself a Canadian. Information Australia was based on the now disbanded Information Canada: yet another example of adaptation.

Behind the scenes there are a series of administrative secondments and exchanges within the following Departments: Prime Minister's, Immigration, Attorney-General's and Defence. Both Canada and Australia have considerable defence cooperation through equipment in common such as the F-18 Hornet and the British-built Oberon-class submarine and there is also exchange at the Education Department level of both teachers and administrators, currently running at between 50 and 100 per annum.

At the ministerial level there are also frequent visits between Canada, Australia and New Zealand, not only at federal level but at provincial level also and in last four years two provincial premiers from Canada have made official visits to Australia and New Zealand. In 1978 there was special consultation and cooperation between Canada and New Zealand over the Gleneagles Accord (concerning the role of racism in sport among Commonwealth members) and its implications for the Commonwealth Games.<sup>29</sup> More recently there have been attempts by the New Zealand Treasury to benefit from Canadian efforts at public expenditure control and accountability.

Thus not only does it appear that Australia and New Zealand see Canada as a role-mentor but Canada is willing to accept this role and generously back its acceptance with assistance and resources. At the same time, it should be noted that there are many Canadian initiatives which have not been adopted; neither Australia nor New Zealand have taken any steps towards a unified command of their tradition-bound Armies, Navies or Air Forces. On the other hand, both nations have evolved in some areas further than Canada, for example both have completed the metrication of weights and measures at an earlier date than Canada, and of the two, New Zealand was the first.



## CONCLUSION

Nations do not formulate policy in a vacuum, but are constantly responding to suggestions, transmitted at the cultural level as ideas, plans, thoughts, slogans, or even only insinuations, as they attempt to position themselves best to respond to their changing environments, though often the suggestions are taken up in a more thorough-going process known to sociologists as role-modelling.<sup>30</sup> These processes can be clearly seen in some of the 'old' Commonwealth members. As a gold-bearing Pacific territory, Canada was, like Australia, New Zealand and California, a target area for Asian immigration in the 19th century. This immigration of individuals in substantial numbers led to the system response of restrictive policies in all four target areas, and the development of cultural attitudes of the 'colour bar'. After the alarming demonstration of Japanese military power in World War II and then the emergence of Asian economic power it was necessary to re-evaluate the 'colour bar' policy at both the cultural and administrative levels and in this process Canada assumed the initiating role. Canada also proposed the post-settlement policy of multiculturalism which has been adopted officially by Australia and is gaining acceptance in New Zealand, although New Zealand had already been a pace-setter in race-relations area. In international relations Canada has been 'at the middle' in several important spectra of influence. In the U.K.-U.S.A. spectrum, Canada was compelled by circumstances to carefully evaluate its position on many issues, and so doing was obliged to distance itself from both sources of influence. In indigenising its formerly imperial honours, its governors-general and its flag, Canada has moved further and faster from Britain than either Australia or New Zealand; in its refusal to commit forces in the undeclared war in Vietnam, Canada distanced itself further from the U.S.A. than Australia and New Zealand both which did as a result suffer the consequences of their decision to commit troops in that conflict. But in 1984, New Zealand took the lead from Australia and Canada in reducing diplomatic relations with South Africa by closing that country's consulate in New Zealand, and from Australia in barring the visit of nuclear powered vessels.

With Britain now in the European Community and the U.S.A. concerned with superpower preoccupations, it seems certain that the interaction between Australia, Canada and New Zealand will develop even further as these three fragments of Anglo-Saxon culture attempt to



make meaningful their respective places in the newly emerging world order of relationships through the process of cultural transmission and role-modelling.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

#### A Review Article

IN their search for nationhood since World War II many peoples of Asia and Africa have discovered that independence from colonial rule is only the first and perhaps the easiest step. Once the foreigner has gone, the larger problem looms of creating a viable political society. Divisions and competitive strivings held in check when outsiders controlled affairs are suddenly released. Ethnic, religious and regional differences that seemed less important so long as colonial administrators ruled, boil up after independence and more often than not come to dominate the loyalties and inspire the ambitions that move men in politics.

Seen in this context the prevailing politics in Punjab present a case of futuristic issues being replaced by revivalist and sectarian issues at a critical moment of the development rhythm of the State. The critical tensions and pressures at work in the present socio-political and economic circumstances are entwined in the problems and issues of economic development, modernisation and cultural and populist revivalism according to almost all the contributors to the volume *Punjab Today*\* edited by Gopal Singh. The increasing affluence of the State does not seem to have in any way affected the dominant role of such parochial factors as religion, language and region. A certain fusion and interpenetration between the traditional social system and modern political institutions as well as between the competing values of tradition and modernity is visible here.

#### UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM

Various theories and analysis have been put forward to understand the present turbulent situation. There is a view that it is, primarily, a socio-political phenomenon. Its genesis is in politics not in religion. At the same time it is also pointed out that the religio-cultural factor is an autonomous force. Not to acknowledge this role would amount to the

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\*Gopal Singh (Ed.): *Punjab Today*, Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi, 1987, xii, 397 p., Rs. 300.



vulgarization of one's approach apart from distorting the reality itself. There are also commentators who locate the problem only in economic issues, that too in terms of elite interests. One thing however is agreed upon, that the happenings in Punjab are not a sudden phenomenon, arising from nowhere and becoming a threat to the integrity and stability of the country. There are various factors contributing to the situation. Therefore each contributing factor must be understood properly to grapple with the complex problem. Lately efforts are being made in this direction. One such study was made by this reviewer (*A Study in Democracy, Development and Distortion: Punjab Politics in National Perspective*) sometime back. Gopal Singh's edited work is yet another significant effort in this direction.

The volume is the outcome of a seminar held at the Department of Political Science, Himachal Pradesh University in March 1986 in the wake of the signing of the Punjab Accord and installation of a democratically elected government. The papers not only present an interdisciplinary approach to analyse various issues but also scholars' sense of involvement for restoration of saner politics. Most of the the authors are of the opinion that the basic problem is a consequence of the various paradoxes of the capitalist path of development. Therefore, the Punjab crisis is nowhere near any solution in the absence of deeper socio-economic changes in the social structure as a whole.

#### ASPECTS OF PROBLEM

The volume is divided into four sections each devoted to a different theme. In the first section are included papers dealing with the economic basis of the crisis along with their political ramifications. The second section deals with various aspects of communal politics in Punjab. The third section covers an analysis of various aspects of the September 1985 Elections. The last section discusses political implications of the Punjab Accord. In addition there is a resolution reported to have been adopted by the participants in the seminar.

Four authors—Nirmal Singh Azad, Kumaresh Chakravarty, Javed Alam and Sucha Singh Gill—discussing the economic component of the problem in general, are of the view that it lies in the distorted capitalist mode of development. It has two aspects: one the general discontent because of decreasing returns to capital in agriculture, inadequate credit support to the industrial investor, inadequacy of public investment in Punjab and the expansion of the market in Punjab of agricultural input and consumer products; the second, the bourgeois aspirations among Sikh rural gentry had come into conflict with the bourgeois hegemony of Hindu traders, merchants and industrialists. In this background, the



interaction of the consequences of economic contradictions and the distinct layers of conflict formed among the Sikhs coalesced because of the centralisation of the state power in India.

The controversy related to centre-state relations in essence represents the emerging contradictions between the landed classes, on one hand, and metropolitan and indigenous bourgeoisie on the other. The extent of the conflict depends on the needs and aspirations of various classes and consolidation of class forces at political level. Due to unevenness in the level of agricultural development and differences in the historical evolution of peasant forces in different regions of India, the level and intensity of conflict between the landed classes and the industrial bourgeoisie as articulated in terms of centre-state relations varies from state to state. In Punjab, the urge for a greater share in the benefits of capitalist development has become more difficult because of the gross imbalance between agricultural and industrial development.

#### THE ETHNIC DIMENSION

M.S. Dhimi, K.R. Bombwall, Pritam Singh, Gurbhagat Singh, Harish K. Puri, Gopal Singh, Satya Pal Dang and Jasmail Singh Brar discuss some aspects of communal politics. The line of general argument is that the ethnic dimension core has two facets: one being the Sikh community's imperative to preserve its separate identity in the face of what it sees as the threat of re-absorption into the vast Hindu majority and the other, the failure of the Punjabi Hindus to begin with and after *Operation Blue Star* and the preceding misinformation campaign of other elements in the community, to accept that imperative as a natural desire and to interpret it as threat to the unity of country.

Here it may be mentioned that it is not adequate to say that the recent notion of 'Sikh identity' is only a mystification of economic tensions in which there is a concealed wish of the affluent peasantry to continue enjoying their privileged status and win more freedom to become bourgeois and of the Sikh trader, to do good business with greater monopoly. The present Sikh in Punjab, in fact, conscious of his 'Sikh identity' is a two layered person; in one, preserving his cherished heritage and the other fighting his economic battle according to the class to which he belongs. He, to quote one of the contributors—Gurbhagat Singh—from another of his writings, thinks that he can battle the over-whelming pressures of the system by taking shelter in his identity. It is an illusion. It will be a still greater illusion if he thinks that he can preserve this identity by shrinking into a sectarian organisation or by pressing to return a feudal setup.

Pritam Singh, however, gives a new interpretation to the fundamentalism. He suggests that the dominant tendency in *Damdami Takhsal*



and its ally All India Sikh Students Federation considers the essence of fundamentals of Sikhism to be egalitarianism, democracy and collective decision-making. However, since the ideological source of this tendency is religion, it can be characterised, for want of better nomenclature, as religious-left. The dominance of this religious-left tendency has resulted in entirely new developments in Punjab politics which Pritam Singh says has generally gone unnoticed. This is the cooperation between this dominant tendency in the *Damdami Taksal*—AISSF combine and some Marxist groups like a section of the Revolutionary Communist Party of India and a faction of the Punjab Students Union. But this cooperation is for what? Pritam Singh does not elaborate.

Gurbhagat Singh from a different perspective also tries to bring out the socialist aspects of Sikh tradition and suggests that Punjab has a future only if it moves towards Socialism

#### ELECTORAL POLITICS

In the section on 1985 Elections, P.S. Verma, M.S. Dhimi, Amarjit S. Narang and T.R. Sharma analyse the background of the elections, shift in the party support, emerging paradoxes and some visible trends. Both Dhimi and Narang point out that while the elections and its holding indicated a faith in the democratic resolution of crisis and a vote against terrorism, these also suggest that because of the events of the 1980s communal polarisation among the non-scheduled caste voters has reached its apex.

The section on the Punjab Accord has three papers. Gobinder Singh, while suggesting that the Accord was a timely measure to find a peaceful solution, points that it was not a matching answer to the Punjab problem. According to him, if the Punjab problem is a problem of the alienation of the orthodox Sikh clergy from the management of the Sikh Gurdwaras, a problem of the unemployed youth who have embraced its militant postures and a problem of inimical encouragement of secessionism from abroad, then the Punjab Accord has only a tangential relevance to it. The latter events to a great extent proved this observation correct.

D.R. Chaudhary's paper "Punjab Accord and Haryana" is very important to understand the myth and reality of Haryana's politics and its emerging trends. According to Chaudhary, turmoil in Haryana cannot be understood only in terms of injustice real or imagined. It can be understood only by placing Haryana in the proper historical context. Here Chaudhary suggests that in Haryana too, people are fighting to acquire an identity of their own and to stress their dignity more than territory and waters,



The overall problem as such is structural crisis, the direct outcome of the growing crisis in our socio-economic structure. No substantial relief of the mass of people is possible unless this structure is made to undergo a qualitative change.

On the basis of the readings in this volume, one can say that in Punjab rural-urban dichotomy, class accentuation as a result of the Green Revolution, little scope for the investment of capitalist farmers, the linguistic controversy engineered by communal elements, creation of fear of annihilation of a religious group and political opportunism of the state and central leaders of the major parties, had created the present situation. This has led to exclusiveness and rivalry among the communities. The Hindus have tended to abjure their Punjabi links with the Sikhs and have preferred to emphasise their Hinduness in Hindu dominated India, so much so that they have disowned their mother tongue. On their part, the Sikhs have gone into a narrow religious shell of their own, and the Hindus see in this the sceptre of Khalistan.

Since religion, language, caste and class generally overlap in Punjab, politics in the state has frequently been dominated by communal considerations. Therefore inspite of economic development, which is considered to be an important catalyst for the modernisation of society, religious antagonisms not only persist but also vitally affect political and economic conflicts. In fact, the development and exposure to modernity has led to renewed awareness and a quickening of traditional identity, its reinterpretation and rejuvenation and its consolidation in the framework of new institutions and ideas.

The resolution adopted by the participants and given at the end of the volume, in this context, is a significant document to take note of. It suggests that the nature of capitalist development has given rise to immiserisation of a large section of our people, increasing unemployment, contracting opportunities of education, mounting inflation and ultimately a stagnation in the growth of the economy as such. This has been accompanied by increasing concentration of property in the hands of a few households in the industrial sector and a small percentage of households in the agricultural sector. Alongside this, regional unevenness has been sharpened further, though some regions have changed places in development ranking. All these were felt to be the long-term results of the character of economic development in our country.

In this communalism and chauvinism of various types, alongwith increasing consumerism of a distorted character, have become the major instruments of the ruling elites. Every religious community, minority or majority is being made to perceive the other community as its adversary and competitor in reaping the benefits of development.



The resolution urges to see the Punjab situation only in the aforesaid context. Added to that, however, is the fact that international monopoly capital has gone all out to encourage such a process both *vis-a-vis* India and in the region—South Asia and the Indian Ocean—as a whole. And in this context, the democratic struggle cannot be conceived without demarcating it both from the forces posing these questions from a reactionary viewpoint and thereby perpetuating sectarianism and obscurantism as well as the tendencies within the state power which are leading to centralisation, both economic and political, and the consequent recourse to authoritarian measures.

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## JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

R.C. PILLAI: *Jawaharlal Nehru and His Critics, 1923-47*. Gitanjali Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, viii, 279 pp., Rs. 150.

THIS is a work of outstanding merit on a subject which is of interest to political scientists as well as historians. It studies the ideas and strategies of Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, Subhash Chandra Bose and M.N. Roy in the context of the Freedom Movement from 1923 to 1947. In 1923 Nehru first came to occupy an important position in the Indian National Congress as one of the General Secretaries. The work ends up in 1947 when India attained Independence. The period of a quarter of a century—1923-1947—is most important not only for the role Nehru played but also for the roles of Gandhi, Bose and Roy. Each had his own way of looking at the Freedom Movement, its ideology, its goals and the methodology for achieving the goal. The scope of the study thus covers their thought as well as programmes of action during the most crucial phase of the national struggle.

At the same time, much attention has been devoted to the interaction of their thoughts and actions. Basically, Nehru's desire to serve the country brought him close to Gandhi whose novel method of political action attracted him to the Freedom Movement.

Dr. Pillai has based his work on a thorough study of the sources showing a remarkable balance of judgement.

*Nehru and Gandhi*

Though the title of the work *Jawaharlal Nehru His and Critics*, points to the aim of the author to treat Nehru as the central figure and study three other leaders—Gandhi, Bose and Roy as reacting to him during the period of his study. Gandhi has been given as much attention as Nehru, and rightly so. In fact, the title of the work could as well have been "Nehru, Gandhi and their Critics."

Pillai says that the Congress point of view on social and economic matters represented a compromise between Gandhi and Nehru. This is largely true, though to hold that the socio-economic programme was half Gandhian and half Nehruite may not be very accurate. Though in the early stages of the National Movement Gandhian ideas held the field, in later years the Congress bent more towards Nehru's ideas of Socialism and economic planning. The author also rightly criticises the view that Gandhi, unlike Nehru, regarded politics and religion as inseparable. This is based on an imperfect understanding of Gandhi. He did not actually want to mix religion with politics. His religion was



based on a relationship between God and Man. In his prayer meetings, he appealed to the moral side of religion, which is common to all and hence the appeal was universal. His politics was morality based politics.

Gandhi was always fighting against the divisions of communalism and insisted upon the equality of all religions. So there was no question of his mixing religion with politics. As soon as religion got mixed up with politics, it assumed the character of communalism to which Gandhi was opposed all his life.

The author holds that to Gandhi religion was neither conventional nor traditional. He appropriately quotes Raghavan N. Iyer's, *The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gandhi* and Joan Bondurant's *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*.

There is a great deal of praise in the book of Nehru's political ideas and he comes out as a great intellectual and man of action. Nehru and Gandhi had different paths as political theorists but one will endorse the view that Gandhi's philosophy and method of political struggle was given to the country as a unique contribution and Nehru adopted it as it suited him and the nation at its critical moments.

Gandhi and Nehru differed on many issues in the long course of political struggle but, at last, Nehru agreed with Gandhian logic and method of approach. Nehru was too shrewd to realize that but for Gandhi's support he could not fight the battle for freedom. Gandhi had a greater mass support. Nehru knew it. But Gandhi needed Nehru, as much as Nehru needed him. That is why Gandhi declared that Nehru was his political heir. A Government of India's assessment of the respective positions of the two leaders as made in 1935, is given below (*Home Poll No. 417, 1935, Note by H. Williamson dated 27 September 1935*).

The fact is that Gandhi is really fond of Nehru and likes and admires him more than he does the great majority of Congress leaders. He wants him to remain a Congressman and to stick to him as he is afraid of Nehru drifting to the left more and more and thinks that by getting him to be President and thereby to follow his (Gandhi's) lead in general policy, he will have him as his chief henchman for his next campaign.

#### *Nehru and Subhash Chandra Bose*

Bose did not show any loyalty to Gandhi as a leader or respect his ideas from the beginning when he entered the political scene as early as 1921. Bose writes that when he met Gandhi for the first time in July



1921, he was disappointed and depressed. Bose said about Gandhi when the Swarajists were emerging, that he was no match for C.R. Das. He regarded the birth of the Swaraj Party as a consequence of a rationalist revolt against Gandhism.

From very early days Gandhi did not like the politics of Bose as was clear from the sessions of the Congress during 1927-30. Later, in 1939 the election of Bose as President of the Congress was opposed by Gandhi, resulting in his resignation as President.

The author's assessment that Bose had always been anti-Gandhi is based on facts which he has mentioned in the book. After World War-II, Bose became an ardent supporter of the Axis Powers and advocated an armed rebellion with the help of foreign powers. Here lay the fundamental difference between Gandhi and Nehru on one side and Bose on the other. Even on the Quit India Movement which Gandhi described as "open rebellion", Bose did not find himself in agreement with Gandhi and Nehru. Bose also did not like Gandhi's methods of non-violence.

Nehru's attitude towards Bose was determined from 1930 onwards by personal factors, even though in the Congress sessions during 1927-29, both Bose and Nehru acted together as radical spokesmen of the left wing of the Congress. Gandhi supported Nehru as against the claims of Sardar Patel and Bose for the Presidentship of the Congress session in Lahore in 1929. This marked the beginning of Nehru's closeness to Gandhi and strengthened the estrangement of Bose.

Bose and Nehru had ideological differences on Socialism and Democracy. Bose thought that Nehru's head was with the Left and his heart with the Rights. Whereas Nehru believed in Parliamentary Democracy, Bose favoured an authoritarian set up to be adopted even after the attainment of Swaraj.

Pillai has missed one point in respect of Bose's attitude to Gandhi; Bose, in his Rangoon Radio Broadcast on 6 July 1944, referred to Gandhi as the 'Father of the Indian Nation'. As a patriot he was recognising Gandhi's contribution to India's freedom.

### *Nehru and M.N. Roy*

Nehru and Roy were intellectuals in politics, but, whereas Nehru was flexible, Roy was rigid. Compromise was a part of Nehru's strategy but Roy quarrelled with everybody and found fault with Gandhi and Nehru and completely misjudged certain aspects of their creed and suitability of their programme of action to the Indian situation. So Roy was a critic of both Gandhi and Nehru, and Pillai has brought out very



clearly Roy's critique of their ideology and programme of action. A few aspects may be noted in this review.

Nehru recognised the fact that nationalism was capable of generating necessary mass enthusiasm, Roy did not subscribe to it. He also believed that the Congress was the only potential instrument of mass action. Nehru, following Gandhi's lead, sought the cooperation of all segments to strengthen the Congress. Roy, on the other hand, wanted to throw the national *bourgeoise* out of bounds of the revolutionary masses, so as to enable the struggle to eventually develop into a class war.

The Communists of India had the same approach as Roy. Their thesis essentially is stated in the following paragraph from Roy's writings:

The movement for national liberation will take place on the basis of the struggle between the exploiting and exploited classes. Henceforth the fight for national freedom in India becomes a class struggle approximating to the final stage. (M.N. Roy, *Future of Indian Politics*, p. 95).

During the thirties, Roy joined Nehru in the peasant movement for non-rent campaign. But Roy soon took his own line. Instead of grouping the Congressmen into Socialists and non-Socialists, Roy took the stand that it would be better to effect a division between militant nationalists on the one hand and those who believed in working the constitutional scheme of the Act of 1935, on the other.

Pillai throws light on an important point of controversy regarding the Congress programme. Who was the author of the Karachi Resolution on Fundamental Rights and the National Economic Programme? Nehru, Roy or Gandhi? Some have claimed that the draft was prepared by Roy. But the author adduces sufficient evidence to show that Nehru had prepared the draft in consultation with Gandhi. Actually, Roy himself was not happy with the Karachi Resolution and regarded it a mere instrument of deception.

The author, puts the record straight in respect of Roy's estimate of Nehru in a small booklet entitled *Jawaharlal Nehru*, which was published in 1945. It contained an indictment of Nehru, his Socialism, his politics and methods during 1937-47, his attitude to the Government's August offer and the Wavell Plan. He regards Gandhi as a medievalist and Nehru as a modernist but one who made compromises with Gandhian medievalism. Actually, Roy's criticism of Nehru is entirely that of a Marxist and without any historical foundation.



Pillai's conclusion is that of a scholar of History and Political Science. He says that Roy's criticism of Nehru as a tool of Gandhi, or a demagogue, or as one who readily served the reactionary purpose of the Congress by rationalising the obscurantism of Gandhi, was unwarranted. Pillai is right.

New Delhi.

AMBA PRASAD

GIRISH MISHRA: *Nehru and the Congress Economic Policies*. Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1988, v, 163 p., Rs. 125.

IT is no exaggeration that the impact of Nehru in all spheres of Indian life has been considerably out of proportion with the length of the period for which he presided over the affairs of this country. In many spheres—political, social and economic—the mainstream paradigm in India even today remains Nehruvian. It is interesting that the mainstream line of thinking has after every aberration come back to Nehru's 'blue print', though not to its actual implementation. Even in politics the successful ones are those who can project themselves as 'true' Nehruites.

1989 which is being celebrated all over the country as the Nehru Birth Centenary Year provides the opportunity for a critical appraisal of Nehru—his philosophy and the concrete programme of action which he had. The book by Dr. Mishra is, therefore, very welcome. The title of this book like a lot of other titles is somewhat inappropriate—partly because like all great statesmen Nehru's views on economics cannot be easily isolated from those on related spheres of politics and sociology. Moreover, to associate the impact with one single party like the Congress is inaccurate, because for the period which the book deals with, the Congress Party embraced an entire national movement. However, this is only a matter of semantics and not terribly important.

Mishra's work is divided into seven chapters besides an introduction. The first of these, reviews the emergence of nationalist economic thought prior to Nehru and Gandhi. Here the author draws heavily on the work of noted economists like B.N. Ganguli and historians like Bipin Chandra. It is well known that up to the First World War economic thinking was largely moulded by stalwarts like Nauroji, Dutt, Ranade and Tilak. The main developments during this period were: (a)



the growing opposition to foreign domination in commerce and industry; (b) the acute need for industrialisation and (c) boycott of foreign capital. On the third issue views were not identical as it was felt that a complete boycott meant no industrialisation at all.

Chapter 3 deals mostly with Nehru's appearance on the Indian scene and his ascent to power. The substantive part of the book begins with Chapter 4 which starts with Nehru being elected President of Congress in September 1929 for the Lahore Session. Chapter 4 through 8 deal sequentially with different phases of India's history as far as economic thinking is concerned. The different phases that are delineated are Lahore to Karachi, Lucknow and Faizpore, national planning committee, independence, and Avadi and after.

The treatment of the subject is mostly a mixture of biography, history and development of ideas. The general theme that runs through the entire book is Nehru as a radical. His growing faith in Socialism is traced right from his first and brief visit to the Soviet Union. Of course, Nehru had already been influenced by ideas on Socialism through the Fabian Society. The entire work is well written and systematically documented indicating how the author has painstakingly gone through, sifted and then coherently put together diverse and voluminous material.

Despite its many merits I find the work deficient in some ways. *First*, Mishra has chosen to deal with his subject in a chronological order rather than in an issue-oriented manner. The book would have served a better purpose if it had dealt with issues rather than with the historical evolution of ideas. *Second*, the general approach is one of unqualified admiration rather than of critical appreciation. Though the author minces no words in pointing out how Nehru differed from Gandhi, he makes no critical evaluation of the basic issues. Nehru is by definition taken to be right. The discussion as in many other works shows little understanding of the Gandhian alternatives. *Third*, Nehru has also not been critically evaluated from a Marxian viewpoint. In comparison to Gandhi, Nehru is projected as a modern and radical idealist and in relation to the Marxists he is viewed as being pragmatic and democratic in a western sense. It would have served some purpose to evaluate Nehru either from Gandhian or Marxist viewpoints.

I must hasten to add that the limitations pointed out above are not peculiar to the present work. In fact the overwhelming part of the literature on Nehru has been more concerned with putting him on the high pedestal than with a bold appraisal of his philosophy, declared plan of action and the actual implementation of this plan during his life-time. It is also true that whatever criticism of Nehruism exists was largely from two opposite poles of the Indian ideological spectrum,



namely the Hindu revivalist conservative lobby in different forms at one end and the Communists at the other. But partly because of their relatively small size and mainly because of their dubious credentials their criticism was not taken seriously. In fact, it also petered out by the mid-fifties.

It is not my intention to undermine either the merits of Nehruism or his signal contribution to the evolution of modern India in its several spheres. All the same, I regarded it as unfortunate that Nehru as well as his followers refused to enter into an honest constructive dialogue with Gandhi on several issues of economic, political and social significance to the nation even though Gandhi himself wanted such a dialogue. It is unfortunate because the path for India lay somewhere between those advocated by the two leaders. It may sound strange to claim that during the closing years of the freedom movement Nehru was less willing to listen and be convinced than Gandhi. But, I think this is in fact the case.

Perhaps there is still time to learn from the successes and failures of the nation in economic and other spheres. The Centenary Celebrations of Nehru's birth provide an opportunity to do so. Mishra's book serves a useful purpose by documenting vast material. This needs to be followed up with more work in a spirit of critical enquiry rather than pure eulogy.

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## PEASANT MOVEMENTS

D.N. DHANAGARE: *Peasant Movements in India 1920-1950*. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 254 p., Rs. 90.

IN this book, Professor Dhanagare examines a number of crucial issues of peasant movements of India in the period between 1920 and 1950. It is a perceptive study of the forms and levels of the Indian peasant movements.

The study has been structured around nine chapters. Chapter One provides the theoretical underpinning to this study and thus spells out the frame of analysis. Chapter Two deals with the evolution of the agrarian structure and peasant uprisings from time to time in India before 1920. This was a phase marked by "primordial consciousness" of the peasant—after reflecting their "quasi-nationalist consciousness" as well. This was in response to the prevailing state of the oppressive political system.

In the next Chapter, Dhanagare highlights the role that religion and politics play in agrarian agitation with reference to the Moplah Rebellion in Malabar in the 19th and early 20th Century. The chapter focuses on the process generated by mutual interaction between agrarian, religious and political developments. In many ways, the Moplah Rebellion in Malabar was the outcome of this socio-economic and political process.

Chapter Four is a study on the "Myths and Reality" of the Bardoli Satyagraha. In handling the subject, the author submits that in course of leading the national liberation movement under the Congress, Gandhi "had taken up cudgels on behalf of very minor agrarian issues." Then he goes on to add that Gandhi's "main support came essentially from the better-off sections of the Indian peasantry." The author's formulation lacks perspective. He has failed to appreciate the kind of challenges that Gandhi faced at that time. The primary task before Gandhi was how to mobilize the rural masses on a broad-based front so that the Indian people could be unitedly engaged in the urgent task of national liberation. However, at one point the author does concede that Gandhi did not completely alienate the poor sections of the Indian peasantry. In fact, despite the limited transformation of economic relations between agrarian classes, Bardoli Satyagraha was symbolic of the heightened political awareness among India's rural masses.

In Chapter Five, Dhanagare makes an assessment of the nature of the peasant movements in the Oudh area of UP. Its an analytical account of the role that Congress played in the Uttar Pradesh peasant movements at two different points of time—1920-2 and 1930-2. The UP



peasant movements became part of the broader national struggle for freedom—the non-cooperation movement and civil disobedience movement respectively. However, the author contends that the “poor peasants were left estranged from the mainstream of the national movement.” The reason being, in leading these agrarian movements, the Congress was in reality drawing its strength from the middle and rich peasants.

Chapter Six highlights a very significant aspect of India's struggle for Independence between 1927-47. It deals with the emergence of Left-wing peasant organisations. These peasant organisations drew their sustenance from the model of Marxian Socialism. This aspect has been handled in the context of the Left-wing political activities in India that started with the foundation of the Indian communist Movement in the 1920's, the establishment of Workers and Peasants Party and the emergence of the United Front. During the years following India's Independence, many of the Left-wing peasant organisations merged into some of the national political parties.

Chapter Seven of the book studies the *Tebhaga* Movement in Bengal 1941-47. It deals with the struggle of the share-croppers to retain a two-thirds share of the produce from land for themselves. The movement was designed to reduce the amount of rent the share-croppers paid to the class of rich peasants—the *Jotdars*. Unlike the other Indian peasant movements—which were marked by dominant Gandhian reformist ethos and passive resistance—the *Tebhaga* Movement was the outgrowth of the “Left-wing mobilizations of the rural masses.” Despite the subsequent abolition of the Zamindari system in West Bengal, the grievances of the share-croppers remained unredressed. This constituted the basis of agrarian radicalism—more commonly known as *Naxalism* in West Bengal of the sixties.

In Chapter Eight, the author traces the social origins of the peasant insurrection in Telengana (1946-51). The movement was launched by the Communist Party of India when it decided to move away from the policy of collaboration with the Congress Party and opted for an insurrectionary strategy. Analysing the class character and structural setting of the insurrection, the author starts with an analysis of the system of land control under the Nizam and focuses on the impact of politics on the Telengana peasantry. This was the parameter of the Telengana peasant insurrection. The Telengana peasant struggle was no more successful than other peasant movements elsewhere.

In some ways, the marching of the Indian Army into Hyderabad State territory and the subsequent collapse of the Nizam's forces ensured the end of the peasants insurrection in Telengana. The Indian Police action marked the end of the feudal rule within the state and thus successfully removed the basis of peasant insurrection there.



In the concluding Chapter, the author sums up the findings of his study on the Indian peasant movements in the context of a comparative sociological survey of this problem. In terms of forms and structure of peasant movements, the author puts them under six analytical categories:

(i) Restorative movements; (ii) Religious movements; (iii) Social banditry; (iv) Mass insurrections; (v) Terrorism and (vi) Liberal reformist agitation.

Admittedly, there are ideal types useful for the purpose of analysis, No peasant uprising can be fitted into a single category. Often peasant movements are a mix of these categories, though one particular category may tend to exhibit relatively greater prominence. This aspect has been noted by the author in his concluding note.

In making this study in comparative sociology of peasant movements in India the author has demonstrated his methodological rigour and analytical skill. This is a competent study based on a wide range of materials—English and vernacular.

SHIVAJI GANGULY

M. V. NADKARNI: *Farmers' Movements in India*. Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1987, xx, 237 p., Rs. 100.

RECENTLY the "Tikait Phenomenon" has catapulted the whole issue of the farmers' movement in national perspective. Though the farmers' movement as such was going on for a fairly long time its importance is seen clearly only now. Prof. M.V. Nadkarni has done a commendable job in explaining critically the issues involved in the farmers' struggle, and he rightly comments that the farmers' agitation on "prices and related issues and against the alleged neglect of rural interests" has become important since the late 1970s. But he does not stop here as a critical examination of the causes of these movements follows. Even the class structure of the movement and its relation with other allied movements is reviewed in a scholarly manner. The most interesting part of the study is the authentic understanding of the problem with a number of tables which not only focus on the agrarian structure but also its relation with political power. Nadkarni should have our thanks for enriching our knowledge of farmers' movement.



In post-colonial India, two types of agrarian movements are seen. Firstly the movements against feudal exploitation, which have a historical background and have been going on for a long time. This particular type of movement is well researched by historians and other social scientists. The second type, and very common, are the outcome of intrusion of capitalist methods in Indian agriculture, particularly after the "Green Revolution" when the aspirations of the middle and rich peasants developed into demands for greater share in the economic surplus of the State. As an economist Nadkarni has carefully analysed the economic issues involved in it, and even for students without the base of economics, in a proper sense this book will be worth reading for understanding the second type of agrarian movement on a wider political economic perspective. But the author is right in explaining that these movements do not represent the rural poor, neither they challenge the established state power for change in agrarian structure.

Apart from using a rich wealth of relevant literature the author has taken pains of interviewing a number of leaders and activists to understand these movements properly. He has also talked with government officials to ascertain the 'role of state' in an empirical manner. Not only the students of economics, political science and allied subjects but also senior policy-makers in Third World countries should be interested in this well-researched study. In the first two chapters of the book he has carefully depicted the role of farmers in India's power-structure and national economy. It is a fascinating study of a number of problems faced in modern Indian agrarian politics. The inner contradiction between the demands of the rural elite and established capitalism is also seen here. The author is right in saying "in a country with dominant rural population and adult franchise, the political power base has to be broadened to accommodate this rural elite". The crux of the problem of understanding agrarian movement probably depends on this issue.

In the next two chapters the author examines the areas of farmers' movements. Thus he covers Tamilnadu, Maharashtra, Punjab and Karnataka. His focus is on a lengthy and illuminating discussion on the farmers' movement in Karnataka. The author writes in the Preface that this is done not only for his greater familiarity with State "but also because the movement in Karnataka continues to be most alive and kicking to this date." Here one can politely point out that leaving out Uttar Pradesh altogether and giving little less than needed coverage for Maharashtra is a little perplexing for the reader. But the main contentions of the study are clear. These movements, though not organized by the Left-dominated Kisan Sabha, constitute a political force as price-issues have come to the forefront now. Broadly speaking, affluent peasants formed the base of these movements, and poor peasants, who



are in absolute majority in India, may not get anything worthwhile from the outcome of these movements. The recent outburst of sympathy of the urban elite for Tikait's movement is a pointer to this debate. As the farmers' movement is not challenging the established state structure the ruling class can be tolerant to it. But in case of the poor peasant or agricultural labourer's struggle the state response is always different and harsh. Moreover, the price increase has not always benefited the agricultural labourer; when prices rose, the rate of wages showed a decline. Price-increase always benefits the rich and middle peasants who have a surplus and as a market economy gives them the power to intervene in the social process. Here the class character of the movement becomes clear as the poor peasant has hardly any surplus and thus does not gain much. The author is again right in pointing out that farmers' movement is yet to become a struggle of the rural poor for a better share of the economy. So it will hardly change the rural poor structure.

In the last three chapters the author is more interested in the aspects of political economy of farmers' movements. But for the social scientists, two other important factors are also discussed: one the class character of the movement and its ideology; secondly, its relation with other movements of the rural poor, particularly 'the Dalit Movement'. Next the issue price policy is taken care of. Here, as an accomplished economist, Nadkarni has analysed different factors in price policy. The causes of the grievances of the farmers on price and other related issues are examined here. The terms of trade of agriculture should improve, but does it always help economic development particularly rural development, is the main debate of the study. Sometimes the price incentive may become counter-productive as it generates inflation. So in any case the poorer section of the agrarian society does not gain much out of these movements.

It is a fascinating study, despite the fact that Uttar Pradesh has been left out and a little less than adequate coverage is given to Maharashtra, one of the major facets of Indian political economy. The book is a must for those who want to understand the phase of socio-economic development of India in our time. The role of farmers' movements in Indian polity is clearly explained here. On the whole a stimulating study based on personal experiences and extensive data. The major formulation is correct. Indeed, farmers' movements "have excelled in populist philosophising" while remaining neutral on the crucial question of changing the rural power structure.

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ASHOK MAJUMDAR



T. K. OOMMEN: *From Mobilization to Institutionalization: The Dynamics of Agrarian Movement in 20th Century Kerala*. Popular Prakashan, Bombay, xxii, 268 p., Rs. 150.

THE present work deals with the agrarian movement in Kerala in the twentieth century. The author has very studiously acquired data pertaining to the period. Although he is fully aware of the pre-Independence context and issues, he has chosen to concentrate his attention on the post-Independence development of agrarian movement in Travancore, Kochin and Malabar during 1947-56 and paid special attention to the study in his book on agrarian mobilization in Kerala during the period 1957-72.

In addition to the descriptive account of the agrarian movement in Kerala, Professor Oommen has raised several issues of great significance from the conceptual as well as methodological point of view. In the first place, he categorically states that the pre-Independence agrarian movement was part of the overall struggle against the alien enemy, that is the British, and as such usual temptation to give it a class character has to be avoided since neither the leaders nor the followers of this movement were a homogeneous lot. Since the agrarian movement was a part of the strategy of the nationalist movement, various parties such as the Indian National Congress, Indian Communist Party and so on made their distinctive impression on the agrarian wing for the furtherance of the struggle with the inevitable consequence of loss of homogeneity. Then again, the author points out very correctly that the time period, *i.e.*, the diachronic dimension has to be borne in mind to understand the changing character of the agrarian movement and also of its composition in particular. Further, after attainment of independence and the vicissitudes of the Congress and Marxist rule in Kerala, the agrarian movement was naturally affected by the important concerns experienced by these two parties. As a matter of fact, the agrarian movement clearly reflected the thinking priorities and strategies adopted by these two parties. Inevitably, the very nature of agrarian legislation has also to be viewed in this context and as such the differing alignment of various groups, castes, religion, region and so on has to be continuously borne in mind. The author, therefore, very rightly raises the issues about the efforts made to understand and explain the agrarian movement in terms of certain well worn categories such as class and further draws attention to the importance of providing sociological categories and entities in order to understand what was essentially a political process, ideology as well as experiment. If sociological categories are thus meaningfully utilised, the temptation to use categories without sufficient warrant can be easily avoided. In fact, the raising of the conceptual problem as well as



that of methodology, particularly the significance of a diachronic dimension, should be highlighted as the main contribution of this study. Consistent with the changing fortunes of political parties and particularly the emergence of Marxist rule, Oommen has been able to point out the necessity of institutionalization of the struggle and stresses the point that mobilization and institutionalization are not as inconsistent as normally thought to be. Moreover, the instrument of power, being in the hands of a radical political party, ensures welfarism and thus blunts the edge of struggle in a way. Moreover, the distance between the leaders and the common members and the power of decision-making in the hands of the leaders, robs the movement of its revolutionary zeal.

Every serious student of socio-economic, political development in the country can read this book with great deal of profit. Moreover, a new researcher can learn how to avoid the usual pit-falls of treating any category as homogeneous and would also learn to adequately take note of the diachronic dimensions of social reality.

Professor Oommen deserves to be congratulated for emphasizing the sociological dimensions underlying the agrarian movement.

Pune.

Y.B. DAMLE



## FOREIGN POLICY

SUMIT GANGULY: *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan Conflict Since 1947*. Westview, Boulder and London, x, 182 p., Rs. 225.

THE book under review is a systematically organised study on a very complex area of international relations. Dr. Ganguly attempts to underline the sufficient as well as necessary conditions behind the war in South Asia with reference to a series of conflicts between India and Pakistan. His integrated analytical scheme is structured around three Indo-Pak conflicts—the First Kashmir War, the Second Kashmir War and the Bangladesh War. The study is supplemented by an introductory note, concluding remarks and an Epilogue.

The author contends that the origins of the Indo-Pak conflicts may be adduced to: first, the inability of the colonial power (in this case, Great Britain) to work out a "clearcut plan" for transferring power to the succeeding native power elite; secondly, the crucial role that ethnicity played as an important causative factor in the relevant conflicts; finally and this is a general formulation, the continuing relevance of the use of force in settling matters of inter-state relations.

The author's particular as well as general formulations in comprehending the bases of Indo-Pak conflicts are well taken. However the problem can be understood better if it is examined in the backdrop of wider global conflict. In many ways, the Indo-Pak relationship has been accentuated by the involvement of some of the major external powers in the affairs of the sub-continent.

In doing this study, Ganguly has selectively referred to the roles played by the external powers—US, USSR and China—while focusing on the individual cases of Indo-Pak conflict. May be, it would have added to the further value of the book, if the author had considered the roles of the external powers as part of the integrated analytical reference frame.

Be that as it may, Ganguly has done a very competent study. The Epilogue added to the study provides relevant recent information about developments in the changing South Asian region.

Not only academicians or researchers but also interested observers will be immensely benefited by Ganguly's study on Indo-Pak conflicts.

New Delhi

V. K. ARORA



AZIZUL HAQUE: Trends in Pakistan's External Policy 1947-71—With Particular Reference to People's China. Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1985, xvi, 284 p., Tk. 150/\$ 12.50.

THROUGHOUT Pakistan's existence, one finds security as the key-element in that country's foreign policy framework. Other elements which can be identified are economic and ideological. While emphasis on the latter two has kept on shifting, depending upon the class character of the Pakistani ruling circles and the international context, the former has consistently persisted. On one side, Pakistan perceived a presumed threat to its security and national identity mainly from India, and on the other, it sought parity with India. In order to achieve artificial parity with India, it has sought a countervailing extra-regional power to meddle in the affairs of the Indian sub-continent.

Several books have come out on Pakistan's foreign policy, including those dealing with Pakistan's relations with China. Most of them have analysed Pakistan's foreign policy in a power-framework. Azizul Haque's book is a departure in one respect. It offers an analysis in an ideological framework. Although the author claims to explain the united Pakistan's external policy in 'a multi-layered perspective'; on going through it one finds ideology as a theme writ large. Besides, the author has made a commendable attempt to expose the ineffectiveness of Pakistan's foreign policy to promote national integration.

Islam being the *raison d'être* of Pakistan, Islamic ideology and national ethos were expected to condition its foreign policy. But this was true only for the initial five years. Later, as a result of alignment with the West and close intimacy with China, Pakistan's external policy had an eroding effect on its Islamic ideology. In one of his conclusions the author observes: "Because of Pakistan's close association with Peking there was wide left-socialization in Pakistan and new political values filled the vacuum. The secular values were in conflict with the cherished values of Pakistan's Muslim ideology. Polarisation between the socialist and anti-socialist elements brought about a disintegration in the mental processes of the Pakistanis which meant that Pakistan's Peking-oriented policy had an eroding effect on [its] cherished (although vague) ideology. Pakistan faced many setbacks both on internal and external issues because it had no clear definite direction." (p. 202) He offers a prescription: "If Pakistan would have tried to befriend Moscow and adopted a socialist goal, Pakistan might have been able to avert many reverses later on both in the internal and external spheres." (p. 201)

The author identifies cultural and historical ties between Pakistan and China, Pakistan's India complex and economic interests as contributory factors to Pak-China friendship. He ignores the contribu-



tion of the Russian factor. The cordiality that marked the Pakistan-China relationship after the Sino-Indian conflict is not regarded by the author as a result of collusion between the two countries *vis-a-vis* India. He sees its *raison d'être* in the 'force of events', by observing: "Pakistan kept aside her ideological differences from her friendship with Peking. Existence rather than ideology became more important with her. Her painful experience taught her that the real basis of international amity was the willingness to move together, not ideologies; that 'real politik' rather than ideology should better decide the course of action of a nation." (p. 124) The element of collusion was never absent from Pak-China friendship. But the author tries to convince otherwise. Misappropriation of Indian territory by Pakistan and China through a boundary agreement and to strengthen hold over it by constructing the Karakoram Highway, which was undertaken within two years of the signing of the agreement, and to sabotage Indo-Pak talks on Kashmir, were nothing short of a collusion. Author's mere claimed 'objectivity' is blurred.

The author has made extensive use of Pakistani, Western and Indian sources available to him. Had he been able to tap the publications of the American Consulate General, Hong Kong like the *Survey of China Mainland Press, the Current Scene* and the *Current Background* as well as Chinese publications like *Peking Review* and *People's China*, he would have certainly an insight into the Chinese mind.

On the whole, the book is a welcome addition and offers refreshing reading.

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## GENERAL

DAVID SELBOURNE (Ed.): *In Theory and in Practice: Essays on the Politics of Jayaprakash Narain*. Oxford University Press, Delhi, xii, 236 p., Rs. 120.

THIS volume was projected and started by Jayaprakash Narain's one-time Private Secretary, the late Brahmanand. After his untimely demise in August 1981, David Selbourne of Ruskin College, Oxford, completed the editing of the chapters and wrote the Introduction, in which the "issues" of the book are critically introduced and reviewed. In addition to the Introduction, Selbourne has also contributed a chapter, entitled "A Political Morality Re-examined", in which he not only attacks the Marxist assessment of the JP Movement but also revises his own earlier *An Eye to India* interpretation of it. The two contributions by Selbourne and Geoffrey Ostergaard's chapter, entitled—"The Ambiguous Strategy of JP's Last Phase"—alone would have made the present volume an extremely useful contribution to the study of the theory and practice of contemporary Indian politics. Fortunately, there are other good chapters as well, viz.; George McRobies' comparison of JP's ideas with those of Fritz Schumacher, Madan Handa's comparison of the Gandhian "paradigm" with the *bourgeois* and Marxist "paradigms", Johann Galtung's discussion of the Gandhian theory of conflict and Chadwick Alger's inquiry into the limits of the nation-state and the relevance of grassroots democracy. Though of a different order, the discussions of self-realization, total revolution, etc., by Fred Blum, Chandra Agrawal and Bhola Chatterji are also useful. Also included in the book is a statement, drafted by Raj Krishna and approved by JP, on the socio-economic objectives of the Bihar Movement.

Let me revert to the Selbourne/Ostergaard contributions which I regard to be the central chapters of the book.

According to Ostergaard, JP, in his last phase, was preoccupied with evolving a "revised strategy" of non-violent revolution; while Vinoba Bhave pursued a "purist" strategy of building up a new politics of truth and love by working from *outside* the existing political system. JP followed a "less purist strategy" of transforming the old politics by working from *inside* the system. Among the several elements of this revised strategy were (i) the setting up of *Janata Sarkars* (a system of direct people's government) as an alternative to "party democracy"; and (ii) active engagement in electoral politics. This latter element, Ostergaard says, constituted a "fatal" flaw of JP's strategy of non-violent revolution; it led to the degeneration of the Movement into a simple opposition movement for defeating the Congress Party in the



elections. The principal function of elections, according to Ostergaard, is to bestow legitimacy on elite-rule over the existing system. JP, therefore, according to Ostergaard, should have relied exclusively on non-violent direct action for "total revolution". He concludes that while JP, by adopting the non-violent direct action, made a great advance from Vinoba's strategy, he failed to avoid "a fatal ambiguity" between reform or revolution. According to Ostergaard, the reformist thesis that the exercise of "state power" by a Gandhi or a JP will bring about social-structural change is misplaced because the state is an institution which separates or alienates political power from social power. For men and women to become truly human, we are told, the state must be transcended!

Disagreeing with Ostergaard's "fatal ambiguity" interpretation of JP's strategy, Selbourne maintains that anyone trying to transform a social system cannot fully avoid working from within that system. Hence, with reference to JP, he says "'failure' is not necessarily 'social democracy', just as 'success' is not necessarily a 'revolution'." (pp. 15-16) In the light of the growing realization that liberal democracies suffer from a deficit of economic equalitarianism just as the communist systems deny political freedoms to the people, Selbourne insists that JP's "revised strategy", despite its shortcomings and even "occasional absurdities", must be seen as representing a new spirit of inquiry and action in response to "*actually existing political, economic and social problems.*" While blaming JP for his antiquarian economic philosophy, Selbourne gives him credit for his progressive theory of democracy and revolt based on the "active recovery of certain values."

The Ostergaard/Selbourne chapters are only illustrative of the food for thought contained in this book, which I enthusiastically recommend to all serious students of contemporary Indian politics. There are two glaring printing errors: (i) Geoffrey Ostergaard's first name is mis-spelt in the Table of Contents; (ii) the chapter by Raj Krishna and Jayaprakash Narain end with two incomplete lines from some other work. (p. 131)

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## INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By V. Machwe

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of Social Sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the Social Sciences)

ALEXANDER, P.J. *Police and Elections in India*. Indian Institute of Police Studies, Trivandrum, 1989. xxvi, 189 p. Rs. 125/-

This is a research study of 1987 Kerala General Elections. The author and Hon. Director of the study has been a Professor of Public Administration and has held the post of Inspector General of Police in Kerala. Allegations of misuse of official machinery including the police in the electoral process are frequently made and the role of police has been a serious issue on the eve of 1987 Kerala elections. This study analyses media reactions and responses to issues connected with police and its behaviour, studies the literature produced by different political parties, groups and contestants and contains an analysis of a public opinion survey specially done to elicit responses from a representative section of the electorate on five broad areas, namely, police visibility, police behaviour, police neutrality, police arrangements and lapses. The book contains a number of useful appendices.

BHASIN, Lalit *Issues Before the Afro-Asian World ed. by Dharampal*. ISAAS (Indian Society for Afro-Asian Studies), New Delhi, 1989. viii, 127 p. Rs. 75/-

Collection of addresses by the President of ISAAS to various seminars and conferences during the period 1980-1989. The addresses deal with a wide range of subjects like security, economics, freedom movement, neo-colonialism, press, India's relations with Afro-Asian Countries etc. Topics like nuclear threat to development, economic self reliance and *apartheid* which are of vital interest to Afro-Asian countries are also included in the book.

CHATTOPADHYAY, Subhash Chandra *Subhas Chandra Bose: Man, Mission and Means*. Minerva Associates (Publications), Calcutta, 1989, 153 p., Rs. 120/-.

The book studies the evolution and offers an appraisal of economic, political and social ideas of Bose, who was an outstanding leader of the Indian National Movement. The book studies factors which influenced his early intellectual life, shows how Bose pioneered ideas of industrialisation and planning for free India, discusses his political methods and examines his ideas about Independent India's political set-up. The author also studies Bose's attitude towards women and briefly examines his views on education, religion and communalism,



DEWIT, Michael and Hans SCHENK (Eds). *Shelter for the Poor in India: Issues in Low Cost Housing*. Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1989. xvi, 147 p., Rs. 135/-.

Case studies based on fieldwork, mostly done in Madras, by Dutch scholars and presented at an interdisciplinary conference organized by Working Group on Development Studies, University of Amsterdam, in Amsterdam in Nov-Dec. 1987. These studies deal with specific issues like role of slum leaders in slum upgrading, the position of tenants, socio-economic problems connected with slum improvement schemes, role of non-governmental bodies and with the World Bank's perspective on self-help housing. The book also deals with development of post-war and post-independence housing policies and editors examine in the introduction and in the epilogue the causes of 'failure' of these policies.

GHOSH, Murari and Dilip CHAKRABORTY *Gun, Submarine and Switzerland*. Sribhumi Publishing Company, Calcutta, 1987, 112 p., Rs. 20/-.

The authors who are well-known figures in Bengali press, piece together the stories, the reports and the revelations connected with the Bofors bribe issue and are critical of the inept manner in which the Indian Government handled it. As background material, they give information regarding India-West German HDW (Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft) submarine deal, the role of commission agents, recent growth of defence expenditure, role of tax havens and the working of Swiss banks. A chapter on Fairfax Report (Thakkar-Natarajan Commission Report) and three appendices containing Report of the Swedish National Audit Bureau, Correspondence between India and Sweden and Bofors and sub-marine deal chronology are included in the book.

JASJIT SINGH, (Ed). *Developments in Asia-Pacific Region*. Lancer International (in association with Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses), New Delhi, 1989. xiii, 291 p. Rs. 250/-.

The book contains the proceedings of a seminar held by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi and Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Moscow, in Mar. 1989 in New Delhi. The papers contributed by scholars from both the countries survey the international environment as seen from the perspective of Moscow and Delhi. The editor who has contributed two papers in the section China and Asia-Pacific, in his introduction emphasises the concept of Asia-Pacific Region (with greater focus on China and Japan) as the centre of the world's politico-economic activities and implicitly as a region of potential conflicts and tensions, calls for new approaches to political thinking in dealing with the region and its problems. The papers have been divided into four sections, viz., (i) The setting (ii) China and Asia Pacific (iii) Japan and South-East Asia and (iv) Co-operation for peace and security and contains a report on the seminar.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY, LIBRARY. *India and World Affairs: A Bibliography* (Jawaharlal Nehru Birth Centenary Year). Vol. I: 1947-1957. Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1989. xvii, 307 p.

Students of India's foreign policy have often consulted and much benefited from *India and World Affairs: An Annual Bibliography* which appeared in the journal *International Studies* (New Delhi) since 1958. The aim of the present



project is to cumulate in ten yearly volumes, the annual bibliography. The first volume covers the ten-year period since India's Independence (1947), which was not covered in the journal. It is in two parts. Part one deals with foreign relations of India and related subjects like defence policy, foreign economic policy and relations with international organizations. In addition to books, periodical articles and theses, a variety of sources published in English language such as official gazettes, parliamentary debates, committee reports and documents of political parties have been included. Part two deals with unofficial Indian opinion on world affairs consisting mainly of periodical articles.

KASHYAP, Subhash (Ed.) *Indian Polity: Retrospect and Prospect*. Published for the Allahabad University Alumni Association, Delhi, by National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1989. xii, 203 p., Rs. 200/-.

Papers presented at a seminar in Delhi organised on the occasion of the Centenary Celebrations of the Allahabad University. The seminarist included cabinet ministers, senior civil servants and eminent academics. The papers, divided into four parts, namely, Indian polity and its economic, social and cultural, and political dimensions, reviewed the working of the Indian political system since Independence raised many questions, covered a wide range of opinions and included varied suggestions.

MEHRA, Parshotam, *Negotiating with the Chinese 1846-1987: Problems and Perspectives (with an Epilogue)*. (H.K. Barpujari Endowment Lectures) Reliance, New Delhi, 1989. xiv, 316 p., Rs. 250/-.

The book consists of three lectures delivered by the well-known author, at the North-Eastern University in Shillong. The first lecture surveys China's rich past and its world outlook emphasising the role of Confucian legacy, the importance of Central Asian region in the evolution of China's dealings with regions outside its periphery, the significance of the tributary system and the effect of confrontation between China and the European powers. The second lecture covering the period 1846-1947 gives an account of the border and trade relations between British India and China highlighting the role of individuals and the significance of series of parleys held between two countries. The third lecture is concerned with recent diplomatic relations between the two countries against the background of China's relations with other major powers and points out to the Chinese style of negotiations and to the differences in mutual perceptions of India and China. The book contains two maps and seventeen appendices.

NAGAR, K.S. and Gautam SHARMA (Eds.), *India's Security: Super Power Threat*. Reliance, New Delhi. xiv, 219 p., Rs. 175/-.

Papers presented at a seminar sponsored by the Department of Defence-Studies, University of Gorakhpur in Nov. 1986. The papers which have been written by academics from defence studies departments of various Indian Universities and others, study all the aspects of the problem of India's security caused by induction of sophisticated weapon's system in South Asian region and are divided into following five parts: (i) Strategic environment (ii) Pakistan and arms aid (iii) Nuclear Pakistan (iv) Soviets in Afghanistan and (v) Indian Ocean and covert operations.



PRAMANIK, Nimai *Gandhi and the Indian National Revolutionaries*. Sribhumi Publishing Company, Calcutta, 1984. viii, 356, x p., Rs. 70/-.

With the emergence of Gandhiji on the Indian political scene, the situation changed in British India. The author studies, phasewise (i.e. 1919-22, 1922-25, 1927-29, 1930-37 and 1938-40) the relationship of conflict and cooperation which existed between Gandhiji and the Indian national revolutionaries. In this context he examines issues like cooperation between the two in non-violent non-cooperation movement, revolutionaries' role in Gandhiji-Swarajist controversy and their role in demand for complete independence and other issues. The book, based on Author's Ph.D. thesis, contains appendices pertaining mostly to Hindustan Socialist Republican Association.

RAY, Sibnarayan (Ed.), *For a Revolution From Below: An M.N. Roy Commemorative Volume*. Published on behalf of the Indian Renaissance Institute by Minerva Associates, Calcutta, 1989. 148 p., Rs. 100/-.

Collection of essays contributed on the occasion of the centenary of the birth of the noted revolutionary. Besides an introduction and an article by the editor, who was closely associated with Roy, the book includes articles by scholars of various disciplines and belonging to many countries. Some of the writers are: Huang I-shu (on Chinese source material on Roy), Amlan Datta (on transfer of technology and the universities), Oroon Ghosh (on Roy and planned development), S.M. Ganguli (on Roy and the Indian left), Tajul Hossain (On Roy and Bengali Muslims), Robert C North (on Roy and Third international and on Roy's associates), Agehananda Bharati (Roy, secular integrity and Indian scholastic tradition) and Philip Spratt (Roy's philosophy).

REDDY, C.R. *Research Methodology in Social Sciences*. Daya Publishing House, Delhi, 1987. 212 p.

This book is an introduction to the subject of social science research methodology and explains systematically the various terms and methods involved in conducting research like: types of research, social survey research design, hypothesis, sampling plan, collection, analysis and interpretation of data, presentation of data, statistical methods and report writing.

*ROLE OF OUR DISTRICT IN THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT*. Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan, New Delhi (Distributed by Print and Media Associates, New Delhi), 1989. iv, 820 p. (In English and other Indian languages) Rs. 450/-.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India, suggested the idea of recording and highlighting the significant contribution made by local heroes and freedom fighters in every district of India in national freedom struggle. The book contains 305 prize-winning essays by rural youth on the above theme and is a compilation of hitherto unwritten local history which is based on memories of freedom fighters and village leaders.

SAHA, A.N. *The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*. Edn 4. Eastern Law House, New Delhi, 1989. 56, 1785 p., Rs. 495/-

The first edition of the book which was published in 1978 reflected the significant changes which were brought about by the Civil Procedure (Amendment)



Act, 1976. In the present edition important topics bearing on matters of constitutional importance have been added and digested and an attempt has been made to make the book comprehensive in treatment of topics covered.

SAMANTA, R.K. *Management in Agriculture and Rural Development*. UDH Publishing House, Delhi, 1989, 147 p, Rs. 125/-.

To meet the growing demand for food and with increasing professionalisation of agriculture, the need for study of management of agriculture and rural development has been felt. This book dealing with the subject is divided into eight chapters. The first two chapters deal with management in general. The next two chapters deal with agricultural research project management and with technology transfer. Chapter five deals with management of rural development programme. The remaining three chapters deal with communication strategies for agricultural development, with rapid rural appraisal method to learn about rural conditions and with population planning and rural communication. The author teaches at the National Academy of Agricultural Research Management, Hyderabad.

SEN, Rathindra P. *Demographic Change and Levels of Living: Studies in National Development in an International Context*. Daya Publishing House, Delhi, 1989, vi, 157 p., Rs. 140/-.

Rapid population growth has adverse effects on developing country's economic, social and political life. This book examines the population problem of India from an economic perspective. Quoting figures relating to India's 1981 population census and to India's successive five years plans the author deals with the following topics: Age composition of the population and its economic consequences, Incomes and levels of living, Development of human capital (health, education, housing, recreation etc. facilities), Question of food and its distribution to all sections of society, Malnutrition, Passage to industrialization, Pace of urbanization and Population planning choices for India.

SEN, S.N. *History of the Freedom Movement in India (1857-1947)*. Wiley Eastern Limited, New Delhi, 1989, 191 p., Rs. 50/-.

The book, meant for younger generation, provides an outline of the history of freedom movement in India. Brief notes on lives of freedom fighters and leaders, associations and political parties, agitations and movements and on important events are given. Inclusion of appendices containing biographical notes, chronological list of Indian National Congress Sessions and Congress Presidents, list of governors-general and viceroys and chronology of important events is a useful feature of the book.

SHABBIR KHAN, Mohammad. *Jawaharlal Nehru: The Founder of Modern India, The Architect of Indian Planning for Political, Economic and Social Structure*. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1989, xvi, 332 p, Rs. 300/-.

The book deals with the impact of Prime Minister Nehru's ideas on the planning process in India; it reviews the working of the first three Five Year Plans with reference to: Planning strategy, Achievements and failure and Role of foreign aid and examines the problems of economic development during this period. The author studies in detail the factors that shaped Nehru's ideas and discusses the



different perspectives of Gandhiji and Nehru with regard to role of religion and science and regarding other social, economic and political issues. The author, a former professor of economics, has been a visiting professor abroad and has written several books on Indian and Islamic economics and on economic theory.

SOOD, Krishnalekha *Trade and Economic Development: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh*. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1989, 228 p., Rs. 195/-.

Developing countries have realized the need for regional cooperation for economic development. The present book studies the potential for regional cooperation among the three countries of the Indian subcontinent. It examines their foreign trade systems and their position in world trading arena. The author, a member of Indian administrative service, has discussed the question of trade and economic development by presenting ample statistical data regarding general economic indicators of these countries and their comparison with world indices and by giving salient features of the economies of each of these countries in terms of trade, industrial performance, development policies, resources, export potential and import requirements.

VISHNU PRABHAKAR *Awara Messiah: A Biography of Sarat Chandra Chatterjee* tr. by Jai Ratan. (New world literature series, 22). B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1989, xxvii, 393 p., Rs. 95/-.

Biography of the well-known Bengali novelist by another well-known Hindi writer. The author obtained the source material through meetings with individuals who were associated with Sarat Chandra, through Sarat Chandra's own writings and by making use of reminiscences and writings of Sarat Chandra's contemporaries. He also visited places associated with Sarat Chandra's name.





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